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Abstract 
 
The Bush Doctrine was constructed over a period of approximately eight months in response 
to the events of 9/11.  Beginning with the 2002 State of the Union address, President George 
W. Bush laid the foundation for a ―newly‖ proactive strategy of counter-proliferation.  In one 
of his first hints of prevention, Bush stated that he would ―not stand as peril draws closer and 
closer... and permit the world‘s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world‘s most 
destructive weapons.‖  Six months later, in a commencement speech to the US Military 
Academy at West Point, Bush elaborated upon the burgeoning national security doctrine, 
emphasising the need for a more forward-thinking strategy that would not wait for ―threats to 
fully materialize.‖  The West Point speech expressed Bush‘s new world concerns in which 
the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile 
technology, enabled ―weak states and small groups‖ to attain a catastrophic power to strike 
―great nations.‖  Finally, in September 2002, the White House released the National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America – the most comprehensive articulation of the Bush 
Doctrine, officially adopting preventive self-defense as a key element of the United States‘ 
security strategy.  Here, Bush justified the use of preventive war and argued that the greatest 
threat that the US faced were entities at ―the crossroads of radicalism and technology.‖  He 
emphasised that the US must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before 
they were able to threaten or use WMD against the US and its allies.  As arguably the most 
defining words of his doctrine, Bush argued that ―where uncertainty remains as to the time 
and place of the enemy‘s attack – to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, 
the US, if necessary, will act pre-emptively.‖  
 
This thesis will argue that despite its portrayal as a bold departure, the Bush Doctrine was not 
the ―new‖ or ―revolutionary‖ policy instrument that many at the time portended.  Firstly, the 
National Security Strategy of 2002 and its pursuit of strategic counter-proliferation policies as 
a means to thwart potential and real adversaries, has been a core pillar encompassed in each 
National Security Strategy release since its inception in 1986/87.  Secondly, the most 
controversial aspect of the National Security Strategy pertaining to its official adoption of 
―pre-emption‖ or preventive war, has long pervaded the strategic thought of policy-makers, 
officials, and military planners at the highest levels of the US government.  Indeed, the 
historical record of the last half century is replete with examples of high level US decision-
vii 
 
makers who seriously considered the undertaking of major unilateral preventive military 
actions as a means to thwart the proliferation of nuclear weapons by rogue states.  Since the 
dawning of the nuclear era in 1945, at least three other US Presidents have faced the potential 
threat of nuclear technology in the hands of states hostile to their respective Administrations 
and each dealt with the same decision problem faced by President Bush in 2003: whether or 
not to use preventive military force as a means to counter the proliferation of such nuclear 
weapons technology.  It is evident that prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US had 
considered waging preventive war against no less than three additional rogue proliferators, 
only to be inhibited in most instances by practical factors.  While it was clear that the Bush 
Doctrine certainly qualified as a preventive war policy, it is apparent that the adoption of this 
strategy did not mark a total break with American tradition or earlier Administrations.   
 
However, while this thesis attempts to dispel arguments pertaining to the supposed 
―revolutionary,‖ ―new,‖ or ―radical‖ nature of the Bush Doctrine – based on comparisons 
with previous National Security Strategies and previous Administrations‘ penchant for 
prevention – it is apparent that what was ―new‖ and ―bold‖ about the Bush Administration‘s 
National Security Strategy of 2002, was its willingness to embrace ―innovation within the 
armed forces... experimentation with new approaches to warfare... exploiting US intelligence 
advantages, and taking full advantage of science and technology,‖ to the extent, of 
reinvigorating a nuclear option that could ultimately be used in the context of preventive war.  
In its punctuating and reaffirming policy instruments (released over the course of Bush‘s 
tenure), the doctrine revitalised the role of nuclear weapons in US security strategy and 
signified the broader quest of the Bush Administration to upgrade US offensive forces, 
deploy missile defenses, reconfigure communications and satellite systems, and overall, 
revitalise the nuclear complex.  As the second argument of this thesis asserts, the nuclear 
policy releases and documental arteries espoused by National Security Strategy cultivated 
and defined such resurgence, providing the platform for the ―quiet revolution‖ undertaken by 
the Administration during the period of 2002-2008.  While it had taken the Clinton 
Administration ten years to dismantle more than 11,000 warheads in the 1990s, it would take 
more than fifteen years to dismantle less than half that number under Bush‘s plan.  In fact, the 
Bush Administration dismantled the smallest number of nuclear weapons of any US 
administration since 1957.  Its rationale was straightforward: the focus was never on 
disarmament but rather on extending the life of the remaining stock of nuclear weaponry.  
Indeed, it was this deeper policy within the Bush Doctrine that foreshadowed a new nuclear 
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era in which the Administration pursued a path of retaining and upgrading its enormous 
strategic arsenal as a means to defeat any adversary.  It was an option that placed nuclear 
weapons back to the fore; ―a strategy‖ that endorsed ―repeated regime change... a large, 
steadily modernizing nuclear arsenal‖ and ―a determination to retain nuclear weapons 
forever.‖ 
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To President George W. Bush, September 11, 2001 represented ―the Pearl Harbor of the 21st 
century;‖1 the first salvo in a new era of asymmetrical warfare against an enemy bent on the 
abolition of Western culture and a willingness to go to extremes as a means to attain that 
objective.  Moreover, it signified an epic struggle between darkness and light.  ―We are here 
in the middle hour of our grief,‖ Bush acknowledged at a national prayer service held on 
September 14.  ―But our responsibility to history is already clear:  to answer these attacks and 
rid the world of evil.‖2  Six days later, speaking to a joint session of Congress, he expanded 
on this theme, declaring, ―What is at stake is not just America‘s freedom.  This is the world‘s 
fight. This is civilization‘s fight... Great harm has been done to us.  We have suffered great 
loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment.  Freedom and 
fear are at war.  The advance of human freedom – the great achievement of our time, and the 
great hope of every time – now depends on us.  Our nation – this generation – will lift a dark 
threat of violence from our people and our future.  We will rally the world to this cause by 
our efforts, by our courage.  We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail… The 
course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain.  Freedom and fear, justice and 
cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.‖3  The 
grand work awaiting America in a dawning age of ―new and uncertain challenges‖ demanded 
bold action
4
 – this was to come in the form of the National Security Strategy of 2002.5 
 
                                               
1 Dan Balz and Robert U. Woodward, ―America‘s Chaotic Road to War: Bush‘s Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in 
First Frantic Hours After Attack,‖ The Washington Post, January 27, 2002. 
2 George W. Bush, speech given at Washington National Cathedral for victims of terrorism, recorded by the Federal News, 
published in ―After the Attacks,‖ New York Times, September 15, 2001. 
3 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, September 20, 2001, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov>. 
4 Mark G. Mantho, ―The Bush Doctrine: Origins, Evolution, Alternatives,‖ Cambridge, MA: Guest Publication, The Project 
on Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute, April 2004, p. 3. 
5 The National Security Strategy is a document issued at various intervals by the Executive branch of the government of the 
United States for Congress.  It illustrates and defines the major national security priorities of the United States of America 
and how the Administration of the day will undertake and execute such priorities in accordance to what it deems to be its 
national interest objectives.  The legal structure for the National Security Strategy is defined in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.  
The document is intentionally broad in content and depends on elaborating the guidance provided in supporting documents.  
In specific relation to this thesis: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America of 2002 was a 36-page 
policy document (including cover and introduction) released by the White House.  The nine-chapter document began with a 
different quote taken from a series of post-September 11 speeches given at West Point; the National Cathedral in 
Washington DC; Berlin, Germany; Monterrey, Mexico; the Inter-American Development Bank, Washington DC; and a Joint 
Session of Congress, Washington.  The National Security Strategy began with an ―Overview of America‘s International 
Security Strategy‖ (Chapter 1) and from there moved into the following: Chapter 2: ―Champion Aspirations for Human 
Dignity;‖ Chapter 3: ―Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our 
Friends;‖ Chapter 4: ―Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts;‖ Chapter 5: ―Prevent our Enemies from Threatening 
us, our allies, and our friends, with Weapons of Mass Destruction;‖ Chapter 6: ―Ignite a New Era of Global Economic 
Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade;‖ Chapter 7: ―Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and 
Building the Infrastructure of Democracy;‖ Chapter 8: ―Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with Other Main Centers 
of Global Power;‖ and Chapter 9: ―Transform America‘s National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and 
Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century.‖ 
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The release of the National Security Strategy on September 20, 2002, was perceived by many 
as marking an end of an era in US security strategy and policy.  In response to the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the previous structures of US security strategy were replaced with 
an explicit strike policy that advocated both the identification and destruction of terrorist 
threats ―before‖ they were able to ―reach‖ the United States‘ ―borders;‖ even if this entailed 
acting alone and using what was referred to as ―pre-emptive‖ force.6  Indeed, the increasing 
possibility that chemical, nuclear and biological weapons could fall into the hands of stateless 
terrorists, coupled with the al Qaeda attack in the United States, signalled the breakdown of 
the strategy that had served the United States military throughout the Cold War and first 
phase (1991-2001) of the post-Cold War period.  Having witnessed firsthand the terrible 
destruction wrought by a comparatively small and unsophisticated attack upon New York, 
Washington DC and rural Pennsylvania, the Bush Administration unanimously proclaimed 
that keeping the ―world‘s worst weapons out of the hands of the world‘s worst people‖ would 
henceforth become Washington‘s highest national security priority for the foreseeable future.  
True to its word, President George W. Bush and his Administration formalised and put into 
action a grand strategy designed to compensate for America‘s new-found perception of 
vulnerability and more importantly, prevent a ―nuclear 9/11.‖7   
 
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America declared that: ―WMD – 
nuclear, biological, and chemical – in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represents 
one of the greatest security challenges facing the US‖ and ―Our enemies have openly 
declared that they are seeking WMD... the US will not allow these efforts to succeed... as a 
matter of common sense and self defense, America will act against such emerging threats 
before they are fully formed.‖8  These two assertions – that the most defining threat to the 
national security of the US was the synthesis of ―radicalism and technology‖ and that the US 
would view these developments as unacceptable and act to destroy them ―before they are 
fully formed‖9 – provided the basis for what would become known as the ―Bush Doctrine.‖  
Not without its critics, the so-called Bush Doctrine came to dominate American political 
discourse from 2002-04 as political leaders, academic scholars and the general public debated 
                                               
6 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington DC: The White House, 
September 2002, p. 2. 
7 Brian M. Jenkins, ―A Nuclear 9/11?‖ This commentary appeared on CNN.com on September 11, 2008 and was republished 
on the RAND Corporation website: <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2008/09/11/CNN.html>. 
8 Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, Opening Letter. 
9 Ibid.; George W. Bush, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCWMD), Washington DC: The 
White House, December 2002, p. l. 
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the implications of this broad and contentious initiative.  Whereas its proponents contended 
that an urgent and unprecedented threat revolution was well under way that required new and 
proactive approaches to using force, critics of the Bush Doctrine viewed its espousal of 
preventive war to combat the proliferation of WMD as further testimony to American 
unilateralism, and perhaps most importantly, a fundamentally unnecessary departure from the 
traditional, time-tested strategies of deterrence and containment that figured so prominently 
in defeating the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
10
  Their political inclinations 
notwithstanding, both sides agreed that the Bush Doctrine was something entirely ―new,‖ 
―candid,‖ ―bold‖ and ―revolutionary,‖ a radical doctrine the likes of which the world had 
never seen and ―perhaps the most sweeping reformulation of US strategic thinking in more 
than half a century.‖11 
 
However, as this thesis will argue, despite the frequent portrayal of being radically ―new‖ or 
―revolutionary,‖ the Bush Doctrine in terms of counter-proliferation and preventive war 
advocacy was not the era-defining departure that many at the time portended.  In fact, it will 
become evident during the course of this thesis that such concepts have been very much 
implicit in previous US Administrations; in the context of both their National Security 
Strategy releases and preventive war considerations extending back to the end of World War 
II.  However, if notions of assertive counter-proliferation and preventive war considerations 
were neither new nor groundbreaking, then what was defining about the Bush Doctrine?  In 
simple terms, and as the second assertion of this thesis will attest, the ―doctrine‖ attempted to 
place the nuclear option back to the fore; a defining policy that punctuated, updated, refined 
and reaffirmed its core nuclear endorsement through the unclassified and classified 
documents it spawned.  These nuclear arteries may be viewed as formal policy that 
established a willingness to use nuclear weapons on states deemed to be adversarial.  Indeed, 
the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, the 2005 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review, the 2006 Strategic Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0 and, in recent 
times, the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, clearly illustrate that the Bush Doctrine 
cannot be defined as a doctrine of preventive intervention alone, but rather as one that 
advocated nuclear weapons reactivation.  It is these documents that signified the Bush 
Administration‘s push to modernise US offensive forces, deploy missile defences, upgrade 
                                               
10 Jeffrey Record, ―The Bush Doctrine and the War with Iraq,‖ Parameters, 2003, 33: p. 9. 
11 John L. Gaddis, ―A Grand Strategy of Transformation,‖ Foreign Policy, 2002, 133: pp. 50-57. 
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communication and satellite systems, and overall, reinvigorate the nuclear military complex.  
Behind the Administration‘s rhetoric of post-Cold War restraint were expansive plans to 
revitalise US nuclear forces and all the elements that supported them within a so-called ―New 
Triad‖ of capabilities, combining nuclear and conventional offensive strikes with missile 
defences and nuclear weapons infrastructure.
12
  Not since the escalation of the Cold War in 
Ronald Reagan‘s first term was there such an emphasis on nuclear weapons in US defence 
strategy.  Indeed, the deeper policy within the Bush Doctrine, carried forward in 
abovementioned policy documents, foreshadowed a new nuclear era in which the once-
termed ―weapon of last resort‖ returned as a distinctly usable, and ―necessary‖ tool, or, what 
Russell and Wirtz described as a ―quiet revolution‖ in which the spectre of nuclear 
reactivation was pursued both arrogantly and assertively.
13
 
 
Research Questions 
It was the controversy surrounding the National Security Strategy of 2002, as well as the 
subsequent War in Iraq shortly after, that sparked this researcher‘s initial interest in this area 
of study and research.  After the first six months of research, however, it became apparent 
that the Bush Doctrine was not necessarily the radical departure that many in the academic, 
policy and commentary areas had subscribed to.  As a result, this led to the following 
question framework in which the research component of the thesis was to be undertaken. 
 
Main Question No. 1: 
To what degree have the core elements of the National Security Strategy of 2002 (―Bush 
Doctrine‖) been implicit in US foreign policy since 1945? 
 
As a means to address the above question, the researcher refined this approach by addressing 
the following sub-questions: 
 
 To what extent have the core elements of the National Security Strategy of 2002 
(―Bush Doctrine‖) been implicit in US foreign policy in comparison to previous 
National Security Strategies since their inception in 1986 under the Goldwater 
Nicholls Act?  
                                               
12
 National Resources Defense Council, ―Faking Nuclear Restraint, The Bush Administration‘s Secret Plan For 
Strengthening US Nuclear Forces,‖ February 13, 2002, available at <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/restraint.asp>. 
13
James Russell and James Wirtz, ―A Quiet Revolution: The New Nuclear Triad,‖ Strategic Insight, May, 2002, I(3), pp. 1-
10. 
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 To what degree has the Administration‘s advocacy of pre-emption – the most defining 
assertion of the National Security of 2002 – been evident, considered or even implicit 
in previous post-war Administrations?   
 Was the Bush Doctrine actually advocating pre-emption in the true definition of the 
word? 
 If the Bush doctrine was indeed an instrument/policy/security strategy that was not 
overly new, then how did it distinguish itself, if at all?   
 In simpler terms, if it was apparent that the Bush Doctrine was not overly ―new‖ in 
comparison to previous National Security Strategies or its advocacy in acting 
preventively, then what was the defining or significant aspect of the ―doctrine?‖   
 
It became apparent during the research process that the Bush Administration was not just 
advocating prevention in its National Security Strategy of 2002, but was also attempting to 
align the nuclear option within this proactive and assertive framework.  This led to the second 
main question.   
 
Main Question No. 2: 
To what extent did the Bush Doctrine attempt to reinvigorate the nuclear option? 
 
This was also articulated and refined into smaller sub-questions: 
 
 How was the Bush Administration different to that of the Clinton Administration in 
terms of maintaining the significance of nuclear weapons in the US security strategy 
framework? 
 What documental evidence suggests that the assertive posture of the National Security 
Strategy engendered further nuclear development? 
 To what extent can the nuclear option be deemed as the ―radical‖ aspect of the Bush 
Doctrine? 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Research Approach 
The purpose of this thesis is to address the above questions and provide an examination of the 
National Security Strategy of 2002.  It has involved an approach encompassing qualitative 
research, document analysis, content analysis and historical research.  In recognising the 
words of Norman A. Graebner, ―the significant milieu‖ of such an analysis seeks to delineate 
the constellation of ideas, beliefs and assumptions (both spoken and unspoken) that inform 
foreign policy, and in the case of this thesis, the National Security Strategy of 2002.  It seeks 
to provide an insight into the major US policy instruments that have been the bases of 
historical and contemporary interpretation during the past ten years specifically, but will also 
engage those dating back to the beginning of the Cold War period.
14
  Such documents, not 
unlike the pamphlets examined by the Harvard historian Bernard Bailyn in The Ideological 
Origins of the American Revolution forty years ago, reveal an exceptional ―explanatory‖ 
quality, ―not merely positions taken but the reasons why positions were taken,‖ the very 
motives, intentions and values that informed America‘s world view.  These documents, as the 
following chapters attest, indicate – in the words of Bailyn about an earlier time of troubles – 
―that there were real fears, real anxieties, a sense of real danger behind those phrases and not 
merely a desire to influence by rhetoric and propaganda the inert minds of an otherwise 
passive populace.‖15   
 
Indeed, the events of 9/11 reflected such ―fears,‖ but more importantly, ―accelerated the use 
of force‖ paradigm, at least in the minds of the Administration and, most importantly, the 
President.  The Bush Administration‘s presentation of the September 11 tragedies did not 
merely define the airliner attacks as criminal activities; rather, these actions were presented as 
acts of terror intended to precipitate a global war effort.  Bush‘s identification of the terrorist 
attacks as an act of war framed the ―question of culpability‖ and the ―propriety of war‖ for 
public acceptance.
16
  By defining the attacks on 9/11 as acts of war, Bush expanded the frame 
for interpreting these symbolic actions and challenged the adequacy of existing laws and 
policies constraining an appropriate government response.  The declaration of war was 
necessitated by what Bitzer detailed as the constraints of the rhetorical situation – the 
                                               
14 Joseph M. Siracusa, Into the Dark House: American Diplomacy and the Ideological Origins of the Cold War. Claremont, 
CA: Regina Books, 1998, Foreword. 
15 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967, 
pp. vi, ix. 
16 Robert L. Ivie, ―Profiling Terrorism: From Freedom‘s Evil Enemy to Democracy‘s Agonistic Other,‖ paper presented to 
the 88th Annual Convention of the National Communication Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, November 22, 2002, see 
<http://www.indiana.edu/-ivieweb/profiiingterrorismnca.htm>. 
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complex web of people, events, objects, relations and actions that bear upon rhetorical 
action.
17
  With the perpetrators‘ remains missing among the debris from the four airplanes, 
the Bush Administration sought a rhetorical means to quell public concerns about the 
imminent risk of future attacks.  By directing ―the full resources for our intelligence and law 
enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice,‖ Bush told the 
American public his strategy to ―make no distinction between the terrorists who committed 
these acts and those who harbor them.‖18  The act of naming the war that the Bush 
Administration would fight enabled the President to avert a legal strategy in pursuit of a 
military response, and thereby attempted to control the political agenda toward public 
acceptance of the commitment to warfare.  The language of modern warfare enabled the 
President to inculcate a sense of urgency among the public that stood by its Commander-in-
Chief.  Historically, such war rhetoric is distinctive because it functions to prepare the public 
for a total commitment, and for sacrifice in support of broader Presidential initiatives.
19
  As 
argued by Condit and Greer: 
 
War constitutes the ultimate measure of the value of a community to its 
members because each war asks whether the survival of the community in its 
particular form is worth the sacrifice of all that each individual person owns, is, 
or can be.  With its emphasis on tragedy and its request for sacrifice, war 
rhetoric also functions to define a problem and to select a screen for public 
interpretation of an event.
20
 
 
The pervasive symbols of insecurity in public discourse after 9/11 helped the President 
request appropriations from the Congress to respond to the new security crisis, and forge a 
new consensus in concordance with the nation‘s domestic needs.  Political scientist Arnold 
Wolfers argued that the symbol of security ―suggests protection through power and therefore 
                                               
17 Lloyd F. Bitzer, ―The Rhetorical Situation,‖ Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1968, 1: pp. l-14. 
18 Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, p. 5.  
19 Denise M. Bostdorff, The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
1994;  Denise M. Bostdorff and Daniel J. O‘Rourke, ―The Presidency and the Promotion of Domestic Crisis: John 
Kennedy‘s Management of the 1962 Steel Crisis,‖ Presidential Studies Quarterly, 1997, 27(2); Richard A. Cherwitz and 
Kenneth S. Zagacki, ―Consummatory Versus Justificatory Crisis Rhetoric,‖ Western Journal of Speech Communication, 
1986, 50; Richard A. Cherwitz, ―Lyndon Johnson and the ‗Crisis‘ of Tonkin Gulf: A President‘s Justification for War,‖  
Western Journal of Speech Communication, 1978, 42; Robert L. Ivie, ―Presidential Motives for War,‖ Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, 1974, 60; Robert L. Ivie, ―The Metaphor of force in Prowar Discourse: The Case of 1812,‖ Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, 1982, 68; Robert L. Ivie, ―Fire, flood, and Red Fever: Motivating Metaphors of Global Emergency in the Truman 
Doctrine Speech, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 1999, 29; Theodore O. Windt, ―The Presidency and Speeches of 
International Crisis: Repeating the Rhetorical Past,‖ Speaker and Gavel, 1973, 11; Theodore O. Windt, ―The Presidency and 
Speeches on International Crises: Repeating the Rhetorical Past,‖ in Theodore O. Windt and Beth Ingold (eds), Essays in 
Presidential Rhetoric. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 1983. 
20 Celeste M. Condit and April M. Greer, ―The Particular Aesthetics of Winston Churchill‘s ‗War Situation I,‘‖ in J. Michael 
Hogan (ed.) Rhetoric and Community: Studies in Unity and Fragmentation. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1998, p. 167. 
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figures more frequently in the speech of those who believe in reliance on national power than 
of those who place their confidence in model behavior, international cooperation, or the 
United Nations to carry their country safely through the tempests of international conflict.‖21 
Wolfers also contended that security works as an ambiguous symbol, and may function ―as a 
cloak for other more enticing demands,‖ where ambitious politicians may consider ―no price‖ 
for security to be ―too high.‖22  He maintained that ―this is one of the reasons why very high 
security aspirations tend to make a nation suspect of hiding more aggressive aims.‖23  In 
evaluating the nature of security policies, Wolfers argued that attention should be paid to the 
―specific character and the particular circumstances‖ of the ways in which security is 
established to subvert, reaffirm and protect national values.  By analysing and exploring the 
documental policy instruments posited in the aftermath of these ―particular circumstances,‖ 
an understanding of the Bush Administration‘s preventive aspirations, and ultimately, pursuit 
of the nuclear option, can be obtained.
24
  As Balz and Woodward observed, ―the President 
and his advisers started America on the road to war that night [i.e., 11 September 2001] 
without a map.  They had only a vague sense of how to respond [to the 9/11 attacks], based 
largely on the visceral reactions of the President.  But nine nights later, when Bush addressed 
a joint session of Congress, many of the important questions had been answered.‖25  Through 
a series of incremental and ad hoc decisions and measures taken in the aftermath of this 
terrorist outrage, the Administration gradually laid out an international paradigm on the right 
to use military force in the global war on terror. 
 
While the National Security Strategy was the main articulation of this approach, other policy 
statements also contributed to the Bush Doctrine: the National Strategy to Combat Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (2002); the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003); and 
supplementing these were Presidential remarks and other Administration officials‘ comments, 
such as President Bush‘s address to the Joint Session of Congress (September 20, 2001); his 
State of the Union Address (January 29, 2002); and his Graduation Speech at West Point 
(June 1, 2002).  This thesis will begin with these ―unspoken and spoken‖ instruments and 
move into the other documental and policy instruments that the Bush Doctrine both 
engendered and resuscitated.  In simple terms, it will examine: the development and 
                                               
21 Arnold Wolfers, ―National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,‖ Political Science Quarterly, 1952, 67(4): p. 483. 
22 Ibid., p. 488. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Balz and Woodward, ―America‘s Chaotic Road to War.‖ 
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implementation of the policies for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (as reflected in each National Security Strategy since its inception in 1986/7); the 
historical and contemporary debates pertaining to the definitions associated with prevention 
and pre-emption; the extent to which prevention has been seriously considered an option by 
previous Administrations as reflected in the declassified documents, speeches, memoirs, and 
interviews posited over the course of three Presidential Administrations; and the extent to 
which the National Security Strategy of 2002 itself has been a driving catalyst in placing the 
nuclear option back to the fore, as reflected in various official strategy and departmental 
documents; internal and external policy reviews; oversight hearings
26
 and assessments; as 
well as speeches, reports and testimonies by government officials, policy experts, Congress 
members and others in the national security policy community.  These are reviewed as a 
means to ―delineate‖ the myriad of policy ―ideas, beliefs and assumption‖ and actions, 
contributing to and deriving from, the Bush Doctrine. 
 
This thesis uses a content and document analysis / qualitative methodology to develop a 
deeper understanding of the Bush Administration‘s National Security Strategy of 2002, the 
extent to which the arteries of this policy instrument have been evident in the past, and the 
extent to which the ―doctrine‖ has reinvigorated the nuclear option.  In terms of attaining both 
applicable and relevant primary sources, the following structure has been employed as a 
means to collect and define the research process.  Moreover, it has enabled a streamlined 
approach for the analysis of the policy instruments that have impacted and derived from the 
centrepiece of the thesis itself – that being, the National Security Strategy of 2002.  
 
Firstly, this researcher investigated Presidential and Secretary of Defense 
documents/statements of national security policy and strategy regarding counter-proliferation, 
nuclear weapon initiative(s), and the broader preservation of US security.  Official 
documents, such as the President‘s National Security Strategies, the Annual Reports of the 
Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, Presidential Decision Directives, as 
well as pertinent speeches on security/nuclear/counter-proliferation policy – have been 
considered and utilised extensively throughout this thesis.  Secondly, various National 
                                               
26 See Richard C. Sachs, Hearings in the US Senate: A Guide for Preparation and Procedure, Government and Finance 
Division, CRS Report for Congress, August 19, 2003. He defines oversight hearings as a review or study a law, issue, or an 
activity, often focusing on the quality of federal programs and the performance of government officials.  Hearings also help 
ensure that the execution of laws by the executive branch complies with legislative intent, and that administrative policies 
reflect the public interest. Oversight hearings often seek to improve the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of 
government operations.  A significant part of a committee‘s hearings workload is dedicated to oversight. 
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Security Council, Department of Defense and Defense supporting agencies‘ official 
documents have also been researched, particularly those relating to the Administration‘s 
counter-proliferation policies, programs and initiatives.  In addition, official reports and 
speeches, along with the writings of agency chiefs involved in US foreign policy security 
issues/strategies and nuclear policymaking have also been evaluated and added to the body of 
research.  Thirdly, key Congress members and their varying releases have been referred to in 
this thesis.  These have come in the form of the congressional oversight process hearings, as 
well as speeches, papers, articles and interviews with key congressional national security 
experts and staff who have also provided important insights and critiques of security policy 
developments.  Fourthly, evidence in unofficial policy research analyses and documents; 
including academic analyses, interest group position papers and academic and policy journals 
that address US security concerns, as well as those focussed on nuclear/counter-proliferation 
developments have also been extensively considered and employed.  The foreign and defense 
policy institutes, known as think tanks, or sometimes referred to as the defense intellectual 
community who have been deeply engaged in the debates regarding US foreign policy, US 
security policy, US nuclear weapons policy and counter-proliferation policy have also been 
considered in the context of this thesis.  Lastly, historical archives such as Library of 
Congress, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington DC – as well as 
research conducted at Georgetown University, Columbia University, John Hopkins 
University, UC Berkeley, San Francisco State University, University of Oregon and Portland 
State University – have proven to be of great significance in enabling the attainment of 
unique documents and publications.  Additionally, formal and informal dialogue with 
American academics at these institutions has also been important to the thesis process – 
particularly in terms of obtaining an American perspective in what can be deemed as a 
significant juncture in US security policy. 
 
Study Value 
Why is such an analysis of the Bush Doctrine important?  With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War, the US stands as the sole superpower on the global stage.  
Aside from its economic, political, technological and cultural dimensions, the US is also 
unmatched in terms of the military power it has at its disposal.  Hence, how it chooses to use 
this power – under what circumstances and to what degree – will critically affect the 
evolution of international rules governing the use of force.  This analysis attempts to fill an 
existing gap in the international literature concerning the use of force in a preventive context 
12 
 
as well as the alignment of preventive force to one that encompasses a nuclear option – as 
reflected in the varying documental instruments engendered by the ―doctrine.‖  While 
scholars have written extensively on the various aspects of the Bush Doctrine, primarily 
exploring the legality and legitimacy of the Administration‘s policies and practices in the 
global War on Terror, these have often been distinctly limited in their scope – particularly in 
terms of making the nuclear connection and the (limited) timeframe of these analyses.  It is 
evident that the Bush Doctrine came to dominate American political discourse from 2002-04 
as political leaders, academic scholars, and the general public debated the implications of 
what appeared to be a radical initiative.  Proponents argued that this was a necessary 
transformation in which new and proactive approaches to using force would be imperative in 
the post 9/11 world.  As stated by Mark Mantho, for ―a vocal and increasingly influential 
cadre of conservative foreign policy analysts, containment was at best pusillanimous 
accommodation of the enemy, at worst treasonous abjuration of America‘s self-evident 
obligation to lead the free world.‖27  Critics, however, argued that the Bush Doctrine‘s 
espousal of preventive war to combat the proliferation of WMD was further testimony to 
American unilateralism and perhaps most importantly, a shift away from the strategies of 
deterrence and containment.  However, as alluded to in the above, many writers, academics, 
commentators and policy-makers (both former and current) who have written about the Bush 
Doctrine have often been limited to the period of 2002-2004 – and often in the context of the 
lead up and immediate period after the invasion of Iraq in March, 2003.  Additionally, and 
like the Bush Doctrine itself, many have often fallen short in their attempts to define pre-
emption and prevention, while others, also like Bush, have interchanged the terms [often] 
based on their own varying political agendas.  Furthermore, and again pursuing another 
apparent gap, it appears that the Bush Doctrine has been more implicit in history than what 
many realise – in the context of previous Administrations‘ National Security Strategy 
releases, as well as the broader US security context extending back to World War II.  While 
many have made fleeting and isolated connections to the historical milieu pertaining to 
preventive considerations, this research attempts to fill what is perceived as a distinct gap in 
comprehensiveness, depth and more importantly, linkages across the several Administrations 
who have seriously considered a preventive course of action. 
 
                                               
27 Mantho, ―The Bush Doctrine: Origins, Evolution, Alternatives,‖ p. 3.  
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Moreover, this analysis attempts to fill an existing gap pertaining to the nuclear option 
posited within the framework of the National Security Strategy of 2002 – refined and 
expanded on in the subsequent documental instruments it sponsored in the period thereafter.  
Indeed, while many commentators have focussed on the Administration‘s endorsement of 
―pre-emptive‖ intervention, it was in the latter stages of Chapter Five, and more significantly, 
the conclusive chapter [Nine] that revealed an underlying doctrinal revision and its reference 
to nuclear applications.  As Chapter Five of the National Security Strategy of 2002 
admonished, proactive counter-proliferation efforts would be pursued in which the United 
States would deter and defend against a threat before it was unleashed.  It would now work to 
ensure that its key capabilities – detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce 
capabilities – were integrated into its defense transformation and homeland security systems.  
Assertive counter-proliferation would be integrated into the doctrine, training and equipping 
of its forces, utilising its technological advantage and nuclear uniqueness as a means to 
ensure that it would prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.
28
  In Chapter Nine, 
Bush argued that the US military‘s highest priority was to defend the United States and as a 
means to do so effectively, the military needed to be transformed so as to focus more on how 
an adversary may fight, rather than where and when a war might occur.  Innovation and a 
new assertion within the armed forces would encompass experimentation with new 
approaches to warfare, strengthening joint operations, exploiting US intelligence advantages, 
and taking full advantage of science, technology and its nuclear dominance.
29
  Most literature 
missed or chose to overlook the correlation between the National Security Strategy‘s Chapter 
Nine – articulated in greater detail in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (NSCWMD ) released a month later – and the Administration‘s willingness to 
not only undertake preventive war, but to align that approach with a reinvigorated nuclear 
option.  Indeed, as will be extensively expanded on within the body of this thesis, the Bush 
Administration consistently released updates of this nuclear strategy, and in doing so, 
illustrated how the National Security Strategy of 2002 can be perceived as the guiding force 
that refined its core sentiments through the unclassified and classified documents it spawned 
during the period of 2002-2008. 
 
 
 
                                               
28 Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, p. 16. 
29 Ibid., p. 29. 
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The discussion of this thesis will proceed as follows: 
 
Chapter Structure 
While the major component of this thesis has drawn extensively on primary sources in the 
form of government publications – not to mention the obvious fact that it is centred on a 
government publication – secondary sources have remained significant in the 
contextualisation of both the historical climate and contemporary debates associated with the 
National Security Strategy of 2002.  Chapter One provides an overview and evaluation of the 
pertinent literature surrounding the issues deriving from the release of the National Security 
Strategy of 2002.  Such issues and debates pertained to the interpretations and meanings 
associated with pre-emption and prevention, the adaptation of ―imminent‖ by the 
Administration and the legal implications associated with the doctrine – particularly its 
endorsement of regime change via the undertaking of preventive/―pre-emptive‖ war against 
sovereign states.  This chapter will also point to the literature surrounding the historical 
context of these two terms in relation to the security challenges Administrations have 
experienced when facing adversarial threats.  The chapter will argue that while there exists 
writers and commentators who have acknowledged the Bush Administration‘s nuclear 
aspirations and subsequent actions, most have not made the correlation emanating from 
Chapters Five and Nine of the National Security Strategy, nor the more detailed National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCWMD) released a month later.  In 
simple terms, this chapter posits the notion that while there is reasonable literature arguing 
the merits of Bush‘s penchant for prevention/―pre-emption‖ and the historical context of 
these terms, albeit fragmented, sufficient linkages to the nuclear option that the National 
Security Strategy of 2002 advocated and punctuated during the period of 2002-2008, have 
been neither consistent nor thorough. 
 
Chapter Two will trace the Presidential vision and rhetoric regarding several 
Administrations‘ counter-proliferation policy goals, objectives and initiatives as conveyed in 
their own respective National Security Strategy release/s.   Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
of 1986, US Presidents have been required to transmit to Congress a comprehensive report 
setting forth the national security strategy of the United States, including a comprehensive 
description and discussion of its goals and objectives.  This chapter will look at the National 
Security Strategies released by all Administrations since its formal inception under Ronald 
Reagan in 1987.   It will argue that while there is no doubt that the National Security Strategy 
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of 2002 advocated preventive attacks, the notion of denying, containing and curtailing an 
enemies‘ efforts to acquire dangerous technologies30 has been clearly evident in each 
National Security Strategy release since 1987.  Indeed, when taken in comparison to the 
National Security Strategies that have preceded it, it appears that the Bush release of 2002 has 
merely continued the US foreign policy desire to counter proliferators and those adversarial 
states and non-state actors that could potentially undermine the United States‘ national 
interest objectives and broader hegemonic aspirations.   
 
However, as argued in Chapter Three, the second and most controversial assertion of the 
Bush Doctrine was its official adoption of preventive ―self-defense‖ as a key component of 
the US security strategy – in which the United States was prepared to ―act against such 
emerging threats before they are fully formed.‖31  This chapter will seek to establish, clarify 
and perhaps even resolve the debates associated with the meanings and definitions pertaining 
to pre-emption and prevention.  The task of confirming the core meanings and disparities 
between these two ―strategic concepts‖ is an imperative requirement that will allow coherent 
and greater exposition (particularly in Chapter Five of this thesis) in evaluating the extent to 
which preventive war has been an implicit consideration in US security strategy.  
Additionally, this chapter will convey the degree in which such concepts and accompanying 
interpretations have challenged and transcended the many facets of international relations and 
US security policy – within the context of history, doctrine, international law and use within a 
Presidential rhetorical framework. 
 
Chapter Four will investigate the question that, if preventive war was considered a viable 
option by the Bush Administration, then why was Iraq the state of ―choice?‖  It is evident that 
from 2001-2003, Iraq, Iran and North Korea were all considered rogue proliferators and 
defined by the Administration as ―grave and gathering threats.‖  Assuming that the US was 
determined to act preventively against at least one of them, one would expect to find evidence 
that the Bush Administration sought and/or planned to attack all three.  However, as this 
chapter will argue, it appears from the outset that the Administration‘s preferred target was 
Iraq.  The chapter will evaluate the extent to which the cultivation of the preventive war 
doctrine (rhetorically and formally in the context of the National Security Strategy of 2002) 
was aligned to the sovereign state of Iraq and will include an analysis into the process 
                                               
30 Ibid., Introduction. 
31 Ibid., pp. 13-15. 
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involved in the orchestration and lead up to the preventive war action undertaken on March, 
20, 2003.  It will assert that despite its appearance of being a radically new approach, at its 
core, the Bush Doctrine‘s push for preventive war (acted on in Iraq) long pervaded the 
strategic thought of policy-makers, officials, and military planners at the highest levels of the 
US government. 
 
As Chapter Five will argue, since the commencement of the nuclear era in 1945, at least three 
other US Presidents (Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lyndon B. Johnson and William J. Clinton) 
have faced the potential threat of nuclear technology in the possession of states hostile to 
their respective Administrations and each wrestled with the same decision faced by President 
Bush in 2003: whether to use preventive military force as a means to counter the proliferation 
of such nuclear weapon development.  The above Administrations had to evaluate the costs 
of preventively striking a state perceived to be developing nuclear weapons against the costs 
of abstaining from employing such preventive actions.  Indeed, as this chapter will posit, the 
historical record of the last half century is replete with examples of high level US decision-
makers who considered the undertaking of major unilateral preventive military actions as a 
means to impede the proliferation of nuclear weapons by rogue states.  Prior to the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, the US had considered waging preventive war against no less than three 
additional rogue proliferators – the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) from 
1945-54; the People‘s Republic of China (China) from 1960-1964; and the Democratic 
People‘s Republic of North Korea (North Korea) from 1993-94.  This chapter will investigate 
the above case studies as a means to evaluate the extent to which the US seriously considered 
undertaking preventive war against these states, and in the final analysis, will assess as to 
whether Bush‘s preventive advocacy can be considered a ―new,‖ ―radical‖ and 
―revolutionary‖ strategy. 
 
Indeed, while the early chapters appraise the extent to which the Bush Doctrine can be 
perceived as being implicit in US security policy – based on comparisons with previous 
National Security Strategies and previous Administrations‘ preventive considerations – the 
next ―section‖ will evaluate the degree in which the National Security Strategy of 2002 
engendered the reinvigorated nuclear option with the potential to be used in a preventive 
context.  This chapter will argue that while the motivation and consideration of preventive 
war has been an integral part of US policy-makers strategic thought since 1945, and while it 
can be argued that the preventive actions of the Bush Doctrine stalled in Iraq, the nuclear 
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dimension encompassed in the Doctrine can be viewed as the aspect that is truly the ―bold‖ 
and ―radical‖ assertion.  As revealed, Bush‘s policy instruments signified a renewed role for 
nuclear weapons and the quest of his Administration to upgrade US offensive forces, deploy 
missile defenses, reconfigure communications and satellite systems, and overall, revitalise the 
nuclear complex.  However, to look at this development as purely a Bush Administration 
initiative would be historically inaccurate.  Thereby, Chapter Six will explain how the 
Clinton Administration retained much of the existing US nuclear weapons policy and force 
posture in the decade after the demise of the Soviet Union and affirmed the role of nuclear 
weapons in US security strategy.   Furthermore, the Clinton Administration investigated the 
merit of employing targeting options for the use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical 
or biological attack from states other than Russia, and, in its own documental instruments, did 
not put out of consideration the first use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances.  It was 
here that military planners and policy-makers – through the Defense Counter-Proliferation 
Initiative (CPI) 1993, Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 1994, Doctrines for Joint Operations 
(Joint Pub 3-12) 1993/1995, Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations 1996, 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 1997 and Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 60 
1997 – maintained the significance of nuclear weapons throughout the 1990s. 
 
However, as Chapter Seven posits, despite the ―base‖ provided and maintained by Clinton, it 
was the Bush Doctrine and its accompanying guidance documents that expanded the role that 
nuclear weapons would play in US security strategy.  This chapter will evaluate the nuclear 
arteries that the National Security Strategy engendered, in particular, the 2002 Nuclear 
Posture Review (NPR), the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(NSCWMD), the 2005 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review, the 2006 Strategic Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0, and in recent 
times, the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program.  Based on this document analysis 
and policy evaluation it will be argued that the Bush Doctrine should not be simply dismissed 
or defined as a doctrine of preventive war advocacy alone, but as one that endorsed and 
invigorated – during the period of 2002-2008 – the nuclear option as a necessary war-fighting 
device.  For the Bush Administration, it was a ―new‖ and necessary ―approach to warfare... 
exploiting US intelligence advantages, taking full advantage of science and technology‖32 and 
in doing so, instituting a ―quiet revolution.‖  
                                               
32 Ibid., p. 29. 
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The National Security Strategy of the United States of America released in September 2002 
defined the Bush Administration‘s strategic response to the events of September 11, 2001.  
The most controversial assertion of the Bush Doctrine was the official adoption of preventive 
―self-defense‖ as a key element of the US security strategy in which the United States was 
prepared to ―act against… emerging threats before they‖ were ―fully formed.‖33  Many 
argued that the Bush Doctrine symbolised a total break with American tradition in which the 
United States had undertaken a more cautious and defensive policy; a policy that was defined 
by the mainstay arteries of containment and deterrence; a policy that advocated respect for 
legal norms and for the sovereign rights of other states.
34
  Moreover, that the United States 
had a history of refraining from the use of force until it or one of its allies had been attacked 
and that the Bush Administration had dispelled this tradition; and was now undertaking a far 
more assertive policy.  As the Administration articulated its National Security Strategy to 
both domestic and international audiences, the cessation of debate over United Nations action 
and Congressional approval for intervention in Iraq presented legitimating issues for these 
national and international institutions struggling to address security issues in an era of 
globalisation.  In the United States, an anti-terrorist narrative dominated post-9/11 security 
discourse and shifted the presumption against the acceptance of the Cold War analytical 
structures that had dominated foreign policy.  Citizens and states opposed to US military 
action against Iraq invariably articulated their opposition through a narrative warning of the 
perils of US global hegemony.  Conversely, advocates of Bush‘s policy in the US alluded to 
the inevitability of future security threats if the United States and a ―willing coalition‖ failed 
to take preventive action against the state of Iraq.  The Bush Administration, as well as its 
international counterparts, all faced the common predicament of how to construct and 
reposition their arguments amid a global media environment, while fulfilling the challenging 
demands of creating a foreign policy rhetoric that addressed the dispositions of their national 
audiences.  While the major component of this thesis has drawn extensively on primary 
sources in the form of government publications – not to mention the obvious fact that it is 
centred on a government publication itself – secondary sources have remained important in 
cultivating an understanding of the varying debates associated with the National Security 
Strategy of 2002.  This Chapter will evaluate the literature surrounding such debates; 
particularly those pertaining to the terminology of pre-emption and prevention and the extent 
to which the literature has considered the historical context of these terms.  Moreover, the 
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chapter will reveal that while there is a reasonable amount of ―discussion‖ and analysis in the 
context of these two terms – albeit at times fragmented, inconsistent and extensively 
politicised – it is apparent that there is a distinct short falling of analysis pertaining to the 
nuclear dimension of the Bush Doctrine.  Again, while many writers and commentators have 
indeed acknowledged that the Bush Administration upped the nuclear weapon ante, many 
failed to make the correlation emanating from Chapters Five and Nine of the National 
Security Strategy, nor the more detailed National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (NSCWMD) released a month later.  Indeed, while the National Security 
Strategy of 2002 was a document advocating prevention, it was the subsequent policy 
instruments it spawned during the period between 2002-2008 that foreshadowed a new 
nuclear era in which the once termed ―weapon of last resort‖ became a usable and, according 
to the Bush Administration, necessary war-fighting device.   
 
One of the most defining assertions of the Bush Doctrine was that the United States would act 
against emerging threats before they had fully developed, clearly implying that it would enact 
a type of proactive response or ―anticipatory self-defense.‖  Anticipatory self-defense is often 
aligned to notions of either ―pre-emption‖ or ―prevention‖ and while they have been 
periodically used interchangeably, the terms are actually two distinct strategic concepts.  It 
was during the period of 2002-04 that many writers, commentators, academics and politicians 
debated the definition of these concepts in the context of the version conveyed in the National 
Security Strategy.  It was clear very early in the research process that the meanings associated 
with such concepts had to be affirmed and established if the thesis was to attain and maintain 
a level of consistency and coherency.  In essence, the main difference between pre-emption 
and prevention pertains to the relative timing of their application and the immediacy of the 
perceived threat.  However, it was Jack Levy‘s 1987 article entitled, ―Declining Power and 
the Preventive Motivation for War,‖ that was able to convey what appeared to be the most 
straightforward definition of pre-emption.  He argued that pre-emption was the initiation of 
military action when it was apparent that an adversary‘s attack was imminent, and that there 
were advantages in striking first or at least in preventing the adversary from doing so.  
Simply put, he articulated, it was a tactical response to an immediate threat, executed as a 
means to forestall the mobilisation and deployment of the adversary‘s existing military 
forces.
35
  Moreover, as by Arend in ―International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force,‖ 
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pre-emption was employed ―downstream‖ in response to a more specific, direct and 
immediate threat where the necessity of self-defense became so instant and overwhelming 
that it left no choice of means for the state and no moment for deliberation.
36
   
 
Other bodies of literature were also able to clarify the term.  In Russell and Wirtz‘s ―US 
Policy on Preventive War and Pre-emption,‖ pre-emption was defined as a state scenario 
where upon detecting evidence that an adversary was about to attack – traditionally the 
aesthetic mobilisation of armies, navies and air forces preparing to attack – the threatened 
state beat the opponent to the punch and attacked first as a means to thwart the impending 
strike.
37
  Delving into history, Russell and Wirtz recounted the 1837 British pre-emptive 
assault on the USS Caroline in which Secretary of State Daniel Webster classified the 
circumstances under which pre-emptive strikes were justified: when the attack is proportional 
to the threat, and when ―the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and 
leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.‖38  Prior to World War II, 
international law permitted the use of force in self-defense.  Afterward, the United Nations 
sought to circumscribe legal justification for application of military force, enshrining the 
standard of ―sovereign equality‖ to secure the political independence and territorial integrity 
of member countries against the threat or use of arms.  States in breach of this edict were 
subject to the collective response of their UN peers.
39
  Russell and Wirtz cited a recent study 
by the Congressional Research Service, the public policy research apparatus of the US 
Congress, which came to the conclusion that the United States had never initiated a pre-
emptive attack on another state, and, aside from the Spanish-American War, never did so 
without first suffering attack.  Opponents of American policy, however, dismissed the 
report‘s depiction of pre-emptive action – ―to prevent or mitigate the threat or use of force by 
another country against the US‖40 – as too narrow an interpretation, and plausibly referenced 
assorted ―pursuits‖ in Central and South America and US involvement in Vietnam as a means 
to support their objections.  As argued by Russell and Wirtz, Richard Nixon‘s secret bombing 
of a technically neutral Cambodia, as well as incursions into Laos during the Vietnam period, 
also posed serious challenges to such interpretations.  Moreover, one also wonders which 
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category the ―muscular interventions‖ in Grenada, Panama and Haiti – that occurred between 
1983 and 1994 – fall into.  What was clear, they argued, was that the American people have 
always thought of unilateral and ―pre-emptive‖ acts of aggression as being the province of 
rogue states and belligerent dictators, something morally abhorrent and rightfully beyond the 
ethical strictures of a ―great‖ and ―good‖ state.41  
 
Nonetheless, many commentators recognised that despite ―the carefully selected term of art 
chosen by Administration officials to describe it, the Bush Doctrine goes well beyond the use 
of pre-emptive military force in a single, discrete instance, crossing a threshold into the 
exponentially more controversial realm of preventive war.‖42  Again citing Levy‘s ―Declining 
Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,‖ prevention pertained to undertaking a 
winnable war now in order to avoid the risk of war later under less favourable circumstances.  
It was a response to a threat that would generally take several years to develop and aimed to 
impede the creation of new military assets.  The consequence of non-action was the gradual 
deterioration of a states‘ relative military power and the risk of a more costly war from a 
position of inferiority.  As argued by Levy, ―the theoretical significance of preventive war 
derives from the importance of the phenomenon of changing power differentials between 
states arising from uneven rates of growth.‖43  In essence, preventive military force was the 
proposition that the dominant power initiates preventive action in order to impede an 
ascending adversary while the latter is still too weak to pose a serious threat.
44
  As the 
clearest explanation of both terms, Levy further argued that the preventive motivation for 
battle may arise from the perception that one‘s military power and potential were declining 
relative to that of a rising adversary and from the fear of the consequences of that decline.  
The power shift may be the result of an advance in military technology or the acquisition of 
nuclear technology in the weaker state.  Thereby, as contended by Lebow in, ―Windows of 
Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?‖ preventive war should be undertaken during a 
period in which a state possessed a distinct military advantage over an adversary before there 
may be a transferral of power to one of vulnerability; a window of opportunity from the 
perspective of the disadvantaged side appeared likely to open.
45
  In Gray‘s The Implications 
of Pre-emptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration, preventive war was simply 
war, distinguished only by its timing and where the ―preventor‖ began with the advantage of 
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the initiative, however, if success was not achieved swiftly and decisively, that advantage 
would rapidly diminish as the enemy recovered and counterattacked.
46
  In researching, citing 
and ultimately using these bodies of literature, it was clear that despite Bush‘s use of ―pre-
emption,‖ what he was advocating in his National Security Strategy of 2002 was indeed the 
use of preventive war against those actors deemed to be rogue proliferators.  By adhering to 
such traditional definitions in the context of traditional forms of imminence,
47
 the thesis 
process in which the preventive war meaning was integral, was able to be undertaken with a 
degree of efficiency and coherency. 
 
Indeed, this apparent prevarication between preventive and pre-emptive war was a rhetorical 
device used by the Bush Administration with clear intention.  For Josef Kunz it attempted to 
convey its strategic option as pre-emption.  It drew the conceptual link to pre-emption 
through its emphasis on an expanded notion of imminence; a key element in the condition of 
necessity as it related to pre-emption.  The Bush Doctrine embellished the concept of 
imminence beyond the semantic breaking point, pushing it back to the early research and 
development stage of the nuclear threat cycle in which the time to construct an operational 
nuclear weapons capability was measured not in days, weeks or even months but, rather, in 
years.  Simply put, nuclear activities at the stage of the threat cycle referred to in the National 
Security Strategy of 2002 do not pose an imminent threat in the true meaning of the word.
48
  
Of course, the very introduction of a policy legitimising a preventive or pre-emptive attack on 
a sovereign state for the purpose of self-defense engendered contentious debate, as well as 
associated political and diplomatic implications.  In very clear terms, many bodies of 
literature at the time of its release argued that what the National Security Strategy of 2002 
proposed was the initiation of violence as a means to prevent it.  As John Steinbruner 
conveyed in ―Confusing Ends and Means: The Doctrine of Coercive Pre-emption,‖ the Bush 
Doctrine appeared to neglect and disdain international legal restraint and therefore, could be 
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viewed as a formula more likely to generate violence than to contain it.
49
  Additionally, as 
illustrated by Michael O‘Hanlon, Susan E. Rice and James B. Sterling in ―The New National 
Security Strategy and Pre-emption,‖ if today‘s international system is defined and 
characterised by a relative infrequency of interstate war, then developing doctrines that lower 
the threshold for pre-emptive and/or preventive action could put that accomplishment at risk 
and intensify regional crises already on the brink of open conflict.
50
  For Neta Crawford, a 
strategy of preventive war assumed a sound knowledge of an adversary‘s ill intentions when 
such presumptions may in fact be premature, exaggerated or false.  While preventive-war 
doctrines assumed that today‘s potential rival will become tomorrow‘s adversary, she argued, 
diplomacy or some other strategy could work as a means to change the relationship from 
antagonism to accommodation.
51
  Moreover, according to Kegley and Raymond, preventive 
war was based on the notion that it is possible to predict with certainty what is to come.  
However, the capacity to foretell another states‘ future behaviour was difficult as leadership 
intentions are hard to discern or detect.
52
 
 
Of course, there were many proponents during the period of 2002-04 who argued that rather 
than being a device for further proliferation, the National Security Strategy of 2002 was in 
essence a direct outgrowth of an existing post-proliferated and terror-prone security 
environment.  As Jason Ellis and Geoffrey Kiefer argued in their article, ―Combating 
Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy,‖ the Bush Doctrine was both the 
logical culmination of more than a decade‘s worth of experience with recalcitrant proliferants 
in key regions, and a solid base on which to formulate US national security planning in the 
years ahead.
53
  They countered the argument that a reactive, diplomatic-oriented, multilateral 
approach would deter the possibility of a rogue state or non-state actor attacking the United 
States any more than a proactive, military-operational, unilateral approach would.  Other 
proponents of the Bush approach, such as Lieber and Lieber, argued that the National 
Security Strategy sustained US primacy which they asserted was ―good‖ for global peace and 
stability, as well as far preferable to the ―alternatives.‖  Their 2002 article entitled, ―The Bush 
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National Security Strategy,‖ appropriated the notion that the Bush Doctrine was not just 
about power and security in any narrow sense; it signified the United States‘ ongoing cause to 
spread democracy worldwide and promote the development of ―free and open societies on 
every continent.‖54  Indeed, for Lieber and Lieber there were compelling reasons as to why 
US primacy was, in fact, ―good‖ for global stability.  Perhaps the best evidence in support of 
this claim, they argued, was the fact that a US military presence was ―welcomed‖ in a great 
number of areas around the globe.  Regional state motivations may have ranged from free-
riding under the American security umbrella, to the pacifying or stabilising impact of an 
American presence, but the basic effect was the same.  Despite obvious and expected political 
tensions inherent in stationing US forces abroad, many states saw US military primacy as 
necessary for stability and preferable to what they ambiguously refer to as ―alternatives, 
especially in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf.‖55  Of course, prior to the flailing US 
experience in Iraq from 2004 onwards, conservative literature as reflected by the likes of 
Ellis, Lieber et al., attained extensive momentum and support.  Despite the easy defeat of 
Hussein in 2003 and the comfortable win in the 2004 US Presidential election, the Bush 
Administration and its proponents‘ advocacy of prevention was to come under serious 
question in Iraq as WMDs were not found and the US military‘s inability to cope with an 
asymmetrical force became very apparent – a threat that the Administration did not plan for.56 
 
In less ideologically driven fashion, Mead and Record contend that the National Security 
Strategy extended beyond notions of prevention and pre-emption and could be deemed as an 
assertive policy to preserve US hegemony and power.  As conveyed by Mead in Power, 
Terror, Peace and War, there was an apparent shift in American thinking in which the need 
for overwhelming military superiority was perceived to be the surest foundation for national 
security.  As the literature argued, this was partly attributed for the obvious reasons of greater 
security, but also correlated to the notion that supremacy could work as an important 
deterrent in that if the US attained a degree of military supremacy in which challenges 
appeared futile, then adversarial actors may ―give up trying...‖57  Additionally, as testified by 
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Record in ―Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War and Counter-proliferation,‖ the possession of 
nuclear weapons by rogue actors can be seen as a threat, not so much to the US itself, but 
rather to the US freedom of military action necessary to sustain US global military 
supremacy.  As a result, the literature conveyed, the US thereby declared a use of force 
doctrine that included preventive war as a means to sustain its perpetual global military 
primacy and prevent actors from deterring the US.
58
  The apparent quest by the Bush 
Administration to maintain US supremacy was further articulated by Mann in Rise of the 
Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet.  In his analysis, Mann argued that the post-
Cold War world would entail a US approach encompassing the prevention of any hostile 
power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be 
sufficient to generate global power and thwart any hostile power from dominating a region 
critical to its interests.  America would not sit back and wait for threats or rivals to emerge, 
but would attempt to maintain the United States‘ lone superpower status – not just today or 
ten years from now, but permanently – even to the extent of developing a newly invigorated 
nuclear option.
59
 
 
Aside from notions of hegemonic preservation, accounts of Presidential war rhetoric have 
been instructive in providing an understanding into Bush‘s attempts to define the scene of the 
United States‘ ―War on Terrorism.‖  Historically, during wartime and crises Presidential 
Administrations have constrained open deliberation for political advantage.
60
  The recent 
Republican administrations of Reagan and Bush Snr were able to manage public discourse 
not only as a means to gain wider public support for policy, but also to diminish the public 
expectation for open, reasoned political deliberations in the US democracy.  A careful 
understanding of Presidential discourse management during wartime offers insights into the 
Bush national security rhetoric, where the President (and his Administration) appeared to be 
similarly armed to wage a public relations campaign designed to foreclose the opportunity for 
public argument and deliberation over public policy.  According to Kenneth Burke‘s analysis 
of rhetorical form, strategies in political discourse are fleshed out by representative 
arguments that are topically consistent and satisfy the public‘s need for an appropriate 
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communicative response.
61
  The US public is accustomed to the rhetorical form of 
Presidential address during foreign crisis and wartime.
62
  The recurring features of the 
rhetorical form invite audience participation by awakening individuals to the possibilities of 
the narrative ending.  As Burke suggested, ―many purely formal patterns can awaken an 
attitude of collaborative expectancy in us.‖63  In the case of war rhetoric, recurrent forms of 
Presidential address invite the public to participate in the process of acceding to the President 
and his administration the authority to wage military aggression.  Historically, such 
Presidential rhetoric crafted during crisis acknowledges the legal and historical precedents 
that Presidents have used to make executive decisions and enact unilateral policies.
64
  
 
Legal doctrine and previous Presidential history can be used as resources in Presidential 
foreign policy rhetoric to help arouse and satisfy public expectations for what ought to 
occur.
65
  For example, Presidents historically have relied on mandates of the War Powers 
Resolution as grounds for executive command of war, and even international legal doctrine to 
justify intervention abroad.   Campbell and Jamieson argue war messages have ―legitimation‖ 
as their ―central persuasive purpose.‖66  The act of defining the war is ―intimately related to 
an ongoing struggle between the President and Congress.‖67  Throughout US Presidential 
history Campbell and Jamieson find that war rhetoric has five recurring characteristics:  
 
(1) every element in it proclaims that the momentous decision to resort to force 
is deliberate, the product of thoughtful consideration; (2) forceful intervention is 
justified through a chronicle or narrative from which argumentative claims are 
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drawn; (3) the audience is exhorted to unanimity of purpose and total 
commitment; (4) the rhetoric not only justifies the use of force but also seeks to 
legitimate Presidential assumption of the extraordinary powers of the 
commander in chief, and, as a function of these other characteristics; (5) 
strategic misrepresentations play an unusually significant role in its appeals.
68
   
 
Reliance on such topoi, or commonplaces, is important during times of domestic ambiguity 
and uncertainty, as they work to provide legitimacy for politicians attempting to define a new 
political framework appropriate to the time.  Windt maintained that crisis-creating rhetoric 
serves both deliberative and epideictic purposes for Presidents.  Windt‘s position is consistent 
with that of Cherwitz and Zagacki, who found that:  
 
...while both consummatory and justificatory rhetoric may be kinds of epideictic 
oratory... sharp differences emerge.  Consummatory discourse also accords with 
the principles of forensic rhetoric, considerable and concerted efforts are made 
to present a prima facie case for guilt to the American public and world; 
perpetrators stand mock trial for specific charges, and evidence is marshaled on 
behalf of the case for conviction.
69
  
 
Consistent with these goals, the War on Terror once again called for the President to 
conceptualise a problem, define an enemy and gather public support to legitimate new public 
policies.  Thus, Presidential speeches responding to such calamitous events also contained 
what Dow identified as ―epideictic strategies that function to allow the audience to reach a 
communal understanding of the events which have just occurred.‖70  
 
In recent history, Presidents have declared war on inflation (Ford), on poverty (Johnson), and 
on drugs (Nixon, Reagan, Bush Snr) to promote a specific problem definition and attitude 
adoption by the public.
71
  The language of war conveys ―the image of a threatening other‖ or 
a clear ―enemy‖ which threatens American ideals.72  Presidents, in addition to acting in the 
name of national interests, advance war rhetoric to hold an enemy accountable for the 
problems that confront the nation.
73
  After 9/11, the news media treated the four plane crashes 
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as incidents of high drama, generating considerable domestic turmoil.  In declaring the 
attacks an act of war, the President was, in effect, reacting to the demands of the situation.  
Dow elaborated further by arguing that there were important differences between crisis 
rhetoric addressing ―situations in which the President responds to events already seen as 
serious... as well as those in which the President attempts to create a crisis to gain support for 
policy.‖74  She argued that there was a greater need to explore the situational constraints on 
crisis rhetoric when the public perceives ―events as having great significance even before the 
President addressed them.‖75  Such was the case after 9/11 when the nation confronted an 
aggressive attack on United States soil that reconstituted questions of national security both 
domestically and abroad.  The President‘s political and rhetorical actions, particularly those 
espoused in the National Security Strategy of 2002, responded to the situational demand to 
legitimate sweeping changes to ―US homeland security policy‖ and apparent changes to its 
broader international security strategy. 
 
Indeed, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the previous foundations of 
US strategy – deterrence and containment – were replaced with a strike policy that advocated 
the identification and destruction of a terrorist threat before it was able to reach US borders, 
even if that exercise necessitated acting alone and using preventive force.  The Bush 
Administration pointed to those ―rogue‖ nations seeking to acquire nuclear weapons in 
conjunction with ―their terrorist clients‖ as requiring the elevation of preventive military 
intervention, from a last resort option to one of centrality within the US security framework.  
Formalised in September 2002, the National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America put forth a doctrine of ―pre-emptive‖ military action, which it acknowledged was 
based on the existence of an imminent threat.  Despite the attempts by some writers and 
commentators to readjust and redefine the application of prevention and pre-emption in their 
interpretations and definitions, the National Security Strategy‘s argument of adapting the 
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of ―today‘s adversaries‖ clearly 
described prevention – attacking when there is no threat of imminent attack – and certainly 
not pre-emption.  Indeed, having established its intent, the National Security Strategy of 2002 
moved quickly towards a preventive war strategy in the state of Iraq in March 2003.  But, as 
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discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, if preventive war was to be undertaken against any 
one of the ―axis of evil‖ states, why was Iraq the state of ―choice‖ for the Administration? 
 
According to Gaddis, perhaps the real reason the Bush Administration ―chose‖ to undertake 
preventive war against Iraq, rather than Iran and North Korea, was because it was perceived 
to be the weakest, least costly of the three threats – and was ―the most feasible place where 
the US could strike the next blow.‖76  For Bob Woodward, the goal of the new war plan was 
to undertake military operations to remove Saddam from power, eliminate the threat of any 
possible weapons of mass destruction and impede his suspected support of terrorism.
77
  
Indeed, from 2001-2003, as conveyed in many bodies of literature, when faced with the 
prospect of having to wage preventive war against one of three rogue proliferators – Iraq, Iran 
and North Korea – the Bush Administration chose to preventively attack Iraq, a decidedly 
weaker state.  This appeared to support Richard Ned Lebow‘s claim that a major 
consideration militating against war can be its expected costs.  As an influential body of 
literature to this chapter of the thesis process, Lebow argued that in some instances the costs 
may be high enough to dissuade policy-makers from using force regardless of the magnitude 
of the expected gains.  The absolute cost of war was probably an important restraining factor 
for American policy-makers in the context of Iran and North Korea – that is, as the absolute 
cost of war increased, the importance of relative gains diminished and ultimately became 
irrelevant to the decision for war or peace.
78
  In terms of the ―choice‖ of Iraq – the cultivation 
of the preventive war doctrine (rhetorically and formally in the context of the National 
Security Strategy of 2002), the alignment of the preventive war option to Iraq, as well as the 
orchestration and lead up to the preventive war itself – it appeared that the Bush Doctrine 
could be deemed as overzealous, extreme and unprecedented.  However, despite such 
appearances of a radically new approach, at its core the Bush Doctrine‘s push for preventive 
war in Iraq in 2003 has long pervaded the strategic thought of policy-makers, officials, and 
military planners at the highest levels of the US government.  Since the end of World War II, 
each time a rogue state has attempted to acquire nuclear weapons, the US seriously 
considered taking unilateral preventive action as a means to obstruct them – even in the 
dubious case of Iraq where action was undertaken.   
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Indeed, the historical record of the last half century is sated with examples of significant US 
decision-makers contemplating the execution of major unilateral preventive military actions 
in order to preclude the proliferation of nuclear weapons by rogue states.  A significant body 
of literature that expressed this idea both clearly and convincingly was that of Marc 
Tratchenberg.  In his article entitled, ―A Wasting Asset: American Strategy and the Shifting 
Nuclear Balance,‖ Tratchenberg evaluated the extent to which preventive war thinking played 
a much greater role in shaping US policy and was by no means limited to what he described 
as the ―lunatic fringe.‖  Indeed, as argued, if the Soviets were allowed to develop nuclear 
forces of their own, wouldn‘t they someday try to destroy the one power that prevented them 
from achieving their goals by launching a nuclear attack on the US?
79
  According to Ricks 
and Loeb in their article entitled, ―Bush Developing Military Policy of Striking First,‖ during 
this period the ―surprisingly widespread‖ espousal of Bush Doctrine-like preventive war 
thinking was very evident.  However, it was also apparent that several powerful US 
government officials and military planners, including some preventive war advocates, 
believed that the very concept of preventive war was ―out of step‖ with America‘s political 
traditions and strategic culture.  That is, preventive war was both ―aggressive‖ and 
―dishonorable,‖ ―the kind of thing inflicted on the American people, not initiated by them.‖80  
Nonetheless, despite these inhibitions it was clear that in the context of the Soviet threat 
during the period of 1945-1954, preventive war thinking was not just limited to those in the 
US military, but attained a substantial following among some of the most renowned 
government officials, journalists and political scientists in the western world.   
 
In the context of China, according to Nacht‘s ―The Future Unlike the Past: Nuclear 
Proliferation and American Security Policy,‖ many US policy-makers saw the Communist 
state as a powerful threat to American security interests.  The decade of the 1950s included 
the Sino-American armed conflict in Korea and several major crises over Taiwan and the 
neighbouring offshore islands.  The Sino-American relationship, prior to Chinese nuclear 
weapons acquisition, was wholly adversarial, and those Americans who thought it should be 
otherwise either had no influence or were summarily discredited if they voiced their views 
decisively.
81
  Extending beyond the case studies explored in this thesis, John Gaddis‘s 
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Surprise Security and the America Experience has argued that throughout the course of US 
history, the concepts of ―pre-emption/prevention,‖ ―unilateralism‖ and ―hegemony‖ have 
been very much evident ―and that their efficacy and morality usually depended on the 
particular historical situation in which they occurred.‖82  Based on a series of lectures 
conducted at the New York Public Library in 2002, Gaddis argued that it was the Monroe 
Administration that set in motion this ―active‖ template as a means to guarantee US 
hegemony in the Western hemisphere, while the likes of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry 
Truman chose to expand American influence through working with allies – but ensuring that 
American goals were always paramount, if subtly disguised as a choice between US primacy 
or ―a worse alternative.‖83  Gaddis posited further examples, including the Andrew Jackson 
invasion of Spanish Florida as a means to stop raids across the border and the annexation of 
Texas and California on the principle that such frail, embryonic republics were not viable and 
were thus likely to fall into the hands of other – and most likely hostile – powers, which 
would inevitably end up threatening American security. 
 
For Gaddis, periods of perceived or real vulnerability have been a key factor in defining US 
strategy pertaining to ―pre-emption/prevention,‖ ―unilateralism‖ and ―hegemony.‖  He 
referred to the 1814 burning of Washington DC by British forces, the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor and al Qaeda‘s attacks on September 11 as examples that all demanded that the 
US re-examine their place in the world and, in each case, expanded their security frontiers 
and embraced a more ambitious foreign policy to deal with newly perceived threats.
84
  
Moreover, he argued, most landmark American initiatives that followed – from Washington‘s 
Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine, through to John Hay‘s ―Open Door Policy‖ in 
China and America‘s ―associated‖ role in World War I – were indicative of the 20th Century 
course in which the United States was prepared to undertake ―a go it alone stance.‖85  In his 
lecture series, Gaddis illustrated the unique set of influences that cultivated American foreign 
policy and argued that contrary to the opinion of many, the foreign policy posited by the 
Bush Administration after 9/11 had its origins deep in the traditional American approach to 
international relations.  While he has not been intricately drawn upon during the course of 
this thesis, it was Gaddis‘s main argument and broader philosophy – pertaining to the 
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intrinsic pervasiveness of the United States‘ preventive assertions in US history – which this 
researcher subscribed to, and more significantly, expanded on through the case studies 
pertaining to the Soviet Union, China and North Korea. 
 
Indeed, in the context of North Korea, the actual notion of using preventive military force to 
preclude North Korea from obtaining a nuclear arsenal became very much a possibility 
during the period of 1993-1994.   Not wanting to take any chances with what was perceived 
as a hostile regime, many in the US advocated ―seizing the initiative‖ and striking first via 
preventive war.  It can be argued that due to its unprecedented media coverage, preventive 
war thinking during the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis commanded a wide range of 
support throughout the US government as well as the general population.  For the likes of 
Larry DiRita of the conservative Heritage Foundation, rather than looking to appease one of 
the last remaining ―Stalinist dictatorships‖ in the world, [the Clinton Administration] should 
have set a deadline for North Korea to allow international inspectors, or else imposed 
sanctions and considered destroying their military headquarters, ballistic missile launch sites, 
or command and control facilities.
86
  Moreover, National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, 
was prepared to run the risk of a violent North Korean reaction to sanctions and even 
undertake preventive air strikes if it meant stopping Pyongyang from obtaining a nuclear 
arsenal. For Lake, North Korea‘s effort to develop a nuclear capability was especially 
dangerous because of their ballistic missile program and the high likelihood that Pyongyang 
would export both technologies to other rogue states.
87
  According to William Perry‘s 
―Remarks by Secretary of Defense William Perry to the Asia Society,‖ Lake believed that 
North Korea had become one of the foremost merchants of [ballistic missiles] weapons, had 
sold Scud missiles to Syria and Iran, was actively marketing its next generation of ballistic 
missiles, and in short, if it developed nuclear weapons, the United States would face an 
extremely volatile situation.
88
  However, as expressed by Richard Cronin in ―Practical 
Constraints on US Policy,‖ while the preventive option was a consideration, the inhibitions 
pertaining to the very high probability that North Korea would retaliate against the US 
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became a distinct concern.
89
  Robert Litwak further articulated the potential risk of a 
preventive war in ―The New Calculus of Pre-emption,‖ arguing that the North Koreans did 
not distinguish between a narrow US counter-proliferation option on the North‘s nuclear 
facilities and general war.  On the American side, the fear of inadvertent escalation and 
catalytic war in which the possibility that a counter-proliferation strike on the North‘s nuclear 
infrastructure would provoke an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula, was a key policy 
determinant.
90
  
 
While it is impossible to fully comprehend the specific reason as to why each respective 
Administration chose not to employ the preventive war option – analytically it was difficult, 
if not unworkable, to separate normative concerns from strategic calculations.  Again, 
drawing from Lebow‘s ―Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?‖ – the 
former were ―intangible considerations that do not lend themselves to ready assessment let 
alone to quasi-quantification,‖ and based on the available information, it was fair to assume 
that the key US decision-makers in all of the cases reviewed in the above were more heavily 
influenced by the practical costs of said action.
91
  None of these Administrations were 
completely unaware or unmoved by the immorality and illegality associated with preventive 
war, however, it was clear that each one – from Truman and Eisenhower to Kennedy and 
Clinton – was ultimately willing (if not always able) under the ―right‖ conditions, to embark 
upon a preventive path of action irrespective of the moral costs.  As confirmed by 
Trachtenberg, ―the reason that a preventive war strategy was never adopted as policy… was 
that it did not make any strategic sense.‖92   Moreover, drawing on a more recent body of 
literature entitled, ―Preventive War and US Foreign Policy,‖ Trachtenberg argued that the 
―preventive‖ war term was one that endorsed the notion of force being used even if a country 
has not been attacked, ―but we also mean a policy rooted in concerns about the future, about 
what might happen tomorrow if nothing is done today.‖  By this definition it was evident that 
the Bush policy certainly qualified as a preventive war policy, however, did the ―adoption of 
that strategy of ‗prevention‘ mark a total break with American tradition, or did earlier 
Administrations, to one extent or another, also think in ‗preventive‘ terms?‖93  As further 
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affirmed by Trachtenberg, ―it turns out that the sort of thinking one finds in the Bush policy 
documents is not to be viewed as anomalous. Under Roosevelt and Truman, under 
Eisenhower and Kennedy, and even under Clinton in the 1990s, this kind of thinking came 
into play in a major way.‖94  Or as eloquently stated by Lavoy, and utilised in this thesis, the 
Bush Administration‘s ―new‖ national security strategy read much like ―old wine in a new 
bottle‖ and hardly represented the significant policy shift that many believed.  95 
 
The literature researched, considered, analysed and evaluated in this thesis illustrates the 
many instances in which preventive war has been seriously considered by previous 
Administrations – and in the context of Bush‘s National Security Strategy of 2002, cannot be 
deemed as ―new,‖ ―candid,‖ ―bold‖ and ―revolutionary.‖  In saying this, however, the Bush 
Doctrine should not be simply dismissed or defined as a doctrine of prevention alone, but also 
as one that advocated a nuclear weapon reassertion.  Indeed, the Bush Doctrine engendered a 
period (2002-2008) in which it released guidance documents pertaining to the resurgent role 
of nuclear weapons and the Bush Administration‘s overall quest to modernise US offensive 
forces and revitalise the nuclear military complex.  Nonetheless, it would be both remiss and 
incorrect to see this assertion as purely the result of the Bush Administration‘s policies.   
 
It was apparent that the Clinton Administration ignored its historic opportunity to reverse 
decades of dangerous and provocative nuclear weapons planning and can be considered as 
maintaining and contributing to the very base in which Bush was able to undertake his 
nuclear assault.  Amy Woolf, a specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense and 
Trade Division, maintained a comprehensive and regularly updated body of literature on the 
nuclear weapons development, including a sound insight into the Clinton era.  Entitled ―US 
Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure,‖ Woolf argued that during the 
Cold War, the United States maintained nuclear forces that were sized and structured to deter 
any attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, and if deterrence failed, to defeat 
the Soviet Union.
96
  In the period after the 1989 collapse of the Berlin wall and 1991 demise 
of the Soviet Union, officials in the US government and analysts outside government pursued 
numerous reviews and studies of US nuclear weapons policy and force structure.  While these 
                                               
94 Ibid. 
95 Peter Lavoy, ―What‘s New in the New US Strategy to Combat WMD?‖ Strategic Insights, I(10), December 2002, pp. 14-
27. 
96 Amy F. Woolf, US Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure, CRS Report for Congress, Updated 
January 23, 2008. 
36 
 
studies varied in scope, most attempted to define a new role for US nuclear weapons, 
including the appropriate size and structure of the US nuclear arsenal in the post-Cold War 
era.  Woolf argued that these attempted to not only end the hostile US-Soviet global rivalry, 
but to adapt to the emergence of new threats and regional challenges to US security – and 
contributed to the Clinton Administration‘s response to changes in the international security 
environment.
97
   
 
Aside from the end of the Cold War, it was also the coinciding Gulf War of 1990-1991 that 
defined and ensured the continued role of nuclear weapons within US security strategy.  As 
explained by Jason Ellis in his Washington Quarterly article entitled, ―The Best Defense: 
Counter-proliferation and US National Security,‖ while Iraq did not ultimately use chemical 
or biological weapons in the conflict, post-war intelligence into the nature of Iraqi WMD 
developments ―shocked‖ those within the national security community; startling even well 
informed observers and highlighted the potential susceptibility of US regional security 
strategy.
98
  In greater detail, Harald Müller, David Fisher and Wolfgang Kotter referred to the 
US Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) in which the Iraqi nuclear program was deemed to 
be ―massive‖ and closer to fielding a weapon than what people during the conflict realised.  
The ―target list‖ on January 16, 1991 contained two nuclear targets, but after the war, 
inspectors operating under the United Nations Special Commission eventually uncovered 
more than twenty sites involved in the Iraqi nuclear weapons program; sixteen of which were 
described as ―main facilities.‖99  As further articulated by Keaney and Eliot in the Gulf War 
Air Power Survey: Summary Report itself, it was concluded that ―the air campaign no more 
than inconvenienced Iraqi plans to field atomic weapons.‖100  The GWAPS study stated that, 
―we now know that the Iraqis‘ program to amass enough enriched uranium to begin 
producing atomic bombs was more extensive... further along, and considerably less 
vulnerable to air attack than was realized at the outset of Desert Storm.‖101  These above 
                                               
97 Ibid. 
98 Jason D. Ellis, ―The Best Defense: Counter-proliferation and US National Security,‖ The Washington Quarterly, 26(2) 
2003: p. 17.   
99 This point was made by Harald Müller, David Fisher and Wolfgang Kotter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order. 
London: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 131. They noted that, ―A taboo connected with the non-proliferation regime was 
broken during the Persian Gulf War. For the first time, nuclear facilities (at Tuwaitha) containing irradiated material were 
purposefully attacked. Previous attacks on nuclear facilities (at Osiraq and Bushehr) took place when no fuel had been 
introduced into the reactors.‖ 
100 Thomas A. Keaney & Eliot A. Cohen (eds) Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report. Washington, DC: USGPO, 
1993, pp. 78-79. Key Iraqi facilities remained undisturbed after 1,000 hours of air war. Only total defeat and subsequent 
inspection revealed the extent of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. 
101 Ibid., p. 82. This was the opinion of an American who participated in some of the IAEA inspection teams that went into 
Iraq under UN Resolution 687 in 1991. 
37 
 
bodies of literature were important in that they helped establish the historical context of the 
Clinton era and illustrated that despite the easy defeat of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, the post 
conflict ―findings‖ contributed to the reason as to why Clinton maintained the nuclear 
platform. 
 
As again stated by Ellis, while containment remained the United States‘ main focus, the 
Defense Department had undertaken a new strategy: developing military capabilities as a 
means to address WMD-armed regional adversaries – reflected in the release of Clinton‘s 
Counter-Proliferation Initiative of 1993.
102
  While there was a reasonable amount of formal 
government literature on this area (evaluated in Chapter Six of this thesis) there existed very 
few articles, journals or commentaries.  One of the most insightful, however, was Barry 
Schneider‘s McNair Paper entitled ―Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Pre-
emptive Counter-Proliferation.‖  Schneider defined the Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI) 
as ―providing the funding to prepare for combating foes with nuclear, biological, and 
chemical (NBC) and missile weapons on future battlefields,‖ improving monitoring for 
locating rival NBC/missile programs, improving theater defenses, and overall, vying to 
develop weapons capable of penetrating and destroying underground facilities.
103
  The CPI 
anticipated a ―troubled world‖ in which more states would acquire WMD; with some of those 
states governed by dangerous and hostile radical regimes.  As Schneider stated, ―hopefully, 
leaders of such states can be deterred from WMD use, however, it was for those states that 
were willing to accept risks, who were very dissatisfied with the status quo, and who may not 
be deterred by threats to their people or their nation‘s economy that the CPI was designed. 
―104  Schneider presented the Clinton approach in maintaining a sound strike force within US 
security strategy as a necessary requirement.  However, for Angus McColl, the Clinton 
approach appeared to pursue ―both paths‖ and was almost a conflict of interest.  As argued, 
many proponents of traditional diplomatic non-proliferation efforts feared that the coercive 
element of counter proliferation, especially the threat to use military force, would undermine 
the international cooperation and consensus upon which non-proliferation depended on for its 
success.  He also criticised counter-proliferation as a short-term solution to the WMD 
proliferation.  Indeed, McColl‘s depiction presented a view extensively held by many at the 
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time who argued that for all of Clinton‘s internationalist rhetoric, the maintenance of US 
hegemony and power was paramount to his Administration‘s security policy framework. 
 
This was clearly evident with the release of the Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations 
(Joint Pub 3-12.1), the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD) 60.  According to Kristensen, in his paper entitled, ―Nuclear Futures: 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy,‖ Joint Pub 3-12.1 
translated the overall joint nuclear doctrine in which nuclear weapons could be used in 
regional scenarios in which short, medium, and intermediate-range missiles capable of 
carrying nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads, were the primary target.
105
  In his article 
entitled, ―Backwards Into the Future: How the Quadrennial Defense Review Prepares 
America for the Wrong Century,‖ Carl Conetta extended on Kristensen‘s presentation, 
arguing that the QDR advocated the continuum of nuclear superiority and the role accorded 
to military power as a means of influence in the attainment of national goals.
106
  According to 
Jeffrey Smith in ―Clinton Directive Changes Strategy On Nuclear Arms,‖ the Presidential 
Decision Directive (PDD) 60 released during the same year, expanded on the position of the 
QDR and how it ―would permit‖ US nuclear strikes after enemy attacks had used chemical or 
biological weapons.  Foreshadowing the period that would be extensively acted upon by the 
Bush Administration, Smith informed his readers that rogue states, ―a terminology commonly 
used by the Pentagon for countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria,‖ were 
specifically listed as possible targets in the event of regional conflicts or crises.‖107  While 
these bodies of literature did not necessarily delve into the intricacies of Clinton‘s nuclear 
guidance documents, they nonetheless illustrated the extent to which Clinton himself retained 
and cultivated the United States‘ nuclear posture. 
 
However, while maintaining the nuclear role as affirmed under Clinton, the Bush 
Administration upon attaining power in November 2000 provided a different description of 
what this role would entail.  Indeed, Bush assumed that nuclear weapons would be a part of 
US security strategy for at least the next 50 years.  Given this timeframe, the Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR) of 2002 recommended that the United States should undertake a development 
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process of its weapons systems that would enter the force in the years between 2020 and 
2040.  It was clear that the Bush Administration did not assume that the current systems in 
the US nuclear arsenal would be the last, and that to have an efficient nuclear option would 
involve redevelopment of such systems – even with the potential of creating a new nuclear 
weapon.  As an extension of the broader National Security Strategy posited two months 
earlier in September 2002, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(NSCWMD) illustrated that Bush‘s policy was a deviation in direction that endorsed and 
advocated an assertive nuclear weapon policy.  While the Clinton Administration reaffirmed 
earlier US pledges not to use nuclear weapons to attack non-nuclear weapon states-parties to 
the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), at the same time, it kept open the option to use 
nuclear weapons, even in nuclear weapon free zones.  In essence, according to Mendelsohn in 
his article entitled, ―The Muddle of US Nuclear Weapons Strategy,‖ both Administrations 
found new reasons as to why nuclear weapons would remain vital to US security while they 
sought to keep the rest of the world denuclearized.
108
  Clinton retained much of the existing 
nuclear weapons policy and force posture in the 1990s in US security strategy through his 
own guidance documents/instruments – the Defense Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI) 
1993, Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 1994, Doctrines for Joint Nuclear Operations (Joint 
Pub 3-12) 1993/1995, Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations 1996, Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) 1997 and Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 60 1997.  
Nonetheless, and as a defining argument of this thesis, the Bush Administration‘s expansion 
on this Clinton ―platform‖ through the amplification of the role of nuclear weapons – to the 
extent that they could be considered and used as a distinct option against potential nuclear, 
biological, and chemical threats from other states and non-state actors – was, in essence, the 
true ―radical,‖ ―new‖ and ―bold‖ assertion of his National Security Strategy of 2002. 
 
One of the very few bodies of literature at the time that was able to highlight the linkage 
between the National Security Strategy of 2002 and the nuclear option was George 
Perkovich‘s Foreign Affair article entitled, ―Bush‘s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in 
Non-proliferation.‖  The writer evaluated the extent to which the Bush Administration‘s 
National Security Strategy of 2002 and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (NSCWMD) of December 2002 engendered a nuclear revitalisation, deeming it 
as the dangerously radical aspect of the document and a strategy in which international 
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cooperation in enforcing non-proliferation commitments would be reduced.
109
  He argued that 
while America‘s willingness to use force against emergent WMD threats, as in Iraq, could 
―stir the limbs of the international body politic to action,‖ an effective approach in reducing 
nuclear dangers over the long-term should encompass a broader, multilateral approach.
110
  
Perkovich asserted that Administration conservatives at the time of the NSCWMDs release – 
Robert Joseph (the National Security Council‘s Senior Counter-proliferation Official), 
Douglas Feith (Undersecretary of Defense), John Bolton (Undersecretary of State), and 
Stephen Cambone (Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense) – did not view nuclear 
weapons as the issue, but those non-state and state based actors they categorised as ―bad 
guys.‖111  For Perkovich, the ―doctrine‖ and the above officials sought not to create a 
balanced global order that actively devalued nuclear weapons and conditions for their 
eventual demise, but rather, sought to eradicate those actors it defined as being ―evil,‖ while 
leaving the ―good guys‖ free of nuclear constraints.  While Perkovich did indeed refer 
extensively to the nuclear option posited in the National Security Strategy of 2002, the sheer 
fact that his article was published in 2003 placed distinct limitations on its value.  
Nonetheless, his identification and focus on the nuclear aspect of the ―doctrine‖ rather than 
preventive/pre-emptive concerns, provided an invaluable insight to this researcher and 
leverage to investigate the future nuclear policy instruments that the Bush Doctrine 
engendered.   
 
In what can be defined as another influential paper on the Bush nuclear assertion, Russell and 
Wirtz‘s ―A Quiet Revolution: The New Nuclear Triad in Strategic Insights,‖ argued that 
while the Bush Administration advocated the reduction of operationally-deployed nuclear 
forces to 1,700-2,200 warheads by 2012, it ambiguously vied for a ―flexible‖ and ―responsive 
nuclear force‖ that could be ―uploaded within days.‖112  As further stated, the Bush new triad 
encompassed a wider range of options available in which the United States would have what 
it deemed to be ―an appropriate way to respond to aggression, thereby bolstering 
deterrence.‖113  The most concerning aspect of the new triad was the greater flexibility it gave 
to the Administration.  As Russell and Wirtz posited, it enabled the avoidance of bureaucratic 
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impediments in changing what constituted one of the most respected elements of the nuclear 
creed that shaped the US nuclear doctrine, ―the sanctity of the old (Cold War) triad of forces 
and the focus on guaranteeing a massive nuclear response under any circumstances.‖114  Like 
Perkovich, Russel and Wirtz‘s article was an influential starting point as to what this 
researcher perceived to be an obvious gap.  That is, having written their article in 2002, it was 
clear that there was an extensive period thereafter in which this ―quiet revolution‖ was 
expanded on through other guidance documents that the National Security Strategy indirectly 
and directly spawned over the next six-seven years.  The Bush nuclear reassertion was also 
conveyed in Therese Hitchens‘ article entitled, ―Slipping Down the Nuclear Slope: Bush 
Administration Nuclear Policy Lowers Bar Against Usage.‖  For Hitchens, the Nuclear 
Posture Review (NPR) could essentially be defined as an integrated release that provided a 
more detailed insight into a key artery of the ―doctrine‖ itself, namely, the concept of 
assertive counter-proliferation.  While both documents (NSS and NPR) called explicitly for 
pre-emptive or preventive nuclear strikes, taken together they represented an alteration in US 
―declaratory policy regarding nuclear weapons use.‖115  Furthermore, in Norris and 
Kristensen‘s ―Nuclear Insecurity: A Critique of the Bush Administration‘s Nuclear Weapons 
Policies,‖ it was argued that the NPR reversed notions of post-Cold War progress by 
expanding the range of potential conflicts in which nuclear weapons could be employed; 
advocating the design and building of a new generation of warheads to meet these perceived 
needs; and putting in place a planning and command structure that would make it easier to 
plan and launch nuclear attacks.
116
 
 
In many ways Hans Kristensen can be regarded as a lone exponent in documenting the 
guidance instruments employed by the Bush Administration during the period of 2002-2008 
and has been important to the research of this thesis.  Indeed, the National Security Strategy 
of 2002 and subsequent documents and policy instruments pertaining to the reinvigorated 
nuclear option it engendered (including the Global Strike mission) signified much more than 
a hypothetical ―what if?‖  For Kristensen, they illustrated real change in US planning and 
assumptions about the use of nuclear weapons.  This was no better described than in his paper 
on Bush‘s CONPLAN 8022 entitled, ―US National Security Strategy and Pre-emption,‖ 
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which he defined as an offensive war plan created specifically to support and substantiate the 
Administration‘s willingness to strike first.117  It was evident that the nuclear option in 
CONPLAN 8022 was not about influencing adversaries but about destroying targets that 
could not be destroyed by other means.  According to Kristensen, the underlying premise was 
that deterrence was ultimately flawed and limited, and as such, when it did fail, nuclear 
weapons would be available and used accordingly.  In his Washington Post article, ―Not Just 
a Last Resort?‖ – William M. Arkin argued that CONPLAN 8022 anticipated two different 
scenarios.  The first was a response to a specific and imminent nuclear threat – a quick-
reaction, highly choreographed strike that would combine pinpoint bombing with electronic 
warfare and cyberattacks to disable a rogue proliferators‘ response.  The second scenario 
involved a more generic attack on an adversary‘s WMD infrastructure, entailing 
multidimensional bombing (kinetic) and cyber warfare (non-kinetic) attacks that would seek 
to destroy the rogue actor‘s program.  As the first public articulation of CONPLAN 8022, 
Arkin was able to clearly convey the significant development in Bush‘s nuclear war fighting 
plans in which a specially configured earth-penetrating bomb to destroy deeply buried 
facilities was ―particularly disconcerting.‖  As further argued, the global strike plan held the 
nuclear option in reserve if intelligence suggested an ―imminent‖ launch of an enemy nuclear 
strike on the United States, or, if there was a need to destroy hard-to-reach targets.
118
   
 
The ―quiet revolution‖ alluded to in 2002 by Russell and Wirtz and expanded on during the 
course of this thesis was reflected in the analysis given to Bush‘s ―Complex 2030‖ and the 
encompassing Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program.  Under the US Department 
of Energy‘s (DOE) Complex 2030, it was envisaged that the entire US nuclear weapons 
complex would be upgraded which would include the design and production of a series of 
new nuclear warheads.
119
  As expected, the RRW program evoked varying levels of opinion.  
In his article entitled, ―New Reasons to Reject New Warheads,‖ Daryl Kimball argued that 
―the plutonium research results obliterated the chief rationale for NNSA‘s emerging strategy‖ 
of RRW,
120
 while an Editorial in the New York Times, entitled ―Busywork for Nuclear 
Scientists,‖ stated that RRW was ―a public-relations disaster in the making; a make-work 
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program championed by the weapons laboratories and belatedly by the Pentagon.‖121  Indeed, 
while Complex 2030 and the RRW it encompassed were depicted by the NNSA as 
developing a smaller and efficient nuclear weapons complex, designed for the 21
st
 century 
with safety and security in mind, others were more wary.  Of course, the proposition of 
actually developing a new nuclear weapon engendered varying levels of debate; however, 
this was surprisingly limited, often taking a back seat to the flailing situations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  In what can be defined as a comprehensive body of literature, updated right up 
until the demise of the Reliable Replacement Warhead program itself, John Medalia 
documented such debates in his Congressional Research Service report entitled, The Reliable 
Replacement Warhead Program: Background and Current Developments.  In very simple 
prose, Medalia argued that the opponents of the RRW anticipated that reliable replacement 
weapons (RRWs), like any other product, would have ―birth defects‖ and believed that such 
defects could require a larger stockpile.  Conversely, those who were for a reinvigorated 
nuclear option lamented that if nothing was done, confidence in the stockpile would decline, 
and with it, according to Medalia, the ability of the US to assure allies that its deterrent 
capacity was sound and able ―to dissuade competitors from beginning nuclear programs, to 
deter adversaries, and if necessary to defeat enemies, as called for in the 2001 Nuclear 
Posture Review and National Security Strategy of 2002.‖122   
 
While the literature surrounding and deriving from the release of the National Security 
Strategy of 2002 has been evident and relatively easy to attain, the presentation and analyses 
have often been limited based on fragmentation, inconsistency and timeframe.  To some 
extent it appears that the re-election of Bush in the 2004 election, combined with the flailing 
campaign in Iraq, ended or even discounted many permeating debates that were very much 
present during the period of 2002-2004.  Aside from bridging the apparent gap in coherency 
and timeframe – particularly in terms of defining and evaluating pre-emption and prevention 
in both a contemporary and historical context – many writers and commentators have failed 
to acknowledge the true ―radical‖ aspect of ―the doctrine.‖  That being, the reassertion of the 
nuclear option posited in Chapters Five and Nine in the National Security Strategy and 
cultivated over the remaining six years of Bush‘s presidency.  While most scholars and 
commentators focussed on the invocation of ―pre-emptive‖ military action to counter enemies 
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seeking ―the world‘s most destructive technologies,‖123 the Bush Administration in the 
process relinquished most notions of non-proliferation and pursued an approach where 
counter-proliferation and nuclear weapon development took precedent.  It is here that the 
Bush Doctrine can be viewed as the initiator and catalyst of the subsequent nuclear weapon 
policy – in particular, the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, CONPLAN (Concept Plan) 8022 (Global Strike), the 
abandoned 2005 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review, the 2006 Strategic Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0, and the recent 
Reliable Replacement Warhead program.  Indeed, only a few writers made the connection 
that while the National Security of 2002 was a document advocating prevention, it was the 
subsequent policy instruments it spawned during the period between 2002-2008 that 
foreshadowed a new nuclear era in which the once termed ―weapon of last resort‖ became a 
usable and, according to the Bush Administration, necessary war-fighting option. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
123 Perkovich, ―Bush‘s Nuclear Revolution.‖ 
45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
The Bush Doctrine:  
Implicit in Previous 
National Security Strategy  
Doctrines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Although only ―formally‖ introduced to the American public in 2002, the theoretical logic 
underlying the Bush Doctrine, including perceptions of threat and counter-proliferation,
124
 
has long pervaded the strategic thought of policy-makers, officials, and military planners at 
the highest levels of the US government.   Despite its frequent portrayal as a radically new or 
revolutionary National Security Strategy, the Bush Doctrine was, in fact, neither new nor 
revolutionary.  As this chapter will argue, the National Security Strategy of 2002 and its 
advocacy of strategic counter-proliferation policies as a means to impede potential and real 
adversaries, has been a driving force behind each National Security Strategy release since its 
inception in 1987.  These official strategy documents were initiated as a result of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act defense reforms
125
 and as this chapter will illustrate, have provided 
an overview of the US Administration‘s perceptions of the international security 
environment, including WMD threats and arms control opportunities.  This chapter will also 
trace the presidential vision and rhetoric regarding several Administrations‘ counter-
proliferation policy goals, objectives and initiatives.  While there is no doubt that the National 
Security Strategy of 2002 considered the inclusion of preventive attacks into the equation 
(detailed in Chapter Three), the notion of countering and documenting such perceived threats 
into formal doctrine, has been clearly evident in each National Security Strategy release since 
1987.  The National Security Strategy of 2002 and its premise to counter and thwart the 
perceived threat of the day merely continued the National Security Strategy trend. 
 
The National Security Strategy process began in 1986 when the Goldwater-Nichols 
legislative stipulated that each Administration would be required to release a report, 
specifying their national security strategy, goals and vision: 
 
The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on 
the national security strategy of the United States… Each national security 
strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States 
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and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following: 
(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objective of the United States that are 
vital to the national security of the United States. (2) The foreign policy, 
worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States 
necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of 
the United States. (3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the 
political, economic, military, and other elements of national power of the United 
States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives 
referred to in paragraph (1). (4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United 
States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including 
an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of national 
power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security 
strategy. (5) Such other measure as may be helpful to inform Congress on 
matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.
126
 
 
Through the above language – a small component of a much larger reform package known as 
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 – the Congress 
amended the National Security Act of 1947, stipulating that the President was required to 
annually submit a written version of his security strategy.  It was an attempt by Congress to 
legislate ―a solution‖ to what it, and many observers, deemed to be a legitimate and 
significant issue of the US governmental processes.  That being, an inability within the 
executive branch to formulate – in a coherent and integrated fashion, judiciously using 
resources drawn from all elements of national power – the mid and long-term strategy 
necessary to defend and further those interests vital to the nation‘s security.  At the time very 
few in Congress doubted that a grand strategy existed.  The nation had been following 
―containment‖ in one form or another for over 40 years. What they doubted, or disagreed 
with, was its focus in terms of values, interests and objectives; its unity in terms of relating 
means to ends; its integration in terms of the elements of power; and its time horizon.
127
  As 
stated by Don Snider, ―in theory, at least to the reformers, a clearly written strategy would 
serve to clarify and inform the Congress better on the needs for resources to execute the 
strategy, thus facilitating the annual authorization and appropriation processes, particularly 
for the Department of Defense.‖128 
 
In practice, since the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Administrations have submitted national 
security strategies regularly, although not always precisely on schedule.  The Reagan 
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Administration submitted two (1987, 1988); the first Bush Administration submitted three 
(1990, 1991, and 1993); and the Clinton Administration submitted seven (this chapter will 
focus on 1994, 1995, 1998 and 2000).  The second Bush Administration twice submitted a 
document entitled National Security Strategy of the United States of America, in September 
2002 and March 2006.
129
  The 2002 Strategy described the global strategic context, named 
broad goals (―political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and 
respect for human dignity‖), and described eight broad areas of effort designed to meet those 
goals.  For each area, the Strategy listed subset initiatives but did not describe how they 
would be achieved and did not assign responsibility for achieving them to specific agencies.  
Neither the eight major areas, nor the subsets within any area, were prioritised.
130
  The 2006 
Strategy maintained the same basic format, though it added an additional area of effort 
(―challenges and opportunities of globalisation‖) for a total of nine, and included, in each 
area, a discussion of ―successes‖ since 2002.131   
 
Before discussing the individual reports that have preceded the National Security Strategy of 
2002, it is important to understand the broader context in which these reports have been 
produced.  First, it should be noted that the requirement for the report did not originate 
exclusively from within the Congress.  In fact, the Congress was, at the time of the 
Goldwater-Nichols legislation, much more interested in reforming the Department of 
Defense.  As stated, ―what was reformed – east of the Potomac was of much less interest.‖132  
Like most bodies of legislation, the notion of a Presidential statement of grand strategy had 
been developing for several years in many locations – think tanks, public-minded citizens, 
former government officials, professional associations, academics and specific interest 
groups.
133
  In what could be regarded as an open and pluralistic process, each proponent had 
its own motivation for advocating such a statement and, as a result, had differing expectations 
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of what the structure, content and use of the final report would be.  As again articulated by 
Snider, ―in retrospect, it is clear that inclusion of the requirement for such a report in the final 
Goldwater-Nichols bill followed one of the better known maxims of the policy community – 
‗if we can agree on what we want, let‘s not try to agree on why we want it.‘‖134  Another 
important aspect related to the question of language.  That is, what was national security 
strategy, as opposed to grand strategy, or defense strategy or even national military strategy?  
What were the distinguishable elements of power of the United States and the boundaries 
between them?  How could national security strategy subsume foreign policy as the Act 
seemed to imply by its language?  Obviously, there was no defined consensus on this 
language in either academia, ―where the public servants in Washington earlier took their 
training,‖ or in Washington ―where they practice their arts.‖135  Within the interagency arena, 
where responsibilities for the preparation for this particular report were perceived as direct 
access to the President‘s overall agenda, and hence highly desirable – there initially existed 
little consensus as to the components of a national security strategy and what represented 
coherence.  Nonetheless, what has been apparent in each National Security Strategy, 
regardless of the nuances of language and rhetoric, has been the government of the day and 
their preoccupation with the ways and means to counter and thwart those adversarial forces 
that may undermine the Unites States‘ well-being, national interest and security. 
 
Indeed, as the main focus of this thesis, the National Security Strategy of 2002, or Bush 
Doctrine, was created and defined incrementally over a span of eight months in 2002, 
beginning with the State of the Union address.  It was here that Bush emphasised the need for 
an assertive form of counter-proliferation.  As stated: 
 
States like these [Iraq, Iran, and North Korea], and their terrorist allies, 
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.  By seeking 
weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger 
...All nations should know:  America will do what is necessary to ensure our 
nation‘s security.  We will be deliberate, yet time is not on our side.  I will not 
wait on events, while dangers gather.  I will not stand as peril draws closer and 
closer. The United States of America will not permit the world‘s most dangerous 
regimes to threaten us with the world‘s most destructive weapons. 136 
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Six months later, in a Commencement Speech to the US Military Academy at West Point, 
Bush elaborated upon the burgeoning national security doctrine, emphasising the need for a 
more forward thinking strategy: 
 
…If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.  We 
must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst 
threats before they emerge...our security will require... preventive action when 
necessary – to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.  In the world we have 
entered, the only path to safety is the path of action.  And this nation will act.
137
 
 
Of course, in the actual National Security Strategy of 2002 itself, the above sentiments were 
further articulated: 
 
Proactive counter-proliferation efforts in which the United States must deter and 
defend against the threat before it is unleashed... it will ensure that key 
capabilities – detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce 
capabilities – are integrated into our defense transformation and homeland 
security systems. Counter-proliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, 
training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we 
can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.
138
 
 
It was clear that the Bush Administration was determined to ―prevent any hostile power from 
dominating regions whose resources would allow it to attain great power status (like Iraq or 
Iran in the oil-rich Middle East); discourage attempts by any other nation to challenge US 
leadership or upset the established political and economic order and should prevent the 
emergence of any potential ‗competitors.‘‖139  As Walter Mead articulated, ―Over time there 
has been a distinct shift in American thinking toward the need for overwhelming military 
superiority as the surest foundation for national security.  This is partly for the obvious 
reasons of greater security, but it is partly also because supremacy can have an important 
deterrent effect.  If [the US] achieves such a degree of military supremacy in which 
challenges seem hopeless, other states might give up trying… establishing an overwhelming 
military supremacy might... deter potential enemies from military attack.‖140  Additionally, as 
asserted by Jeffrey Record, ―rogue states‘ possession of nuclear weapons is seen as a threat 
not so much to the US itself but rather to the US freedom of military action necessary to 
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sustain US global military supremacy... the US has declared a use of force doctrine that 
includes preventive war...that serves the state goal of perpetual global military primacy... the 
underlying objective... may well be to prevent rogue states from deterring the US.‖141  
Finally, as James Mann articulated: 
  
In the post-Cold War world the goal of American policy will be to ‗prevent any 
hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under 
consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power‘... ‗preclude any 
hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests.‘ The US will 
become so militarily strong, so overwhelming that no country would dream of 
ever becoming a rival.  America will build up its military lead to such an extent 
that other countries would be dissuaded from even starting to compete with the 
US It would actively work to maintain its pre-eminence... America would not sit 
back and wait for threats or rivals to emerge... Thus ensuring that the US would 
be the world‘s lone superpower not just today or ten years from now but 
permanently.
142
   
 
Accordingly, the National Security Strategy of 2002 expressed the view that the US enjoyed 
―unparalleled military strength and economic and political influence‖ and would work to 
―keep [the] military‘s strengths beyond challenge,‖ maintain forces ―strong enough to 
dissuade potential adversaries from trying to equal or surpass the power of the US,‖ and 
―build a balance of power that favors‖ what the US deemed to be its broader national interest 
objectives pertaining to the international arena.
143
  While proponents of the Bush Doctrine 
contended that an urgent and unprecedented threat revolution was well under way that 
required new and proactive approaches, critics of the Bush Doctrine viewed its espousal of 
preventive war in its counter-proliferation repertoire as further testimony to American 
unilateralism and arrogance; ―a reckless setting of a dangerous precedent that other states will 
exploit to mask aggression‖ and perhaps most importantly, a fundamentally unnecessary 
departure from the traditional, time-tested strategies of deterrence and containment that 
figured so importantly in defeating the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
144
  Many have 
argued that the Bush Doctrine was something entirely ―new,‖ ―candid,‖ ―bold‖ and 
―revolutionary,‖ a radical doctrine the likes of which the world had never seen and ―perhaps 
the most sweeping reformulation of US strategic thinking in more than half a century.‖145  In 
terms of its endorsement of preventive attacks, this may be the case.  But as the next three 
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chapters will argue, the notion of prevention has long been a consideration and option of the 
United States.  However, as the remainder of this chapter will illustrate, the National Security 
Strategy of 2002 when taken in comparison to the National Security Strategies that have 
preceded it, has merely continued the US foreign policy desire to counter proliferators and 
those adversarial states and non-state actors that could undermine the United States‘ national 
interest objectives and broader hegemonic aspirations. 
 
National Security Strategy (NSS1987) 
Released in 1987, the first National Security Strategy (NSS1987) emphasised an approach 
that all Administrations have since continued to pursue in each NSS release; that being, the 
preservation of US power and strategies to counter those states or actors deemed as having 
the potential to impede such power.  The Administration‘s authors of the NSS1987 
emphasised that while the document was only a guide, it was extensively rooted in broad US 
national interests and objectives, integrating all aspects of national power as a means to 
achieve these objectives.  As NSS1987 posited, the overarching national interests were: (1) 
US survival; (2) the US economy; (3) democratic growth and free trade; (4) world stability 
and security; and (5) US alliances.  Of course, the number one objective was to deter hostile 
attacks on the US homeland.  Objective 3 cited adapting efficiently with threats including 
international terrorism, while Objective 4 specified preventing and countering the spread of 
nuclear weapons.  Reflecting the Cold War context, the NSS1987 defined the USSR as the 
core threat to US interests and argued that the USSR‘s intent was still focussed on altering the 
international system and promoting Soviet global hegemony.  However, the NSS1987 was 
also concerned with the proliferation of nuclear weapons amongst smaller states, as well as 
broader international terrorism – depicted as worldwide, frequent, indiscriminate and state 
supported.
146
  It singled out terrorism as a prominent feature of the international landscape for 
the remainder of the century and identified that effective counterterrorism was now to be a 
major US national security objective.  The document‘s section on foreign and regional 
policies emphasised the need to thwart state-sponsored terrorism, specifically in Libya, Syria, 
and Iran.
147
   
 
The defense policy section argued that it was now necessary for US forces to defend against 
aggression across the entire spectrum of potential conflict, ―forward deploy‖ to defend US 
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interests ―as far from North America as possible,‖ and to seek security though ―America‘s 
national genius for technological innovation.‖148  US defense policy was to be furthered by 
advancing US strengths against Soviet weakness, driven by (1) US technology; (2) a 
competitive strategies approach;
149
 (3) alliances; and (4) strong individuals (highlighted as a 
characteristic of people in Western societies).
150
  The remaining section of the NSS1987 
focussed on arms control, stipulating that ongoing negotiations with the USSR were not 
efficient in addressing the emerging threats from other potential proliferators.  NSS1987 
highlighted the core objectives articulated in David Packard‘s Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense Management, in which improving the quality of strategic planning – promoting a 
tighter linkage among strategy, military requirements, and acquisition programs; and 
maximising the military benefits for each defense dollar spent – was emphasised.  The 
Packard Commission also recommended organisational changes, including unified (four star) 
joint commands for transportation and special operations that encompassed new DOD staff 
positions for special operations and coordinating boards at the National Security Council 
level.  Additional organisational reforms included an Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition in order to reorganise DOD procurement functions.  Finally, the Commission 
called for a two-year budget cycle to enhance stability.  The final components of the 
NSS1987 argued for a sounder integration of national security capabilities via the National 
Security Council‘s interagency working groups and its production of national security 
decision directives, while also improving Administration and Congressional collaboration.
151
  
As the first formal National Security Strategy, the 1987 document established the tone that 
has since become implicit in each formal ―doctrine;‖ that being, the presidential vision, 
policy goals, objectives and initiatives that the United States would undertake as a means to 
counter those states and non-state actors deemed as having the potential to impinge upon its 
national security interests. 
 
National Security Strategy of 1988 (NSS1988) 
As a continuum of the NSS1987 and the last Cold War NSS, the National Security Strategy 
of 1988 (NSS1988) emphasised the core concerns of the previous year, noting that ―the 
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fundamentals of our strategy change little from year to year; our interests and objectives are 
derived from enduring values.‖152  NSS1988 continued a realist framework based on US 
values and interests, along with an apparent willingness to undertake a form of dialogue with 
adversaries.
153
  However, the NSS1988 did emphasise a major objective: ―To prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons‖ and counter the threat from ―state-sponsored terrorism.‖154  In the 
year prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the official strategy noted that while the USSR was 
still the primary threat, other emerging threats with the potential for nuclear proliferation, as 
well as from ―radical politico-religious movements,‖ including Iranian sponsored terrorism in 
the Persian Gulf and Lebanon were now to be a focus of US counter efforts.
 155
  Indeed, as the 
document contended, the use of terror against US personnel and facilities in the Middle East 
and the spread of nuclear weapons in exacerbating regional conflict were all now perceived 
as significant security concerns.  NSS1988 also addressed the importance of intelligence in 
controlling and reducing the threats of terrorism.  It described Iran as the driver behind the 
continuity and escalation in the Iran-Iraq War, and interestingly, acknowledged the 
Administration‘s leaning towards Iraq.156  In executing US strategy, the NSS expressed 
themes of gaining an innovation-technological edge through a revolution in military 
technology and the leveraging of US economic power and technology in the third world 
during what it viewed to be a period of international security transition.
157
   
 
National Security Strategy of 1990 (NSS1990) 
Published immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the National Security Strategy of 
1990 (NSS1990) referred to the sweeping changes that were taking place in the international 
arena at that time.
158
  Nonetheless, the formal document remained consistent with previous 
NSS documents in its emphasis on adapting efficiently with threats short of war that included 
international terrorism and the transfer of critical military technologies – particularly the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction.
159
  Reaffirming previous themes, NSS1990 reasserted 
a commitment to impeding the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass 
destruction, the means to produce them and the associated long-range delivery systems.
160
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Regarding arms control, the document emphasised a ―comprehensive approach‖ featuring 
stringent controls and multilateral cooperation – particularly the strengthening of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
161
 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
162
 
and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
163
  The arms control section argued for 
the need to use diplomatic, economic and security assistance instruments as a means to 
address the underlying causes of tension and insecurity, including the causes for states that 
seek advanced weaponry.
164
  With the fall of the Soviet Union apparent, NSS1990 called for 
a new approach and direction in the post-Cold War era.
165
  As stated: 
 
We will not let that opportunity pass, nor will we shrink from the challenges 
created by new conditions.  Our response will require strategic vision – a clear 
perception of our goals, our interests, and the means available to achieve and 
protect them.  The essence of strategy is determining priorities.  We will make 
the hard choices.   This Report outlines the direction we will take to protect the 
legacy of the post-war era while enabling the United States to help shape a new 
era, one that moves beyond containment and that will take us into the next 
century.
166
 
 
National Security Strategy of 1991 (NSS1991) 
Indeed, the National Security Strategy of 1991 (NSS1991) preface included a reference to 
establishing and creating a ―New World Order‖ and that the Gulf War would serve as a 
―crucible‖ to its implementation. 167  While there was a clear focus on the USSR and its six 
thousand strategic nuclear weapons and three million soldiers, the earlier pages continued to 
emphasise the significance in countering the threat of international terrorism.
168
  New in the 
document was the demand that Iraq comply with United Nations Security Council Resolution 
687, in which Iraqi WMD, including biological weapons and related facilities had to be 
destroyed.  NSS1991 also discussed the potential for improving relations with Iran, based on 
the condition that they did not support terrorism.  Additionally, the Administration stated that 
it would monitor Libya and their alleged terror and WMD proliferation programs.  The final 
state identified by NSS1991 was Pakistan and how the influence of the Presler Amendment 
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was preventing the resumption of full political and economic relations without an 
Administration certification of the termination of the Pakistani nuclear program.
169
  
Additionally, George H.W. Bush Administration‘s NSS1991 included a new section entitled, 
―Stemming Proliferation.‖170  The section stated that of all arms control objectives none was 
more urgent than thwarting the global proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons and the missiles to deliver them.  The NSS posited three major Persian Gulf War 
lessons regarding WMD proliferation and arms control.  Firstly, it argued that an 
international agreement may enable compliance, but was not enough to ensure it.  The 
Administration cited evidence that Iraq had signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1968 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, yet they had used chemical weapons and continued to exhibit 
nuclear aspirations.  As the second point, NSS1991 stipulated the need for stronger export 
controls; while thirdly, it argued that a successful non-proliferation strategy must be refined 
as a means to address underlying security concerns.  The Administration‘s prescription was to 
call for advanced weapons and the development of contingency plans to deal with 
proliferators should prevention fail.  
 
To address the above Gulf War lessons, the Administration proposed a three tiered non-
proliferation strategy.  Tier one included the strengthening of existing non-proliferation 
arrangements, while Tier two included the expansion of membership in the multilateral 
regimes directed against proliferation.  The third tier advocated the pursuit of new objectives, 
including revising guidelines for responsible conventional weapons transfers; the freezing of 
WMD weapons production and testing, including supersonic missiles; the expansion of the 
Non-proliferation Treaty and Chemical Weapons Convention; and strengthening the 
application of arms control and counter-proliferation agreements.  Other areas for program 
development pertained to technology transfer and trade issues, which included the tightening 
up of export controls and export licenses.  NSS1991 also proposed new standards for 
exporting super computers and increasing penalties to those states deemed to be contributing 
to proliferation.  More assertive rhetoric was included when highlighting the need to impede 
the export of chemical and biological weapons related material and technology, with stringent 
international controls and multilateral measures emphasised as a means to counter technology 
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transfers.
171
  One example of a program attaining successful outcomes was the twenty-nine 
nation Australian Group of major chemical suppliers – which had established common lists 
of chemical weapons precursors and equipments for chemical weapons manufacturing.  A 
second international agreement cited was the 1990 Missile Technology Control Regime, 
which the NSS argued should include new members to form an international consensus.  This 
was further articulated in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency‘s institutional role in technical assistance for civilian use nuclear energy (and 
safeguards of material for developing nuclear weapons), which were highlighted as being 
significant to global security. 
 
NSS1991 also provided a progress report on the George H.W. Bush Administration‘s 
counter-proliferation and arms control policies.
172
  The report stated that the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 and the UN Special Commission‘s efforts to 
dismantle all nuclear weapons and related activities in Iraq had been undertaken with relative 
success.  It also positively endorsed Argentina and Brazil‘s acceptance of IAEA safeguards 
on their nuclear facilities and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which declared Latin America a 
nuclear weapons-free zone.  The NSS endorsed India and Pakistan‘s agreement on banning 
the attack or destruction of each others‘ nuclear facilities.  The Administration also claimed 
intelligence successes in locating threats from narco-traffickers, terrorists and advanced 
weapons proliferators.  In relation to its ―defense agenda‖ for the 1990s, Section V 
highlighted the four fundamental demands, including: strategic deterrence; forward presence; 
crisis response; and the capacity for reconstitution.
173
  This section included the need for civil 
defense programs as a means to address the consequences of a nuclear attack and the 
improvement of capabilities for responding to natural and human-engendered disasters.  The 
Administration also called for improving the safety, testing, and modernisation of nuclear 
weapons and production facilities.  NSS1991‘s concluding section stated that ―The 20th 
century has taught us that security is indivisible.‖174  It emphasised how the threat of 
proliferation of weapons of destruction have ―begun to draw the communities of nations 
together in common concern;‖175  emphasising the principle of working with others in the 
global community to resolve regional disputes and thwart weapons proliferation.  
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National Security Strategy of 1993 (NSS1993) 
The last of the three National Security Strategy reports of the Bush Administration was 
published in January 1993, just before the inauguration of President-elect Bill Clinton.  A 
draft had been prepared in early 1992, but several summits and the press of the 1992 
campaign precluded its completion.  Another contributing factor was the content of that 
campaign, which focussed almost exclusively on the domestic economy, obviating the 
political usefulness of a new statement of security strategy.
176
  Unlike the previous reports in 
both the Reagan and Bush Administrations, NSS1993 was intended to document the 
accomplishments of the past rather than point to the way ahead.  The Republicans were 
leaving the White House after twelve years of control of the nation‘s foreign and defense 
policies, including what they thought was a remarkably successful conclusion to, and 
transition out of, the Cold War.  As the titles of two of the report‘s sections attested – 
―Security through Strength: Legacy and Mandate‖ and ―The World as It Can Be, If We Lead 
and Attempt to Shape It as Only America Can‖ – they wanted to document their 
accomplishments in strategic terms, as well as to put down markers by which the Clinton 
Administration‘s foreign policy could be judged.  In terms of strategic content, however, 
there was little change between this report and the 1991 version.  Both emphasised a steady, 
deliberate transition from a grand strategy of containment to one of ―collective engagement‖ 
on a regional basis.
177
  Militarily, both embodied the same defense strategy of four pillars as 
developed earlier by the Cheney-Powell team.
178
  What differences there were, were found in 
the 1993 report‘s heavy emphasis on a broad goal of ―democratic peace‖ and the absolute 
necessity of American leadership in a world of increasing interdependencies.  NSS1993 noted 
that ―there is a peace dividend‖ and an interdependence of international opportunities to 
promote US interests and domestic imperatives.
179
   
 
Nonetheless, despite these apparent opportunities, threats were again identified and were 
consistent with previous strategy documents, listing: the proliferation of advanced 
conventional arms, ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction; terrorism; and the 
international drug trade as the most glaring aspects relating to US security.  NSS1993 
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proposed an extensive list of programs designed to reinforce non-proliferation policy, citing 
the spread of WMD and delivery means as a significant and threatening national security 
challenge.
180
  The NSS stipulated four principle US proliferation policies. The first was to 
build, strengthen and broaden existing norms against proliferation.  The second was to make 
specific efforts to counter what it deemed to be the acute proliferation dangers in the Middle 
East, South and Southwest Asia and Korea.  The third was to expand multilateral support 
while maintaining a capability for unilateral action.  The fourth and most ambitious, was to 
address the underlying security concerns motivating the acquisition of WMD, including a 
range of political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, military, security assistance and other 
foreign and defense instruments.  NSS1993 highlighted the links between terrorism and 
proliferation and that the post-Cold War era required the continual restructure of the 
Department of Defense as a means to adapt to this newer threat.
181
   
 
In a regional context, the document emphasised the Middle East and South Asia as focus 
areas in which work to deter terrorism would be ongoing.  The Administration broadly 
stressed continuing world-wide efforts, encompassed within a four goal framework.  The first 
was to constrain the proliferation of WMD; the second was to reduce the spread of militarily 
useful technologies for WMD and ballistic missiles; the third was to implement international 
agreements; and the fourth was to develop a system of international accounting of dangerous 
materials and equipment, as well as methods for protecting them from theft and diversions.  
Overall, the 21 page document posited an ambitious agenda and an optimistic vision of 
national security in working towards an ―age of democratic peace‖ in the 21st Century.182  It 
also made it clear that notions and considerations pertaining to counter-proliferation, non 
proliferation and nuclear weapons as a whole were an ongoing focus of the National Security 
Strategy formal doctrine.  While these ―areas‖ were a defining focus of the Bush Doctrine, it 
is evident when looking at the Reagan and Bush Snr National Security Strategies that both 
policy and considerations pertaining to dangerous weapons and proliferators were deeply 
ingrained in all of these formal releases.  Indeed, while the National Security Strategy of 
2002 amplified this focus (as will be discussed extensively in the latter chapters of this 
thesis), it is evident that such considerations pertaining to ―curtailing‖ proliferators was a 
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distinct and ongoing emphasis in each National Security Strategy since its inception in 
1986/87. 
 
National Security Strategy – of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS1994) 
President Bill Clinton‘s first National Security Strategy was published in July 1994, well after 
the ―usual‖ January release.  NSS1994 began with traditional statements about the 
executive‘s foremost constitutional duty and role in protecting the nation‘s security, including 
the American people, territory and way of life.  The Preface specified the rise of ethnic 
conflict and rogue states in which ―the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
represents a major challenge to our security.‖183  Section I of the Introduction emphasised the 
expansion of WMD as creating new transnational and cross border threats, and the potential 
for WMD armed terrorists.
184
  The document shifted into promoting the ―tangible results‖ of 
the first 17 months of the Clinton Administration, including: a bureaucratic assessment of 
defense forces and systems for the new security environment; the January 1994 NATO 
Summit and the Partnership for Peace initiative; and President Clinton‘s launch of ―a 
comprehensive policy to combat the proliferation of WMD and the missiles that deliver 
them.‖185  Two more specific initiatives included the opening of formal negotiations on the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the ―landmark‖ commitment to eliminate all nuclear 
weapons in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.  NSS1994 also called for the development 
of integrated approaches for dealing with post-Cold War threats, such as, the coordination of 
WMD counter-proliferation, arms control and intelligence activities.  In specifying tasks for 
military forces the document posited the following: (1) major regional contingencies;
186
 (2) 
overseas presence; (3) counter-WMD and ―stemming the proliferation of WMD‖ and 
delivery means; (4) multilateral peacekeeping; and (5) the support of counter-terrorism 
efforts [with general purpose and special operations forces].  In addition, the NSS also 
specified that hostile regional powers, including North Korea, Iran and Iraq,
187
 were the focus 
for major regional contingencies.  NSS1994 was the first to explicitly correlate terrorism with 
WMD threats,
188
 a theme that was to become a major staple in both future National Security 
Strategy doctrine and broader US security policy.  
                                               
183 William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Washington, DC: The White House, 
July 1994, p. i. 
184 Ibid., p. 1. 
185 Ibid., p. 2. 
186  Formerly referred to as major theater wars in post-Cold War, 1990s national and military security strategy 
documents. 
187 Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1994, p. 7. 
188 Ibid., p. 8. 
61 
 
 
The document explicitly articulated counterterrorism measures that called on special units to 
strike terrorists, terrorist structures and bases abroad.  Indeed, the section emphasised a policy 
that encompassed: no concessions; the pressuring of state sponsors; exploiting legal means to 
punish international terrorism; and helping other governments‘ counterterrorism efforts.  The 
1994 document also pointed to organisational efforts required for ―close day-to-day 
coordination among Executive Branch agencies‖ including the State, Defense and Justice 
Departments, as well as those of the FBI and CIA.  The Administration noted that ―Terrorism 
involving WMD represents a particularly dangerous potential threat that must be 
countered.‖189  The Clinton Administration also highlighted the ―concerted efforts‖ it had 
been pursuing in its counterterrorism activities,
190
 including the June 26, 1993 cruise missile 
attacks on Iraqi intelligence headquarters in response to the alleged assassination plot against 
former President George H.W. Bush.  The document also mentioned the March 4, 1994 
conviction of four World Trade Center bombers and the UN‘s sanctions imposed on Libya 
for the Pan Am 103 disaster.  Additionally, two counterterrorism treaties, including protocols 
for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international aviation and 
for acts against the safety of maritime navigation, were also posited.  
 
In the evolving process of shaping and formulating the counter-proliferation policy, NSS1994 
included a new section entitled: ―Combating the Spread and Use of WMD and Missiles.‖191  
It was here that the Administration emphasised WMD as a major threat and that a key 
component of US security strategy to ―stem‖ the proliferation of such weapons would entail 
the development of an ―effective capability.‖192  This requirement was articulated in the 
subsection entitled ―Non-proliferation and Counter-proliferation,‖ emphasising counter-
proliferation as a ―critical priority.‖  Some of the goals posited pertained to extending the 
Non-proliferation Treaty beginning in 1995, achieving the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
and ending the unsafeguarded production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes.  
Additional goals included strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group, IAEA and MTCR, 
combating missile weapons proliferation, supporting the Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Conventions and improving export controls.  In terms of international affairs, the NSS 
divided its approach into two areas: regional and bilateral relationships.  The first region of 
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concern was Northeast Asia and the Administration‘s desire to have North Korea adhere to 
non-proliferation initiatives, including the NPT, IAEA, and North-South Korean 
Denuclearization Accord.  The second point called for an end to Iran‘s advanced WMD 
program, the third identified the need for an Iraq reconstitution prevention programs, while 
the fourth point pertained to capping, reducing and eliminating India and Pakistan‘s nuclear 
and missile capabilities.  The fifth and last point emphasised the need for a Middle East 
regional arms control agreement.
193
   
 
In terms of the bilateral component, working on relations with Russia and the Ukraine and 
encouraging their participation in the MTCR was emphasised, as well as discouraging any 
missile technology transfers to India.  Other arms control measures included gaining South 
African acceptance of the NPT, entering Argentina and Brazil into MTCR guidelines, and the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco.  The next area of focus related to encouraging the dismantling of 
intercontinental missiles in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, as well as pressing China to join the 
MTCR.  The final emphasis, called for a trilateral accord among the US, Russia and the 
Ukraine for eliminating Ukrainian nuclear weapons.  Additionally, the Administration 
signified that it would continue to improve defensive capabilities while placing a high 
priority on locating, identifying and disabling WMD arsenals, production, storage and 
delivery systems.
194
  While the document did not acknowledge homeland defense, it did 
nonetheless highlight the significance of intelligence capabilities as being critical in detecting 
terrorism and WMD counter-proliferation.  It was here that the NSS1994 called for the 
improvement in technical capabilities as a means to identify and deter ―the efforts of foreign 
nations to develop WMD.‖195  Perhaps the most defining assertion by the Administration was 
the statement that, ―the US will retain the capability to retaliate against those who might 
contemplate the use of weapons of mass destruction...‖196   
 
National Security Strategy of 1995 (NSS1995) 
The National Security Strategy of 1995 (NSS1995) reaffirmed previous national security 
sentiments as well as highlighting a list of recent successes.
197
  The preface specified the 
accession of the former Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus into the 
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Non-proliferation Treaty, while also agreeing to eliminate nuclear weapons from their 
territorial domains.  NSS1995 highlighted how the assertive diplomacy undertaken with 
North Korea – through economic incentives and the threat of economic sanctions – was a 
viable means and pathway in attaining US objectives.  The preface reemphasised the US‘s 
special responsibilities as a great power with global interests and historical ideals.  As a 
continuum of previous National Security Strategies, Section I (the Introduction) once again 
espoused the continued spread of WMD as a serious security threat that must be countered, as 
well as what was defined as world-wide militant nationalism, ethnic and religious conflict 
and terrorism.
198
   
 
NSS1995 pointed to numerous counter-proliferation results in what it deemed to be its 
―comprehensive policies in combating the proliferation of WMD and missiles.‖199  Firstly, it 
posited the success of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts and the 
transferral of 600 kilograms of vulnerable nuclear material from Kazakhstan to the US under 
a joint Defense and Energy Department mission.  Secondly, it highlighted the Russian 
conversion of highly enriched uranium into commercial reactor fuel along with the enhanced 
control and accounting of Russian nuclear materials.  Thirdly, international efforts including 
the NPT, CTBT, NSG, and IAEA as well as the call to the UN to increase efforts in seeking a 
global ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons was also posited.  
Fourthly, the NSS identified regimes to combat missile proliferation, including the MTCR, 
CWC and BWC as well as a fifth component that listed a range of regional approaches to 
countering the WMDs.  Such regional efforts included the North Korean Agreed Framework 
along with counter-proliferation efforts gauged towards Iran, Iraq, India and Pakistan. The 
NSS also mentioned a Middle East arms control initiative, while pursuing bilateral 
agreements with Russia, the Ukraine and South Africa on the MTCR.  Other bilateral partners 
were also identified as a means to expand the Australia Group, including the likes of 
Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Poland.  Once again the Administration 
highlighted the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the South American nuclear free zone, as well as 
dismantling intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan.  In 
European proliferation efforts the NSS emphasised the January 1994 NATO Summit calling 
for a political framework to counter, prevent and defend against the use of NBC weapons and 
proliferation threats.  The section on intelligence reiterated calls for coordinating a global 
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capability for detecting, identifying and deterring efforts of states likely to develop WMD 
capabilities,
200
 while in the section on integrated regional approaches, the Middle East, 
Southwest and Southeast Asia were combined in to a singular region in which Iraq, Iran, and 
the India-Pakistan conflict were identified as WMD threats.
 201
  Foreshadowing the post-9/11 
National Security Strategy of 2002, the 1995 document noted the significance of the US in 
retaining the capacity in its counter-proliferation policy to retaliate against threats that 
―contemplated‖ using WMD.202  As stated: 
 
The United States will retain the capacity to retaliate against those who might 
contemplate the use of weapons of mass destruction, so that the costs of such 
use will be seen as outweighing the gains. However, to minimize the impact of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on our interests, we will need the 
capability not only to deter their use against either ourselves or our allies and 
friends, but also, where necessary and feasible, to prevent it. 
 
National Security Strategy of 1998 – for a New Century (NSS1998) 
Indeed, the Bush Doctrine‘s US foreign policy quest to counter-proliferators and those 
adversarial states and non-state actors that may undermine the United States‘ national interest 
objectives and broader hegemonic aspirations, was clearly evident in the Clinton National 
Security Strategy of 1998.  The document acknowledged the 1997 Department of Defense 
report (the Quadrennial Defense Review – QDR) and that the NSS would work to meet the 
military and security challenges addressed in the QDR.  The preface highlighted threats from 
adversarial states, terrorist groups, criminal organisations, as well as those who may be 
tempted to use WMD against US citizens.  NSS1998 also articulated how the evolving 
interconnectedness of globalisation presented new threats to US security.  That is, 
―globalization enables other states, terrorist, criminals, drug traffickers and others to 
challenge the safety of our citizens and the security of our borders in new ways.‖203  In 
essence, the core thrust of the NSS goals pertained to ―protecting the lives and safety of 
Americans‖ and ―preventing‖ the spread of NBC weapons and materials for producing them, 
while also attempting to control ―destabilising technologies,‖ such as long range missiles.204  
Once again, and clearly a pre-Bush consideration, was the notion of developing an effective 
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means to counter and respond to terrorism, encompassed in a section listing five threats to US 
national interests.
205
 
 
The ongoing focus on nuclear weapons (or what began to be commonly referred to as WMDs 
under Clinton) was clearly articulated in three of the ―five threats.‖  First, regional state-
centred threats including NBC weapons and long range delivery systems were highlighted 
and aligned to the states of Iraq, Iran and North Korea.  The second threat described as a 
―special concern‖ pertained to that of a transnational nature – such as terrorism and the 
prospect of terrorism encompassing WMD.  Placed third on the threat list was the spread of 
dangerous technologies, or WMD related technologies that were seen as a great potential 
threat to global stability and security.  Also cited was the threat of the proliferation of 
advanced weapons and technologies in the hands of rogue states, terrorists, and criminal 
organisations.  The fourth perceived threat related to foreign intelligence collection, while the 
fifth, pertained to the increasing spectre of failed states.  Using a phrase from the Quadrennial 
Defense Review, NSS1998‘s section on integrated approaches included increasing 
intelligence, law enforcement cooperation and the denial of enemy safe havens.  The 
document identified WMD threats and how the potential for terrorist groups to attack ―US 
territory and the American people in unconventional ways‖206 was increasing, including 
threats to disrupt critical infrastructure and the potential use of WMD against civilians in 
cities.  Again foreshadowing the National Security Strategy of 2002, the Clinton NSS1998 
noted that the US needed to counter such threats by striking terrorist bases and states 
supporting terrorist acts.  As stated: 
 
Potential enemies, whether nations, terrorist groups or criminal organizations, 
are increasingly likely to attack US territory and the American people in 
unconventional ways.  Adversaries will be tempted to disrupt our critical 
infrastructures, impede continuity of government operations, use weapons of 
mass destruction against civilians in our cities, attack us when we gather at 
special events and prey on our citizens overseas. The United States must act to 
deter or prevent such attacks and, if attacks occur despite those efforts, must be 
prepared to limit the damage they cause and respond decisively against the 
perpetrators.
 207
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Indeed, concerns about terrorism led to the creation of the May 1998 Presidential Decision 
Directive 62.  NSS1998 reviewed the key points of PDD 62; designed to reinforce agency 
missions and roles in the US defense against terrorism, while implementing counter-terrorism 
programs and activities.  As stated: 
 
To meet the growing challenge of terrorism, President Clinton signed 
Presidential Decision Directive 62 in May 1998. This Directive creates a new 
and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat of the next century. 
It reinforces the mission of the many US agencies charged with roles in 
defeating terrorism; it also codifies and clarifies their activities in the wide range 
of US counter-terrorism programs, including apprehension and prosecution of 
terrorists, increasing transportation security, and enhancing incident response 
capabilities. The Directive will help achieve the President‘s goal of ensuring that 
we meet the threat of terrorism in the 21st century.
208
 
 
NSS1998 again clarified principles for countering international terrorism including: (1) 
granting no concessions; (2) increasing pressures on state sponsors of terrorism; (3) 
exploiting all legal mechanisms; and (4) helping other governments.  More specific goals 
pertained to: uncovering and eliminating foreign terrorists and networks in the US; 
eliminating terrorist sanctuaries; countering those states that supported terrorism and 
subverting moderate regimes through a comprehensive program of diplomatic, law 
enforcement, economic, military, and intelligence instruments.  Furthermore, the 
Administration emphasised its role in providing better security for the US transportation 
system and would work to impede terrorist fundraising activities.
209
  To enable this, the NSS 
emphasised the importance of interagency (DOS, DOJ, DOD, DOT, DOE) integration on 
intelligence and transportation, as well as the need for congressional support.  
 
The continuum of counter-proliferation and counterterrorism in Clinton‘s NSS1998 was 
further evident in its emphasis on the January 1998 International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombing;
210
 and how this was significant to its endorsement of a 
national self defense that encompassed the right to strike terrorist bases.  The 1993 attack on 
Iraqi intelligence headquarters in response to the alleged George H.W. Bush assassination 
plot was cited, as well as the August 1998 missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan in 
response to the Kenya and Tanzanian embassy bombings that killed 12 Americans and 300 
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foreign nationals.  Osama bin Laden was mentioned by name as the leader of the ―preeminent 
organization and financier of international terrorism‖ and affiliated with the African embassy 
bombings.
211
  NSS1998 characterised the strikes against terrorist facilities and infrastructure 
as ―necessary and proper responses‖ against imminent threats and warned that there were no 
safe havens for terrorists.  The document also pointed out that terrorism was at the ―top of the 
agenda‖ at the June 1997 Denver Summit of the Group of Eight (G8), including Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the US.  The Group agreed 
that by 2000 they would join an international terrorist convention first touted in a 1996 UN 
resolution on measures to promote counterterrorism.  They also agreed to exchange 
information on technologies as a means to deter the use of WMD in terrorist attacks.
212
  
NSS1998 made special mention of WMD threats in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, 
emphasising the states of Iraq and Iran as security challenges.
213
  In Bush-like rhetoric, the 
Clinton Administration clearly articulated their concerns: 
 
Iraq must also move from its posture of deny, delay and obscure to a posture of 
cooperation and compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions designed 
to rid Iraq of WMD and their delivery systems.  Iraq must also comply with the 
memorandum of understanding reached with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
in February 1998.  Our policy is directed not against the people of Iraq but 
against the aggressive behavior of the government.  Until that behavior changes, 
our goal is containing the threat Saddam Hussein poses to Iraq‘s neighbors, the 
free flow of Gulf oil and broader US interests in the Middle East...  Our policy 
toward Iran is aimed at changing the behavior of the Iranian government in 
several key areas, including its efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction and 
long-range missiles, its support for terrorism and groups that violently oppose 
the peace process, its attempts to undermine friendly governments in the region, 
and its development of offensive military capabilities that threaten our GCC 
partners and the flow of oil.
214
 
 
The National Security Strategy of 2000 – for a Global Age (NSS2000) 
The National Security Strategy of 2000 was the Clinton Administration‘s longest strategy 
document.  It was the final strategy statement of his two-term presidency and served as a 
summary record of the Administration‘s national security policy.  The Preface directly 
addressed the new challenges of technology and open borders, and the ―contemporary 
threats‖ of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, along with terror 
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and international crime.
215
  The early component of NSS2000 also reemphasised the 
Administration‘s support for arms control agreements by calling for the extension of the Non-
proliferation Treaty, while encouraging initiatives to contain those nations seeking to acquire 
and use weapons of mass destruction.  Other international initiatives included efforts to 
increase ―antiterrorism cooperation‖ as well as ―stepped up efforts‖ to combat international 
crime, cyber-terrorism, global warming and infectious diseases, especially HIV/AIDS.
216
  
The Preface‘s points of emphasis were developed in more detail in the document‘s 
subsequent chapters.  The fundamental elements of the strategy included positive assessments 
of the US role in ―shaping the international environment.‖217  In bold print the document 
proclaimed the engagement strategy‘s efforts to ―fashion a new international system‖ 
including ―adapting alliances and encouraging the reorientation of other states.‖218  For 
―preventing conflict‖ the focus was not on threats, but on using the diplomatic, economic, 
and military instruments of statecraft ―as tools for promoting peace.‖219  In the section on 
threat and crisis response there was discussion on ―countering potential regional aggressors‖ 
on ―the Korean peninsula,‖ however, in the Persian Gulf individual states were not 
mentioned.  Vague enemies were also inferred in the document‘s language on ―confronting 
new threats.‖  As a NSS staple, ―potential use and continued proliferation of weapons for 
mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery‖ was emphasised as a threat to US 
national security;
220
 and again, countering such threats would be a major component of the 
NSS where, ―prevention remains our first line of defense to lessen the availability of weapons 
of mass destruction being sought by such aggressor nations.‖221 
 
NSS2000 also noted the vigorous pursuit of arms control regimes.  These included the 
―strengthening of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Conventions, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and entry into force of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.‖222  The Administration claimed credit for having ―made 
great strides in restructuring its national security apparatus to address new threats with 
diplomatic, economic and military tools.‖223  The document also emphasised the US 
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leadership role in the post-Cold War era, in which ―US leadership in steering international 
peace and stability operations‖ was evident in both Bosnia and Kosovo.224  It also proclaimed 
its intent in extending the process of transformation beyond the Defense Department to its 
diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement and economic efforts – all as a means to meet 
threats, adapt to technological change and deal with ―potential contingencies.‖  In terms of 
prevention, the document again used the context of preventive diplomacy to ―contain or 
resolve problems before they erupt into crises.‖225  New terminology regarding 
―asymmetrical threats‖ was included in a section on the ―Efficacy of Engagement‖ subsection 
on ―Enhancing Our Security at Home and Abroad.‖226  The Administration emphasised non-
proliferation programs such as the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative which within the 
START I framework would lead to deactivating numerous nuclear weapons.
227
  
 
The last Clinton NSS also posited what it deemed to be instruments for shaping the 
international environment, including: diplomacy, public diplomacy, international assistance, 
arms control and non-proliferation, military activities, international law enforcement 
cooperation and environmental and health initiatives.
228
  The document described a ―panoply 
of arms control agreements‖229 in its five page section on Arms Control and Non-
proliferation.
230
  The early part highlighted an emerging partnership between the US and 
Russia in strategic arms control through the strategic arms reductions talks (START I, II and 
III).  Further non-proliferation measures focussed primarily on space launches and ballistic 
missiles and highlighted several diplomatic agreements, such as the June 4, 2000 Joint 
Statement on Principles on Strategic Stability; the September 6, 2000 Joint Statement on the 
Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative and Implementation Plan; and the December 16, 
2000 Bilateral Pre-Launch Notification Agreement.
231
  Most of the Administration‘s formal 
agreements and programs were focused on friendly nations and long-standing multilateral 
security organisations.  Outside of specific new agreements with Russia, former Soviet 
republics and Newly Independent States, NSS2000 specified existing arms control regimes.  
These included the relatively long-standing Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Non-
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proliferation Treaty. The document also addressed initiatives under the United Nation‘s 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that sought transparency, control, and the 
reprocessing or destruction of nuclear weapons and fissile materials.  Working initiatives 
included: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament; and Material Protection, Control 
and Accounting Program.  In essence, all were created as a means to secure former Soviet 
nuclear materials.
232
  Additional programs targeted former Soviet materials under the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program,
233
 while other programs addressed 
former Soviet weapons and materials proliferation, including the Non-proliferation and 
Disarmament Fund that stipulated three priority requirements: to halt the spread of WMD; to 
limit the spread of advanced conventional weapons and technologies; and to eliminate 
existing weapons.  A second Administration program, entitled the 1999 Expanded Threat 
Reduction Initiative (ETRI), sought to expand CTR successes to enhance the security of 
fissile materials.  Also mentioned in NSS2000 was the June 2000 Clinton-Putin Plutonium 
Management and Disposition Agreement.  Although the Soviet Union was no longer a direct 
threat to the United States, the NSS‘s ongoing determination in countering and securing 
nuclear capacities and materials, evident in the above developments, merely continued the 
National Security Strategy trend. 
 
Such determination was further emphasised as NSS2000 shifted its focus on multilateral 
cooperation measures.  It was here that US interagency efforts (through training, equipment, 
advice and services to law and border security enforcement agencies) were highlighted as a 
means to assist foreign governments develop export controls and capabilities – enabling them 
to prevent, deter, or detect proliferation.  The US agencies involved in this process included 
the Departments of Defense, Energy and Commerce, the US Customs Service and the FBI.
234
  
Other internally directed US government initiatives included those of the executive branch 
that encompassed Congress in arms control efforts as a means to embolden the Biological 
Weapons and Chemical Weapons Conventions.  NSS2000 noted Congress‘s October 1998 
implementation of legislation for the BWC and CWC,
235
 while other executive branch efforts 
included the 1999 Executive Order (EO 13128)
236
 and Presidential Decision Directive 70 
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(PDD 70).
237
  The document also highlighted counter-proliferation initiatives with European 
partners gauged towards conventional arms, dual use technologies and existing international 
regimes.
238
  Originally adopted at NATO‘s 50th Anniversary Summit,239 the new initiatives 
included establishing a NATO WMD Center that would ―promote invigorated discussions of 
non-proliferation issues in the NATO Senior Political Military and Defense Groups on 
Proliferation.‖240  Of course, as per previous National Security Strategies, emphasis on 
regional actors or what would later be referred to as ―rogue states‖ was also made. NSS2000 
clearly emphasised ―three critical proliferation zones: the Korean Peninsula, Southwest Asia 
and South Asia.‖241  It was argued that these areas did not reflect the agreements, 
organisational or institutional efforts and initiatives discussed in the previous sections on 
Russia and Europe, and would thereby require stern counter-proliferation efforts.   
 
The clearest sentence of the Clinton‘s NSS2000 stated that ―the primary mission of our 
Armed Forces is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our vital 
interests are threatened.‖242  The document shifted into what it deemed to be the significance 
of counter-proliferation, including one paragraph of eight lines covering the Defense 
Department‘s counter-proliferation programs. One such program, the Counter-proliferation 
Initiative (CPI), was defined as ―another example of how US military capabilities are used 
effectively to deter aggression and coercion against US interests.‖243  The wording noted that 
the CPI prepared US forces to work with allies ―to ensure that we can prevail on the 
battlefield despite the threatened or actual use of NBC weapons by adversaries.‖244  Chapter 
III of NSS2000 on ―Integrated Regional Approaches‖ documented the Administration‘s 
claimed successes with the EU and NATO and especially in the Balkans.
245
  It restated the 
NATO WMD initiative and efforts with NATO‘s senior groups on proliferation.246  The 
section on East Asia and the Pacific was more of a discussion of WMD, highlighting the 
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significance of the US-Japan security alliance that ―anchors the US presence in the Asia-
Pacific region.‖247  Also of note were the bilateral treaty alliances with the Republic of Korea, 
Australia, Thailand and the Philippines.  Multilateral organisations that were mentioned 
included the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and supporting regional 
dialogues under the ASEAN Regional Forum.  The WMD issue was addressed directly in the 
section on regional approaches in which NSS2000 called for working with Japan on regional 
peace and stability and seeking adherence to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.  This 
section also mentioned the Japanese investment of $1 billion in the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO) as part of the US-Korean Agreed Framework.  
Following Japan, the Asia section listed the Korean Peninsula and specifically the ―tensions‖ 
there as the ―leading threat to peace and stability in East Asia.‖248  The pursuit of a peaceful 
resolution of the Korean conflict was addressed in which the document stipulated that a 
―democratic, non-nuclear, reunified peninsula... is clearly in our strategic interest.‖249  The 
section on enhancing security highlighted the diplomatic goal of normal relations and pointed 
to the success of Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright‘s ―historic meeting with the North 
Korean leader Kim Jong Il in late October 2000.‖250  NSS2000 did specify several conditions 
for normal relations and was ―firm that North Korea must maintain the freeze on production 
and reprocessing of fissile material, dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors and related 
facilities, and fully comply with its NPT obligations under the Agreed Framework.‖251  The 
NSS extended on the Agreed Framework and called for North Korea‘s elimination of its 
missile program and weapons of mass destruction.  NSS2000 also called for the continuation 
of North-South summitry as well as Four Party Talks among the US, North and South Korea, 
and China. 
 
The China section highlighted the small developments in improving US-China relations 
pertaining to WMD proliferation in East Asia.  As NSS2000 stated, ―we have advanced our 
dialogue on non-proliferation and arms control through exchanges at the Secretary of 
Defense, Secretary of State, and sub-cabinet level in 1999 and 2000.‖252  Significantly, the 
dialogues led to agreements in which states agreed to not target strategic nuclear weapons at 
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one another and confirmed a common goal of ―halting the spread of WMD.‖253  The 
Administration applauded China‘s support for international arms control, including the 
CTBT, the MTCR, the CWC and BWC, as well as controlling WMD and missile related 
technologies.  The NSS highlighted China‘s work with the US in support of the June 2000 
North-South Summit, working together to ―convince North Korea to freeze its dangerous 
nuclear program,‖ as well as the importance of diplomacy as a tool in establishing peace and 
security in Northeast Asia.
254
  In what George W. Bush would later refer to as a ―strategic 
competitor,‖ the NSS2000 view of China was still nonetheless reflective of the National 
Security Strategy trend since its inception in 1987 – that being, the broader quest to counter, 
thwart, or in this case, monitor via relationship building, those states or non-state actors 
deemed to be capable of encroaching upon or undermining the United States‘ national 
security and national interest objectives. 
 
Of course, NSS2000‘s emphasis on countering such perceived threats to the United States‘ 
national security objectives was once again clearly defined in its treatment of Southwest Asia 
(in Iraq and Iran) and in South Asia (in India and Pakistan).  In relation to Iraq, policy 
included three elements: (1) contain Saddam Hussein; (2) provide relief for the Iraqi people 
through the UN oil-for-food program; and (3) support Iraqi efforts to replace Saddam‘s 
regime.
255
  Containment was the foundation of the US‘s Iraqi policy as addressed in the 
December 1999 UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1284.  In addition to measures 
regarding containment and humanitarian relief operations the Administration stated that, ―it 
provides for a robust new inspection and monitoring regime that would finish the work begun 
by UNSCOM.‖256  Additionally, NSS2000 admonished that it ―would allow for a suspension 
of the economic sanctions in return for full Iraqi cooperation with UN arms inspectors and 
Iraqi fulfilment of key disarmament tasks.‖257  In relation to countering Iran, the 
Administration stated that its policy was ―aimed at changing the practices of the Iranian 
government in several key areas, including its efforts to obtain WMD and long-range 
missiles, its support for terrorism and groups that violently opposed the Middle East peace 
process, and its human rights practices.‖258  Specifically, the Administration voiced its 
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concerns over Iranian WMD acquisition efforts and missile programs, evident in its testing of 
a 1,300 kilometre-range Shahab-3 missile in July 1998, July 2000 and September 2000.  The 
Administration also referred to multilateral efforts with ―Arab allies threatened by WMD to 
develop a defense through efforts such as the Cooperative Defense Initiative.‖259 
 
NSS2000 also posited the need for multilateral efforts as a means of countering WMD 
proliferation in South Asia, arguing that it did ―not believe that nuclear weapons have made 
India or Pakistan more secure.‖260  As stated, ―we hope they will abandon their nuclear 
weapons programs and join the NPT as non-nuclear  weapons states.‖  Proposed multilateral 
initiatives pertaining to India and Pakistan included working with the UN and G8 Nations as 
a means to bring both states into the international non-proliferation mainstream, and included 
the signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the multilateral 
moratorium on the production of fissile material ―pending the conclusion of a Fissile 
Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMTC).‖261 In essence, the Administration‘s policy with respect to 
India and Pakistan sought to cut off fissile material production, strengthen export controls, 
thwart a potential arms race and engage in a direct dialogue as a means to reduce tensions.  
The final South Asia security section pertained to Afghanistan directly.  NSS2000 pointed to 
the Taliban‘s support of terrorism as a serious threat to US interests in which ―Afghanistan 
remains a primary safe-haven for terrorists threatening the United Sates, including Usama bin 
Ladin.‖262  The document called for the enforcement of UN and US sanctions on the Taliban 
regime for harbouring bin Ladin and emphasised that the Administration would ―continue to 
pressure the Taliban until it complies with international requests to bring bin Ladin to 
justice.‖263  NSS2000 also noted concerns with Pakistan‘s support of the Taliban, including 
the harbouring of radicals.  For countering the bin Ladin and Taliban threat the 
Administration stated that it was ―engaged in energetic diplomatic efforts, including through 
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the United Nations and with Russian and other concerned countries, to address these concerns 
on an urgent basis.‖264   
 
The Clinton Administration‘s apparent sense of urgency in countering the new threats of 
terrorism, as well as WMD proliferation, were all reaffirmed, and in most instances, 
amplified after the events of September 11, 2001.  Nonetheless, as this detailed narrative and 
analysis has conveyed, notions of counter-proliferation and thwarting perceived threats have 
been a core thrust encompassed in each National Security Strategy formal release since 1987.  
Perhaps the most telling words in illustrating the linkage between the Administrations are 
encompassed in the following words from Clinton‘s last National Security Strategy: 
 
Those who threaten the United States or its allies with WMD should have no 
doubt that any such attack would meet an overwhelming and devastating 
response. Our military planning for the possible employment of US strategic 
nuclear weapons is focused on deterring a nuclear war and it emphasizes the 
survivability of our nuclear systems, infrastructure, and command, control, and 
communications systems necessary to endure a pre-emptive attack yet still 
deliver an overwhelming response.
265
 
 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS2002) 
As both a continuum and extension of previous National Security Strategies, the National 
Security Strategy of 2002 served two important functions: it readily identified the most vital 
contemporary threat to the US – the marriage of rogue states and WMD; and posited that the 
development of these threats would be unacceptable and would have to be dealt with 
preventively.  As stated, ―[in terms of] common sense and self-defense, America will act 
against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.‖266  However, before proceeding, 
clarity needs to be provided in relation to the important concepts, assumptions, and 
methodology regarding these two points, especially the terms ―rogue‖ and ―proliferator.‖  For 
a state to pose a vital threat to the security of the US, it must be both willing and able to do 
serious harm.  Indeed, the US perception of threat as encompassed in each National Security 
Strategy has emanated from the perception of what a state or non-state actor has in terms of 
capabilities and real intentions.  The Bush Doctrine made clear that it was not enough for a 
state to just have a will (rogue) to harm the US, but must also have the capacity 
(WMD/nuclear weapons/related technologies).  That is, a state must lie ―at the crossroads of 
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radicalism and technology‖ and must be both ―rogue‖ and ―proliferating.‖  However, the 
cases in which the US would actively engage in counter-proliferation that encompassed the 
use of anticipatory self-defense involved a relatively select sub-set of adversarial states that 
had hostile intentions and were pursuing the acquisition of WMD capabilities.  These states 
constitute ―rogue proliferators.‖267  But what do the terms ―rogue‖ and ―proliferator‖ mean 
exactly?  Let us first consider the concept of ―rogue.‖ 
 
While the term ―rogue‖ is often associated with the Bush Administration, the meaning and 
threat perception evoked by the term has been implicit in each National Security Strategy.  In 
general, a rogue state is one that neither abides by international law nor acts in accordance 
with conventional international norms governing inter-state relations and behaviour.  More 
specifically, rogue states are characteristically aggressive, assertive, ambiguous and are often 
prone to serious miscalculation, as well as reckless and irrational behaviour.  As contended 
by Kenneth Pollack, rogue states are often ―unintentionally suicidal‖ in the sense that they 
frequently misconstrue their odds of success and ignore the likelihood of catastrophic failure; 
they are risk-takers that play dangerous games without realising how dangerous they truly 
are.
268
  As further articulated by Barry Rubin, ―rogue states put a high priority on subverting 
other states and sponsoring non-conventional types of violence against them,‖ and ―do not 
often react predictably to deterrence or other tools of diplomacy and statecraft.‖269  Rogue 
states are thus said to be ―undeterrable‖ in that they are not dissuaded by credible threats of 
retaliation.  Consequently, because they do not play by the same rules, rogue states must be 
dealt with by alternative means.  As concluded by Rubin, ―...such state[s] require special 
treatment and high levels of international pressure in order to prevent [them] from wrecking 
public order, setting off wars, and subverting whole areas of the world.‖270  For the likes of 
Joseph Nye, rogues states encompass the following criteria:   
 
(1) Well documented evidence of the possession of WMD; (2) evidence of the 
hostile nature of the suspect regime; (3) regime used WMD in the past; (4) 
failure by the regime to implement Security Council resolutions; (5) a history of 
aggression; (6) state sponsorship of terrorism; (7) absence of a pluralistic 
political system of constraints on the government; (8) refusal to accept 
multilaterally approved verification systems like the IAEA Additional 
Safeguards Protocol; (9) refusal to accept additional inspections or to destroy 
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WMD stockpiles once identified; and (10) threats to use WMD, or preparation 
for launch delivery systems for WMD.
271
  
 
The countering and thwarting of rogue states was evident in all of Clinton‘s National Security 
Strategies, to the extent that he too posited a detailed definition of what constituted a ―rogue 
state.‖ 
 
[Rogue states]...  are recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to 
remain outside the family [of democracies] but also assault its basic 
values...These backlash states have some common characteristics.  Ruled by 
cliques that control power through coercion, they suppress human rights and 
promote radical ideologies. While their political systems vary, their leaders 
share a common antipathy toward popular participation that might undermine 
the existing regimes. These nations exhibit a chronic inability to engage 
constructively with the outside world...They are often on the defensive, 
increasingly criticized and targeted with sanctions in international forums.  
Finally, they share a siege mentality.  Accordingly, they are embarked on 
ambitious and costly military programs – especially in WMD and missile 
delivery systems – in a misguided quest for a great equalizer to protect their 
regimes or advance their purposes abroad.
272
 
 
Finally, according to the National Security Strategy of 2002, rogue states exhibited specific 
quantifiable attributes: 
 
They brutalise their own people, display no regard for international law, threaten 
their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are 
part; they are determined to acquire WMD to be used as threats or to achieve the 
aggressive designs of these regimes; they sponsor terrorism around the globe, 
reject basic human values, and hate the US and everything for which it stands.
273
  
 
While these depictions are relatively accurate, they are also remarkably vague and 
indiscriminate.  As Robert Litwak observed, ―because the term ‗rogue state‘ has no standing 
in international law and is quintessentially political, its application [can be] selective and 
contradictory.‖274  Indeed, while many states exert some of these characteristics, not all 
should be deemed as ―rogue.‖  For example, Pakistan, one of America‘s most significant 
allies in the ―War on Terror,‖ although accused of undermining basic human rights, 
instigating conflicts over the disputed territory of Kashmir, undertaking ambiguous relations 
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with the Taliban in the ―Aft/Pak‖ region, and even sponsoring and harbouring terrorists, is 
not considered a rogue state.  Thereby, in order to impart some much needed clarification to 
the term it can be stated that a rogue state is perceived as an enemy; a particularly hostile or 
dangerous strategic adversary that ―aggressively threatens‖ the US and/or its allies.  By 
―aggressively threatens,‖ the state or non-state actor has repeatedly made attempts to 
intimidate or attack the US and/or its allies either directly or indirectly through violent means 
(i.e. terrorism, brinkmanship, direct military confrontation).
275
  This refined definition of 
―rogue‖ gets closer to a core threat perception identified in the Bush Doctrine, as well as 
those frequently referred to in prior US Administrations‘ National Security Strategies.  While 
the term ―rogue‖ has not been extensively utilised in National Security Strategies prior to the 
Bush Doctrine, external forces or threats that could potentially challenge, intimidate, coerce, 
subvert or undermine US national security have been the core thrust of policy-makers, 
officials, and military planners at the highest levels of the US government.   
 
Having defined ―rogue,‖ it is also important to refine the concept of ―proliferator.‖  As 
observed by Litwak, there are two types of proliferation, ―vertical‖ and ―horizontal.‖  Vertical 
proliferation pertains to an increase or qualitative improvement in the unconventional arsenal 
of a state that has already acquired WMD; whereas horizontal proliferation refers to the 
development of these capabilities by states that previously did not have them.
276
  Today, 
Russia would be an example of the former – a nuclear ―have‖ – whereas Iran would be an 
example of the latter – a nuclear ―have not.‖  Furthermore, although the term WMD generally 
applies to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, this definition in some instances is too 
broad.  As explained by Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby: 
 
Biological agents may ultimately come to rival nuclear weapons as a threat to 
the whole population but for now they should be feared primarily for creating 
havoc and terror. Chemical weapons already can kill on a large scale, but ‗mass 
destruction‘ is not the term that accurately describes their lethality.  Civil 
defense and advanced medical techniques could potentially become very 
effective in mitigating the potential consequences of chemical and biological 
agents.  Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are so destructive that there is no 
practical way to make the consequences of their use more bearable for civilian 
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populations.  These weapons are unique in their terrifying potential for massive 
destruction on an unprecedented and unimaginable scale.
277
 
 
It should be noted that a simple desire to develop a nuclear capacity by itself is not enough to 
constitute proliferation.  That is, to be considered a true horizontal proliferator, a state must 
exhibit an assertive and active determination to acquire nuclear weapons via relatively 
advanced and functional nuclear weapons programs.  Such ―robust‖ programs would 
encompass the capacity in which that state could either weaponise a nuclear weapon or 
produce fissile material, highly enriched uranium and/or plutonium indigenously.   
 
If the National Security Strategy is the formal articulation of the US Administration‘s 
perceptions of the international security environment – including WMD threats and arms 
control opportunities, as well as those of a ―rogue‖ and ―proliferating‖ nature – it is evident 
that the Bush Doctrine merely continued the doctrinal path.  In other words, the National 
Security Strategy of 2002 and its advocacy of strategic counter-proliferation policies as a 
means to impede potential and real adversarial ―developments‖ has been implicit in each 
National Security Strategy release since 1987.  As this chapter has conveyed, each 
Administration has been concerned with the proliferation, access and control of nuclear 
weapons.  As expressed by Steve Fetter, nuclear weapons and the proliferation of such 
weapons both consume and complicate US foreign policy: ―…crisis instabilities are likely to 
be more severe; the probability of inadvertent or accidental use is likely to be greater; 
transfers to terrorist or sub-national groups are more likely; at least some of the future 
possessor nations are likely to be politically unstable, aggressive, and difficult to deter.‖278  
Although the emergence of a few small rogue proliferators would hardly challenge the global 
hegemony of the US, their latent nuclear capacity would represent a considerable shift in the 
existing regional strategic balance and may deter the US from exercising its political, 
economic or military strength in some of the most critically important regions around the 
world.  More explicitly, the attainment of nuclear weapons by rogue states would have the 
effect of significantly eroding the ability of the US to freely engage in coercive diplomacy 
vis-à-vis rogue proliferators without the fear of a ―potent retaliatory strike against its troops 
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or allies.‖279 As espoused in each National Security Strategy, such developments would 
severely dilute the credibility of US diplomatic threats and, more importantly, inhibit the 
application of US military force, the surest foundations of American hegemony.  Indeed if 
rogue states were able to procure nuclear weapons, they would become virtually 
―untouchable.‖  Facing such a powerful nuclear deterrent, the US would find it both 
extremely difficult and dangerous to intervene in the realm of rogue proliferants – even if it 
was necessary. 
 
The attainment of such ―immunity‖ from US power and influence may have the unintended 
consequence of encouraging rogue proliferators to embark upon even more aggressive, 
expansionist foreign ―policies.‖  As posited in the National Security Strategy of 2002, 
―...today, our enemies see WMD as weapons of choice.  For rogue states these weapons are 
tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbours.  These weapons may 
also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the US and our allies to prevent us from 
deterring or repelling the aggressive behaviour of rogue states.  Such states also see these 
weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the US.‖280  
Implicit is the concern that once rogue proliferators have securely attained nuclear weapons, 
they may use them and the associated deterrent capability as a means to forcefully challenge 
the US and overthrow the existing status quo.  As O‘Hanlon et al. contended, ―the strongest 
argument for making sure that [rogue states] never acquire nuclear weapons is that, if they 
possessed them, [they] would be less constrained and would therefore become much more 
dangerous in the region.‖281  Moreover, as further explained by Fetter, ―some authoritarian 
states are ruled by aggressive dictators, such as Libya‘s Muammar Qaddafi or Iraq‘s Saddam 
Hussein, who have little regard for international norms of behaviour.  Many of the new 
[nuclear] missile states are not happy with the status quo, and may look upon their newly 
acquired capabilities for mass destruction as instruments of intimidation and change.‖282  As 
emphasised in all National Security Strategies, there is sufficient reason to believe that 
proliferators may come to view nuclear weapons as an effectual means to achieve previously 
unattainable goals; to the extent that they might seek to wield these arms in order to deter the 
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US from interfering with their efforts to defeat or blackmail neighbouring states, dominate 
their respective regions, and destroy and punish their enemies.
283
  For example, a nuclear Iraq 
may believe that its new military advantage would allow it to re-invade Kuwait and then 
successfully deter the US from ousting its army as it did in the first Gulf War.
284
 
 
In short, if states (deemed as rogue or volatile) were permitted to attain nuclear weapons, not 
only would the US become more deterred, but rogue proliferators would become less 
deterred.  The emergence of proliferators could threaten the security of the US and its allies, 
bolster bargaining positions on both sides in any future political negotiations, increase 
militancy and entrench hard-liners, destabilise the regional balance, and finally, encourage 
other states to follow suit.  For the United States, this scenario was completely unacceptable 
and was to be avoided, countered, thwarted and impeded at every intersection.  While there is 
no doubt that the Bush Doctrine amplified notions of counter-proliferation – even to the 
extent of waging a preventive war against rogue states on the verge of allegedly acquiring 
nuclear weapons – it merely continued the path established in the first National Security 
Strategy: to preserve an imbalance of power favourable to the US and to preclude any 
potential aggression by emboldened nuclear adversaries.   
 
This is no more apparent than in Chapter 5 of the National Security Strategy of 2002, entitled, 
―Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of 
Mass Destruction.‖  As in previous NSS2002 chapters it began with a quote from a recent 
speech, in this case, the defining speech given to the West Point graduating class of that year: 
 
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and 
technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, 
along with ballistic missile technology – when that occurs, even weak states and 
small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our 
enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these 
terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to 
harm our friends – and we will oppose them with all our power.285  
 
As with previous National Security Strategies, Bush began by identifying those threats 
deemed to be undermining US national security.  He argued that ―deadly challenges‖ have 
emerged from ―rogue states‖ and terrorists, and while none of these contemporary threats 
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rivalled the destructive power that was evident during the Cold War, the nature and 
motivations of these ―new adversaries;‖ their determination to obtain ―destructive powers 
hitherto‖ available only to the world‘s strongest states; and the greater likelihood that they 
will use weapons of mass destruction against the United States, made the security 
environment more complex and dangerous.
286
  Bush referred to the 1990s and the emergence 
of a small number of ―rogue states,‖ that while distinctly different, embodied a number of 
similar characteristics.  Aside from this, he pointed to the Gulf War and how the United 
States attained what he termed to be ―irrefutable proof‖ that Iraq‘s structures were not limited 
to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also extended to the 
acquisition of ―nuclear weapons and biological agents.‖287  Chapter 5 proceeded to move in 
the direction of North East Asia and how North Korea had become the world‘s ―principal 
purveyor of ballistic missiles;‖ a state that has frequently tested capable missiles while 
developing its own WMD arsenal.  Bush alluded to other ―rogue states‖ that sought nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons as well, but did not state them.  Such states in their pursuit 
of, and global trade in such weapons, had become a ―looming threat to all nations.‖288  The 
National Security Strategy theme of countering and thwarting threats to US security was 
evident in Bush‘s assertive call for ―free‖ nations to impede ―rogue states‖ and their terrorist 
―clients‖ before they were able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the 
United States and its allies and ―friends.‖  As emphasised, the United States must take full 
advantage of strengthened alliances; the implementation of new partnerships with former 
foes; ingenuity in the use of military forces; modern technologies, including the development 
of an effective missile defense system; and ―increased emphasis on intelligence collection 
and analysis.‖289  
 
Bush articulated in specific detail what the United States would do as a means to impede and 
counter WMD developments and clearly alluded to its controversial assertion of ―pre-
emption.‖  Firstly, he posited what he referred to as ―proactive counter-proliferation efforts‖ 
– in which the United States must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed.  
That is, it needed to ensure that key capabilities – detection, active and passive defenses and 
counterforce capabilities – were integrated into the US defense transformation and homeland 
security systems.  Counter-proliferation must also be further integrated into the doctrine, 
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training, and equipping US forces and those of our allies as means of ensuring they prevail in 
any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.  Secondly, ―strengthened non-proliferation 
efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and 
expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction‖ were also emphasised – in which the 
United States would attempt to enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls 
and threat reduction assistance that prevent states and terrorists seeking WMD, and when 
necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials.  Furthermore, the United States 
would continue to endorse coalitions that supported these initiatives, encouraging the 
increased political and financial support for non-proliferation and threat reduction programs.  
Finally, ―effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether 
by terrorists or hostile states‖ would be implemented.  This would work to minimise the 
effects of WMD use against US citizens, and would help deter those who possess such 
weapons and dissuade those who sought to acquire them by persuading enemies that they 
could not attain their desired ends.  The United States would also be prepared to respond to 
the effects of WMD use against its forces abroad, and to help ―friends‖ and allies if they were 
attacked.
290
  
 
Bush emphasised that such policy development had taken almost a decade to implement 
under previous National Security Strategies, based on the fact that it had taken the United 
States that long to ―comprehend the true nature of this new threat.‖  He alluded to notions of 
pre-emption when he talked again of the goals of ―rogue states‖ and terrorists, and how the 
United States could no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as they had done in the past.  
Indeed, as argued, the inability to prevent a potential attacker, particularly when considering 
the immediacy of ―today‘s threats,‖ and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused 
by our adversaries‘ choice of weapons, did not permit a reactionary option any longer.  
Thereby, the United States ―cannot let our enemies strike first.‖291  Bush differentiated 
between the two eras (pre 9/11; post 9/11) in which he posited that weapons of mass 
destruction were once perceived to be weapons of a last resort whose use risked the 
destruction of those who used them.  He argued that there were those states that saw weapons 
of mass destruction as viable options, or as stated earlier, ―weapons of choice.‖  As argued, 
―rogue states‖ viewed such weapons as devices of intimidation, ―vehicles for military 
aggression against their neighbors‖ and their best means of overcoming the conventional 
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superiority of the United States via asymmetrical avenues.
292
  Echoing previous National 
Security Strategies, Bush stated that the purpose of the United States‘ would always be to 
―eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends.  The reasons for our 
actions will be clear, the force measured.‖293  
 
This is not to say that traditional diplomatic and economic measures – such as sanctions, 
export controls, international arms control, and technology denial regimes, as well as their 
non-proliferation counterparts, such as cooperative threat reduction – would not be retained 
in the National Security Strategy of 2002.  But as has been evident throughout the course of 
this chapter, counter-proliferation, defined as the ―full range of military preparations and 
activities to reduce, and protect against, the threat posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons and their associated delivery means‖294 has been of central importance to the 
National Security Strategy doctrine since 1987.
295
  Counter-proliferation was not the Bush 
Administration‘s creation.  Traces of it were evident under the Reagan Administration, 
evident during the Bush Senior Administration and officially articulated under the Clinton 
Administration‘s Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin.296  Indeed, in the view of Gilles Andréani, 
―one finds convincing signs of a gradual shift‖ toward counter-proliferation through the 
1990s.
297
 Relevant counter-proliferation capabilities, plans, and programs clearly were 
developed in Clinton‘s Department of Defense, but coexisted with a national strategy 
predicated on encompassing traditional and more non-proliferation measures. 
 
As each of the National Security Strategies released since the Gulf War have illustrated, 
counter-proliferation programs – as well as broader efforts to prevent, contain, reverse, stem 
or thwart the development of nuclear weapons – have attempted to come to terms with many 
vexing challenges.  For several years, the Defense Department has undertaken research and 
development activities to develop strike capabilities that could achieve operational objectives, 
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including the destruction of an adversary‘s assets located in hardened and/or buried targets 
with attention to minimising collateral effects.  The development of non-nuclear capabilities 
that rapidly allowed US forces to identify, target, and destroy both fixed and mobile targets 
was critical to effective counter-proliferation planning; some suggested that development of 
low-yield nuclear weapons may have further enhanced US capabilities to hold at risk 
hardened or deeply buried targets.  As the US ability to credibly target such facilities 
improved, some of the leverage adversaries may have gained by possessing WMDs could be 
eroded.  Although the 1990s witnessed evident progress on this technical front, policy 
concerns over the potential for collateral effects remained critical seven years after the Gulf 
War, when the risk of inadvertently releasing chemical or biological materials led the United 
States and the United Kingdom to proscribe certain targets during Operation Desert Fox.
298
  
In future military engagements against WMD-armed regional adversaries, policy officials 
may again have to weigh the prospect of collateral release against the imperative to ensure 
adversarial non-use of such weapons.
299
  
 
The National Security Strategy of 2002‘s call for proactive counter-proliferation stemmed 
directly from its premise that the security landscape had undergone a profound 
transformation.  In this new era, key regional states and terror organisations ―are determined 
to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be 
used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes.‖  As a 
result, there is a ―greater likelihood‖ that rogue states and terrorists may ―use weapons of 
mass destruction against us.‖300  The Bush Snr and Clinton Administrations clearly 
recognised US vulnerabilities to WMD and other asymmetric attack modes in their respective 
National Security Strategies, and sought to develop and implement particular defensive 
measures and operational capabilities.  However, it took the hijacked commercial airliners of 
September 11 to effect more sweeping adjustments.  As indicated above, at the time of the 
Gulf War, WMDs were generally perceived as a last resort to be used principally in overseas 
theaters and in wartime.  In the post 9/11 world, the possibility of their employment in 
peacetime, against population centres or on the US homeland, could not be discounted. 
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The underlying logic and core sentiments of the National Security Strategy of 2002 
pertaining to perceptions of threat and counter-proliferation, have long been a significant 
strategic focus of US policy-makers, officials and military planners.  While it is often 
depicted as being a distinct and radical departure, the Bush Doctrine in its advocacy of 
strategic counter-proliferation policies – together with broader concepts to prevent, contain, 
reverse, stem or thwart the development of nuclear weapons from those state or non-state 
actors deemed as adversarial – has been a driving force behind each National Security 
Strategy release since its inception in 1987.  Providing an overview of the US 
Administration‘s perceptions of the international security environment including WMD 
threats and arms control opportunities, these official strategy documents were initiated as a 
result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act defense reforms.  While it is apparent that the Bush 
Administration‘s National Security Strategy of 2002 asserted the notion of preventive attacks 
into the counter-proliferation equation (discussed in the following chapters), the US 
government‘s fixation with external threats and those actors developing nuclear weapons and 
accompanying capabilities, has been an implicit concern and consideration in every National 
Security Strategy since the Reagan era.  The Bush Doctrine and its premise to counter the 
perceived threat of the day, merely continued this process. 
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Released in 2002, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America and its 
lesser known counterpart, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
defined the Bush Administration‘s strategic response to the events of September 11, 2001.  In 
essence, the controversial documental instruments made two important declarations: ―WMD 
– nuclear, biological, and chemical – in the possession of hostile states and terrorists 
represents one of the greatest security challenges facing the US‖ and ―Our enemies have 
openly declared that they are seeking WMDs... the US will not allow these efforts to 
succeed... as a matter of common sense and self defense, America will act against such 
emerging threats before they are fully formed.‖301  Taken together, these two assertions – that 
the most vital threat to the national security of the US was the linkage of ―radicalism and 
technology‖ and that the US would view such developments as intolerable and act to destroy 
them ―before they are fully formed‖ – created the basis for what became known as the ―Bush 
Doctrine.‖  Not without its critics the so-called Bush Doctrine came to dominate American 
political discourse from 2002-04 as political leaders, academic scholars, and the general 
public debated the ramifications of this broad and contentious initiative.  While its advocates 
argued that an urgent and unprecedented threat was well under way which required new and 
proactive approaches in the use of force, critics of the Bush Doctrine viewed its espousal of 
preventive war to combat the proliferation of WMD as further testimony to American 
unilateralism and arrogance; ―a reckless setting of a dangerous precedent that other states will 
exploit to mask aggression‖ and perhaps most importantly, a fundamentally unnecessary 
departure from the traditional, time-tested strategies of deterrence and containment that 
figured so prominently in defeating the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
302
  While the 
Bush Doctrine‘s assertiveness may have been ―candid‖ and ―bold,‖ it was not necessarily the 
radical departure in US security policy that many portended.  As a means to placate some of 
these debates, this Chapter will seek to clarify and establish the meanings and definitions 
associated with pre-emption and prevention, the legal dimension associated with these 
meanings and the extent to which preventive war was framed and considered a viable option 
for the Administration.  By establishing the meanings pertaining to these two ―strategic 
concepts,‖ a significant platform will be established and will enable latter analysis; that 
being, the extent to which preventive war has long been a deep and implicit consideration in 
US security strategy.    
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In terms of formal Presidential doctrine encompassed in the National Security Strategy, it has 
been evident that each Administration has articulated what it deemed to be the threat or 
security challenge of the day; as well as the means in which the United States would counter, 
adapt to, coerce or thwart such a ―perceived‖ threat.  As articulated in the previous chapter, 
counter-proliferation methods have been implicit in the formal documents of the National 
Security Strategy since 1987.  However, as indicated above, the second and most 
controversial assertion of the Bush Doctrine was the official adoption of ―anticipatory self-
defense,‖ in which the United States was prepared to ―act against such emerging threats 
before they are fully formed.‖  As stated by George W. Bush: 
 
The grave threat our nation faced lies at the crossroads of radicalism and 
technology... We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients 
before they are able to threaten or use WMD against the US and our allies and 
friends... Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the US can no longer 
solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The US has long 
maintained the option of pre-emption actions to counter a sufficient threat to our 
national security. The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction and the 
more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, 
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy‘s attack, to 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the US... if necessary, 
will act pre-emptively.
303
   
 
Through these words of the National Security Strategy of 2002, Bush formally endorsed the 
use of pre-emptive measures, or, what will be discussed during the course of this chapter, 
preventive war.  He referred to how international law recognised that nations need not suffer 
an attack before they could lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that 
presented an imminent danger of attack.  Bush highlighted how legal scholars and 
international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of an 
imminent threat – most often a ―visible mobilisation of armies, navies, and air forces 
preparing to attack.‖304   For the Administration, he continued, the United States must adapt 
the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today‘s adversaries.  As 
stated, ―rogue states‖ and terrorists did not seek to attack the United States using 
conventional means as they ―know such attacks would fail.‖  Instead, they ―employ acts of 
terror‖ and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction; ―weapons that can be easily 
concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.‖305  
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In emotive fashion, Bush‘s National Security Strategy of 2002 referred to the events of 
September 11, 2001 as a means to illustrate and punctuate his ―pre-emptive‖ assertions.  He 
argued that the targets of these attacks were the United States‘ military forces and civilian 
population and that this was a direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of 
warfare.  He pointed to the mass civilian casualties as being the specific objective of the 
terrorists and that these losses could be exponentially more severe if ―terrorists acquired and 
used weapons of mass destruction.‖306  It was this emotional reference that provided Bush 
with the ultimate platform on which to launch his vision of pre-emption or preventive war.  
Indeed, as further posited, the United States has ―long maintained the option of pre-emptive 
actions‖ to impede or ―counter a threat to their national security... the greater the threat, the 
greater is the risk of inaction‖ and the more compelling the case for taking ―anticipatory 
action‖ to defend the United States, even if, he argued, ―uncertainty remains as to the time 
and place of the enemy‘s attack.‖  The conclusion of this endorsement came with one of the 
most defining statements of his ―doctrine,‖ that being, ―to forestall or prevent such hostile 
acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.‖307  
 
As a means to qualify the above statement, Bush signified that the United States would not 
use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats, nor should nations use pre-emption as a 
―pretext for aggression.‖  However, as emphasised, ―in an age where the enemies of 
civilization openly and actively seek the world‘s most destructive technologies,‖ the United 
States cannot stand still while perils gather momentum.
308
  As a means to support a pre-
emptive option Bush, clearly described what he deemed to be necessary for the future of US 
national security.  That being, the building of better, more integrated intelligence capabilities 
to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge; the close 
coordination with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and 
―the transformation of our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise 
operations to achieve decisive results.‖309  
 
Pre-emption or Preventive War? 
At the time of its release, many scholars and commentators argued that the most defining 
assertion of the Bush Doctrine was encompassed in the statement that US would now ―act 
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against such emerging threats before they are fully formed,‖310 clearly implying that the US 
would enact a type of proactive response, or, ―anticipatory self-defense.‖  Anticipatory self-
defense has often be aligned to notions either of ―pre-emption‖ or ―prevention‖ and while 
they have been periodically used interchangeably, the terms are actually two distinct strategic 
concepts.  Indeed, the defining dichotomy between the two is based in the relative timing of 
their application and the immediacy of the perceived threat.  Because the latter is a core 
component of this chapter (as well as Chapters Four and Five), it is important to understand 
the disparity.  Pre-emption, in the most basic sense, is nothing more than a quick draw.  Upon 
detecting evidence that an adversary is about to attack – traditionally a visible mobilisation of 
armies, navies and air forces preparing to attack – a threatened state beats the opponent to the 
punch and attacks first as a means to thwart the impending strike.
311
  It is employed 
―downstream,‖ in response to a more specific, direct, and immediate threat where ―the 
necessity of self-defense becomes so instant and overwhelming that it leaves no choice of 
means and no moment for deliberation.‖312  As stated by Jack S. Levy, ―pre-emption involves 
the initiation of military action because it is perceived that an adversary‘s attack is imminent 
and that there are advantages to striking first or at least in preventing the adversary from 
doing so... it is a tactical response to an immediate threat... designed to forestall the 
mobilization and deployment of the adversary‘s existing military forces.‖313  For example, the 
1967 Six-Day War in which Israel launched an ―unprovoked‖ attack upon the Egyptian, 
Syrian and Jordanian armies massing on its borders was, in the purest sense, a pre-emptive 
war. 
 
In contrast, prevention pertains to the military strategy undertaken by states as a means to 
address long-term tensions emanating from hostile and/or powerful rivals.  Like preventive 
medicine, preventive war is employed ―upstream‖ as a means to confront factors that are 
likely to contribute to the development of a threat before they have a chance to become 
specific, direct or immediate.  The preventive motivation of conflict or war is structured on 
the premise that military conflict, while not necessarily imminent, is probably inevitable, and 
that it is better to undertake the conflict now while the costs and/or risks are low(er) than later 
when the costs are high(er).  In most instances, a preventive war is fought in order to preclude 
the diminishing level of an individual state‘s power in relation to an ascending adversary.  
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The dominant state strives to take advantage of a window of opportunity – ―a period during 
which a state possesses a significant military advantage over an adversary‖ – before a 
window of vulnerability – ―a window of opportunity from the perspective of the 
disadvantaged side‖ – appears likely to open.314  As Levy stipulated, ―prevention involves 
fighting a winnable war now in order to avoid the risk of war later under less favourable 
circumstances... [it] is a response to a threat that will generally take several years to develop... 
[and] aims to forestall the creation of new military assets. The consequence of non-action... is 
the gradual deterioration of... relative military power and the risk of a more costly war from a 
position of inferiority.‖315  The classic example of preventive war is the Peloponnesian War, 
which, according to Thucydides, was made inevitable by the ―growth of Athenian power and 
the fear which this caused in Sparta.‖316  More recently, the 1981 Israeli attack against the 
Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor was indiscriminately portrayed as a preventive operation which 
was designed to keep Iraq‘s nuclear weapons capability from ―happening or existing a 
number of years down the road.‖317  Although pre-emption and prevention signify two very 
different paths to conflict, they both derive from a crucial assessment that inaction is not 
viable and ―that the future will be bleak unless [some anticipatory action] is undertaken or at 
least a belief that this world will be worse than the likely one produced by the war.‖318  As 
Victor Cha articulated, ―in a pre-emptive situation doing nothing means being the victim of 
imminent aggression.  In a preventive situation, doing nothing means growing inferiority.‖319  
In both instances, the expected costs of peace are higher than the potential costs of conflict, 
and thereby, necessitate a state to act proactively and assertively.  Nonetheless, regardless of 
their similarities, differences and the Bush Administration‘s seeming attempts to confound 
the two concepts, it is apparent that what was really being pursued in the Bush Doctrine was a 
strategy of preventive war.   
 
For Colin Gray, preventive war was not a concept akin to deterrence and containment, despite 
the sentiments to the contrary made by Bush.  Preventive action was an option that very 
occasionally was necessary, however, it did not have the character of a reasonably reliable 
                                               
314 Lebow, ―Windows of Opportunity,‖ p. 147.   
315 Levy, ―Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,‖ p. 91. 
316 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War. New York: Penguin, 1972, p. 49.  
317 Francois Heisbourg, ―A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences,‖ The Washington Quarterly, 2003, 
76: p. 78. 
318 Robert Jervis, ―Understanding the Bush Doctrine,‖ Political Science Quarterly, 2003, 118: p. 370. 
319 Victor D. Cha, ―Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,‖ International Security, 2002, 27: 
p. 48.   
93 
 
default strategy, like deterrence and containment.
320
  To attain an improved ―theoretical 
understanding of preventive war,‖ Gray posited the following ―principal observations and 
suggestions:‖   
1. Preventive war is simply war, distinguished only by its timing. 
2. Since preventive war is simply war, it is already explained adequately by 
Clausewitz. 
3. Preventive war, in common with all war, is a gamble. 
4. The ―preventor‖ begins with the advantage of the initiative, but if success is 
not achieved swiftly and decisively, that advantage will rapidly diminish as 
the enemy recovers and counterattacks. 
5. The assessment of a preventive war option has to be on the basis of cost-
benefit analysis (or guesswork). 
6. The anticipation of high costs to prevention action need not be a 
showstopper. It depends upon the value of the stakes.
321
 
 
As Gray further conveyed, the main dichotomy between pre-emption and prevention was that 
the former option was exercised in or for a war that was certain, the timing of which has not 
been chosen by the pre-emptor.  In every instance, by definition, the option of preventive 
war, or of a preventive strike, must encompass speculation that war, or at least a major 
negative power shift, was probable in the future.  The preventor had a choice.  It could choose 
to absorb and tolerate the predicted adverse power shift.  Alternatively, it could ―function 
grand strategically, and endeavor by, say, diplomatic, economic, subversive, as well as 
military competitive means, to lessen the growing peril.‖322  Obviously, temporally the more 
distant the danger, the greater has to be the uncertainty.  In the early 1990s, Americans were 
assailed by a fashionable theory that tomorrow‘s great enemy would be superpower Japan.  
Less than a decade later, the status of the super threat of the future was shared between 
violent Islamic fundamentalism and China.
323
 
 
As will be discussed more extensively in the next chapter, the attack on Iraq was the 
manifestation of the Bush Doctrine‘s form of ―pre-emption‖ – or in reality, preventive war – 
formalised in the National Security Strategy of 2002.  The Bush Administration identified 
rogue states seeking to attain nuclear weapons – in conjunction with ―their terrorist clients‖ – 
to justify the elevation of preventive military intervention from a last resort option to one that 
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many critics argued was the new centre of US security policy.  Indeed, while many 
admonished that the Bush Doctrine was a defining shift, in reality, the United States has long 
maintained the option of ―pre-emptive‖ actions to counter adversaries deemed as threats to 
US national security.  The National Security Strategy of 2002 put forth a doctrine of ―pre-
emptive‖ military action which it acknowledged was based on ―the existence of an imminent 
threat.‖324  However, in its formulation the strategy argued that, ―we must adapt the concept 
of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today‘s adversaries... We cannot let 
our enemies strike first.‖325  In essence, this described the notion of prevention –attacking 
when there was little to no threat of an imminent attack.   
 
The introduction of a policy legitimising preventive attack on sovereign states for the 
purposes of self-defense engendered contentious debate, as well as associated political and 
diplomatic implications.  Critics argued that attacking potential enemies before a threat had 
actually materialised potentially increased the spectre and likelihood of unintended 
consequences, and made it vital that the US national security system act with an extremely 
high degree of accuracy in any first move.  Critics also contended that the US risked 
establishing a precedent of defensible inter-state preventive attacks in which the actual use of 
preventive force would motivate other international actors to also incorporate ―preventive 
approaches‖ into their security planning.  Preventive military intervention was aligned to 
notions of vigilante justice in that the act of a state preventively attacking another violated 
both the UN Charter and the NATO Charter.  Furthermore, an assertive policy raised the 
capacity to engender nuclear proliferation amongst weaker states instead of deterring them.
326
   
Finally, critics argued that in simple terms, the National Security Strategy of 2002 proposed 
the initiation of violence as a means to prevent it.  As stated by John Steinbruner: 
 
[I]t appears to neglect and indeed to disdain international legal restraint. In the 
judgment of much of the world, that formula is more likely to generate violence 
than to contain it.
327
 
 
Preventive military intervention has always been an option for states but its inclusion in the 
National Security Strategy of 2002, combined with the US preventive intervention in Iraq, 
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elevated its legitimacy (in the eyes of the Bush Administration) as a viable, defensible tool 
that states could undertake in the pursuit of their foreign policy goals.
328
  This scenario would 
not necessarily translate to a realm of security and order as expressed by some in the 
Administration, but an environment in which states themselves could consider prevention a 
potential option.  A policy brief from The Brookings Institution contended: 
 
Today‘s international system is characterized by a relative infrequency of 
interstate war. Developing doctrines that lower the threshold for pre-emptive 
action could put that accomplishment at risk, and exacerbate regional crises 
already on the brink of open conflict.
329
 
 
Conversely, however, Ellis and Kiefer argued that it was unclear as to whether a non-
proliferation regime alone ―would ultimately be capable of preventing the further 
proliferation of WMD or weapon-related technologies or expertise, let alone be capable of 
rolling back existing capabilities in key states of proliferation concern.‖330  They challenged 
the notion that a reactive, diplomatic-oriented, multilateral approach would deter the 
possibility of a rogue state or non-state actor attacking the United States any more than a 
proactive, military-operational, unilateral approach would.  As stated: 
 
Rather than a recipe for further proliferation, the Bush National Security 
Strategy of 2002 is a direct outgrowth of an existing post-proliferated and terror-
prone security environment.  It is both the logical culmination of more than a 
decade‘s worth of experience with recalcitrant proliferants in key regions and a 
sound premise on which to base US national-security planning in the years 
ahead.
331
 
  
The Decision to Undertake Preventive War 
The use of force is one of the most extraordinary decisions a leader can make.  Even more 
extraordinary is the decision to use force preventively – to attack another state when there is 
no imminent threat – because international law makes no provision for preventive war as it 
does for those of a pre-emptive nature.   In a modern context, preventive intervention is often 
associated with the deployment of military personnel and/or the execution of air strikes 
against targets across recognised borders for the purpose of precluding the target state from 
obtaining and utilising nuclear technology.  In simple terms, military intervention is 
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preventive if it is authorised when there is no threat of an imminent attack from the target 
state.  As discussed earlier, the definitions of the concepts of both prevention and pre-emption 
are based on ―better now than later‖ logic, which explains as to why they can engender 
ambiguity in their usage.  Referring again to Levy, the term prevention encompasses notions 
of fighting a winnable battle or simply employing military action now in order to avoid the 
risk of battle later under less favourable conditions.  Conversely, pre-emption involves the 
initiation of military action because it is perceived that an adversary‘s attack is imminent.332  
As argued by Levy, ―the theoretical significance of preventive war derives from the 
importance of the phenomenon of changing power differentials between states arising from 
uneven rates of growth.‖333  In essence, preventive military force is the proposition that the 
dominant power initiates preventive action in order to impede an ascending adversary while 
the latter is still too weak to pose a serious threat.
334
  The preventive motivation for battle 
arises from the perception that one‘s military power and potential are declining relative to 
that of a rising adversary and from the fear of the consequences of that decline.  Importantly, 
apprehension at the decline in power stems from the potential decline; not only of one‘s 
military power but also of one‘s bargaining position in international affairs and the 
corresponding decline in political, economic and cultural benefits one receives from the 
status quo.  The power shift may be the result of an advance in military technology or the 
acquisition of nuclear technology in the weaker state. 
 
As a means to define the preventive motivation, Levy suggested several reasons why a state 
may prefer to initiate war now rather than war later.  First, leaders may be prepared to 
precipitate a conflict as a means to maintain credibility if they have been challenged.
335
  This 
assumes the preventer is militarily stronger than its adversarial target, which Levy argued is 
most often the situation.  Levy also signified that decision makers may initiate a preventive 
attack because they perceive that a victorious war may increase their domestic political 
support.  That is, winning a ―conflict‖ may ―satisfy specific interest group pressures, exploit 
more generalized jingoistic sentiment, or distract the public‘s attention from internal social or 
economic problems through the creation of an external scapegoat.‖336  Finally, decision 
makers may elect to utilise preventive force if they perceive critical national interests to be 
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directly under threat.  It is here that the preventive motivation is an intervening variable 
between a state‘s relative decline in military power and the decision for war.337   
 
Additionally, the prevention consideration is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
war, but it can contribute to it in combination with other variables.
338
  For instance, variables 
related to domestic governance can also have an impact in a leader‘s decision to utilise 
preventive force.  Randall Schweller aligned domestic structure and preventive force, arguing 
that preventive force was an unrealistic policy for declining democratic leaders, as the 
strength of public opinion in democratic states often generated a complex set of factors which 
lessened the motivation to enter into a preventive war.
339
  Furthermore, he argued, such 
declining democratic leaders have attempted to counterbalance rising authoritarian 
challengers through the formation of defensive alliances rather than through the use of 
preventive force.  Richard Ned Lebow also made the connection between domestic political 
factors and a leader‘s decision making process in relation to the usage of force.  Like 
Schweller, he argued that public opinion and other domestic political forces could sway the 
decision making of leaders, even if they perceived that the national interest required military 
action.  In referring to World War II, he stated, ―Pacific or divided public opinion forestalled 
American intervention in the two world wars until either enough American ships had been 
sunk or the country itself had been attacked.‖340  Moreover, it is clear that the shock of the 
September 11 events evoked a crisis vortex that may have reduced public scepticism about 
both ―diagnoses of threats and proposed solutions,‖341 and may have invigorated an upsurge 
in public willingness to embrace an ―unusually high cost (economic and human) for 
international military engagement.‖342  Indeed, as Levy noted, regardless of the motivations, 
variables or stimuli, ―a decision to initiate war for preventive purposes involves enormous 
risks and uncertainties, and the risk propensities of decision makers can have a significant 
impact.‖343   
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Shifting National Security Strategy and Discourse 
On September 11, 2001, the United States suddenly found itself in what appeared to be a new 
and perplexing world in which the old structures no longer seemed adequate.  President 
George W. Bush and his advisors in their new national security policy defined the main lines 
of that policy which were by no means kept secret.
344
  US policy, the Bush Administration 
declared openly, would no longer be based on the principle of deterrence ―while dangers 
gather.‖  It had to identify the threat and impede such threats before they reached ―our 
borders;‖ taking ―whatever action [was] necessary.‖  It had to be prepared to act ―pre-
emptively‖ and, indeed, alone if necessary against ―rogue states and their terrorist clients 
before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States 
and our allies and friends.‖  It had to be proactive and ―take the battle to the enemy, disrupt 
his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.‖  In this ―new world,‖ Bush 
declared that ―the only path to peace and security is the path of action.‖345 
 
The increasing possibility that chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons could be attained 
by stateless terrorists, coupled with the recent al Qaeda attack in the United States, signified 
the breakdown of the deterrence and containment strategy that served the United States 
military throughout the Cold War and first stage of the post-Cold War era (1991-2001).  
Political uncertainty erupted over how US institutions would act to the situation as such 
strategies (in light of 9/11) now appeared unable to deter multiple threats from national and 
sub-national sources.  In response, the Bush Administration identified two significant 
changes to its security strategy.  First, the Administration detailed the significance of 
homeland security in the context of the broader global environment and articulated what it 
perceived to be significant threats to the United States.  Second, the Administration detailed 
its security strategy in which the deterrence and containment posture would be replaced by a 
policy advocating ―pre-emptive‖ offensive actions as a means to counter the ambitions of 
rogue states and terrorists.   
 
Controversy over the Bush Administration‘s national security strategy arose at the doctrinal 
level, as narratives of historical comparisons and competing visions of the future became the 
focus of domestic and international deliberative discourse.  One European commentator 
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stated that Bush had in fact ―stunned the international community‖ by declaring that such 
―pre-emptive military action was an acceptable option for coping with the new threat 
environment characterised by transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.‖346  Many argued that the new policy signified a total break with American 
tradition where the United States had pursued a more cautious and defensive policy; a policy 
that was framed by the core pillars of containment and deterrence; a policy that advocated 
respect for legal norms and for the sovereign rights of other states.
347
  It was argued that the 
United States had traditionally refrained from the use of force until it, or one of its allies, had 
been attacked.  The Bush Administration, it was argued, had broken with this tradition and 
was now pursuing a far more assertive policy.   As the Administration articulated its national 
security strategy to both domestic and international audiences, the cessation of debate over 
United Nations action and Congressional approval for intervention in Iraq presented 
legitimation issues for these national and international institutions struggling to address 
security issues in an era of globalisation.  In the United States, an anti-terrorist narrative 
dominated post-9/11 security discourse and shifted the presumption against the acceptance of 
the Cold War analytical structures that had dominated foreign policy.  Citizens and nations 
opposed to US military action against Iraq invariably explained their opposition through a 
narrative warning of the perils of US global hegemony.  Whereas proponents of Bush‘s 
policy in the US warned of the inevitability of future security threats and risks if the United 
States and a ―willing coalition‖ failed to take ―pre-emptive‖ action against the state of Iraq.  
The Bush Administration, as well as international counterparts, all faced the common 
predicament of how to sustain and reposition their arguments amid a global media 
environment, while fulfilling the challenging demands of creating a foreign policy rhetoric 
that addressed the dispositions of their national audiences.   
 
The Bush Administration‘s arguments for reshaping the United States‘ global security 
strategy relied on the shared premise that 9/11 engendered a new security environment.  The 
National Security Strategy of 2002 prominently featured rhetoric that worked to reinforce the 
threats presented by terrorism.  The document defined the War on Terror, the nature of the 
enemy, and in detail, how ―the United States of America‖ was ―fighting a war against 
terrorists of a global reach... The enemy (was) terrorism – premeditated, politically motivated 
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violence perpetrated against innocents.‖348  The Bush Doctrine articulated the ―new war‖ that 
the US was undertaking and dramatised a global security struggle that would be different 
from previous national struggles.  During the 20
th
 Century, it argued, nations struggled over 
divergent ideas between ―destructive totalitarian visions‖ and ―freedom and equality.‖  
Today, despite the events of 9/11, ―that great struggle is over‖349 as the United States would 
champion aspirations for human dignity and ―oppose those who resist it.‖350    
 
Indeed, the Bush Doctrine identified the ascendancy of democratically secured liberties in an 
era of globalisation and asserted that a clear moral vision would guide American foreign 
policy.  This public discussion of the need to secure liberties was significant as it highlighted 
the Bush Administrations intention to ―also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against 
international terrorism.‖351  While the strategy document maintained that terrorism was not ―a 
single political regime or person or religion or ideology,‖352 the battle against terrorist 
motivations signalled a willingness by the United States to engage in a battle over ideological 
differences.  The National Security Strategy of 2002 also acknowledged the ways in which 
the threat of the enemy had changed.  As stated, ―America is now threatened less by 
conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than 
by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.  We must defeat these threats 
to our Nation, allies, and friends.‖353  Hence, the new policy justified a ―pre-emptive‖ 
military posture as a means to counter the ambitions of rogue states and terrorists.  The 
strategy report maintained that: 
 
Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer 
rely solely on a reactive posture as we have in the past... Traditional concepts of 
deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are 
wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so called soldiers seek 
martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness.  The 
overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels 
us to action.
354
 
 
The apparent shift to pre-emptive action was grounded in a fortiori argumentation.  That is, 
Aristotle defined a fortiori as a rhetorical technique in which the arguer attempted to prove 
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that the opponent acted cruelly in the past – and thereby, the notion of future cruel actions 
reoccurring was a distinct possibility, if not, most probable.
355
  In the Iraq context, the 
arguments were constructed as a means to project the possibilities of future threats and to 
justify current resolve.  Inherent in Bush‘s National Security Strategy of 2002 was a 
reconfiguration of the United States‘ position in defining its legitimate use of assertive force 
and conflict.  
 
In the post-Cold War era, the challenge for the United States was how to adapt to the spectre 
of multiple security threats, including sub-national terrorism, together with heterogeneous 
ideologies engendering competition and conflict.  Amidst this environment, the Bush 
Administration refashioned its military doctrine.  The inability of the nation‘s security 
umbrella to impede the September 11 tragedies heightened expectations that the 
Administration must construct a security strategy commensurate with the new era.  The 
rhetoric of ―pre-emptive‖ war was prominently featured in Presidential addresses.  Bush‘s 
2002 State of the Union speech emphasised that the United States would be a virtuous leader 
by waging preventive war against international terrorists and the ―axis of evil‖ nations that 
gave comfort to them.  In his speech, Bush declared US intentions to act against terrorism, 
stating that ―some governments will be timid in the face of terror.  Make no mistake about it: 
If they do not act, America will.‖356  The arguments for US action to prevent future acts of 
destruction were further pronounced in subsequent Bush addresses.  In the June 1, 2002 
―Address to the Cadets at West Point,‖ he argued:  
 
Deterrence – the promise of massive retaliation against nations – means nothing 
against shadowy terrorist networks with no nations or citizens to defend.  
Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass 
destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to 
terrorist allies... If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited 
too long... the only path to safety is the path to action.
357
  
 
The linkage between the ―War on Terror‖ at home and abroad was very much evident in 
these speeches; compounded with the notion that the threat of weapons of mass destruction 
had now created a new security environment in which ―the battlefield has now shifted to 
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America.‖358  One year and one day after the 9/11 attacks, Bush was scheduled to appear 
before the UN to discuss security issues.  Although many UN members had envisaged a 
heated discussion in relation to international terrorism in the opening session of the UN 
General Assembly, Bush Administration officials indicated in early August that the President 
would use this forum to address the threat that Saddam Hussein posed to the world 
community.  President Bush‘s September 12th speech to the United Nations detailed the 
history of international efforts to impede the development of weapons of mass destruction by 
containing Iraq.  Bush described Iraq‘s history of non-compliance with UN resolutions and 
conveyed the possibility of actions the regime could undertake as a means to undermine 
global security at an international level.  As stated: 
 
The first time we may be completely certain that a terrorist state has nuclear 
weapons is when, God forbid, they use one.  And we owe it to our citizens to do 
everything in our power to prevent that day from coming.
359
 
 
When he addressed the nation on September 14
th
, Bush repeated his identification of Saddam 
Hussein‘s regime as ―a grave and gathering danger‖ to the global community, and stated, 
―...to suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence.  To assume this regime‘s good faith is 
to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble.‖360  
 
To many, such speeches signalled the shift from a security strategy embracing deterrence and 
containment to one emphasising preventive action.  Initially, many states expressed concern 
that the Administration was forgoing diplomatic options of threat reduction.  As stated by 
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, Bush‘s speech presented a ―very severe and clear 
challenge to the Security Council to contain Iraq.‖361  A new UN draft resolution proposed by 
the United States to disarm Iraq initially faced opposition from Russia, France and China, 
who demanded that the United Nations give full consideration to the ways in which any 
precedent authorising the use of force in the Iraqi context would legitimate conflict in future 
scenarios.  Members of the UN Security Council also expressed concern that the United 
States was willing to act against a state that did not convey a preparedness to attack the 
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United States.  Moreover, the legitimacy of the Bush Administration itself was challenged in 
relation to the fact that it initiated its policy goals first, and then sought United Nations (as 
well as Congressional) approval to pursue such policy objectives.  
 
International Law 
Reading the Bush Doctrine in the context of International Law, the intention to act ―pre-
emptively‖ as a means to stymie the emergence of terrorist networks, also became the subject 
of controversy in international public arenas.  Part of the international legitimation 
controversy the Administration encountered in justifying the change in American foreign 
policy was its inconsistency with previous instantiations of American military doctrine.  
Many argued that for decades, the United States‘ war doctrine was justified based on 
international law, agreements and norms.  Robert Tucker‘s examination of American doctrine 
in The Just War posed questions concerning the proper limits of defensive war, the grounds 
in which a pre-emptive war had been condemned, as well as the ramifications incurred in 
maintaining a Cold War nuclear deterrence strategy.  In depicting the ―just war‖ he 
articulated the overarching legal and moral limitations on military engagement.  As stated:  
 
The American doctrine is distinguished by the assumption that the use of force 
is clearly governed by universally valid moral and legal standards; it is 
distinguished further by the insistence with which these standards are interpreted 
as making the justice or injustice of war primarily dependent upon the 
circumstances immediately attending the initiation of force.  In substance, the 
just war is the war fought either in self-defense or in collective defense against 
an armed attack.  Conversely, the unjust and, of course, the unlawful-war is the 
war initiated in circumstances other than those of self or collective defense 
against armed aggression.
362
  
 
The United States has had a long history of insisting that ―whatever its grievances, a state 
cannot justify initiating war, [and] that whatever its interests, a state should not resort to war 
to preserve or protect those interests.‖363  Its adherence to the Charter of the United Nations, 
as well as the various security arrangements it entered after World War II, were used by 
Tucker as confirmatory evidence of the orthogonal nature of the United States‘ moral 
standards to those of international law.  For decades after World War II, the US military 
engaged in pre-emptive action to address imminent threats to the nation‘s interests.  With the 
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exception of the Kosovo campaign, the Clinton Administration acted in concert with the 
United Nations when engaging in military conflict.  As stated by Harries: 
 
There were clear UN resolutions to use force to expel Iraq from Kuwait; to 
preserve the no-fly zones in Bosnia; for the United States to act under Article 51, 
the right of self defense, in Afghanistan; to intervene in Sierra Leone and, more 
ambiguously, in Kosovo.
364
  
 
While the legitimacy of the Kosovo campaign was contested, the US acted with a 
commitment to internationalist purposes in accord with a ―coalition of willing nations‖ to 
impede ethnic conflict in the Balkans.  In contrast to these Clinton Administration conflicts, 
as well as former President George H.W. Bush‘s campaign against Iraq‘s incursions into 
Kuwait, Iraq‘s military threat presented no immediate danger to another state.  Hence, the 
United States‘ validation for confronting Iraq‘s failure to disarm in 2002/03 was perceived to 
be steeped with national interest.  Furthermore, although the United States vied for an 
international commitment to justify its intervention efforts, the rationale for military 
intervention presented a prima-facie case contravening international law against pre-emptive 
war.  The Bush Administration justified the Iraq intervention within a security strategy 
structure that would enable ―pre-emptive‖ action to be undertaken in the absence of an 
imminent threat.  It redefined national security strategy to encompass ―pre-emptive‖ actions 
taken as a means to prevent rogue states and terrorists from exacting mass civilian casualties 
upon the United States.  In so doing, however, they attempted to create the moral equivalence 
between historical actions taken by the United States to pre-empt an enemy attack, and the 
current ambiguous security actions needed to ―prevent‖ terrorist acts.  In essence, the Bush 
Administration argued that the level of proof for executing a ―pre-emptive‖ strike should be 
lowered as a means to adapt to ―non-traditional‖ objectives of terrorist states and networks. 
Furthermore, the Administration questioned the legitimacy of international law in the post-
September 1l security environment.  As already indicated in the above, the new security 
strategy created an ambiguous new meaning for justified pre-emptive action in the sense that 
the new meaning would encompass understandings of traditional war fighting conducted as 
―preventive‖ war.  As the National Security Strategy of 2002 posited: 
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For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack 
before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that 
present an imminent danger of attack.  Legal scholars and international jurists 
often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on existence of an imminent 
threat – most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces 
preparing to attack.  We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the 
capabilities and objectives of today‘s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do 
not seek to attack us using traditional means... Instead, they rely on acts of terror 
and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction – weapons that can be 
easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning... As was 
demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is 
the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more 
severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.
365
  
 
The subsequent prevarication between preventive and pre-emptive war was a rhetorical 
device used with clear intention.  As defined earlier, a legitimate pre-emptive strike under 
international law required that states demonstrate that aggressive states have both the capacity 
and intention of executing extreme harm.  In contrast, preventive war was without such 
requirements, but rather engendered mutual fear of a surprise attack.  The result may increase 
global instabilities as motives for arming can be misconstrued.  As argued by Crawford: 
 
Some states may defensively arm because they fear the ―pre-emptive/ 
preventive‖ state; others may arm offensively because they resent the 
preventive-war aggressor who may have killed many innocents in a quest for 
total security.  A pre-emptive doctrine which has – because of great fear and a 
desire to control the international environment – become a preventive war 
doctrine is likely to create more fearful states and more aggressor states.
366
 
 
Furthermore, such an equivocation between preventive and pre-emptive war actions 
undermined United Nations legal doctrine and diplomatic means of communicating security 
concerns.  While Article 51 of the UN charter illustrated that acts in self-defense are only 
legitimate in the face of attack, the doctrine of preventive war as posited in the National 
Security Strategy of 2002, risked making this article irrelevant.   
 
The National Security Strategy of 2002, nonetheless, maintained that the right of pre-emption 
had been recognised under international law ―for centuries,‖ although not in the expanded 
sense of the concept that the Bush Administration had framed it.  Reference to the writings of 
various classical international jurists lent support to this argument.  Gentili, for example, 
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argued in favour of pre-empting impending threats while also preventing the development of 
potential future threats.  He maintained that ―[a] defence is just which anticipates dangers that 
are already meditated and prepared [i.e., pre-emption], and also those which are not 
meditated, but are probable and possible [i.e., prevention].‖367  He emphasised, however, that 
there must be a clearly defined basis for apprehending the threat in which ―a just cause for 
fear is demanded; and suspicion is not enough.‖368  Nor is hostile intent alone sufficient 
justification for anticipatory action.  As Gentili stated, ―one ought not to be punished merely 
because of his desire to do harm... [but for] an impulse which was accompanied with action, 
as is made clear elsewhere.‖369 
 
Like Gentili, Grotius acknowledged that pre-emptive action may be taken to forestall or 
thwart an imminent attack.  He also argued that mere suspicion or speculation was not 
enough to justify such action:  
 
War in defence of life is permissible only when the danger is immediate and 
certain, not when it is merely assumed.  The danger, again, must be immediate 
and imminent in point of time.  I admit, to be sure, that if the assailant seizes 
weapons in such a way that his intent to kill is manifest the crime can be 
forestalled... But those who accept fear of any sort as justifying anticipatory 
slaying are themselves greatly deceived, and deceive others.
370
 
 
Pre-emptive action was a measure of last resort, to be taken up only when all other remedies 
have been exhausted: 
 
Further, if a man is not planning an immediate attack, but it has been ascertained 
that he has formed a plot, or is preparing an ambuscade, or that he is putting 
poison in our way, or that he is making ready a false accusation and false 
evidence, and is corrupting the judicial procedure, I maintain that he cannot 
lawfully be killed, either if the danger can in any other way be avoided, or if it is 
not altogether certain that the danger cannot be otherwise avoided.  Generally, in 
fact, the delay that will intervene affords opportunity to apply many remedies, to 
take advantage of many accidental occurrences; as the proverb runs, ‗There‘s 
many a slip ‗twixt cup and lip.‘371 
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De Vattel maintained that the greater the likelihood and destructiveness of an impending 
attack, the greater the justification for taking pre-emptive actions:  
 
One is justified in forestalling a danger in direct ratio to the degree of probability 
attending it, and to the seriousness of the evil with which one is threatened. If 
the evil in question be endurable, if the loss be of small account, prompt action 
need not be taken; there is no great danger in delaying measures of self-
protection until we are certain that there is actual danger of the evil. But suppose 
the safety of the State endangered?... Are we to delay averting our destruction 
until it has become inevitable?
372
 
 
In such circumstances, a state need not wait until the danger is apparent, but may act on the 
basis of a ―reasonable presumption‖ of threat:  
 
But presumption becomes almost equal to certitude if the Prince who is about to 
acquire enormous power has already given evidence of an unbridled pride and 
ambition.
373
 
 
The cornerstone of the Charter jus ad bellum regime is the general prohibition on the use of 
force found in Article 2 (4), coupled with the self-defence exception found in Article 51.  Is 
the preventive or pre-emptive use of military force lawful under the regime anchored on these 
two provisions?  
 
First, it is clear from other provisions of the Charter that the Security Council can resort to the 
preventive or pre-emptive use of force under its Chapter VII powers.
374
  As per Article 39, 
the Council may pursue forcible measures in response to ―any threat to the peace [emphasis 
added], breach of the peace, or act of aggression.‖375  The reference to ―threat to the peace‖ 
suggested that the Security Council may act (or authorise members to act) before a breach of 
the peace or an act of aggression had actually taken place.  This is confirmed in rhetoric used 
elsewhere in Chapter VII, Article 50, for example, that referred specifically to ―preventive or 
enforcement measures against any state... taken by the Security Council.‖376  The question, 
however, was as to whether States are permitted to unilaterally (i.e., without prior and explicit 
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Security Council authorisation) act in a preventive or pre-emptive military capacity as a 
measure of self-defence.  The answer to this of course depended upon the interpretation of 
Article 51, and specifically, as to whether the article permitted the anticipatory use of force in 
self-defence. 
 
The debate over the legitimacy of anticipatory self-defence, that is, unilateral measures of 
military force taken by a state to prevent an expected armed attack, has been one of the most 
controversial and extensive disputes connected with the Charter jus ad bellum regime.  On a 
general level, there have been two competing interpretations of Art. 51.  The restrictive or 
narrow interpretation posited that a state may exercise its right of self-defence only in 
response to an actual armed attack.  The non-restrictive or broad interpretation, conversely, 
emphasised that a state may also undertake this strategy in anticipation of an impending 
armed attack.  Both sides of the equation have articulated and conveyed powerful arguments 
in support of their respective positions.  But while there may be a substantial and admittedly 
controversial basis for pre-emptive counter-proliferation strategies in international law; there 
is much less so for preventive strategies.  It seems reasonable to recognise the legitimacy of 
anticipatory self-defence in the face of a clearly defined imminent threat.  As has often been 
said, international law in general – and the UN Charter regime, in particular – is not a suicide 
pact.  No state can be expected to sit passively to absorb an aggressor‘s impending attack.  At 
the same time, however, active defence does not necessarily imply that pre-emptive action 
should be taken in all circumstances against all threats. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a place for pre-emption both in a state‘s national security policy and, 
more to the point of this section, in international law.  This does not extend, however, to the 
brand of prevention/pre-emption set out in the Bush Doctrine, in so far as it does not meet the 
conditions of necessity and proportionality that regulate the anticipatory use of defensive 
force under the current interpretation of the Charter jus ad bellum regime.  The reason is, 
quite simply, that the strategic option enshrined in the Doctrine – as argued extensively 
throughout the above – is not pre-emption but, rather, prevention cloaked in the rhetoric of 
pre-emption.  This is more than just semantics.  As also demonstrated in the above, the 
international community had serious reservations concerning preventive military action.  
Such action, based often on ambiguous evidence of potential long-term threats has 
engendered greater scope for abuse.  That is, for the pursuit of aggressive ends under the 
guise of anticipatory self-defence, as well as for major informational mistakes in which 
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thousands die as a result.  In order to make its preventive strategy more palatable to the 
international community – and hence, lessen its instinctive opposition to the strategy – the 
Bush Administration attempted to convey this strategic option as pre-emption.  It drew the 
conceptual link to pre-emption through its emphasis on an expanded notion of imminence; a 
key element in the condition of necessity as it related to pre-emption.  Here again, the Bush 
Doctrine embellished the concept of imminence beyond the semantic breaking point.  The 
Doctrine pushed imminence back to the early research and development stage of the nuclear 
threat cycle, where the time to develop an operational nuclear weapons capability was 
measured not in days, weeks or even months but, rather, in years.  Nuclear activities at this 
stage of the threat cycle do not pose an imminent threat in the true meaning of the word.  This 
is not to argue for complacency in the face of such a potential long-term threat, and it may 
call for determined non-military action in order to prevent its realisation.  But it is not an 
imminent threat in the sense of a clear and impending attack, the basis for truly pre-emptive 
action.
377
  
 
This leads to the second component of the necessity condition on which the Bush Doctrine‘s 
brand of pre-emption faltered.  Traditionally, necessity requires that force be used as a last 
resort after all reasonable non-military alternatives have been exhausted.  It is difficult to 
credibly make the argument that there is no alternative to the use of force when dealing with 
a WMD capability whose emergence to the point where it actually poses an existential threat 
to the target state is measured in years.  In such circumstances, the target state certainly has 
time for ―a hundred visions and revisions‖ of its counter-proliferation efforts.  The Bush 
Doctrine attempted to bypass the issue of time by portraying conflict with the adversary as 
inevitable.  It assumed that the irrational hostility of the leaders of rogue proliferators was 
such that, once they acquired nuclear weapons, they would – not might – use them against the 
US and its friends either directly or through their terrorist proxies.  That being the case, it was 
better to ―impede now‖ when there was a better chance of success at relatively low cost, than 
later when the threat was more fully developed.
378
  
 
The last point where the Bush Doctrine‘s version of pre-emption faced limitations pertained 
to the second condition of regulating the defensive use of force on proportionality.  The target 
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state should not, for example, incinerate an aggressor‘s city in response to a rifle shot at a 
border post.  For pre-emption of a perceived nuclear threat, in particular, the severity of the 
response turns critically on the characterisation of that threat.  In its public pronouncements, 
the Bush Administration focussed on the worst-case scenario imaginable – a nuclear 
holocaust unleashed on American cities at the cost of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, 
of lives – to underpin its preventive/pre-emptive strategy.  Can this scenario be completely 
ruled out?  Obviously not.  It was not only the consequences of a catastrophic event but the 
likelihood of that event that must be assessed in order to place a particular threat scenario in 
its proper perspective among the panoply of other possible threats to the nation‘s security.  
This was particularly important when the threat response under consideration was preventive 
military action, with all the intended – and unintended – consequences that can flow from 
such action.  The target state must have the ability to gather and assess accurate, reliable and 
timely intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of the adversary.  As several American 
committees studying the 9/11 and Iraqi WMD intelligence failures have revealed, the US 
intelligence system did not demonstrate that it had this capacity, certainly to the degree 
necessary to underpin a strategy of prevention.  In the absence of such a capacity, falling back 
on worst-case scenario planning to ―cover the bases‖ had the associated consequence of 
rendering the concept of proportionality irrelevant.  The hypothesised demise of millions of 
innocents effectively served to justify any level of preventive military action.  It is here that 
while there may have been grounds, at least in principle under the UN Charter jus ad bellum 
regime for a counter-proliferation strategy of pre-emption that satisfied the conditions of 
necessity and proportionality, the Bush Doctrine‘s brand of pre-emption – prevention by any 
other name – was extensively limited in this context of international law.379 
 
Real World Preventive Considerations 
The National Security Strategy of 2002 deemed the proliferation of nuclear weapons as being 
unacceptable for a number of compelling reasons.  In simple terms, proliferation adds vast 
complexities to US foreign policy: crisis instabilities are likely to be more extreme; the 
likelihood of inadvertent or accidental use is likely to be greater; transfers to non-state groups 
are more likely; and at least some of the future possessor states are likely to be politically 
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volatile, aggressive, and are hard to deter.
380
  Important as these were, however, it appears 
that the real reason the US considered waging preventive war against Iraq, Iran, and North 
Korea was to ensure the maintenance of its overwhelming superiority in the Persian Gulf, 
East Asia, and the world.
381
  Indeed, it was evident that the Bush Administration was 
determined to ―prevent any hostile power from dominating regions whose resources would 
allow it to attain great power status (like Iraq or Iran in the oil-rich Middle East); discourage 
attempts by any other nation to challenge US leadership or upset the established political and 
economic order and should prevent the emergence of any potential competitors.‖382   
 
Accordingly, the National Security Strategy of 2002 reasserted such sentiments in its 
depiction of the US – a state that: ―enjoyed unparalleled military strength and economic and 
political influence;‖ would maintain its effort to ―keep military strengths beyond challenge;‖ 
sustain forces ―strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from trying to equal or 
surpass the power of the US;‖ and ―build a balance of power that favors freedom.‖383  
Therefore, if rogue actors were permitted to attain nuclear weapons, not only would the US 
become more deterred; rogue proliferators would become less deterred.  The emergence of 
rogue proliferators would threaten the security of the US and its allies, strengthen bargaining 
positions on both sides in any future political negotiations, increase militancy, entrench hard-
liners, destabilise the regional balance, and finally, encourage other states or non-state actors 
to follow suit.  For the Bush Administration this situation was completely unacceptable and 
had to be avoided.  As a result, the National Security Strategy of 2002 emphasised that the 
US would undertake preventive war against rogue states that were deemed to be close in 
acquiring nuclear weapons as a means to preserve an imbalance of power favourable to the 
US, and to preclude any potential aggression by emboldened nuclear adversaries.  Despite 
such concerns, many commentators questioned the perceived necessity and efficaciousness of 
using preventive war to address the issue of rogue proliferation.  More specifically, many 
analysts challenged the notion as to why the US ―needed‖ to wage preventive war against 
Iraq, Iran, or North Korea in the first place, even if they did pose a threat to US pre-eminence. 
 
Some critics argued that a strategy of preventive war was not necessary because many of the 
threats to the US were over-exaggerated and could be challenged with assertive, but less 
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militarised policies, such as deterrence and containment.
384
  Indeed, there is a substantial 
body of evidence which suggested that not all rogue proliferators were inherently unhinged 
and undeterrable.  As Record contended, because rogue states, like other states, have ―return 
addresses‖ in the form of attackable assets such as territory, population, armed forces, 
governmental and economic infrastructure, and most importantly, leaders who value their 
lives, they can be held hostage by credible threats of US retaliation.
385
  Michael O‘Hanlon, 
Susan E. Rice, and James B. Steinberg similarly posited that ―deterrence tends to work 
against even brutal autocrats, who tend to value highly their hold on power and their lives – 
as National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice herself wrote, ‗...these [rogue] regimes are 
living on borrowed time, so there need be no sense of panic about them.  Rather the first line 
of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence – if they do acquire WMD, 
their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national 
obliteration.‘‖386  Finally, Lawrence Korb elaborated: ―history has demonstrated that even the 
most ruthless tyrants understand and respect the logic of robust containment and active 
deterrence... even if a rogue country ruled by a terrorist and tyrant such as Saddam Hussein 
acquired [nuclear weapons], its weapons would cause little tangible harm because any 
attempt to use them would bring national obliteration.  When dictators have undertaken acts 
of aggression, it has been as a direct result of the United States‘ failure to communicate 
credibly its intent to retaliate.  On those occasions, deterrence did not fail us; it was just 
poorly implemented.‖387  For example, Saddam Hussein reportedly decided to wage war 
against Kuwait in July 1990, but before sending in his troops, he approached the US to find 
out how it would react.  In a now infamous interview with the Iraqi leader, US ambassador 
April Glaspie told Hussein, ―we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border 
disagreement with Kuwait.‖  Furthermore, in a previous communication, the US State 
Department had told Hussein that Washington had ―no special defense or security 
commitments to Kuwait.‖  The US may not have intended to give Iraq a green light, but in 
essence, that is what it did.
388
  This suggests that deterrence worked in 1991, and furthermore, 
that the despots atop even the most offensive, seemingly reckless rogue regimes were still 
fundamentally rational calculators that sought some degree of political survival above all 
else, and understood the logic of deterrence.  In other words, ―rogue state behaviour so far 
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provides no convincing evidence of immunity to deterrence via the credible threat of 
unacceptable retaliation.‖389  If this is correct, then a strategy of preventive war may not be 
the most efficacious or cost-effective way to thwart the emergence of rogue proliferators. 
 
Moreover, other scholars and commentators have posited the notion that even if a state was 
perceived to be both rogue and proliferating, there was still no guarantee that it sought to 
initiate hostilities, upset the status quo or extend its sphere of influence.  After all, ―blackmail 
and aggression are not the only reasons rogue states seek [nuclear weapons]; they may also 
see in such weapons a means of, deterring or at least raising the price of, US military action 
against themselves.‖390  As posited in the above, the US perception of threat has often derived 
from the interaction of capabilities with intentions; and while a states‘ capability to do harm 
might not be in dispute, there is always the potential for its motives and intentions to be 
misinterpreted or change, sometimes in unexpected and even positive ways.  As Neta 
Crawford articulated, ―a strategy of preventive war assumes... perfect knowledge of an 
adversary‘s ill intentions when such presumptions may be premature or false... while 
preventive war doctrines assume that today‘s potential rival will become tomorrow‘s 
adversary, diplomacy or some other factor could work to change the relationship from 
antagonism to accommodation…‖391  Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond further 
explained: 
 
Preventive war is based on the proposition that it is possible to foretell with 
certainty what is to come.  But predicting another state‘s future behavior is 
difficult because leadership intentions are hard to discern. Information on an 
adversary‘s long-range goals may be obscured by its attempts to shroud policy 
planning in secrecy.  Evidence on the options being considered for attaining 
those goals may be misinterpreted due to a carefully crafted deception 
campaign.  Finally, signals of impending moves may be distorted by background 
noise.  Acknowledging these difficulties, [US Administrations] often try to 
predict an adversary‘s future behavior by evaluating its military capabilities. 
However, capability estimates can be misleading, especially when being made 
over a long time horizon without reliable data on possible changes... Another 
drawback is divining whether projected capability enhancements are earmarked 
for offensive or defensive purposes.
392
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Sharing this analysis, numerous states-people over the years have warned against undertaking 
wars predicated upon assumptions and speculation about adversaries or the future.  As 
Randall L. Schweller argued, ―above all, preventive wars are ‗wars of anticipation,‘ and 
therefore their justification, if any is given, can rest only upon the inherently unprovable 
assumptions of human foresight.  As Abbe Galiani posited: ‗the misfortunes of mankind 
derive from foresight... the actual cause of wars.  Because one foresees the House of 
Hapsburg will increase, because the French, a hundred years from now, will do such a thing, 
we begin to cut one another‘s throats right now.‘‖393  Even the consummate statesman Otto 
von Bismarck had difficulty assessing the immediate costs of war against alternative futures, 
stating that: ―The idea of undertaking a war because it might be inevitable later on and might 
then have to be fought under less favorable conditions has always remained foreign too me, 
and I have always fought against it... For I cannot look into Providence‘s cards in such a 
manner that I would know things beforehand‖ and ―I would... never advise Your Majesty to 
declare war forthwith, simply because it appeared that our opponent would begin hostilities in 
the near future.  One can never anticipate the ways of divine providence securely enough for 
that.‖394  For this reason, promulgating a strategy of preventive war is said to be both 
imprudent and ―defeatist,‖ for ―who knows what hopes the passage of time may bring to 
realization?‖395 
 
Conversely, proponents of the Bush Doctrine and preventive war have argued that it was 
imperative for the US to ―do something big‖ after September 11 as a means to restore its 
damaged deterrent capability.  While the Afghanistan campaign was a sufficiently strong 
response to the September 11 acts themselves, it was not expected to be assertive enough to 
effectively signify US resolve in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by rogue 
states.  To be an effective treatment for proliferation, preventive war must not only remove 
the direct threat, it must also dissuade would-be proliferators.  According to Galia Press-
Barnathan: ―The US has demonstrated its willingness to use force since the end of the Cold 
War, but most of its activities were limited to air war and to relatively small-scale missions.  
It was, therefore, not at all clear that a US Administration would be willing and able to 
engage in a serious ground war that was not preceded by an attack on the US itself... In light 
of this problem, waging a preventive war as to serve the goal of re-establishing the credibility 
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of the US deterrent capability, which was undermined after September 11, and, in turn, to 
give credibility to the new preventive doctrine...‖396  Indeed, rogue states such as Iraq, Iran, 
and North Korea it was argued, needed to be shown that significant challenges to US 
supremacy, especially the proliferation of nuclear weapons, would not go unnoticed and 
would be countered by a prompt and devastating response.  As stated by Mead, ―...the enemy 
had to learn who was the strongest and, if it came to that, the most ruthless.  From this 
standpoint the invasion of Iraq was in the nature of a warning shot: a warning that future 
attacks on the pre-eminence of the US will be followed by even more overwhelming 
responses.‖397  Unfortunately, the main avenue for the US to effectively communicate this 
new and powerful determination would be to actually engage in a preventive war.  As 
asserted by Robert J. Pauly and Tom Lansford, ―for any strategy to be deemed credible, 
decisive action to back rhetorical promises is essential.  That is why the Bush 
Administration‘s release of the National Security Strategy coincided with the President‘s 
issuance of an ultimatum to Saddam to disarm and desist from sponsoring terrorist 
organizations... and that is why the Bush Administration ultimately decided to use force to 
remove Saddam from power.‖398  Indeed, even former US Secretary of the Treasury Paul 
O‘Neill, an ardent opponent of undertaking preventive war against Iraq, conceded that taking 
such action could ―act as a ‗demonstration model‘ of what other countries that were 
considering actions hostile to the US might face... [preventive war] would persuade other 
countries to change what they‘ve been doing by harboring or supporting terrorists [and 
developing nuclear weapons].‖399  In essence, after the September 11 attacks, the US needed 
to make a ―big, fast, bold, simple move that would send a signal at home and abroad, a signal 
that said ‗don‘t mess with Texas. Or America,‘‖ and according to its proponents, waging 
preventive war was quite simply the only way in which this could be achieved.
400
 
 
Finally, John Lewis Gaddis and others have posited that the US had to engage in a preventive 
war relatively soon after its operations in Afghanistan if it was to sustain the already waning 
momentum of the Bush Doctrine and its expected ―domino effect‖ upon other rogue 
proliferators.  According to Gaddis, ―the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were meant to 
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topple selected dominos with a view of destabilizing others.  The purpose was as much 
psychological as military: to eliminate individuals, gangs, and regimes who commit to 
support terrorism and acquire nuclear weapons, but also to intimidate so... prevention, by this 
logic, could produce a deterrent effect... in order for this new domino theory to work, 
however, the pace had to be kept up; there couldn‘t be too much time between topplings.‖401  
Similarly, Vice President Dick Cheney exclaimed: ―Afghanistan was only the beginning of a 
lengthy campaign.  Were we to stop now, any sense of security we might have would be false 
and temporary...‖402  Indeed, whereas fighting a preventive war against one rogue proliferator 
may convince others to relinquish their arrant hostility and nuclear desires, without a ―swift, 
sure, and clear‖ preliminary action there could be no subsequent reaction.  In this view, for 
the US to attain any long-term deterrent benefits vis-à-vis other existing or potential rogue 
proliferators, it would be necessary to quickly and successfully set an example by executing a 
preventive war against at least one rogue proliferator, if not more.   
 
Ultimately defined in this chapter in the context of preventive war, the National Security 
Strategy of 2002 should be considered an ―active‖ Doctrine.  During the 1950s, Paul Nitze 
argued that the term ―doctrine‖ could be used in two related but different senses, the ―action 
sense‖ and the ―declaratory sense.‖  The action sense referred to the broader guidelines that 
policy-makers believed should and would in fact govern the movement of the US in various 
contingencies.  The declaratory aspect pertained to policy statements that were gauged in 
their principal towards political and/or psychological effects.
403
  Although the Bush Doctrine, 
like most doctrines, may have, at various intervals, served both active and declaratory 
functions, throughout this paper it will be assumed that its principal aim was to guide and 
inform the definitive actions of US foreign policy.  Regardless of the apparent misuse of the 
terms pre-emption and prevention, and the interchanging of these terms in Bush‘s rhetoric via 
speeches and documental instruments, this chapter in essence has subscribed to the belief that 
what Bush was advocating all during the period after 9/11 (2001), the release of the National 
Security Strategy (September 2002), through to the Iraq War (March 2003), was the 
consideration, endorsement and ultimately, use of preventive war against those actors deemed 
as a major threat to the United States‘ security and well-being.  Indeed, the definitions and 
interpretations of both pre-emption and prevention during this period challenged and 
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transcended every facet of international relations and US security policy in the context of 
history, doctrine, international law and their use within a Presidential rhetorical framework.  
Having defined these concepts (pre-emption and prevention), the next chapter will focus on 
the perceived threats or ―rogue proliferators‖ that were apparent at the time of the National 
Security Strategy of 2002, and why the US deemed it both appropriate and necessary that 
preventive war be both seriously considered (in the context of the ―axis of evil‖) and actually 
undertaken (in state of Iraq). 
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Having established the meanings and definitions associated with pre-emption and prevention; 
and the extent to which preventive war was considered a viable option by his Administration, 
the next task for Bush was to ―choose‖ a state in which to undertake the preventive war 
strategy.  It was clear that from 2001-2003, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were all perceived to 
be ―grave and gathering threats‖ – and were all considered rogue proliferators.  Assuming 
that the US was determined to act preventively against at least one of them, one would expect 
to find evidence that the Bush Administration sought and/or planned to attack all three.  From 
the beginning, however, it appeared that the Administration‘s preferred target was Iraq.  As 
indicated by Clarke, the US ―planned early on to eliminate Saddam Hussein.‖404  That is, on 
November 21, 2001, only two months after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Bush 
reportedly asked Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, ―what kind of a war plan do you 
have for Iraq?  How do you feel about the war plan for Iraq?‖405  Furthermore, within days of 
the publication of the National Security Strategy, the Bush Administration announced that a 
senior State Department official would travel to Pyongyang in October to reengage the North 
Koreans on security issues, while others were quietly working to secure Iranian neutrality in 
the case of a war with Iraq.
406
  Why was this the case?  If the Iranian and North Korean 
regimes were just as despicable and dangerous as Iraq, why did the Bush Administration seek 
conciliation with the former and war with the latter?  Or, as Senator Richard Durbin inquired 
in a September 10
th
 2002 speech to Congress, ―If all three are threats and enemies to the US, 
why is it that the Administration has focused on Iraq.‖407  Indeed, if preventive war was to be 
undertaken, why was Iraq the state of ―choice‖ for the Administration?  These questions, 
together with those pertaining to the events surrounding the justification and lead up to the 
actual declaration of war, are addressed in this chapter, and thereby, will enable latter 
analysis (Chapter 5) on the extent to which the National Security Strategy (in its preventive 
endorsement and aspirations) has been evident and perhaps even implicit in US security 
strategy since the end of WWII. 
 
The Choice of Iraq 
From 2001-03, Iraq was widely perceived to be a rogue proliferator, having previously defied 
no less than seventeen different UN Security Council Resolutions.  Moreover, it had: 
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allegedly developed an extensive arsenal of WMD; impeded and deceived international 
weapons inspectors over the span of twelve years; used WMD against its own Kurdish 
population; invaded two neighbouring states (Iran and Kuwait); and supported and harboured 
well-known terrorist organisations.  At varying intervals, Iraq had challenged the security of 
the US and its allies and participated in military confrontation during the first Gulf War.  As 
stated by Gordon Indyk and O‘Hanlon: 
 
Certainly the US has good reasons to want to get rid of Saddam Hussein. 
Saddam is a menace who has ordered the invasion of several of his neighbors, 
killed thousands of Kurds and Iranians with poison gas, turned his own country 
into a brutal police state and demonstrated an insatiable appetite for WMD.  He 
is currently funding Palestinian terrorists who attack Israeli civilians as well as 
trying to disrupt world oil supplies.  He is also, almost surely, still trying to build 
nuclear weapons.  And he is powerfully motivated to seek revenge against his 
personal and political nemeses, as demonstrated most vividly in his... attempted 
assassination of former President George Bush in 1993.  That is why there is a 
general consensus in the US that overthrowing Saddam would be a good 
thing.
408
 
 
In addition, it appeared that Iraq may have served as a haven, transit point and operational 
base for groups and actors who directed terrorism and violence against the US, Israel and 
other Western states.  According to the US Department of State:  ―Baghdad overtly assisted 
two categories of Iraq based terrorist organizations – Iranian dissidents [Mujahedin-e-Khalq] 
devoted to toppling the Iranian government and a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups 
opposed to peace with Israel.  Baghdad provided material assistance to other Palestinian 
terrorist groups that were at the forefront of the Intifada.  The Popular Front for the liberation 
of Palestine – General Command Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad were the most 
important groups to whom Baghdad had extended outreach and support efforts... Several 
expatriate terrorist groups continued to maintain offices in Baghdad including the Arab 
Liberation Front, the inactive 15 May Organization, the Palestinian Liberation Front and the 
Abu Nidal organization.‖409  Moreover, the 9/11 Commission reported that, ―[Osama] Bin 
Laden was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperating with Iraq... Bin Laden himself 
met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995.  Bin 
Laden is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in 
procuring weapons... In March 1998, after Bin Laden‘s public fatwa against the US, two al 
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Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence.  In July, an Iraqi 
delegation travelled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Laden... 
Iraqi officials offered Bin Laden a safe haven in Iraq.‖410  
 
Aside from the alleged ―connections‖ to al Qaeda, many in the Bush Administration believed 
that Iraq had demonstrated an ability to construct a large, clandestine nuclear weapons 
program.
411
  In the decade before the first Gulf War, Iraq had invested more resources into 
nuclear programs than any other developing state in the world and came very close to 
becoming the first Arab state to actually produce and deploy such weapons.  As stated in the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative:  
 
In the early 1970s, Baghdad initiated a bomb program under direct orders from 
then Vice-President Saddam Hussein.  The plan called for developing a civilian 
fuel cycle and related expertise first; the weapons program was to parallel and 
build off of these efforts. Accordingly, Baghdad acquired a French nuclear 
reactor in 1975.  After Israel destroyed the [Osiraq nuclear] reactor in June 1981 
air strike, Iraq explored a number of clandestine uranium enrichment methods.  
By the time of Desert Storm in 1991, Iraq had a robust covert nuclear weapons 
program, with a completed – though untested – nuclear weapon design. Baghdad 
was perhaps one to three years away from building a nuclear weapon at the 
onset of the war.
412
  
 
While it was difficult to ascertain the extent to which Saddam Hussein was able to rebuild his 
nuclear weapons program after the first Gulf War, the view of the CIA and US Department of 
Defense was that Iraq‘s nuclear aspirations and accumulated technical expertise had remained 
intact, and coinciding with this, the capacity to reignite a proliferation program quickly and 
covertly.  As the Rumsfeld Commission reported: ―Iraq has maintained the skills and 
industrial capabilities needed to reconstitute its long range ballistic missile program... Prior to 
the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq could have had nuclear weapons in the 1993-1995 time 
frame... Iraq has the capability to reconstitute its nuclear weapon program; the speed at which 
it can do so depends on the availability of fissile material.‖413  Indeed, it was believed that 
Iraq had a workable design for the weaponisation of a nuclear weapon in 2002, to the extent 
that the only significant impediment to producing such a weapon was its ability to attain 
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fissile material.  As indicated by the CIA Unclassified Report to Congress: ―Iraq has engaged 
in extensive concealment effort and has probably used the period since it refused inspections 
to attempt to reconstitute prohibited programs... A sufficient source of fissile material 
remains Iraq‘s most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon.  The 
intelligence community is concerned that Baghdad is attempting to acquire materials that 
could aid in reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.‖414  If Iraq were able to obtain the 
said material from another state, it was perceived that it could have constructed a nuclear 
device within months.
415
   
 
Aside from Iraq‘s potential to develop nuclear weapons, considerations pertaining to varying 
aspects of international law and precedents dating as far back to the first Gulf War were 
posited as potential justification for preventive war.  According to William Taft and Todd 
Buchwald, given Iraq‘s repeated breaches of UN Security Council Resolutions, any military 
action taken by the US against Iraq would be wholly justifiable: 
 
[United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 678] was the 
authorization to use force for the Gulf War in 1991.  In April of that year, the 
Council imposed a series of conditions on Iraq, including most importantly 
extensive disarmament obligations, as a condition of the ceasefire declared 
under UNSCR 687.  Iraq has ‗materially breached‘ these disarmament 
obligations, and force may again be used under UNSCR 678 to compel Iraqi 
compliance... Just last November, in resolution 1441, the Council unanimously 
decided that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations.  
1441 then gave Iraq a ‗final opportunity‘ to comply, but stated specifically that 
violations of the obligations,  including the obligation to cooperate fully, under 
1441 would constitute a further material breach.  Iraq has clearly demonstrated 
such violations and, accordingly, the authority to use force to address Iraq‘s 
material breaches is clear.
416
 
 
According to those in the Administration, as well as proponents of the ―Iraq choice,‖ previous 
UN Security Council resolutions had provided the US with sufficient authority needed to 
legally justify attacking Iraq.  The US would be acting on the basis of implied authority from 
Resolution 578, which automatically authorised individual member states to use ―all 
necessary means,‖ including force, to enforce Iraqi compliance with any of the conditions 
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stipulated in previous resolutions – especially resolutions 687 and 1441.  As stated by Press-
Barnathan, ―Iraq had a previous ‗criminal record‘ that gave at least some legitimacy to the 
allegations that it had sinned again and would allow for military action against it.‖417  This 
may have been true, however, it was unlikely that the Bush Administration would have 
defined its decision to go to war strictly on legal terms.  After all, there was very little 
historical evidence to signify that US decisions to use force abroad had been cultivated on 
notions of efficacy and permissiveness of the relevant legal arguments.  On the contrary, the 
traditional view of international law and the use of force has been that ―it is a sham, 
something that international lawyers talk and write about but to which statesmen pay no 
attention, except perhaps when they want to justify something that they have made up their 
minds to do in any case.‖418  This may be relatively extreme – the presence of a robust legal 
argument was certainly important and probably enabled to make the case for war in Iraq – but 
it was doubtful that any US Administration would focus a decision to wage war strictly on the 
legality of such actions.  Moreover, there was reason to believe that the US would be able to 
construct equally viable legal arguments based on emerging norms of ―conditional‖ or 
―contractual‖ sovereignty and/or existing UN resolutions to facilitate the justification of 
military action in both Iran and North Korea.  As explained by Lawrence Korb: 
 
This country has long respected the principle of non intervention established by 
the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia…Yet, in recent times, international law has 
evolved to recognize a countervailing principle that qualifies the norm of non 
intervention: regimes may surrender the right to rule over their people if they 
systematically deviate from established international human rights standards and 
consistently pose a threat to regional and global peace and stability.  A state that 
condones or practices terrorism, or seeks to use WMD as weapons of choice or 
retains its hold on power by violating virtually every norm of morality and law 
known to mankind forfeits its claim to sovereignty.
419
 
 
Indeed, the emerging legal doctrine, also known as the ―Responsibility to Protect‖ required 
that states had a responsibility to protect the ―lives, liberty, and basic human rights of their 
citizens, and that if they to fail or are unable to carry it out, the international community has a 
responsibility to step in.‖420  This international ―duty‖ also applied to states where the 
population was experiencing serious harm as a result of internal conflict, insurgency, 
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repression or state failure, as well as those forces that undermined global stability and 
security via state sponsored terrorism and/or acquisition of WMD.  Furthermore, the US 
could also plausibly argue that it was within its legal rights to take military action against Iran 
based on UN Resolution 1373, which in essence, imposed ―binding obligations upon states to 
prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, to refrain from providing any support to 
terrorists, to deny safe haven to terrorists, to develop effective border controls, and to bring to 
justice those who commit terrorist acts, among other requirements.‖421  As articulated by 
Richard N. Gardner: 
 
...in Resolution 1373, the Security Council imposed a legal requirement on all 
UN members [including Iran] to suppress al Qaeda and other transnational 
terrorist groups.  Read in the context of the long-recognized principle of 
international law that states must not permit their territory to be used for the 
purpose of launching attacks on other states, I believe the decisions of NATO 
and the UN provide a sufficient legal basis for military actions the US needs to 
take to destroy terrorist groups operating in countries that do not carry out their 
legal obligations to suppress them.
422
 
 
In relation to the state of North Korea, a solid legal case could be made for military action 
based on its abrupt withdrawal and dismissal from the legally binding Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and/or the regime‘s egregious human rights abuses.  Certainly, 
Pyongyang‘s contravention of nuclear safeguards during 1994 could provide a relatively 
sound legal basis for US military actions.  Hence, in the unlikely event that the Bush 
Administration based its decision exclusively on legal parameters, it would have had no 
better reason to attack Iraq over either Iran or North Korea 
 
The next point of consideration pertaining to the US‘s determination in waging war against 
Iraq, was based on Iraq‘s alleged complicity in the September 11 terrorist attacks and links to 
the al Qaeda terrorist organisation.  This viewpoint did not seem plausible, however, even 
prior to the war the Administration struggled to produce any compelling evidence associating 
Saddam Hussein to al Qaeda; and very few commentators believed that this was the ―real‖ 
reason as to why the US went to war with Iraq.  As Wirtz and Russell reported, ―many 
observers [found] the connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda to be farfetched; 
they believe that it is unlikely that Iraq‘s secular regime would support religious 
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fundamentalists, or that Saddam, who has plenty of personal and political enemies, would 
give ‗outsiders‘ control of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.‖423  Indeed, prior to 
the war most believed that ―the evidence adduced for the Security Council was, at best, 
unconvincing and in part misrepresented and falsified... very few nations accepted that 
credible evidence could be shown of an operational link between al Qaeda and the regime in 
Baghdad.‖424  Lastly, as Brent Scowcroft acknowledged: ―The only thing that Osama [Bin 
Laden] and Saddam Hussein have in common is they hate the US. There is scant evidence to 
tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the 11 September attacks.‖425  
Therefore, it did not appear that the Bush Administration would have chosen to undertake 
war against Iraq based primarily upon its supposed ties or connection to al Qaeda.  In fact, as 
Chaim Kaufman alerted, ―Hussein provided far less practical support to terrorism than did 
Syria, Iran, Yemen, or sources in some friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan.‖426  If any of the three rogue proliferators were to have links to the September 11 
attacks or al Qaeda, it would most likely have been the state of Iran.  As Clarke exhorted: 
 
When the Bush Administration talked about Iraq as a nation that supported 
terrorism, including al Qaeda, and was developing WMD, those comments 
perfectly suited Iran, not Iraq.  It was Tehran that had funded and directed 
Hezbollah since its inception.  It was Hezbollah that had killed hundreds of 
Americans in Lebanon.  Hezbollah, with Iranian support has also killed 
hundreds of Israelis.  While the ‗ties‘ and ‗links‘ between Saddam and al Qaeda 
were minimal, al Qaeda regularly used Iranian territory for transit and sanctuary 
prior to September 11.  Al Qaeda‘s Egyptian branch, Egyptian Islamic Jihad 
operated openly in Tehran.  It is no coincidence that many of the al Qaeda 
management team... moved across the border into Iran after US forces finally 
invaded Afghanistan.
427
 
 
Another possible reason as to why the Bush Administration may have ―chosen‖ to wage war 
against Iraq (rather than Iran and North Korea) was centred upon Baghdad‘s endemic and 
deplorable record of human rights abuses.  As the US Department of State reported:  
 
Iraq‘s human rights record [in 2002] remained extremely poor, and it continued 
to commit numerous, serious human rights abuses.  Citizens did not have the 
right to change the regime.  The regime continued summarily to execute alleged 
political opponents and leaders of the Shi‘a religious community.  Reports 
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suggested that persons were executed merely because of their association with 
an opposition group.  The regime continued to be responsible for disappearances 
and to kill and torture persons suspected of or related to persons suspected of 
oppositionist politics, economic crimes, military desertion, and a variety of other 
activities... The UN... issued a report... detailing ongoing, grievous violations of 
human rights by the regime.
428
  
 
There is no doubt that Iraq‘s human rights record was appalling, however, so too was Iran 
and North Korea‘s.  According to the same report, Iran‘s human rights record in 2002 was 
―poor, and deteriorated substantially during the year, despite continuing efforts within society 
to make the Government accountable for its human rights policies.‖429  Additionally, the 
State Department highlighted how the Iranian government had ―denied citizens the right to 
change their government‖ while also undertaking ―systematic abuses‖ including ―summary 
executions; disappearances; widespread use of torture and other degrading treatment, 
reportedly including rape; severe punishments such as stoning and flogging; harsh prison 
conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; and prolonged and incommunicado detention.‖430  
The situation in North Korea pertaining to humanitarian conditions was reported to be even 
worse.  The State Department in 2002 also rated North Korea‘s human rights record as 
―poor‖ and indicated that the North Korean government had continued to commit serious 
human rights abuses.  As stated, ―Citizens did not have the right to peacefully change their 
government, and the leadership viewed most international human rights norms, particularly 
individual rights, as illegitimate, alien, and subversive to the goals of the State and the 
Party.‖431  Moreover, the North Korean situation was complicated by the fact that the 
government was unable to feed its population; the country relied on international aid and 
trade to supplement domestic production, which has been hobbled by disastrous agricultural 
policies.  From 1995 to 1997, famine caused internal dislocation, widespread malnutrition, 
and an estimated 1 to 2 million persons – or possibly as much as 10 percent of the population 
– died from starvation and related diseases.432  In simple terms, all three states had deplorable 
human rights records and thus, could not sufficiently account for the Administration‘s 
decision to undertake war against Iraq over the states of Iran and North Korea. 
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Various commentators and scholars have argued that the reason the Bush Administration may 
have ―chosen‖ to undertake preventive war with Iraq rather than Iran and North Korea, was 
because it was ―Iraq obsessed‖ and saw the terrorist attacks as an ―opportunity to mobilize 
support for forcible regime change in Iraq even absent of evidence of Iraqi complicity in 11 
September.‖433  Indeed, it was apparent that the sensational events of September 11 
engendered a ―crisis atmosphere that may have reduced public scepticism about both 
diagnoses of threats and proposed solutions‖ and may have ―spurred an upsurge in public 
willingness to accept an unusually high cost (economic and human) for international military 
engagement.‖434  Nonetheless, even if the Bush Administration was able to exploit a state of 
emergency to mobilise public support for a more assertive foreign policy, it did not 
necessarily lead to a choice of force against Iraq.  Indeed, given their respective histories, it 
would appear that both Iran and North Korea had also been persistent irritants to the US as 
indicated by the US Department of Defense in December 2001: ―North Korea, Iraq, and 
Iran... are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected 
contingencies.  All have longstanding hostility toward the United States and its security 
partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military concerns.  All sponsor 
or harbor terrorists and all have active WMD and missile programs.‖435  Furthermore, the 
nine independent Commissioners of the Rumsfeld Commission were adamant in their 
sentiments and concluded that, ―concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially 
hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a 
growing threat to the US, its deployed forces and its friends and allies.  These newer, 
developing threats in North Korea, Iran and Iraq are in addition to those still posed by the 
existing ballistic missile arsenals of Russia and China... The extraordinary level of resources 
North Korea and Iran are now devoting to developing their own ballistic missile capabilities 
poses a substantial and immediate danger to the US, its vital interests and its allies.‖436  As 
Mann articulated, ―the Rumsfeld Commission report... was a prominent manifestation of the 
way these three countries were being increasingly bracketed by the Washington‘s foreign 
policy and intelligence communities, well before George W. Bush arrived in the White 
House.‖437  Finally, Iran and North Korea were also highlighted by the Bush Administration 
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as being members of the now infamous ―axis of evil.‖  Such evidence strongly suggests that 
the US may have also been ―obsessed‖ with Iran and North Korea. 
 
In the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, many commentators throughout the US came to 
believe that the decision to wage preventive war was predicated primarily upon Washington‘s 
burgeoning need and desire to gain unimpeded access to Iraq‘s oil reserves.  Given the Bush 
Administration‘s links to the oil sector and the rising costs of gasoline, many considered the 
―oil rationale‖ to be the most compelling of all.  Indeed, it was argued that a combination of 
US direct influence over Iraq‘s share of oil reserves – the world‘s third largest – and a long-
term military presence in Iraq, would enable the US to have much greater leverage and 
control over world oil supplies and policies, and thereby, provide American and British 
companies (ExxonMobil, Chevron-Texaco, Shell, and British Petroleum) a potential windfall 
of hundreds of billions of dollars.  Simultaneously, a successful war could weaken the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Counties (OPEC) oil cartel, limit the influence of other 
major oil suppliers such as Russia, Mexico, and Venezuela and finally, reduce the 
dependency upon oil from Saudi Arabia – the world‘s single largest supplier of oil.438  
However influential this alleged yearning for oil may have been, it too cannot adequately 
explain why the US chose to wage preventive war against Iraq; if the US was determined to 
wage war against a threatening state on account of oil, why did it not attack Iran, the world‘s 
second largest holder of proven oil reserves?
439
 
 
In addition to the explanations and variables provided above, the Bush Administration‘s 
decision to ―choose‖ Iraq may have been based on other considerations.  That is, one of the 
residual objectives of the Bush Doctrine and the operation in Iraq was to provide the platform 
for the transformation of the Middle East into a liberal, democratic and economically viable 
region.  In a speech on the future of Iraq, Bush declared that, ―a liberated Iraq can show the 
power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives 
of millions.‖440  It was perceived that removing the Iraqi threat and replacing it with a 
democratic polity could demonstrate the merits of integration and engagement to 
neighbouring Muslim states, and thereby, facilitate the desire for democratisation and 
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political liberalisation in the Persian Gulf.  As further articulated by Mann, ―some of the 
[Bush Administration] hoped that in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, the US could turn Iraq 
into a model for democracy that would transform Arab political culture and the politics of the 
entire Middle East.‖441  Indeed, ―as far as the Bush Administration was concerned, a 
democratic Iraq at the heart of the Arab world could become a liberal beacon in the region, 
promoting demands for openness and real reform inside neighboring states.‖442  
 
In contrast to the above explanations, it is plausible that the Bush Administration‘s decision 
to undertake preventive war against Iraq rather than Iran and North Korea was viewed as a 
strategic choice based primarily upon practical considerations.  This included notions 
pertaining to the relative military capacities and capabilities of the targeted states, which 
represented the most quantifiable measure of a states‘ ability to defend/retaliate against an 
armed attack.  As explained by Richard Ned Lebow: ―Relative military capability has the 
further appeal in that it appears to lend itself to quantification more readily than do other 
possible measures of deterrence.  Relative military strength is frequently described in terms 
of the respective makeup and size of adversarial forces and the performance characteristics of 
their most important weapons systems.‖443  Certainly no relatively composed US 
Administration would consider waging war without first taking into account the war-fighting 
capabilities of the designated state.  In assessing the use of force against rogue proliferators, a 
primary concern must be the capability of the target state to retaliate.  Indeed, there are 
obvious ramifications involved in undertaking a preventive war and these costs vary directly 
with the military capabilities of the state in question.  Holding all aspects to be more or less 
equal, if we find that Iraq was considerably weaker than both Iran and North Korea from 
2001-03 then, presumably, these large asymmetries had a significant impact on the Bush 
Administration‘s risk calculus and ultimate decision to attack Iraq first.  In essence, perhaps 
the real reason the Bush Administration ―chose‖ to undertake preventive war against Iraq, 
rather than Iran and North Korea, was because it was perceived to be the weakest, least costly 
of the three threats – and was ―the most feasible place where the US could strike the next 
blow.‖444  Although many arguments have been proposed to account for the US decision to 
attack Iraq rather than Iran or North Korea – given the varying similarities between them – it 
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appears that one of the major palatable differences between the three threatening states at the 
time was their relative military strength and relative military capabilities.  However, even 
though Iraq may have been deemed as the weakest of the three states in the eyes of the Bush 
Administration, it was still perceived as being a dangerous ―rogue proliferator.‖  Regardless 
of some of the varying considerations posited above – it was clear – Bush and his 
Administration chose Iraq because it argued that it allegedly had WMDs, had supposed links 
to al Qaeda and posed an extensive threat to the United States‘ security.  While these 
arguments were highly debatable and contentious, they nonetheless remained the core thrust 
of the Administration‘s platform and justification in the lead up to its preventive war with 
Iraq in March 2003.   
 
Early Indications of Prevention  
Hints that the Bush Administration was considering a counter-proliferation strategy of 
preventive war were foreshadowed in statements made well before the publication of the 
National Security Strategy of 2002.  Speaking at the Citadel on September 23, 1999, then-
Presidential candidate Bush hinted that the US under his presidency would take 
preventive/―pre-emptive‖ action to thwart challenges to America‘s security: ―When direct 
threats to America [emanating from the ―troubled frontiers of technology and terror‖] are 
discovered, I know that the best defense can be a strong and swift offense – including the use 
of Special Operations Forces and long-range strike capabilities.‖445  Of course, the 9/11 
attacks brought the option of ―pre-emption‖ to the fore.  The Administration‘s first explicit 
mention of pre-emption came in the statement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
the Quadrennial Defense Review Report issued nineteen days after 9/11.
446
  The Report 
stated that ―defense of the US homeland is the highest priority for the US military... The US 
must deter, prevent and defend against aggression targeted at US territory sovereignty, 
domestic population, and critical infrastructure.‖447  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
followed up on this theme in a speech on the transformation of the US armed forces delivered 
in January 2002.  He noted that the defence of the United States: 
 
...requires prevention, self-defense and sometimes pre-emption.  It is not 
possible to defend against every conceivable kind of attack in every conceivable 
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location at every minute of the day or night.  Defending against terrorism and 
other emerging 21
st
 century threats may well require that we take the war to the 
enemy.  The best, and in some cases, the only defense is a good offense.
448
 
 
President Bush‘s post-9/11 statements continually moved toward advocating the explicit 
adoption of prevention as a key weapon in America‘s global war on terror.  In a 
teleconference broadcast to the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism on November 
6, 2001, he indicated that the US would act proactively to prevent terrorist groups from 
acquiring WMD.  He told the assembled audience that, ―we will not wait for the authors of 
mass murder to gain the weapons of mass destruction.‖449  Bush extended this determination 
to act proactively to prevent the spread of WMD to include rogue states in his State of the 
Union address on January 29, 2002.  He listed the second objective in the global war on terror 
as preventing state sponsors of terror – specifically, the ―axis of evil‖ states of North Korea, 
Iran and Iraq – from acquiring WMD with which could threaten the US and its allies.450  He 
warned the nation and the world at large that, ―by seeking weapons of mass destruction, these 
regimes pose a grave and growing danger.  They could provide these arms to terrorists, 
giving them the means to match their hatred.  They could attack our allies or attempt to 
blackmail the United States.‖451  He vowed that the US would not permit the world‘s most 
dangerous regimes to threaten the US with the world‘s most destructive weapons.452   
 
The President explicitly raised the prospect of prevention in the global war on terror in his 
speech to the West Point graduating class on June 1, 2002.  He asserted that the US must 
―confront the worst threats before they emerge‖453  and warned that ―if we wait for threats to 
fully materialize, we will have waited too long.‖454  Further, President Bush again stipulated 
the need for robust options encompassing those of a military pre-emptive nature as a means 
to – should it be necessary – prevent attacks from either states or terrorist groups using 
weapons of mass destruction.  Amplifying this theme, Administration officials emphasised 
that conventional military technologies were being developed as part of a Joint Stealth Task 
Force that could launch ―no warning‖ pre-emptive raids on suspected nuclear, biological and 
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chemical weapons facilities.  In addition, officials also spoke of using nuclear weapons, 
especially against biological weapons where the extreme heat of a nuclear blast could 
vaporize toxic biological agents.
455 
 The Administration‘s interest also extended to the 
development of a new, low-yield nuclear weapon (including in the sub-kiloton range) that 
could be used with earth-penetrating missiles to destroy underground command and control 
bunkers and hidden facilities used for developing or storing weapons of mass destruction.  
These various strands in elevating pre-emption (or in reality, preventive war) to a more 
prominent role in American defense strategy became further crystallised in the President‘s 
National Security Strategy report that was made public on September 20, 2002.  The relevant 
section of the report regarding pre-emption was encompassed in Chapter V, entitled ―Prevent 
Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass 
Destruction.‖  The very title of the chapter was clear in its emphasis on preventive war; that 
the United States would act to prevent potential foes, whether states or terrorist groups, from 
even threatening to use, much less, actually using weapons of mass destruction.  As Chapter 
V emphasised, the strategy rested on three fundamental components: proactive counter-
proliferation efforts (including counterforce capabilities); strengthened non-proliferation 
efforts; and effective responses to the effects of WMD use. 
 
The National Security Strategy of 2002 / “Bush Doctrine” 
At its core, the National Security Strategy of 2002 provided the official articulation of a 
strategy of preventive war against hostile states and terrorist groups developing weapons of 
mass destruction.  The document stated that the United States would destroy terrorist 
organisations and state actors through direct and continuous action using all the ―elements of 
national and international power.‖456  Its focus would be those terrorist organisations of 
global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempted to gain or use 
WMD or their precursors.  Bush argued that defending the United States, the American 
people, and US interests at home and abroad – by identifying and destroying the threat before 
it reaches its borders – was paramount.  In linking the Bush Doctrine to Iraq and the need to 
impede what has been referred to throughout this thesis as a ―rogue proliferator,‖ Bush 
emphasised how the US at the time of the Gulf War attained ―irrefutable proof‖ that Iraq‘s 
designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, 
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but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents.
457
  Therefore, 
he argued, the United States was prepared to thwart such rogue states and their terrorist 
clients before they were able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the 
United States and its friends.  Alluding to the Administration‘s willingness to undertake 
preventive war, Bush pointed to the notion of that ―minimizing the effects of WMD‖ use 
against ―our people‖ would require a need to respond to the effects of WMD use against US 
forces abroad.
458
  That is, given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States 
could no longer solely rely on a ―reactive posture‖ as it had done in the past.  For Bush, the 
inability to deter a potential attacker, combined the apparent immediacy of ―today‘s‖ threats, 
as well as the magnitude of potential harm that could be executed by adversaries, dispelled 
future notions of US reaction and pragmatism.  As stated, ―...we cannot let our enemies strike 
first.‖459 
 
Bush contrasted the Cold War period of deterrence to what he argued was the necessity of 
today.  In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, the United States was 
generally faced with a ―status quo, risk-averse adversary.‖460  During this period, deterrence 
was an effective defense, however, in the post-Cold War era as the threat of retaliation was 
―far less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling 
with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.‖461  As further explained by 
Bush, during the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last 
resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them: 
 
Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice.  For 
rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression 
against their neighbors.  These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to 
blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or 
repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states.  Such states also see these 
weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the 
United States.
462
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For Bush, the threat confronting the US in the 2lst century was based in the nexus of 
transnational terrorism and WMD proliferation.  Again emphasising the significance of 
―today‘s threats,‖ he stated:  
 
[N]ew deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists... [T]he 
nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain 
destructive powers hitherto available only to the world‘s strongest states, and the 
greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, 
make today‘s security environment more complex and dangerous.463 
 
As a result, the Administration believed that notions of employing traditional concepts of 
deterrence would not be effective against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics were 
―wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom 
in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness.‖464  Again, implying a link with 
Iraq, the Bush Doctrine argued that states that sponsored terror and those that pursued WMD 
would compel the United States into preventive action.  Interchanging the term preventive 
with the more ―acceptable‖ term of pre-emption, Bush made it clear that, ―the United States 
has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our 
national security.‖465  Or in other words, the US has long reserved the right to take pre-
emptive action in the face of an imminent security threat.  However, it was necessary, the 
document continued, to adapt the concept of imminent threat to a new era of security 
circumstances i.e. to the determination of rogue states and terrorists to use weapons of mass 
destruction in attacks aimed at US civilian and military targets.  This extended understanding 
of imminent threat connected logically to a consideration of pre-emption (or preventive war) 
as a strategic option in confronting that threat.  As stated, ―the greater the threat, the greater is 
the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to 
defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy‘s 
attack.‖466  
 
The Bush Doctrine hastened to add that pre-emption would not necessarily be the first or the 
only option considered when confronting these threats.  Nor, it warned, should other states 
use this option as a pretext for aggression.  But henceforth, it insisted, the US retained the 
option of acting pre-emptively when the cause was just – in other words, pre-emption if 
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necessary, but not necessarily pre-emption.  As articulated, to forestall or impede such hostile 
acts by our adversaries, the United States would be prepared to ―act pre-emptively 
(preventively)… To support pre-emptive actions (preventive war), it will…continue to 
transform its military forces.‖467  
 
Clarifying the Preventive Strategy 
As indicated in previous chapters, the preventive option set out in the National Security 
Strategy of 2002 produced extensive controversy within both domestic and international 
circles.  In response, senior Administration officials followed up the release of the document 
with statements intended to elaborate on, reinforce, and, to some extent, qualify the basic 
tenets of this option.  First, Administration spokespersons emphasised that the US had not 
completely forsaken previous strategic doctrines in favour of prevention/―pre-emption,‖ nor 
had it enshrined this strategy as the cardinal element in its overall national security policy.  In 
a speech before the Manhattan Institute in New York in October 2002, National Security 
Adviser Condoleezza Rice, maintained that prevention/―pre-emption‖ was only one of a 
range of strategic options open to the US in the global war on terror: 
 
The National Security Strategy does not overturn five decades of doctrine and 
jettison either containment or deterrence.  These strategic concepts can and will 
continue to be employed where appropriate.  But some threats are so potentially 
catastrophic – and can arrive with so little warning, by means that are 
untraceable – that they cannot be contained.  Extremists who seem to view 
suicide as a sacrament are unlikely to ever be deterred.  And new technology 
requires new thinking about when a threat actually becomes ―imminent.‖  So as 
a matter of common sense, the United States must be prepared to take action, 
when necessary, before threats have fully materialized.
468
 
 
Secretary of State Colin Powell echoed Rice‘s argument in an article written for Foreign 
Affairs: 
 
As to pre-emption‘s scope, it applies only to the undeterrable threats that come 
from non-state actors such as terrorist groups.  It was never meant to displace 
deterrence, only to supplement it.  As to its being central, it isn‘t.  The 
discussion of pre-emption in the NSS takes up just two sentences in one of the 
document‘s eight sections.469 
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Rice also emphasised in her October 2002 speech that pre-emption (preventive war) was an 
option of last resort, to be taken only when the threat is grave and all other means of 
confronting it have been exhausted: 
 
[T]his approach must be treated with great caution.  The number of cases in 
which it might be justified will always be small.  It does not give a green light – 
to the United States or any other nation – to act first without exhausting other 
means, including diplomacy.  Pre-emptive action does not come at the beginning 
of a long chain of effort.  The threat must be very grave.  And the risks of 
waiting must far outweigh the risks of action.
470
 
 
State Department Legal Adviser William H. Taft IV emphasised the two-pronged 
requirement of necessity for preventive/―pre-emptive‖ action – i.e., a credible imminent 
threat and the exhaustion of peaceful remedies – implicit in Rice‘s remarks.  In a 
memorandum presented to the Council on Foreign Relations, he maintained that, ―after the 
exhaustion of peaceful remedies and a careful, deliberate consideration of the consequences, 
in the face of overwhelming evidence of an imminent threat [in the Administration‘s 
expanded understanding of that term], a nation may take pre-emptive action to defend its 
nationals from unimaginable harm.‖471  These qualifying statements from senior 
Administration officials sought to dispel what they maintained was the misconception that the 
Bush Doctrine signalled the adoption of a use-of-force doctrine in which preventive/―pre-
emptive‖ military action was the method-of-choice in the Administration‘s fight against the 
twin evils of international terrorism and WMD proliferation.
472
 
 
Linking the Preventive Strategy to Iraq 
The lead up to the National Security Strategy, the formalisation and release of the document 
itself, and the justification and reemphasis of prevention (conveyed above and referred to as 
―pre-emption‖) from Bush Administration officials, were key components of the 
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Administration‘s post 9/11 security agenda.  But also coinciding with such developments was 
a drive to link such notions of preventive war to the state of Iraq – deemed as the ―rogue 
proliferator‖ of choice.  It was the likes of Vice-President Cheney who stipulated what 
appeared to be the defining reason as to why the United States should undertake preventive 
war against Iraq.  In late August 2002, in the most aggressive speech given to date by an 
Administration official on Iraq, Cheney argued that Saddam Hussein‘s possession of a 
nuclear arsenal posed a serious threat to the US because Iraq possessed l0% of the world‘s oil 
reserves.  According to Cheney, Saddam Hussein could be expected to:   
 
... seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of 
the world‘s energy supplies, directly threaten America‘s friends throughout the 
region, and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail. 
Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass 
destruction.  There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, 
against our allies, and against us.
473
 
 
Cheney‘s assertive tone on Iraq was embraced by many in the Bush Administration – 
including the President himself.  In his weekly radio address in September 2002, Bush noted 
that Saddam Hussein ―has broken every pledge he made to the United Nations and the world 
since his invasion of Kuwait was rolled back in 1991,‖ and emphasised how close Iraq was to 
attaining nuclear weapons.  As stated, ―should his regime acquire fissile material, it would be 
able to build a nuclear weapon within a year.‖474  In the same address, Bush described Iraq as 
a gathering danger:  
 
By supporting terrorist groups, repressing its own people and pursuing weapons 
of mass destruction in defiance of a decade of UN resolutions, Saddam 
Hussein‘s regime has proven itself a grave and gathering danger. To suggest 
otherwise is to hope against evidence. To assume this regime‘s good faith is to 
bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble.
475
 
 
Bush also warned that Iraq would use its association with Osama bin Laden to attack the US. 
As stated to a group of reporters on September 25, 2002: 
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...al Qaeda hides. Saddam doesn‘t, but the danger is, is that they work in concert. 
The danger is, is that al Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddam‘s madness and 
his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the 
world… [Y]ou can‘t distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk 
about the war on terror.
476
 
 
In the fall of 2002, the Bush Administration‘s rhetoric on the threat Iraq posed to US security, 
escalated.  Public speeches by Bush‘s foreign policy team became rather shrill, often making 
the assertion that the only way to disarm Iraq was to oust Saddam Hussein through military 
intervention.  Cheney went on NBC‘s Meet the Press and argued that Iraq was aggressively 
developing nuclear weapons in which ―the United States may well become the target of those 
activities.‖477  Rice told CNN‘s Wolf Blitzer that ―there will always be some uncertainty to 
obtaining a nuclear weapon,‖ but, ―…we don‘t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom 
cloud.‖478  On Fox News Sunday, Colin Powell added to these preventive war sentiments, 
stating that the Bush Administration believed that the best way to disarm Iraq ―is with a 
regime change.‖479   
 
Once the preventive doctrine had been made public in the National Security Strategy of 2002, 
Bush was both forthright and consistent in his quest to convince the American public of the 
threat that Saddam Hussein posed and of the possible ramifications should he acquire nuclear 
weapons – an attack similar to, but potentially more devastating than the events of 9/11.  It 
was apparent that Bush was laying the platform for war and his rhetoric suggested that this 
was clearly on the Administration‘s agenda.  As stated in a speech in early October 2002 in 
Cincinnati:  
 
If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched 
uranium a little larger than a softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than 
a year... The Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the 
world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons. 
America must not ignore the threat gathering against us.  Facing clear evidence 
of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof of the smoking gun that could come 
in the form of a mushroom cloud. 
 
In the same address, the President again linked Saddam Hussein to al Qaeda:  
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We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a 
decade.  Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq... We‘ve 
learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons 
and deadly gases. And we know that after September the 11
th
, Saddam Hussein‘s 
regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America.
480
 
 
Aside from the American public, Bush also had to convince Congress that the use of force in 
disarming Iraq was both necessary and imperative.  Reminding key Senate and House 
members that they had voted for a policy of regime change in 1998, Bush told the assembled 
policy-makers that, ―doing nothing is not an option.‖481  Congress responded by requesting 
more information on Iraq‘s WMD program from the CIA.  The October 2002 National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded in its key judgments that, ―Iraq has continued its 
weapons of mass destruction programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions... if left 
unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.‖  Moreover, ―since 
inspections ended in 1998, most analysts assess Iraq as reconstituting its nuclear weapons 
program.‖  The intelligence community concluded, ―...if Baghdad acquires sufficient 
weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year... 
Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until 
the last half of the decade.‖482  Notably, the Department of State‘s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research (INR) held a dissenting opinion on the rest of this assertion, which was clearly 
referenced in this first key judgment:  
 
The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case 
that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and 
comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons.  Iraq may be doing so, but 
INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment.
483
 
 
Three days prior to the Congressional vote (October 7, 2001), DCI George Tenet provided 
the following information on ties between Iraq and al Qaeda and permitted their use in 
unclassified discussions.  In a letter to the Senate on Baghdad‘s intentions, he stated: 
 
 We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al Qai‘da 
going back a decade.  
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 Credible information indicates that Iraq and al Qai‘da have discussed safe 
haven and reciprocal nonaggression.  
 Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence 
in Iraq of al Qai‘da members, including some that have been in Baghdad. 
 We have credible reporting that al Qai‘da leaders sought contacts in Iraq 
who could help them acquire WMD capabilities. The reporting also indicates 
that Iraq has provided training to al Qai‘da members in the areas of poisons 
and gases and making conventional bombs.
484
 
 
Notably, Tenet did not identify the threat from Iraq as immediate and posited that Saddam 
Hussein would restrain himself from undertaking terrorist attacks against the US as long as 
the US did not attack Iraq.  As again stated:  
 
Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist 
attacks with conventional or CBW chemical, biological weapons against the 
United States. Should Saddam conclude that a US-led attack could no longer be 
deterred, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist 
actions.
485
 
 
In other words, if the US didn‘t attack Saddam, he was unlikely to attack the US, signifying 
the CIA‘s view that Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq was not an immediate or even intermediate threat 
to the US... unless it was attacked.  Nevertheless, on October 10
th
 and 11
th 
both houses of 
Congress authorised President Bush to ―use the armed forces of the United States as he 
determines to be necessary and appropriate… against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.‖486   
 
Planning for Preventive War 
When Bush asked Rumsfeld to define and construct a war plan for Iraq in November 2001, 
he had two major options to choose from in deciding how to disarm Iraq.  The first pertained 
to the notion of improving the pre-9/11 policy of containment; including the development of 
a new sanctions package.  The second option was of course, the disarmament of Iraq through 
the use of military force and/or covert action as a means to attain regime change.  In the late 
winter and spring of 2002, Bush commenced a review of the options for Iraq involving a 
review group that comprised of second and third ranked people from the foreign policy 
agencies.  This included: Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz; Undersecretary for 
Defense Policy, Douglas Feith; Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage; Deputy 
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National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley; the regional specialist on Iraq from the National 
Security Council (NSC), Zalmay Khalilzad; Deputy Director of the CIA, John Mclaughlin; 
and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Peter Pace.
487
  This group came to the 
conclusion that dealing with Iraq using a strategy of containment was no longer viable and 
that the most appropriate means to impede the threat from Saddam Hussein was to remove 
him from power – or topple his regime.  According to biographer James Mann, Khalilzad 
said ―the belief was that as long as you had Saddam [in power], he could change his mind 
[about weapons of mass destruction].‖488  The rationale was clear – Iraq could not be 
disarmed while Saddam Hussein ruled the country and if he was removed, the dissolution of 
Iraq‘s WMD program would follow suit.  This change in policy objective – in practice and 
not just theory – significantly altered the nature of the available alternatives to execute it.  To 
achieve disarmament through regime change, Bush‘s advisers laid out five options from 
which to choose: tough new UN inspections designed to cause the regime to implode; a coup 
d‘état engineered by the CIA; the Enclave Strategy; Iraqi opposition forces; and finally, a 
full-scale, preventive invasion of Iraq.
489
 
 
The eventual and preferred option pertained to a full-scale preventive invasion and 
occupation of Iraq as a means to remove Saddam Hussein‘s regime and ultimately destroy his 
nuclear arsenal.  This option comprised of two components: first, fighting the war to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein; and second, occupying and rebuilding post-Saddam Iraq.  When 
Rumsfeld began working on a plan for regime change in Iraq, the initial war plan called for a 
force of 500,000 and envisaged a similar scenario to the Gulf War of 1990/1991 – that being, 
provocative action by Saddam Hussein that would necessitate a large military response, while 
also allowing ample time (at least seven months) for a force build-up prior to military 
action.
490
  This strategy ―draft,‖ however, shifted as Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks‘ 
Central Command (Centcom) planning staff vied for a faster and smaller solution.  Both men 
had spent 18 months planning an Iraq invasion, an endeavour which started in earnest in 
December 2001 two months after the invasion of Afghanistan.
491
  The goal of the new war 
plan was to ―conduct military operations to remove Saddam from power, eliminate the threat 
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of any possible weapons of mass destruction, and choke off his suspected support of 
terrorism.‖492 
 
The first version of the Iraq war plan was the Generated Start or ―90-45-90‖ plan.  The first 
90 referred to the 90 days it would take to move forces and otherwise prepare for the 45 days 
of bombing and Special Operations activity.  The second 90 days was the period in which 
ground forces would engage in combat operations to overthrow Saddam Hussein‘s regime.493  
The Generated Start Plan evoked concern among Bush‘s foreign policy team, particularly the 
―Fortress Baghdad‖ scenario in which Saddam‘s forces would retreat to the city and force the 
US to engage in urban warfare – a high-risk endeavour in a foreign state where the enemy 
had the potential to attain an asymmetrical advantage.  According to Franks, there were 
varying considerations that Bush needed to put into place before undertaking this strategy 
option.  While not an extensive list, they included the attainment of host nation support, the 
creation of a sustainable supply line, the movement of the alternate air command and control 
centre into Qatar, and the prepositioning of aircraft around the world in order to transport 
forces and equipment.
494
  In essence, this meant that Bush would need to orchestrate the 
groundwork for war in advance of a decision to execute it.  In the event that the President 
only gave them short notice (less than the 90 days), a second version of the plan, ―Running 
Start,‖ would go into effect.  This scaled-down version would begin with air operations and 
would escalate over time.  Running Start planned for a bare minimum of troops (50,000) to 
move into Iraq with plans to send two more divisions within the span of three weeks.
495
  The 
third version of the Iraq war plan – the Hybrid Plan – in simple terms, merged aspects of the 
Generated Start and the Running Start plans.  First and foremost, it vied for a dramatic time 
frame in which the front end would move forces into place prior to the commencement of 
offensive military operations.  It comprised of four phases – Phase One would take sixteen 
days: five to establish an air bridge and eleven to transport initial forces.  Phase Two would 
entail 16 days of air attacks and Special Force operations.  Phase Three consisted of 125 days 
of combat operations, and finally, Phase Four which comprised of post-war stability 
operations, but included no time limit as it was not defined at that stage.
496
  The idea was to 
pressure Saddam Hussein‘s regime to the breaking point, and thereby, avoid a long war.  In 
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terms of feasibility, the Bush Administration judged that a full scale, preventive invasion had 
a greater chance of achieving the policy goal than the other, more limited options.  For 
example, when asked by the Armed Services Committee why the Iraq proliferation problem 
could not be solved with air strikes against its nuclear facilities only, Rumsfeld replied: 
 
The problem with doing it piecemeal is this: First, we do not know where all of 
Iraq‘s WMD facilities are.  We do know where a fraction of them are.  Second, 
of the facilities we do know about, not all are vulnerable to attack from the air. 
Some are underground.  Some are mobile.  Others are purposefully located near 
population centers – schools, mosques, hospitals, etc. – where an air strike could 
kill large numbers of innocent people.  The Iraq problem cannot be saved with 
airstrikes alone.
497
 
 
Moreover, the Pentagon assessed that the Iraqi army was even weaker than it had been in the 
1991 Gulf War, making the probability of a successful campaign high.  This was mainly due 
to economic sanctions which had prevented Saddam Hussein from modernising the military 
and seriously diminished its offensive capability.  The second part of the preventive option 
focused on re-building the Iraqi government without Saddam Hussein.  Although a State 
Department team had been working on a project entitled ―The Future of Iraq‖ for months, the 
Pentagon‘s Undersecretary for Policy, Douglas Feith, became responsible for planning a 
post-Saddam Iraq, while Centcom was to orchestrate the invasion and removal of the regime.  
Feith delegated the actual planning to Centcom, however, after several months, the work was 
largely discarded due to criticisms that it did not reach out ―to real-world people and 
information.‖498  On January 20, 2003, the White House issued a National Security 
Presidential Directive that established the Pentagon post-war planning office – the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.  In essence, post-war planning encountered 
several false starts and in many instances could been deemed as relatively ad hoc.  In fact, the 
apparent last minute nature of the post-war planning indicated that Bush and his advisers did 
not take the occupation portion of the preventive option into account when deciding which 
option to choose.  
 
Although the Bush Administration had assessed the probability of a successful preventive 
war against Iraq as being fairly high, they also acknowledged the risks associated with such 
an attack.  As a means to ensure that the President understood the types of impediments and 
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problems the US may encounter in the effort to oust Saddam Hussein‘s regime, Rumsfeld 
sent a three page memo to Bush on October 15, 2002, detailing the risks of a preventive 
attack on Iraq.  As stated: 
 
Another state could try to take advantage of the US involvement of 
preoccupation with Iraq; oil disruption could cause international shock waves; 
Iraqi intelligence services, who have a global presence including inside the US, 
could strike the US, our allies or other deployed forces in unconventional ways; 
there could be higher than expected collateral damage; Fortress Baghdad could 
prove to be long and unpleasant for all; Iraq could experience ethnic strife 
among the Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds as had happened before; Iraq could use 
chemical weapons against the Shiites and blame the United States; and Iraq 
could successfully beat the US in public relations and persuade the world that it 
was a war against Muslims.
499
   
 
This option was considered the riskiest as it posed the widest variance in outcome.  That is, 
disarming Iraq through regime change and taking the first step in spreading democracy to the 
Middle East would be considered a success.  However, an Iraq response that entailed a WMD 
counter attack that caused thousands of US casualties, increased the cost and length of war, as 
well as potentially inciting ethnic strife or increased anti Americanism, would obviously be 
deemed as the worst case scenario.  Nonetheless, the decision was clear.  Likening the 
terrorist attacks in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania to another tragic day in US 
history, Bush described the events in his diary on the night of September 11, 2001.  He stated, 
―The Pearl Harbor of the 2lst century took place today.‖500  The preventive war undertaken 
against Iraq on March 20, 2003 initiated the second ―theatre‖ in the War of Terror and the 
second major response by the US to the events of 9/11. 
 
Bush later acknowledged that despite George Tenet‘s warnings about bin Laden, prior to the 
events of 9/11 he had not ―felt that sense of urgency.‖501  In simple terms, 9/11 motivated 
Bush‘s movement from a cautious policy of containment to a risk-seeking one of prevention.  
As indicated above, the President‘s heightened sensitivity to external threats and keen sense 
of crisis in the aftermath of 9/11 influenced how he began to view Saddam Hussein and the 
risks he was willing to take as a means to disarm Iraq and topple his government: 
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The threat comes from Iraq... and its drive toward an arsenal of terror.  It 
possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons.  It is seeking nuclear 
weapons... We also must never forget the most vivid events of recent history.  
On September the 11
th
, 2001 America felt its vulnerability – even to threats that 
gather on the other side of the earth.  We resolved then, and we are resolved 
today, to confront every threat, from any source, that could bring sudden terror 
and suffering to America... The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its 
nuclear weapons program... Some citizens wonder, after 11 years of living with 
this problem, why do we need to confront it now?  And there‘s a reason.  We‘ve 
experienced the horror of September the 11
th
.  We have seen that those who hate 
America are willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people.  
Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to use 
biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon.
502
 
 
Before the attacks, Bush advocated a policy of containment for Iraq, however, after 9/11 he 
viewed Iraq‘s threat to the US as more acute and immediate – as the influence of this event 
became his frame of reference.  As stated: 
 
Before September the 11
th
, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein 
could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist 
networks are not easily contained.  Imagine those 19 hijackers with other 
weapons and other planes this time armed by Saddam Hussein.  It would take 
one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror 
like none we have ever known.
503
 
 
Despite a lack of credible intelligence linking Iraq to either 9/11 or al Qaeda and the 
unfounded assumption that Saddam Hussein would give nuclear weapons to terrorists if he 
had them, Bush‘s new view of Iraq as an intolerable threat and probable culprit of a horrific 
future attack on the US suggested that once 9/11 put the President in a domain of loss, his 
reference point became the pre-9/l1 status quo; an America impervious to external, 
asymmetric attacks, which he felt he could regain only by dismantling the Iraqi regime. 
 
The Lead Up 
At least six weeks before the completion of the UN inspections, Bush made the decision to 
use preventive force as a means to topple Saddam Hussein‘s regime.  Convinced that the 
inspections were not going to put enough pressure on Iraq and subsequently force the 
government to fall, Bush, according to Woodward, informed Rice that, ―time is not on our 
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side here.  Probably going to have to, we‘re going to have to go to war.‖504  Indeed, when 
Blix‘s February 14, 2003 announcement to the UN Security Council was made, it only 
worked to embolden Bush‘s resolve.  Despite ―more than 400 inspections covering more than 
300 sites‖ covering a wide range of facilities, inspectors had ―not found any such [WMD] 
weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions, which should have been 
declared and destroyed.‖505  While this was a key finding which fundamentally undermined 
the rationale for war – it did nothing to deter Bush from his decision to launch a preventive 
war against Iraq.
506
 
 
At Tony Blair‘s request, Bush went back to the UN for two reasons: in hope of garnering a 
coalition to assist in or at least support an attack against Iraq and to seek a second UN 
resolution authorising military force.  Despite Powell‘s efforts to persuade the President to 
keep war as a last resort and to continue with stern UN inspections, Bush requested that the 
Secretary of State present the US case for war in Iraq.
507
  Powell‘s February 5, 2003 UN 
speech illustrated his shift from periodical objector within the Administration to what 
appeared to be defender of the Bush‘s determination to end the Hussein regime in the pursuit 
of disarmament; defining the threats from Iraq as ―real and present dangers to the region and 
the world,‖ and the ―sinister nexus between Iraq and the al Qai‘da terrorist network.‖508  Bush 
and Blair‘s desire for endorsement from the UN were lost when the leaders of France, Russia 
and Germany issued a statement calling for extended weapon inspections, stating that, 
―Nothing today justifies war.  Russia, Germany and France are determined to ensure that 
everything possible is done to disarm Iraq peacefully.‖509  With failure imminent, Powell 
                                               
504 Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp. 253-254. Patrick Suskind corroborates the timeframe on Bush‘s decision in 
One Percent Doctrine. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006. 
505 Cirincione, Mathews, Perkovich & Orton, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications, p. 59 
506 Ibid. 
507 Before President Bush‘s decision on Iraq, Powell‘s language around the issue consistently referred to disarmament as 
opposed to regime change.  However, once Bush selected the preventive option, Powell fell in behind his commander-in-
chief and supported the Administration‘s efforts to pull together a coalition at the UN. Powell himself has made very few 
public comments about his shift in stance but Greg Thielmann, former director of the Strategic Proliferation and Military 
Affairs Office at the State Department said Powell eventually supported the preventive military option because he was a 
―loyal secretary of state, a ‗good soldier,‘ as it were, building the Administration‘ case before the international community.‖  
(Interview with Greg Thielmann, Truth, War & Consequences, PBS Frontline, August 13, 2003).  Lawrence Wilkerson, 
Powell‘s chief of staff during the decision making process on how to handle the perceived threat from Iraqi WMD, echoed 
Thielmann, calling Powell the ―world‘s most loyal soldier,‖ implying that Powell did not  continue to push the LN option 
once it became clear that Bush had selected a different alternative.  (―Weighing the Uniqueness of the Bush Administration‘s 
National Security Decision-Making Process: Boon or Danger to American Democracy?‖  New America Foundation, 
American Strategy Program Policy Forum, October 19, 2005).  Whatever the case, though he remained committed to a 
philosophy of overwhelming force, popular support and well-defined mission, like his colleagues at the top of the Bush‘s 
foreign policy apparatus, Powell, in the end publicly supported a preventive attack on Iraq. 
508 Colin L. Powell, ―Remarks to the United Nations Security Council,‖ February 5, 2003, available at 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/WMD/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030205-powell-un-17300pf.htm>. 
509 Woodward, Plan of Attack, p. 315. 
147 
 
pulled the vote.  Undaunted, Bush went to war with a small and unimpressive coalition, at 
least in comparison to his father‘s l991 standards.  That Bush proceeded with his plans for 
regime change in Iraq with substantial and material support from only three countries – Great 
Britain, Australia and Spain – made his decision to wage preventive war in Iraq all the more 
risk-acceptant. 
 
Bush Announces War with Iraq 
On March 19, just hours after he had ordered the first attacks on Iraq, Bush announced his 
decision to attack Iraq to the American public and spoke of the Iraqi threat.  As stated, ―...we 
meet that threat now, with our Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines, so that we 
do not have to meet it later with armies of fire fighters and police and doctors on the streets of 
our cities.‖510  Even as he announced the commencement of war with Iraq, Bush reconnected 
with 9/11 – an event wholly unrelated in practical terms to Iraq – to justify the action.  Bush 
chose the preventive option because he believed it could allow him to recoup the pre-9/11 
status quo of American invulnerability and this could be attained by ousting Saddam Hussein, 
disarming Iraq and therefore averting future attacks similar but more deadly than 9/11.  The 
preventive option had the highest outcome value if it succeeded, but one of the lowest 
outcome values if it failed.  Bush selected the riskiest option in order to take a chance at 
recouping previous losses, re-establishing the previous status quo, and averting future losses. 
According to Cheney, ―After we got hit on 9/11 the President said no more and enunciated in 
the Bush doctrine that we will hold states that sponsor terror, that provide sanctuary for 
terrorists to account, that they will be treated as guilty as the terrorists themselves of whatever 
acts are committed from bases on that soil.‖511 
 
From 2001-2003, when faced with the prospect of having to wage preventive war against one 
of three rogue proliferators – Iraq, Iran and North Korea – the Bush Administration chose to 
preventively attack Iraq, a decidedly weaker state.  This seemed to provide strong evidence to 
support Richard Ned Lebow‘s basic claim that ―a [major] consideration militating against war 
can be its expected costs.  In some circumstances they may be high enough to dissuade 
policy-makers from using force regardless of the magnitude of the expected gains... The 
absolute cost of war... was probably an important restraining factor for American policy-
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makers... This indicates that as the absolute cost of war increases, the importance of relative 
gains diminishes and may ultimately become irrelevant to the decision for war or peace.‖512  
Although many arguments have been proposed to account for the US decision to attack Iraq 
rather than Iran or North Korea, given the vast similarities between them – it appears that the 
main palatable difference between the three threatening states at the time was their relative 
military strength.  Nonetheless, it was evident that Bush‘s regular public refrain about the 
threat from Iraq, centred on the dangers and risks inherent in doing nothing to thwart the 
suspected Iraqi WMD programs and Saddam Hussein‘s intent to use them against the US.  In 
simple terms, the President framed the options in public on Iraq as merely twofold: 
preventive war or ―trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein.‖513   In seeking to 
avert future losses similar to the one suffered by the US on 9/11, Bush took a worst-case 
scenario perspective and thus gave little credence to the middle of the road alternatives 
involving weapons inspections or sanctions that might have worked to disarm Iraq, but not to 
remove Saddam Hussein from power. 
 
The fact that Bush ordered the invasion before inspections had been completed indicated that 
when it came to Iraq, preventive military force was not a last resort.  A tendency to disregard 
information both from the intelligence community and from his advisers, specifically Powell, 
which ran contrary to his goal of regime change, also suggested that Bush sought war with 
Iraq as a way to re-establish the pre-9/11 status quo and avert a future loss to US national 
security.  A March 2005 White House-commissioned report on NBC intelligence was 
extremely critical of American intelligence on Iraqi NBC prior to the 2003 Iraq War, ―noting 
the thin body of information.‖514  While Greg Thielmann, former head of the Office of 
Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs in the State Department‘s Office of Intelligence 
and Research, admonished that, ―The effectiveness of any first-strike military doctrine 
depends on reliable intelligence.  The US intelligence community‘s inability to produce 
accurate information on enemy threats renders such a doctrine feckless and reckless.‖515  In 
essence, Bush and his team disregarded intelligence analysts whose conclusions did not 
coincide with their own, and at the same time, challenged intelligence that questioned the 
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existence of Iraqi WMD or Saddam‘s ties to al Qaeda, or generally, called into question the 
ultimate goal of regime change in Iraq.  Powell, who believed disarmament could be achieved 
without war, was regularly ―outweighted‖ by Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, all of whom 
embraced Bush‘s view that war was necessary to permanently disarm Iraq.  Illustrating how 
removed Powell was from influencing the ―final‖ decision, Bush chose preventive war and 
conducted it in a manner that contradicted Powell‘s doctrine of overwhelming force.  
Rumsfeld‘s speed and mobility won out and the post-Saddam occupation occurred without a 
clear vision for the future or an exit strategy.   
 
In making the decision on how to handle the perceived proliferation of nuclear weapons in 
Iraq, Bush gave small thrift to options other than preventive war on the grounds that they had 
been tried to no avail, albeit not during his Administration.  The President also chose the 
preventive option despite the lack of solid evidence indicating Saddam Hussein was complicit 
in 9/11, that he had ties to al Qaeda or that Iraq‘s suspected nuclear program was close to 
producing a nuclear weapon.  He made repeated declarations regarding the dire nature and 
immediacy of threat from Iraq and embedded these declarations with images of a nuclear 
9/11 orchestrated by Saddam Hussein – even when there was little evidence to link Saddam 
to terrorism or to 9/11 – and in fact – a statement by the CIA expressing a view that Saddam 
would not attack the US unless attacked first.  That Bush viewed the 9/11 attacks as a type of 
harbinger of extreme consequences to follow if he did not act to avert it, also likely played a 
role in his decision to opt for preventive war.  As he later stated in the National Security 
Strategy of 2006: 
 
For America, the September 11 attacks underscored the danger of allowing 
threats to linger unresolved.  Saddam Hussein‘s continued defiance of 16 UNSC 
resolutions over 12 years, combined with his record of invading neighboring 
countries, supporting terrorists, tyrannizing his own people, and using chemical 
weapons, presented a threat we could no longer ignore.  The UNSC 
unanimously passed Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, calling for full and 
immediate compliance by the Iraqi regime with its disarmament obligations. 
Once again, Saddam defied the international community.
516
 
 
Condoleezza Rice‘s decision making process was also heavily defined by the events of 9/11.  
As late as 2000, Rice felt Iraq could be deterred much as the Soviet Union had over the last 
forty years.  Against Iraq and North Korea, she advocated that ―the first line of defense 
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should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence – if they do acquire weapons of mass 
destruction, that weapon will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national 
obliteration.‖517  Yet, after 9/11, Rice‘s views on how to conduct foreign policy underwent a 
sea change.  She saw 9/11 as a sign that it was time to change the direction of American 
foreign policy.  As stated: 
 
The international system has been in flux since the collapse of Soviet power. 
Now it is possible – indeed probable – that the transition is coming to an end... 
This is, then, a period akin to 1945 to 1947, when American leadership 
expanded the number of free and democratic states – Japan and Germany among 
the great powers – to create a new balance of power that favored freedom.518 
 
Within this context, Rice stressed the new vulnerability facing the United States in the wake 
of 9/11: 
 
It will take years to understand the long-term effects of September 11
th
.  But 
there are certain verities that the tragedy brought home to us in the most vivid 
way.  Perhaps most fundamentally, 9/11 crystallized our vulnerability... Today‘s 
threats come less from massing armies than from small, shadowy bands of 
terrorists – less from strong states than from weak or failed states.  And after 
9/11, there is no longer any doubt that today America faces an existential threat 
to our security...
519
 
 
Rice clearly discussed both the loss on 9/11 of America‘s sense of security and the future 
threats which must be averted.  In the same speech, she also illustrated how the September 
1lth attacks influenced her thinking on how the US should respond to other actors perceived 
as threatening in order to avert future losses similar to 9/11: ―...since 9/11, our nation is 
properly focused as never before on preventing attacks against us before they happen.‖520  A 
manifestation of Rice‘s new perspective was the National Security Strategy of 2002, which 
embodied the Bush Doctrine and created a framework for foreign policy which Rice arguably 
believed would allow the US to recoup the pre-9/11 status quo of a feeling of security.  Using 
9/11 as context, Rice asserted that adopting the Bush Doctrine did not constitute throwing out 
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containment or deterrence, but that these traditional concepts were not enough to prevent 
future losses caused by terrorist attacks.  As stated: 
 
Some threats are so potentially catastrophic – and can arrive with so little 
warning, by means that are untraceable – that they cannot be contained.  
Extremists who seem to view suicide as a sacrament are unlikely ever to be 
deterred.  And new technology requires new thinking about when a threat 
actually becomes ―imminent.‖  So as a matter of common sense, the United 
States must be prepared to take action, when necessary, before threats have fully 
materialized.
521
 
 
In authoring the National Security Strategy of 2002, Rice married the threat and dangers of 
terrorism to warnings about Saddam Hussein and his desire to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction in a formula seemingly designed to recoup the pre-9/11 status quo of security and 
to avert future losses – which Rice suggests may come in the form of terrorist attacks similar 
to, but even deadlier than those perpetrated on 9/11.  On this basis, Rice made the case for 
going after Iraq as part of the war on terrorism.  
 
Terrorists allied with tyrants can acquire technologies allowing them to murder 
on an ever more massive scale. Each threat magnifies the danger of the other... 
For these reasons, President Bush is committed to confronting the Iraqi regime, 
which has defied the just demands of the world for over a decade... The danger 
of Saddam Hussein‘s arsenal is far more clear than anything we could have 
foreseen prior to September 11
th
.  And history will judge harshly any leader or 
nation that saw this dark cloud and sat by in complacency or indecision.
522
 
 
When it came to choosing between the available options, Rice was not diametrically opposed 
to seeking a UN resolution on Iraq or renewing inspections, because this method of 
disarmament had actually worked in South Africa.  She initially advocated going to the UN to 
obtain a new resolution on Iraq and encouraged the President to at least try new weapons 
inspections, likely because, even if they failed, US efforts at the UN could justify and 
possibly garner international support for a war in Iraq.  However, Rice ultimately believed 
that the only way to remove the perceived threat of Iraqi WMD was to launch a preventive 
war.  She told House minority leader Nancy Pelosi at a meeting at the White House on 
February 5, 2003, that ―we tried sanctions, we tried limited military options, we tried 
resolutions.  At some point, war is the only option.‖523  Although Rice entered the Bush 
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Administration as a well-known realist who advocated a foreign policy that focused on big, 
powerful countries in pursuit of the national interest, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, she began 
to frame external threats to the US differently.  When asked by Bush if he ought to pursue 
war, Rice answered: 
 
Yes, because it isn‘t American credibility on the line, it is the credibility of 
everybody that this gangster can yet again beat the international system... To let 
this threat in this part of the world play volleyball with the international 
community this way will come back to haunt us someday.  That is the reason to 
do it.
524
 
 
Indeed, the Bush Administration‘s ideologically-driven framing of the Iraq issue, and the 
mindset that regime change in Iraq was necessary to prevent another 9/11, resulted in a 
tendency to overlook nuance and to reduce complex issues to simple, Boolean choices which 
produced an all or nothing perspective on the decision problem regarding Iraq.  Even before 
he went to the UN, Bush publicly cast the decision on how to handle Iraq as a choice between 
two options – doing nothing or toppling the regime – while ignoring any options in the 
middle.  In a November 2002 speech, he stated that there is a ―risk in all action we take. But 
the risk of inaction is not a choice, as far as I‘m concerned.  The inaction creates more risk 
than doing our duty to make the world more peaceful.‖525  This characterisation of the options 
did not in fact reflect the way Bush approached his available alternatives, suggesting that his 
depiction of the options as: a) go to war; b) do nothing and put your fate in the hands of 
Saddam Hussein, was rhetoric constructed as a means to persuade the American people to 
back military action.  Bush never considered inaction an option and he appears to have 
viewed all options other than military action as distinctly limited.  His conviction that regime 
change was a necessary step in preventing another 9/11 manifested itself to the extent that the 
President believed that options other than military force had already been exhausted.  For 
example, in the weeks before he made the decision on Iraq, Bush dismissed two new options 
proposed by UN members with the justification that they had been tried in some shape or 
form and had failed: a German and French proposal for a tougher program of coercive 
inspections and renewed UN inspections under an explicit threat of force – until it was 
established with certainty that Saddam Hussein had dismantled his weapons program or 
inspectors were obstructed from completing their jobs.
526
  Bush was convinced regime 
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change was the only viable option for achieving Iraqi disarmament, and thus, making the US 
more secure, suggesting that the President approached the UN, not to prevent a war with Iraq, 
but to justify one.  Such logic would again be prevalent in the National Security Strategy of 
2006.   And once again, replacing preventive war with pre-emption, he stated: 
 
When the consequences of an attack with WMD are potentially so devastating, 
we cannot afford to stand idly by as grave dangers materialize.  This is the 
principle and logic of pre-emption.  The place of pre-emption in our national 
security strategy remains the same.  We will always proceed deliberately, 
weighing the consequences of our actions.  The reasons for our actions will be 
clear, the force measured, and the cause just.
527
 
 
In terms of the ―choice‖ of Iraq, the cultivation of the preventive war doctrine (rhetorically 
and formally in the context of the National Security Strategy of 2002), the alignment of the 
preventive war option to Iraq, as well as the orchestration and lead up to the preventive war 
itself – it appears that the Bush Doctrine could be deemed as overzealous, extreme and 
unprecedented.  In fact, when looking at Bush‘s unbridled determinism to wage war with 
Iraq, this seemed to be nothing short of the truth.  However, despite such appearances of a 
radically new approach, at its core, the Bush Doctrine‘s push for preventive war in Iraq in 
2003 has long pervaded the strategic thought of policy-makers, officials, and military 
planners at the highest levels of the US government.  As the next chapter will argue, since the 
end of World II, each time a rogue state has attempted to acquire nuclear weapons, the US 
has seriously considered taking unilateral preventive action as a means to impede this 
development – even in the dubious case of Iraq where action was actually undertaken.  
Indeed, the second half of the 20
th
 Century is sated with examples of prominent US decision-
makers who have contemplated the undertaking of major unilateral preventive military 
actions as a means to forestall the proliferation of nuclear weapons by rogue states.  Although 
much attention has been paid to the recent actions in Iraq and the potential for future wars in 
Iran and North Korea, precious little has been written about the three other earlier preventive 
war targets.  The next section will thus seek to investigate and analyse each of those cases in 
order to assess the extent to which the US considered waging preventive war against them, 
and to uncover why in the final analysis, US decision-makers in each case decided to refrain 
from such action.  If we find that the US abstained from preventive war against these three 
states primarily because of practical concerns directly related to military costs (i.e. the size 
and strength of the enemy and its prospects for retaliation), then perhaps a strong case can be 
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made for the effectiveness of deterrence in mitigating the US drive for preventive war against 
rogue proliferators in both the past and present. 
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The core theoretical thrust underpinning the Bush Doctrine, and specifically, the preventive 
motivation for war, has long been an intrinsic strategic thought of policy-makers, officials, 
and military planners at the highest levels of the US government.  While it has often been 
depicted as a distinct and markedly new National Security Strategy, the Bush Doctrine was, 
in fact, neither new nor era-defining.  As Peter Lavoy contended, the Bush Administration‘s 
―new‖ strategy read much like ―old wine in a new bottle‖ and hardly represented the 
fundamental policy shift that many portend.
528
  As this chapter will argue, since the dawning 
of the nuclear era in 1945, at least three other US Presidents (Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lyndon 
B. Johnson and William J. Clinton) have faced the potential threat of nuclear technology in 
the hands of states hostile to their respective Administrations and each dealt with the same 
decision faced by President Bush in 2003: whether to use preventive military force as a 
means to counter the proliferation of such nuclear weapons technology.  Each was forced to 
make their decision regarding the preventive use of force in the face of uncertainty.  Each had 
to weigh the costs – many of them unknown – of preventively striking an adversarial state 
perceived to be developing nuclear weapons against the costs of refraining from preventive 
intervention and employing more conservative diplomatic methods, even while the threat of 
future military conflict hovered.  Indeed the historical record of the last half century is replete 
with examples of high level US decision-makers who seriously considered the undertaking of 
major unilateral preventive military actions as a means to thwart the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons by rogue states.  As early as January 1946, in a foreboding memorandum on the 
military implications of the development of nuclear weapons, US General Leslie Groves, then 
wartime commander of the Manhattan Project, expressed the simple but compelling 
temptation of preventive war thinking: ―If we were ruthlessly realistic, we would not permit 
any foreign power with which we are not family allied and in which we do not have absolute 
confidence, to make or possess nuclear weapons.  If such a country started to make nuclear 
weapons we would destroy its capacity to make them before it had progressed far enough to 
threaten us.‖529  Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US had considered preventive 
options against no less than three additional rogue proliferators: the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (Soviet Union) from 1945-54; the People‘s Republic of China (China) from 1960-
64; and the Democratic People‘s Republic of North Korea (North Korea) from 1993-94.  This 
chapter will investigate the above case studies as a means to appraise the extent to which the 
US seriously considered executing preventive war against these states, and in the final 
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analysis, will reveal that what Bush advocated in 2003, was not ―new,‖ ―radical‖ and 
certainly not ―revolutionary.‖  
 
According to Schneider, for any leader to order a preventive counter-proliferation strike a 
―very special set of circumstances‖ was required.  As stated: 
 
The nuclear aspirant would have to be approaching the nuclear weapons 
threshold and be led by a hostile government that appears ready to take extreme 
risks.  Such a government is unlikely to be deterred from future warlike actions.  
Moreover, the developing scenario would have to directly and immediately 
threaten a vital interest of the country considering the pre-emptive strike.  It 
would require information on important nuclear target locations of the adversary 
and the ability to achieve tactical surprise.  Moreover, the adversary should not 
be able to threaten the pre-emptor with nuclear arms or other weapons of mass 
destruction or have a strong ally who is likely to do so on its behalf.  All other 
reasonable options should have been exhausted before such a strike is 
undertaken.  The head of state should have adequate domestic and international 
political support for the action and for bringing any military campaign to a 
successful conclusion before choosing this type of non proliferation activity.
530
  
 
That these conditions were not met in the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 is less 
noteworthy than the fact that the invasion constituted the application of the preventive war 
doctrine in US national security strategy.  The Bush Doctrine, at its core, gave primacy to the 
use of preventive military intervention both as a central component of US foreign policy and 
a method of counter proliferation.  However, prevention has not only been a common motive 
for war, it has actually been ―quite routine.‖531  As argued by Gray, it is difficult to find 
historical cases of warfare wherein prevention was not a motivator: ―Wars typically occur for 
several, even many, reasons.  Prevention is nearly always prominent in the cluster of those 
reasons. The concept of preventive war has an ominous ring to it that is not entirely deserved. 
Poor historical understanding is the explanation.‖532  What this monograph suggests is that 
considerations of prevention typically played a sometimes greater, sometimes lesser, role.  As 
Gray further asserted, it has been rare to find a conflict wherein there was no spore of a 
preventive motive to be found: ―With regard to the great Cold War of 1947-89, it was 
standard to cite the deadly trio of geopolitics, ideology, and personality as combining to 
produce the fatal brew which resulted in 42 years of nuclear shadowed global menace.  But, 
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austerely viewed, in 1946-47 both Washington and Moscow decided to wage preventive non-
military conflict.  The United States was determined to prevent the USSR from expanding its 
sphere of control any further, while the USSR was no less determined to prevent the United 
States from rolling back its hard won gains.‖533  In relation to the National Security Strategy 
of 2002, many of the Administration‘s critics denounced the policy as new and dangerous, 
while the Administration itself argued the need to go beyond past practice, warranted by the 
novel and dangerous threats facing the United States.
 
 But as indicated by Steinberg, the use 
of preventive force – including the debates over its legality and wisdom – predate the Bush 
Administration‘s post 9/11 strategy.  As stated, ―a careful examination of the history, 
rationale, costs and benefits of using preventive force suggests that while rare, preventive 
force has had a legitimate role to play in tackling some of the most dangerous security 
problems facing the United States and the wider international community.‖534  For 
Tratchenberg, the claim that the Bush strategy of dealing with developing threats 
―preventively‖ marked a total break with American tradition was an argument that needed to 
be both examined and challenged: 
 
It turns out that preventive war thinking played a much greater role in shaping 
US policy than most people realize.  During the early Cold War period, this sort 
of thinking was by no means limited to the lunatic fringe.  Could the United 
States simply sit back and allow first the Soviets and then the Chinese to 
develop nuclear capabilities of their own?  Many people, both inside and outside 
the government, were worried about what would happen if America did nothing 
and thought that the possibility of preventive action had to be taken seriously.  
In the post-Cold War period, the Clinton Administration seemed ready to do 
whatever was necessary to prevent North Korea from going nuclear; it seemed 
prepared, in fact, to go to war over the issue.  Even in the pre-nuclear world, 
preventive war thinking played a major role in shaping policy: American (post-
war) policy was strongly influenced by this kind of thinking.
535
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a. Preventive War and the USSR – 1945-1954 
 
Preventive Considerations 
As World War II came to an end, it became increasingly evident that the first unallied foreign 
power that would attempt to revise the international system by acquiring nuclear weapons 
would be the second greatest power in the world, that being, the USSR.  Following the 
cessation of hostilities, the once expedient wartime alliance between the US and the Soviet 
Union quickly unravelled into an ideological and strategic chasm.  As Russell Buhite and 
William Hamel stated, ―in the years immediately following World War II basic conflicts of 
interest, not to mention mutual suspicion and misperception, tore the Grand Alliance apart 
and precipitated a dramatic deterioration of relations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  Since their pre-war relationship had provided nothing solid on which to build, 
it is not surprising that their conflicting world views and objectives in the post-war period 
gave rise to the Cold War.‖536  With Germany and Japan devastated, Great Britain severely 
weakened, and the rest of Western Europe on the cusp of political and economic collapse, the 
US and the Soviet Union after World War II enjoyed a unique period of uninhibited strength 
and opportunity with which to expand their relative influence throughout the world and 
especially in Western Europe.  Given their vast disparities and mutual interest in this 
contested region, it was not surprising that by the end of 1945 most US government officials 
and military planners, to say nothing of the American public, viewed Soviet aggression, 
expansionism and intransigence as the most serious threat to the future of US and world 
security.  Indeed, concerns pertaining to the perceived actions, motives, capabilities and 
intentions of the Soviet Union informed, and to a certain degree, distorted, American attitudes 
during this time of great uncertainty.  As argued by Campbell Craig: 
 
The primary reason the American officials instigated the Cold War was that... 
the official ideology of the Soviet Union was to seek the eradication of capitalist 
regimes like the US. The Soviet Union had cynically signed a peace treaty with 
Nazi Germany... Josef Stalin, had killed millions of his fellow citizens, and the 
Red Army... continued to dominate...several eastern European states... this threat 
derived from the existence of military technology capable of traversing the 
oceans, and of a regime potentially interested in using such a technology for the 
purposes of conquering the US.  This did not mean... that the Soviet Union was 
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destined to mount a Hitler-like campaign against the US.  But it was possible to 
believe, especially given the vivid lessons of recent history, that it might.
537
  
 
With a diametrically opposed ideology that espoused sentiments of a worldwide ―communist 
revolution,‖ ―capitalist encirclement‖ and ―inevitable conflict;‖ an estimated four to six 
million troops already mobilised in Eastern Europe and an estimated 10.5 million in reserve 
(more than enough to overturn and occupy all of Western Europe); alleged aggression in 
Berlin, the Baltic republics, Finland and Hungary; and a perceived desire and ability to 
develop nuclear weapons; the Soviet Union represented a clear threat to the US and its 
European allies.  As articulated by Michael Nacht, ―[concern over the Soviet Union] was 
surely predicated on... the threatening character of Soviet communist ideology, consolidation 
of Soviet political control of Eastern Europe, the potential threat posed by Soviet 
conventional forces against Western Europe, the subversive techniques of this international 
communist movement controlled by Moscow, and the intransigent character of Soviet 
negotiating behavior on a wide range of post war issues.‖538  The supposed Soviet desire to 
attain nuclear weapons was of specific concern to the US during this volatile period.  As 
conveyed by Trachtenberg: ―If the Soviets were allowed to develop nuclear forces of their 
own there was no telling what might happen.  If they were so hostile and aggressive in the 
period of America‘s nuclear monopoly, what would they be like once this monopoly had 
been broken... wouldn‘t the Soviets someday try to destroy the one power that prevented 
them from achieving their goals by launching a nuclear attack on the US?‖539  For many 
observers during this period the very spectre of such an outcome led to a ―surprisingly 
widespread‖ espousal of Bush Doctrine-like preventive war thinking. 
 
From 1945-49 the US held a clear nuclear monopoly in which no other state in the world had 
nuclear weapons.  From 1949-54, although the Soviet Union had developed a diminutive 
nuclear capability, the US still enjoyed a vast nuclear superiority, and thus, it was argued, still 
had the capacity to remove the burgeoning Soviet nuclear program.  Once this 
monopoly/superiority was lost, however, most American observers believed that the Soviet 
Union would likely undertake an even more aggressive, expansionist foreign policy or 
potentially undertake a quasi-―nuclear Pearl Harbor‖ against the US mainland.  Indeed, 
shortly after Stalin‘s emotive ideological address to the Soviet citizenry on February 6, 1946, 
                                               
537 Craig Campbell, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1998, p. 3. 
538 Nacht, ―The Future Unlike the Past,‖ p. 194.   
539 Trachtenberg, ―A Wasting Asset,‖ p. 5. 
161 
 
William Bullit, the first American ambassador to the Soviet Union warned, ―as the conquest 
of the earth for Communism is the objective of the Soviet government, no nation lies outside 
the scope of its ambitions.‖540  Furthermore, as Trachtenberg reported, ―the assumption that 
the Soviets were intent on world domination and thus on the destruction of American power, 
and the belief that they were absolutely ruthless and that their policy was ‗guided only by 
considerations of expediency,‘ implied that they would strike when they had developed [a 
nuclear] capability.‖541   
 
In this light, it was viewed by policy-makers in the US and Western Europe that the only 
reason the Soviet Union had not yet pressed its interests any further west was the fact that the 
US held a clear nuclear deterrent.  Once the Soviet Union was securely in possession of a 
large nuclear weapons arsenal of its own, however, it was feared that the US line would no 
longer hold and that the Soviet Union would swiftly move to overthrow or undermine the 
existing status quo in Western Europe.  As Campbell reported:  ―always a fanatical regime 
bent on world domination, the Kremlin had avoided confrontation in the Cold War‘s early 
years because of the American nuclear monopoly... Once Stalin obtained nuclear parity... he 
would use it to cancel out the American arsenal, move his vast almost omnipotent 
conventional forces into the ‗Eurasian land mats‘ and dare the Americans to risk World War 
III by stopping him.‖542  As a result, many policy-makers in the US and Western Europe at 
the time argued that the attainment of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union would be 
completely unacceptable and would have to be ―rolled back.‖  It was perceived that the surest 
way to do so was to ―strike first and strike hard,‖ before it was too late.  It was with this in 
mind that preventive war thinking during this time received an extensive level of support in 
which, according to Trachtenberg, the ―impact on actual policy was both enormous and 
pervasive.‖543  
 
The call for preventive war against the USSR came as early as mid 1945, when several high 
ranking members of the US government began discussing the need to address the expanding 
―Soviet problem.‖  In what is now viewed as an infamous phone conversation with General 
Joseph T. McNamey, General Dwight D. Eisenhower‘s deputy at the time, one of the most 
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vocal and anti-Soviet advocates of preventive war, General George S. Patton first conveyed 
the emerging preventive war sentiment: 
 
Hell, why do you care what the Goddamn Russians think?  We are going to have 
to fight them sooner or later within the next generation.  Why not do it now 
while our army is intact and the damn Russians can have their hind ends kicked 
back into Russia in three months?  We can do it ourselves easily with the help of 
the German troops we have, if we just arm them and take them with us; they 
hate the bastards.  In ten days I can have enough incidents happen to have us all 
at war with those sons of bitches and make it look like their fault.  So much so 
that we will be completely justified in attacking them and running them out.
544
  
 
While Patton was one of the first and most overt proponents of preventive war against the 
Soviet Union, he was certainly neither the last nor the most extreme.  Over the course of the 
next nine years many others would reiterate his proactive view of assertive counter-
proliferation.  For instance, later in 1945, the State War Navy Coordinating Committee 
constructed an official government memorandum which audaciously declared that ―when it 
becomes evident that forces of aggression are being arrayed against us by a potential enemy, 
we cannot afford, through any misguided or perilous idea of avoiding an aggressive attitude, 
to permit the first blow to be struck against us.‖545  Furthermore, in September l946, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff recommended in clear fashion, that the US needed to ―press the issue to a 
prompt political decision while making preparations to strike the first blow if necessary... the 
US should demonstrate its readiness and determination to take prompt and effective military 
action abroad to anticipate and prevent an attack on the US.‖546  Additionally, in a report to 
the Secretary of War (now Secretary of Defense), General Henry H. Arnold of the US Air 
Force staunchly asserted that ―the only certain protection against [Soviet] aggression is to 
meet it and overcome it before it can be launched or take full effect.‖547  Coinciding with 
these sentiments, General Ely Culbertson articulated before a US Senate committee that the 
US was ―facing within the next five or six years a preventive war by the capitalist world to 
eliminate the threat of a rising Russian giant state.  And if that war does not take place, then 
we are facing in fifteen or twenty years a war for the control of the world by Communist 
Eurasia lead by Russia.‖548  Further to this, in August 1950, Secretary of the Navy, Francis 
Mathews reportedly stated: 
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The US should be willing to pay any price to achieve a world at peace even the 
price of instituting a war to compel cooperation for peace... [The Communists] 
would brand our program as imperialist aggression.  We could accept that 
slander with complacency, for in the implementation of a strong affirmative, 
peace-seeking policy, though it casts us in a character new to a true democracy 
– an initiator of a war of aggression – it would win for us a proud and popular 
title – we would become the first aggressors for peace... 549  
 
Finally, as recounted by Buhite and Hamel: 
 
Other officers joined the chorus... [they] assumed that in the next war the nation 
that struck first with nuclear weapons would win; therefore, preventive war 
seemed like an attractive option.  According to General Carl Spaatz, the way to 
deal with a possible Soviet air attack was ‗to get them at the place they start 
before they are launched.‘  And in response to concerns that the Soviet Union 
might acquire and use the nuclear bomb, General Arnold argued that the ‗one 
defense against the nuclear bomb‘ was to ‗hit it before it starts.‘  ‗The first 
blows‘ in the next war, wrote Ira Eaker, ‗would be struck through the air, and to 
prevent destruction of this country in the event of such an attack, we must strike 
the enemy first.‘  General Orvil Anderson subsequently spoke out in favour of a 
surprise attack.
550
  
 
Proponents of preventive war were not limited to the US military.  It became clear that 
notions of preventing the USSR from attaining nuclear weapons by offensive means gained a 
substantial following among some of the most renowned government officials, journalists and 
political scientists in the western world.  Of these, many were in favour of a proposal that 
would take the onus away from the US, placing it firmly upon the Soviet leadership.  In this 
way, the US would present the Soviet Union with an unambiguous nuclear ultimatum: cease 
research and development efforts on nuclear weapons or face an American preventive war.  
Indeed, several US government officials and military planners, some of considerable 
prominence and authority, endorsed this potentially catastrophic assertive proposition.  That 
is, Ambassador Bullit suggested that the US should threaten Moscow with ―annihilation‖ and 
―if that failed,‖ he wrote, ―then the US, should annihilate the Soviet Union.‖551  Moreover, 
according to Trachtenberg, ―William Laurence, the science correspondent for the New York 
Times and then America‘s leading writer on nuclear issues, wanted to force the Soviets in 
1948 to accept nuclear disarmament through an ultimatum if necessary.  If they turned down 
this American demand, their nuclear plants should be destroyed before bombs could be 
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produced.  If that meant war, he said, it would be one forced on America by Soviet 
‗insistence on a nuclear armament race which must inevitably lead to war anyway.  Under the 
circumstances, it would be to our advantage to have it while we are still the sole possessor of 
the nuclear bomb.‘‖552  Another of the earliest and clearest advocates of preventive war came 
from the world famous British mathematician and logician, Bertrand Russell.  As explained 
by George Quester: ―Russell in the years from 1945 to 1949, authored some very long letters, 
and newspaper and journal articles, lamenting the day of the future when more than one 
country would have nuclear bombs, and applauding the fact that it had been the US and not 
some other county that had first acquired them, and concluding that it would be a great 
service to humanity if the US applied this monopoly to prevent any duopoly from 
emerging.‖553   
 
Preventive war-thinking garnered even more support following the outbreak of the Korean 
War.  Given the Soviet Union‘s apparent complicity with the North Korean communists, 
several officials within and outside of the Truman Administration – and now containing what 
they deemed to be a ―legitimate‖ pretext for which to justify a war with the Soviet Union – 
began considering an even more aggressive stance vis-à-vis Moscow.  One of these mainstay 
advocates of preventive war against the Soviet Union included the aforementioned General 
Anderson, then commandant of the Air University at Montgomery, Alabama, who, on 
September 1, 1950, stipulated the reasons as to why confrontation was necessary: 
 
Since we‘re at war, damn it, I don‘t advocate preventive war, I advocate the 
shedding of illusions.  I advocate saying to Stalin: ‗Joe, you‘re not kidding 
anybody. You are saying you are going to destroy us.‘ And if he says ‗yes‘ – and 
he has been saying ‗yes‘ all the time – we must conclude civilization demands 
that we act. Give me the order to do it and I can break up Russia‘s five A-bomb 
nests in a week!  When I went up to Christ I think I could explain to Him that I 
had saved civilization.
554
  
 
Significantly, in January 1952, President Harry Truman at least fleetingly considered 
confronting the Soviet Union with ―an ultimatum with a ten day expiration limit informing 
Moscow that we [the US] intend to blockade the China coast from the Korean border to 
Indochina, and we intend to destroy every military base in Manchuria including submarine 
bases, by means now in our control and if there is further interference we shall eliminate any 
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ports or cities necessary to accomplish our peaceful purposes... Moscow, St. Petersburg, 
Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dairen, Odessa, Stalingrad, and every 
manufacturing plant in China and the Soviet Union will be eliminated.‖555 
 
Dwight D. Eisenhower  
Under the Eisenhower Administration, it was evident that preventive war options were put on 
the table on at least two different occasions: firstly, as an additional option in Project 
Solarium; and secondly, after the Soviets tested their first thermonuclear bomb in August of 
1953.  The Project Solarium preventive option was summarily dismissed (and containment 
favoured) as Eisenhower saw prevention as too extreme given the nature of the perceived 
Soviet threat at the time.  However, once the Soviets displayed their formidable and 
unexpected progress in thermonuclear weapons development one year ahead of US 
expectations, the President began to view the Soviet nuclear threat more acutely and became 
willing to at least consider the preventive option in addition to those already posited as part of 
Project Solarium.  Indeed, the status quo after the Soviet thermonuclear test constituted the 
reference point in which Eisenhower gave serious consideration to launching preventive 
strikes against the Soviet Union.  In a memorandum he sent to Secretary Dulles on September 
8, 1953, he stated: 
 
Among other things, we should describe the capabilities now and in the near 
future of the H-bomb, supplemented by the A-bomb.  We should patiently point 
out that any group of people, such as the men in the Kremlin, who are aware of 
the great destructiveness of these weapons – and who still decline to make any 
honest effort toward international control by collective action – must be fairly 
assumed to be contemplating their aggressive use.  It would follow that our own 
preparation could no longer be geared to a policy that attempts only to avert 
disaster during the early ―surprise‖ stages of a war, and so gain time for full 
mobilization.  Rather, we would have to be constantly ready, on an 
instantaneous basis, to inflict greater loss upon the enemy than he could 
reasonably hope to inflict upon us.
556
   
 
Additionally, Eisenhower posited further preventive war considerations when he admonished 
that, ―...if the contest to maintain this relative position should have to continue indefinitely, 
the cost would either drive us to war – or into some form of dictatorial government.  In such 
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circumstances, we would be forced to consider whether or not our duty to future generations 
did not require us to initiate war at the most propitious moment that we could designate.‖557   
 
Ultimately, Eisenhower was unwilling to accept the cost of employing the preventive option 
against the Soviet Union, as it potentially risked tens of thousands and maybe millions of 
deaths from a retaliatory strike.  Prevention was also viewed by some decision makers as 
morally questionable; a violation of US founding principles and unlikely to produce a 
successful outcome – that being, the total demolition of the Soviet Union‘s nuclear 
capabilities and its ability to threaten the US with complete destruction.  From a position of 
gains in which no lives had yet been lost, Eisenhower judged the options according to which 
would prevent a massive loss of life and cautiously chose containment over the preventive 
option.  On January 1955, Eisenhower formally put a halt to the preventive consideration and 
signed NSC-5501 – entitled ―Basic National Security Policy.‖  He declared that: 
 
The United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war or acts 
intended to provoke war.  Hence, the United States should attempt to make 
clear, by word and conduct, that it is not our intention to provoke war.  At the 
same time the United States and its major allies must make clear their 
determination to oppose aggression despite risk of general war, and the United 
States must make clear its determination to prevail if general war eventuates.
558
 
 
The document argued that the notion of undertaking a preventive war had passed, and hence, 
signified the end of the 1945-54 ―preventive war era.‖  Instead, Eisenhower‘s national 
security strategy involved ―deterring further Communist aggression and preventing the 
occurrence of total war‖ by using a ―flexible combination of military, political, economic, 
propaganda, and covert actions which enables the full exercise of US initiative.‖  Taking the 
Soviet Union‘s imminent nuclear parity into account, the national strategy noted that 
―Programs for the general strategy between now and the time when the USSR has greatly 
increased nuclear power should be developed as a matter of urgency.‖559  Containment was 
thus instituted as a long-term solution to the emerging problem of impending Soviet nuclear 
parity.  Eisenhower showed cautious restraint in dealing with Soviet nuclear proliferation and 
the threat it posed to the US.  Later, in 1956, despite the capability of the US to launch a 
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decisive strike against the Soviet Union, Eisenhower also took the cautious path and rejected 
the preventive option.  
 
Preventive Restrictions 
While the record clearly illustrates that the US enjoyed either a clear-cut nuclear monopoly or 
vast superiority during this time frame, it ultimately chose not to exploit this extraordinary 
advantage – despite the grave and gathering proliferation threat posed by its main adversary. 
Why was this the case?  Why did neither Truman nor Eisenhower, despite their intense 
repugnance to the Soviet Union and the strong pressures upon them to act, ever authorise a 
preventive war against the rising power of the USSR?  Or, as Quester queried, ―Why exactly 
did the US not then use this monopoly to force some major political concessions on the 
Soviet Union, perhaps even to force on Moscow what was imposed on Tokyo and Berlin, a 
surrender and disarmament and democratization?  Or why was the monopoly not at least used 
to perpetuate itself, to retain and maintain whatever advantages stemmed from our ability to 
bomb Leningrad or Moscow with no fear of nuclear retaliation against Washington or New 
York.‖560  Upon further investigation, it was evident the US refused to undertake a preventive 
path of action on the grounds of morality and practicality. 
 
First, it was apparent that several powerful US government officials and military planners, 
including some preventive war advocates, believed that the very concept of preventive war 
was ―out of step‖ with America‘s political traditions and strategic culture.  That is, preventive 
war was both ―aggressive‖ and ―dishonorable,‖ ―the kind of thing inflicted on the American 
people, not initiated by them.‖561  As Richard Smoke explained: 
 
It is worth recalling the option of preventive war, because more recently people 
have forgotten the moral significance of the fact that the US never considered it.  
America is the one nation in all of recorded history that for a few years probably 
had – to put it bluntly – the chance to rule the world.  The nuclear monopoly 
would almost certainly have carried the US to victory in a war against the Soviet 
Union...  Thereafter the US might have enforced pax Americana on the world 
indefinitely, either directly, or through a UN that America controlled.  This 
possibility was never seriously entertained in Washington, and that fact has a 
permanent moral meaning.  However uncomfortable Americans may have felt, 
and still feel, about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and more recently about the war in 
Vietnam, it will always be to their nation‘s credit that the US possessed the one 
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opportunity in history to be master of the globe, and was not even seriously 
tempted.
562
  
 
Indeed, in the history of the US, preventive war had long been equated with aggressive war.  
As posited by Scott Silverstone, ―In normative or moral terms, one problem with preventive 
war is that throughout history it has been closely tied to the concept of ‗wars of aggression.‘  
Witness the cast of characters most frequently cited as engaging in preventive war: Louis 
XIV, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm, Hitler, Imperial Japan.‖563  Further to 
this, as conveyed by Walter Slocombe, ―... preventive war... is not only in violation of 
international law, but an unbounded invitation to use of force on mere suspicion of the 
ambitions or intent of another nation; it is indeed a negation of the very concept of 
international law.‖564  Distinctly conscious of this traditionally negative and unlawful 
connotation, Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway and several others regularly condemned 
preventive war as a viable means to impede the Soviet Union from proliferating nuclear 
weapons – as it was ―wholly contrary to every principle upon which our Nation has been 
founded,‖ and ―utterly abhorrent to the great mass of American people.‖565  Furthermore, in 
the now infamous NSC-68, Eisenhower and his advisors maintained: 
 
It goes without saying that the idea of ‗preventive‘ war – in the sense of a 
military attack not provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies is 
generally unacceptable to Americans... [a] surprise attack upon the Soviet 
Union, despite the provocations of recent Soviet behavior, would be repugnant 
to many Americans.  Although the American people would probably rally in 
support of the war effort the shock of responsibility for a surprise attack would 
be morally corrosive.  Many would doubt that it was a ‗just war‘ and that all 
reasonable possibilities for a peaceful settlement had been explored in good 
faith...  The US therefore cannot engage in war except as a reaction to 
aggression of so clear and compelling a nature as to bring the overwhelming 
majority of our people to accept the use of military force.
566
  
 
Moreover, many during this period believed that it would be difficult for the US to undertake 
an aggressive war against the Soviet Union while maintaining its credibility as a benevolent 
state attempting to engender liberal democracy and notions of world peace.  As articulated by 
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Ray Reuther, ―America rejects the theory of preventive war as the answer to Soviet 
aggression.  We could not live with ourselves nor stand before the world as defenders of 
human freedom... if we accepted the ‗moral responsibility‘ for launching a war of 
aggression.‖567  Finally, and perhaps more significantly, both Truman and Eisenhower were 
concerned with the contravention of American values and ideals that a preventive war against 
the Soviet Union would signify.  In 1954, for example, James Reston of the New York Times 
asked Eisenhower what he thought of preventive war.  Eisenhower replied: ―A preventive 
war, to my mind, is impossibility...  I don‘t believe there is such a thing, and frankly I 
wouldn‘t even listen to anyone seriously that came in and talked about such a thing.‖568  
Truman was especially clear that preventive war was contrary to American principles and 
could not be perceived as a policy option in an action sense.  On varying occasions, Truman 
renounced preventive war thinking, having declared: ―We do not believe in aggression or 
preventive war.  Such a war is the weapon of dictators, not of free democratic countries like 
the US‖ and ―Starting a nuclear war is totally unthinkable for rational men,‖ and finally, 
―There is nothing more foolish than to think that war can be stopped by war.  You don‘t 
‗prevent‘ anything but peace.‖569 
 
Aside from the moral considerations presented in opposition to preventive war, many US 
observers at the time were also concerned about the logistic and strategic practicality of such 
an action.  Indeed, there were a plethora of such ―practical‖ variables from 1945-54; three 
that specifically appeared to be the most defining: a lack of US bombs and bombers; the 
prospect of Soviet retaliation against Western Europe; and the enormous costs of post-war 
occupation/reconstruction.  In the first instance, the US quite simply did not possess a 
sufficient amount of nuclear bombs and bombers with which to execute a major preventive 
campaign against the USSR as envisaged by military war planners.  As explained by Quester: 
 
While the world was led to believe that the US had a sizable stockpile of nuclear 
weapons...one of the best kept secrets of the post-war years was that the total of 
nuclear weapons in the US arsenal was indeed quite small... By some accounts, 
moreover, even the few bombs for which components had been assembled... 
were no longer functional or usable.  The actual totals of nuclear weapons 
possessed by the US, counting components as if they were assembled into 
bombs, rather than badly maintained, is something like the following: perhaps 
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three or four at the end of 1945, and nine by the middle of 1946, and perhaps 
thirteen by the middle of 1947... by the middle of 1948 the total had climbed to 
perhaps fifty.
570
  
 
While an intensive bomb building campaign resulted in a stockpile of approximately 250 
nuclear bombs by the end of 1949, the USSR had already developed its own nuclear bomb by 
that time.  Aside from this, the burgeoning US military complex demanded more bombs than 
those that existed in the US arsenal during the early 1950s.  David Allan Rosenberg posited 
that, ―[during] the vaunted era of American nuclear monopoly, the nation‘s stockpile and 
delivery capability were extremely limited.  There were very few weapons available and none 
of these weapons was assembled... when nuclear war planning began in earnest, this focus 
was diluted reflecting scarce resources, poor intelligence, and operational difficulties.‖571  
 
Moreover, even if the US had been in possession of a sufficient amount of nuclear bombs – 
as a means to meet its preventive war plan objectives – it still would have been palpably 
limited in executing an attack by virtue of the fact that it lacked a satisfactory delivery 
capability.  From 1946-1947 the US possessed only twenty-seven modified B-29 bombers 
suitable for delivering the enormous nuclear bombs (each weighed over 10,000 pounds and 
had to be delivered one at time); in 1948 it had only thirty-two; and through 1949 that 
number continued to hover around thirty, not nearly enough to ensure a successful delivery 
capability.
572
  Further to this limitation, compared to modern bombers, the B-29 had a 
relatively short range of only fifteen to seventeen hundred miles depending on the payload.  If 
deployed from the US American pilots would be forced to undertake costly and inefficient 
one-way suicide missions.  Finally, until the technology and operational capacity improved in 
1950, it took approximately 39 men close to a week to assemble the bombs, prepare the 
modified planes and move them to the appropriate bases for an attack.
573
  In short, from 
1945-54 the nuclear wherewithal of the US, in terms of having both the quality and quantity 
of bombs and bombers, was far too inadequate and unreliable in which to undertake a 
preventive war on a level that would be necessary to efficiently nullify the Soviet threat. 
 
In addition, while there was no distinct concern in relation to a nuclear retaliation against 
American cities from 1945-54, there was a legitimate fear of Soviet conventional retaliation 
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against Western Europe.  As posited earlier, it was widely perceived that the only reason that 
the USSR had not yet advanced to occupy and/or devastate all of Western Europe was based 
on US nuclear deterrence.  Indeed, ―if we see American nuclear weapons and extended 
nuclear deterrence as the crucial barrier to Soviet conventional attack one might thus in 
reverse see the Soviet conventional grip on Western Europe as a necessary and sufficient 
counter to the American nuclear grip on Soviet cities.‖574  Therefore, a defining concern for 
high-level US government officials and military planners from 1945-54 was the Soviet 
Union‘s ability to retaliate against Western Europe.  According to Buhite and Hamel: 
―Nothing could prevent the Soviet Union, with its overwhelming superiority in conventional 
forces in place in Eastern Europe, from occupying Western Europe.  Short of using nuclear 
bombs – an obvious impossibility – nothing the US could do would then dislodge them.  
Moreover, any nuclear attack on the Soviet Union would result in a stalemate – the US could 
devastate a large portion of the Soviet Union, but the Soviets could hold on to the western 
section of the continent indefinitely.‖575  As elaborated by Quester: ―A more certain 
explanation of the American failure to...  initiate a preventive war must therefore go back to 
the limitations on the potency of the American nuclear stockpile; it was not widely expected 
that the Russians would surrender even if their cities were regularly being hit by nuclear 
weapons, as long as they could install themselves in the cities in Western Europe.‖576  
 
Finally, it was evident that the US was ―self-deterred‖ from undertaking a large-scale 
preventive war against the Soviet Union because of the significant, indeed, unmanageable 
costs it would incur while attempting to occupy and/or reconstruct the largest state in the 
world.  In November 1947, Air Force General Hoyt Vanderberg admonished, ―...in a war 
with the Soviet Union is our purpose to destroy the Russian people, industry, the Communist 
party, the Communist hierarchy, or a combination of these?... Will there be a requirement to 
occupy, possibly reconstruct, Russia after victory, or can we seal off the country letting it 
work out its own salvation?‖577  Years later, Eisenhower exhibited the same concern, stating: 
―What do you do with the world after you have won victory in such a catastrophic nuclear 
war?  The colossal job of occupying the territories of the defeated enemy would be far 
beyond the resources of the US at the end of such a war... the only thing worse than losing a 
                                               
574 Quester, Nuclear Monopoly, p. 77.   
575 Buhite & Hamel, ―War for Peace,‖ p. 383. 
576 George H. Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty Five Years. New York: The Dunellen Company, Inc., 1970, p. 
39. 
577 Quoted in Rosenberg, ―The Origins of Overkill,‖ p. 13.   
172 
 
global war was winning one.‖578  In essence, even if a general preventive war could be won 
in any meaningful sense, the logistical issues that the US would encounter in the post-war 
period were both overwhelming and, quite obviously, prohibitive. 
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b. Preventive War and China – 1960-1963 
 
Preventive Considerations 
By the time President John F. Kennedy took office in early 1961, a second major strategic 
competitor emerged to alter the nuclear balance – China.  While having some similarities to 
the USSR, the case of Chinese proliferation from 1960-63 was extensively distinct from that 
of the USSR during the period of 1945-54.  The USSR epitomised a proliferation threat.  It 
was unequivocally an antagonistic and expansionist state with both the will and the means to 
challenge the US in strategically significant regions throughout the world.  China on the other 
hand, although clearly hostile towards the US and a formidable regional power, was never 
considered a threat to the very survival of the US or a legitimate contender for global 
dominance.  As argued by Robert H. Johnson, a high-ranking US State Department Policy 
Planning Council East Asian specialist in the 1960s: 
 
We do not believe that the explosion of a first device, or even the acquisition of 
a limited nuclear weapons capability, would produce major changes in 
Communist China‘s foreign policy in the sense that the Chinese would adopt a 
general policy of open military aggression, or ever become willing to take 
significantly greater military risks. China‘s leaders will recognize that their 
limited capabilities had not altered the real power balance among the major 
states and could not do so for the foreseeable future.  In particular, they would 
recognize that they remained unable either to remove or neutralize the US 
presence in Asia... so long as the ChiComs only have soft, vulnerable delivery 
means, they will have to take account of the danger of a US nuclear or non-
nuclear counterforce attack as a possible response to major ChiCom aggression. 
This could increase ChiCom caution.
579
 
 
Roger Hilsman, director of the State Department‘s Intelligence Bureau, also subscribed to 
Johnson‘s view when commenting in public in 1962 that as ―dramatic‖ as the prospect of 
China‘s exploding a nuclear device may have been, ―it [would] not change the balance of 
power in Asia, much less throughout the world.‖580  Moreover, in late July 1963, a CIA report 
on China‘s anticipated response to the Limited Test Ban Treaty further discounted the 
possibility of Chinese aggressiveness, stating that the Chinese ―over the past few years, in 
spite of their warlike oratory, have followed a generally cautious policy... The Chinese have 
thus far shown marked respect for US power, and we do not expect them to change this basic 
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attitude.‖581  In essence it was apparent that several US government officials and military 
planners from 1960-63 believed that the unique variables surrounding China‘s nuclear 
proliferation program – specifically, its historically cautious military policies and weak 
strategic position vis-à-vis the US – would make its nuclear movements more of a ―tolerable 
inconvenience‖ than an ominous threat.  Many in Washington were therefore unmoved by 
China‘s attainment of nuclear weapons and their capacity to effectively challenge the US 
military. 
 
Of course, not all observers during this period embodied this optimistic assessment. 
According to Nacht, many ―US policy-makers saw Communist China as, other than the 
Soviet Union, the most powerful threat to American security interests, especially in Asia but 
in other regions of the developing world as well.  The decade of the 1950s included the Sino-
American armed conflict in Korea and several major crises over Taiwan and the neighboring 
offshore islands...  The Sino-American relationship, prior to Chinese nuclear weapons 
acquisition, was wholly adversarial, and those Americans who thought it should be otherwise 
either had no influence or were summarily discredited if they voiced their views too 
loudly.‖582  Indeed, the acrimony that had characterised the Sino-American relationship 
during the previous ten years, in which China and the US had recently concluded a bitter war 
on the Korean Peninsula, almost came close to another conflict over the status of the 
Taiwanese-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. This encompassed extensive 
exchanges of bellicose rhetoric in which many US government officials and military 
planners, not least of which included President Kennedy, were inclined to view Communist 
China through a decidedly suspicious and guarded lens.  According to William Burr and 
Jeffrey T. Richelson, ―implicit to Kennedy‘s view, shared by area specialists at the CIA and 
State Department that the position of the Soviet leadership on peaceful coexistence and the 
dangers of nuclear escalation was substantially more responsible and less dangerous than 
Beijing‘s.‖583  For example, in a classified report entitled, ―China as a Nuclear Power,‖ a 
group of high-ranking US State Department policy planners portentously concluded that: 
 
As China goes down the road of becoming a nuclear power she will do her 
utmost to exploit her new weapons to achieve her goals.  These goals are 
perfectly evident.  China is determined to gain status, as a world power, 
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primarily by reducing US power and influences in Asia and the Western Pacific.  
The Chinese Communists seem determined to eject the US from Asia.  We can 
be sure that they will be seeking ways to exploit their nuclear weapons to this 
end.  China is determined to seize the leadership of the Communist movement.  
This is to be done by... proving by example that China is the only militant and 
reliable source of aid to revolutionaries seeking to overthrow the existing order 
by force... Hopes that nuclear weapons will bring greater caution to the Chinese 
are made to appear rather forlorn by the Chinese criticism of the Soviets for 
having been too timid in the use of their nuclear deterrent to aid the spread of 
Communism.
584
  
 
More significantly, it was apparent that Kennedy himself viewed China as an aggressive state 
with an expansive agenda.  According to Robert Garson, Kennedy at various intervals had 
described China as being ―intrinsically hostile to the US,‖ a ―dangerously radical nation that 
preached and encouraged world revolution that would take any opportunity to eliminate 
American influence from Asia.‖585  Moreover, as reported by Burr and Richelson, ―Kennedy 
was hostile to Mao‘s regime and found the prospect of a nuclear China disquieting.  The 
President... saw a Chinese nuclear test as likely to be historically the most significant and 
worst event of the 1960s.‖586  Furthermore, Kennedy‘s closest advisers regularly overheard 
him bemoaning China as ―the great menace in the future to humanity, the free world, and 
freedom on earth,‖ who was ―prepared to sacrifice hundreds of millions of [Chinese] lives to 
carry out Mao‘s aggressive and militant policies‖ and was likely to become Washington‘s 
―major antagonist of the late 60s and beyond.‖587  Defining Kennedy‘s stern position on the 
Chinese nuclear program was ―the perception of Mao‘s China as fundamentally more 
dangerous and irresponsible than the Soviet Union (with which the terms of ‗peaceful 
coexistence,‘ as Khrushchev put it, could be negotiated).‖588  As stated by Alice Langley 
Hsieh, even the Soviet Union – at this stage China‘s communist ally and exemplar – had 
intimated that the real reason the Chinese vied to develop its own nuclear capacity 
independent of Moscow was to ―pursue special aims and interests which could not be 
supported by the military forces of the socialist camp... her basic foreign policy objectives 
[included]  the incorporation of Taiwan into Peking‘s domain, the achievement of hegemony 
in the Far East, and the removal of US power and influence from the area – the Chinese had 
little alternative but to seek to rely on their own military potential and to develop their own 
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nuclear weapons, in order to make gains where Soviet military support or assistance could 
not be expected, or where Soviet aid would be subject to conditions and controls imposed by 
Moscow.‖589  
 
It was of course difficult to fully know the underlying motivations or potential consequences 
of the Chinese desire for nuclear weapons from 1960-63.  Nonetheless, it was quite apparent 
that any such development, whether intended for ―peaceful‖ or aggressive purposes, was 
widely perceived in the US to be a potential threat to national and international security.  In 
the first instance, once China had nuclear weapons there was always the real prospect that it 
may use them against the US.  While China had no intercontinental ballistic missiles at the 
time, it did have a comparatively sizeable fleet of military aircraft that could reach all parts of 
Asia, including US military installations and allied structures in Japan, Taiwan and South 
Korea.  Moreover, as one writer from the National Review warned in 1965, ―even today a 
ship can carry a Chinese bomb into the harbors of New Orleans, San Francisco, New York, or 
London.‖590  In fact, the US navy even suggested that ―the Chinese might consider initiating a 
‗catalytic war‘... attacking the US with submarine-launched missiles in such a way as to make 
the US believe the attacker was the Soviet Union and respond accordingly.‖591  This rather 
extreme scenario in itself may have engendered a sufficiently strong justification for acting 
against China‘s nuclear weapons program.  However, based on the empirical record, it is 
evident that it was not, as a matter of policy, Washington‘s primary concern.  For the US, the 
potential for continuous negative political-psychological effects (particularly in the context of 
the Cold War), together with an increase in China‘s involvement in low-level border wars, as 
well as an expected ―chain reaction‖ of nuclear proliferation in Asia, proved even more 
distressing (and realistic) than the prospect of an overt Chinese nuclear attack. 
 
According to some US officials, Chinese nuclear proliferation had the potential to engender 
politically significant ―psychological effects‖ on both allies and enemies throughout the 
region and around the world.  As Johnson observed in early 1964, ―the ChiComs will value 
their nuclear capability for... its psychological effects in weakening the will of countries 
resisting insurgency, inhibiting their requests for US assistance, and in stimulating and 
exploiting divisions within Asia and between Asian countries and the West.  It will be used to 
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put political pressure on the US military presence and to obtain support for Chinese 
acknowledgement of claims to pre-eminence in Asia and status as a world power.‖592  Hence, 
if the Chinese were allowed to attain nuclear weapons, ―a heightened sense of China‘s power 
would create a bandwagon effect with greater political pressures on states in the region to 
accommodate Beijing and loosen its ties with Washington... a nuclear China could only 
weaken Washington‘s influence in the region and its capabilities to intervene on behalf of its 
allies there.‖593  In short, the political and psychological effects following the detonation of a 
Chinese nuclear weapons was expected to raise China‘s ―stock‖ or prestige while at the same 
time undermining the US presence in Asia. 
 
A second and related concern pertained to the possibility of how a dramatic increase in 
international power and prestige may encourage China to use its new capability as a type of 
―political weapon... to earn respect, to promote [and] encourage revolutionaries.‖594  Given its 
storied history of actively supporting communist Marxist and Maoist revolutionary 
movements along its borders, the US certainly had legitimate reason to believe that an 
emboldened nuclear China would ―feel very much stronger and this mood would doubtless be 
reflected in their approach to conflicts on their periphery.‖595  While Johnson and other 
policy-makers believed it to be unlikely that China would risk a general war on the continent 
for such revolutions, they did believe that Beijing would come to doubt America‘s 
willingness to intervene on the Asian mainland.  As a result, China‘s policies were expected 
to grow more assertive.  This could very easily translate into increased Chinese ―political 
pressures and the indirect support of local ‗wars of liberation,‘‖ as well as a more direct play 
towards hegemony on the Asian continent.
596
 
 
Third and finally, many US government officials and military planners at the time were 
concerned that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by China would foster an unwelcome 
―chain reaction‖ of nuclear proliferation in the greater Asia region and beyond.  As stated by 
Johnson, ―...the possibility of development of additional national nuclear capabilities has 
been one of the central concerns of our interdepartmental Chinese nuclear exercise because of 
the general possibility that Asian nations might be tempted in this direction and because of 
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the more specific evidence that India was at least developing the option for such a 
capability.‖597  Furthermore, as indicated by Burr and Richelson, ―...in early 1961, CIA 
analysts mused that when China or Israel went nuclear, ‗other nations might enter the field if 
only to counter the power and prestige which their rivals or their enemies might gain... 
Intelligence reports from the capitals of two key countries, Japan and India, suggested that 
heads of state there were considering the possibility of developing national nuclear weapons 
programs...‘‖598  It was envisaged that if this scenario was to take place, a major level of 
―global instability would result,‖ in which ―even a small increase in the number of nations 
possessing nuclear weapons will add to the dangers inherent to critical situations when they 
arise... an increase in the number of states with nuclear-threat capabilities would increase the 
chances for irrational and desperate action...‖599 
 
Although there is substantially less corporeal information pertaining to the prevalence of 
preventive war thinking in the US from 1960-63 than from 1945-54, a number of recently 
declassified government documents signify that the logic of preventive war had in fact 
infiltrated some of the most influential offices of the US government – including that of the 
President.  In February 1963, the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara drafted a secret 
memorandum for Kennedy on the prospects and implications of the ―diffusion of nuclear 
weapons,‖ concluding that their spread was ―clearly not in the interest of the US‖ and ―in 
some cases... would probably have to [be met] with stronger incentives and sanctions than 
has seriously been considered so far,‖ encompassing both economic and military 
―penalties.‖600  Furthermore, in July 1963, Secretary of State Dean Rusk reportedly informed 
the US ambassador to West Germany that robust coercion would be undertaken against 
Beijing ―not to go down the nuclear path,‖ and if China persisted, ―other action might have to 
be taken to prevent this.‖601  In a meeting with Taiwan‘s powerful ―security czar‖ in October 
1963, National Security Assistant McGeorge Bundy made clear that the US was ―very 
interested in whether something could be planned... that could have a delaying and preventive 
effect on the nuclear growth of China.‖602   
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McGeorge Bundy 
When Gordon Chang revealed in 1988 that President Kennedy had seriously considered using 
preventive military force to destroy China‘s nuclear installations, McGeorge Bundy denied 
that such action had ever been considered.  He wrote, ―...there had been talk in Washington 
about the possibility of pre-emptive action against the Chinese bomb – talk, not serious 
planning or real intent...‖603  However, Bundy‘s denial directly contradicts the paper trail of 
documents declassified in 1997 which portray him as ―the point man in countering the 
Chinese nuclear effort, passing Kennedy‘s instructions to the CIA, holding secret discussions 
with Nationalist Chinese officials and seeking to enlist Soviet diplomats in joint efforts 
against China‘s nuclear program.‖604  Indeed, it appears that Bundy was more in favour of 
preventive attacks on Chinese nuclear sites than Johnson‘s other senior advisors.  His 
willingness to seriously consider preventive force began during the Kennedy Administration 
from the period when China‘s nuclear program was discovered.  Bundy continued to hold this 
position despite the opposing views of colleagues and key subordinates in the subsequent 
Johnson Administration.  Motivating Bundy‘s proclivity for preventive military action was 
his belief that a nuclear China presented a grave threat to United States national security.  He 
believed that while the Soviet Union under Khrushchev was a cautious nuclear power, China 
under Mao was volatile: 
 
...Mao regularly insisted that nuclear war would bring the end of imperialism 
and the final victory of socialism, while Khrushchev argued that the right way to 
victory was by the peaceful proof that socialism was better.
605
 
 
Indeed, throughout 1963 and the beginning of 1964, Bundy continued to favour some type of 
preventive military action despite contrary opinions from his colleagues.  Following an 
informal Planning Group lunch on November 5, 1963 at which Communist China‘s nuclear 
developments and US possible responses were posited, NSC staffer Robert Komer reported 
to Bundy that ―[while] there was much discussion on how to ‗strangle the baby in the cradle‘ 
before the Chinese developed a capability... the essential conclusion is that the ChiCom 
acquisition of a semi-nuclear capability will not have much more than a marginally 
significant impact and can probably be coped with by some marginal stepping up of existing 
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programs...‖606  However, in spite of Komer‘s virtual dismissal of preventive action, Bundy 
wanted to see more work and planning done in the ―preventive action field.‖  In response to 
another memo from Komer on February 26, 1964, in which he wrote, ―WWR [Walt Rostow] 
is also poking around in the preventive action field.  Do we want this?‖ Bundy wrote in the 
margin, ―I‘m for it.‖607  In short, Bundy appeared to be willing to take on the ―option.‖ 
 
John F. Kennedy 
As indicated in the above, it was evident that Kennedy himself had taken a considerable 
interest in the notion of using preventive military action as a means to ―strangle the baby in 
the cradle‖ and impede China‘s expanding nuclear weapon program.  Indeed, since his 
untimely assassination on November 22, 1963, a wide range of previously classified and 
significant information regarding Kennedy‘s thinking on China and preventive war has been 
released.  As Burr and Richelson stated, ―Less than a year after President John F. Kennedy‘s 
assassination, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Foster told a 
historian that Kennedy had been rivalling to ‗consider politically dangerous moves... to 
coerce the People‘s Republic of China into complying with the 1963 Limited Test Ban 
Treaty.‘  Foster, whose comments remained classified until 1994, asserted that Kennedy was 
willing to ... secure Soviet cooperation ‗in taking action, if necessary physically, against 
China.‘  Moreover, Foster told his interviewer that the President would ‗think out loud‘ 
saying ‗You know, it wouldn‘t be too hard if we could somehow get kind of an anonymous 
airplane to go over there, take out the Chinese facilities... they‘ve only got a couple... and 
maybe we could do it, or maybe the Soviet Union could do it, rather than face the threat of a 
China with nuclear weapons.‘‖608  Kennedy also articulated his concerns in a conversation 
with Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone, in which he stated that ―[a nuclear 
China] would so upset the world political scene [that] it would be intolerable.‖609  According 
to Bundy, Kennedy felt that ―we should be prepared to take some form of action unless they 
[China] agreed to desist from further efforts in this fie1d.‖610  Specifically, at the January 22, 
1963 National Security Meeting, Kennedy said that the Chinese would be ―our major 
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antagonists of the late 1960s and beyond,‖ such that the US‘ main purpose in treaty 
negotiations with the Soviet Union should be to ―halt or delay the development of an atomic 
capability by the Chinese Communists.‖611  China‘s nuclear efforts had so concerned 
Kennedy that since June of 1961, he had been considering approaching the USSR in hopes of 
exploiting the widening Sino-Soviet split and persuading Khrushchev to work with the US in 
countering or delaying China‘s nuclear program.612 
 
It was the possibility of joint action by the US and the Soviet Union, combined with his 
concerns about the political implications and consequences of a nuclear China, that spurred 
Kennedy to seriously consider the use of preventive military force to stop China from 
obtaining nuclear weapons.  In February of 1963, Paul Nitze, the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to conduct a 
study on using ―persuasion, pressure, or coercion‖ to persuade China to sign a test ban treaty.  
Influenced by the thinking of Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman, Kennedy felt a US and 
Soviet Union agreement to stop nuclear development in China would create enormous 
pressure on China to give up their nuclear program or at least provide justification for a 
military strike by the US – but blessed by the Soviet Union.613  However, while the report 
submitted to Nitze by the JCS in April of 1963 included a myriad of indirect measures 
involving propaganda campaigns and diplomatic schemes, as well as direct coercive 
measures including both multilateral and unilateral military options, the Acting Chairman 
General Curtis LeMay ultimately concluded that because there was no guarantee that China 
would actually adhere to a nuclear test ban treaty, it was ―unrealistic to use military force‖ to 
try to achieve that goal.  However, the report also stated that Soviet cooperation, in the event 
the US decided to conduct air strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities, could ―well be the 
difference between escalation and quick acquiescence by the ChiComs.‖614 
 
In July 1963, Kennedy sent a secret cable to Assistant Secretary of State, Benjamin H. Read, 
the US official responsible for communications with the Soviet Union.  It related to what he 
referred to was the largest Chinese nuclear development and clearly affirmed his preventive 
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war inclinations vis-à-vis the Chinese.  As articulated by Kennedy, ―I remain convinced that 
the Chinese problem is more serious than Khrushchev‘s comments in the first meeting 
suggest, and believe you should press question in private meeting with him.  I agree that large 
stockpiles are characteristics of US and USSR only, but consider that relatively small forces 
in hands of people like ChiComs could be very dangerous to us all... You should try to elicit 
Khrushchev‘s view of means of limiting and preventing Chinese nuclear development and his 
willingness either to take Soviet action or to accept US action armed in this direction.‖615  
While Kennedy did not clearly specify the type of ―action‖ he had in mind, it was apparent 
that he was advocating something more than mere diplomatic or political strategies.  
Moreover, at a meeting of the National Security Council on 22 January, 1963, Kennedy 
explained that ―our primary purpose in the ongoing Nuclear Test Ban Treaty negotiations 
with the Soviet Union is to halt or delay the development of an atomic capability by the 
Chinese Communists.‖616  Finally, in response to a question on how a nuclear test ban treaty 
would thwart China and other states from acquiring nuclear weapons, Kennedy argued that 
―the ban‖ should stipulate that signatories would ―use all the influence that they had in their 
possession to persuade others not to grasp the nuclear nettle.‖  Further to this, Kennedy 
added, ―quite obviously,‖ countries pursuing nuclear weapons ―may not accept this 
persuasion and the, as I say, they will get the false security which goes with nuclear 
diffusion.‖617  While such words are hardly conclusive, they do signify that Kennedy was at 
least attuned to the consideration of waging preventive war against China.   
 
Despite the general advantages in taking such an approach – the elimination of the Chinese 
nuclear capability would ―eliminate the need for US consideration, in responding to 
Communist aggression or even the marginal possibility of ChiCom use of nuclear weapons... 
deprive the ChiComs of the political psychological and military-defense advantages of a 
nuclear capability... [and] greatly reduce the incentive and justification for Indian 
development of nuclear weapons and the possible subsequent movement of Japan [and 
Taiwan] in the same direction... thus eliminat[ing] an important source of a possible chain 
reaction leading to further nuclear proliferation – the preventive war option was, quite 
obviously, never made a reality.‖618  Shortly after Kennedy‘s assassination, newly appointed 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, who was said to be ―rhetorically more cautious about China‖ 
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and ―wholly averse to confrontation with China,‖ quickly and quietly decided to put aside the 
preventive war option, and instead, put in place a more cautious, less intrusive means of 
counter-proliferation, including trade and export controls, assertive military containment and 
continued intelligence monitoring.
619
  However, on October 16, 1964, China detonated its 
first nuclear weapon, and thus, ended the 1960-63 preventive war era.  Johnson described his 
perspective on the Chinese nuclear test in his memoir, seven years after his cautious decision 
to try again with the Soviets: 
 
Peking‘s accomplishment came as no great surprise because we had been 
expecting it for some time.  Nonetheless, the fact that a large country with a 
hostile government had mastered the technology of nuclear explosives was 
necessarily a source of worry.  I was not concerned for the immediate future.  A 
long and expensive road separated setting off a nuclear blast and developing the 
powerful and accurate missiles to carry nuclear weapons across seas and 
continents.  But what of my successor?  Or his successor?  Some future 
President would have to face the question of how to deal with this situation.  The 
problem was not just a matter of China.  It was a question of how to deal with a 
great many nations, of all sizes and levels of political stability, equipped with 
nuclear weapons.  All I could do was to move as fast and as far as possible 
during my Presidency to slow the arms race, to achieve international agreements 
on their control, and to prevent the continuing proliferation of weapons that 
could mean an end to civilization as we knew it.
620
 
 
In the months that followed, Johnson Administration officials continued to evaluate the use of 
force, however, officials at the top no longer viewed such a strategy as being viable unless 
Beijing first launched a major aggressive act against its neighbours.  Johnson and his advisers 
―would monitor China‘s nuclear progress closely and search for ways to delay it through 
trade controls, but it was clear that the President had tacitly decided to live with the Chinese 
bomb.‖621  
 
Preventive Restrictions 
The 1960-63 period was the second time in ten years that the US had an extraordinary 
opportunity to preclude a major strategic competitor from acquiring nuclear weapons via 
preventive action – but refrained from doing so.  As indicated in the case of the Soviet Union, 
when faced with a similar situation, both Truman and Eisenhower were apt to forgo a 
preventive course of action on the basis of both moral and practical considerations.  In the 
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case of China, however, it appears that only latter restraint proved politically influential.  
Indeed, very little evidence exists to support an argument that the Kennedy Administration 
was dissuaded from taking preventive action against China on account of morality.  This is 
not to say that the Kennedy Administration completely eschewed international norms or 
American traditions regarding the use of force – after all, during the Cuban missile crisis 
President Kennedy and his brother, US Attorney General Robert Kennedy, ultimately 
condemned a surprise US air strike against Soviet missile sites under construction  in Cuba 
because they believed it was morally repugnant.  At one point in the famous ―Excom‖ 
debates, Robert Kennedy passed a note to President Kennedy which read, ―I know now how 
Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor‖ and ―[attacking Cuba] would be a Pearl Harbor 
in reverse, and it would blacken the name of the US in the pages of history‖ as a great power 
who attacked a small neighbor.  However, regardless of this, the fact remains that neither 
legal nor moral questions were explicitly addressed in any of the available government 
documents concerning preventive action in China.
622
 
 
Nevertheless, Kennedy‘s political advisers did frequently express concerns pertaining to the 
potential for ―heavy foreign policy costs,‖ ―adverse international political reactions,‖ and 
―difficult international opinion‖ that were expected to accompany an unprovoked US 
preventive attack on China.  As Burr and Richelson indicated, the Kennedy Administration 
well understood that ―an unprovoked US attack could entail heavy foreign policy costs,‖  
―was dangerous and likely to fail and... could hurt the US image and weaken its prestige.‖623  
Moreover, Johnson concluded that any US action ―with no justification than a general 
argument that the US was seeking to preserve the peace of the world through depriving a 
potential aggressor of nuclear weapons would be subject to [adverse international political 
reactions].‖624  Finally, acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Curtis LeMay, 
concluded that ―it was unrealistic to use overt military force against China because... if the 
US took unilateral action, whether initiating a blockade or military action, policy-makers had 
to consider the strong prospects for retaliation and escalation, not to mention the difficulty of 
justifying such an action to international opinion.‖625  While such statements hardly prove 
that the Kennedy Administration had a strong moral aversion to preventive war, they may 
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imply that there was, at least on some level, a general concern for the ―rightness‖ or 
―wrongness‖ of such action. 
 
Whereas morality seemed to play a very small role in restraining the Kennedy Administration 
from taking preventive action against the Chinese nuclear program, the practicality (or 
impracticality) involved in such an attack was ever present.  Indeed, as posited by Robert H. 
Johnson in one of his many studies on the Chinese Communist nuclear capability and some 
―unorthodox‖ approaches to the issues of nuclear proliferation: ―It is evident... that the 
significance of a ChiCom nuclear capability is not such as to justify the undertaking of 
actions which would involve great political costs or high military risks.‖626  In particular, 
many observers believed that the chances of operational failure (a la the ―Bay of Pigs‖ fiasco) 
and Chinese retaliation were far too great.  First, it was evident that the intelligence 
―portfolio‖ on China from 1960-63 was inadequate.  According to Burr and Richelson, the 
―US intelligence collection capabilities, particularly with respect to China were limited.  
Satellite imagery of China became available only in August 1960, and at first on an 
intermittent basis.  Meanwhile, the location deep in China‘s interior of critical nuclear 
facilities... made it difficult to cover such targets with U-2 spy planes...with all the gaps in 
intelligence about the PRC‘s nuclear program, Washington may not have identified all 
relevant targets.‖627  Moreover, Johnson concluded: ―There is considerable uncertainty 
regarding the location of critical facilities... we have no certainty, even now, that we have 
identified all nuclear production facilities.‖628  Clearly, this was a major impediment for the 
Kennedy Administration and the preventive war option, for without accurate intelligence, it 
would have been near impossible for the US to ―have full assurance that its action [would] 
eliminate the ChiCom capability.‖629  Not eliminating the Chinese nuclear program would, of 
course, have undermined the very purpose of launching a preventive attack in the first place. 
 
The second and perhaps more important restraint upon the US was the strong possibility of 
Chinese retaliation against Taiwan or US bases in East Asia.  Indeed, there was a clear 
apprehension among US leaders at the time that Beijing or Moscow would misconstrue a 
―limited war action‖ on select Chinese nuclear installations as the beginning of a major attack 
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on the Chinese mainland, and such developments could engender a massive communist 
retaliation against allied positions by China, the Soviet Union, or both.  As explained by 
Johnson: ―The possibility of military retaliation by Communist China or the USSR is very 
difficult to estimate because it would depend in some significant measure upon the particular 
circumstances in which the US action was taken. However, some kind of ChiCom retaliation 
(e.g. an attack on the bases in Taiwan or elsewhere from which the US attack was launched) 
cannot be ruled out...  In general, action against Communist Chinese facilities... is highly 
dangerous, involving grave risk of precipitating war (or escalation of existing conflict) in 
Asia and even bringing the Soviets to the support of the Chinese.‖630  In essence, it appears 
that the Kennedy Administration – like the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations before it 
– was deterred from waging a preventive war against China based on perceived practical 
concerns pertaining to the uncertainty of targets, as well as the potential physical costs and/or 
risks of retaliation.  Shortly after the Chinese Communists detonated their first nuclear 
device, Kennedy‘s successor, President Lyndon Johnson, directly addressed this development 
in a speech to the American people.  The President made a point of assuring US allies that 
Washington was carefully monitoring the nuclear situation in China, making it clear that the 
US had expected the nuclear test, could specify where and when it had occurred, and 
emphasised that it would not lead to immediate dangers of war: 
 
As Secretary Rusk noted on September 29, we have known for some time that 
the Chinese Communists had a nuclear development program which was 
approaching the point of a first detonation of a test device... The explosion came 
as no surprise to the US Government.  It has been fully taken into account in 
planning our own defense program and nuclear capability.  Its military 
significance should not be overestimated.  Many years and great efforts separate 
testing of a first nuclear device from having a stockpile of reliable weapons with 
effective delivery systems.  Still more basic is the fact that if and when the 
Chinese Communists develop nuclear weapons systems, free world nuclear 
strength will continue to be enormously greater.
631
 
 
Three days later, the Chinese Government issued a statement, setting forth in detail China‘s 
position on the question of nuclear weapons: ―China‘s mastering of nuclear weapons is 
entirely for defense and for protecting the Chinese people from the US nuclear threat.‖632  
The Chinese government also announced it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons 
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and stated their position against all nuclear weapons.  The Chinese immediately began acting 
like a cautious nuclear power, validating CIA and State Department political analysis.  
However, examination of debris picked up by US Air Weather Service aircraft revealed that 
the bomb exploded by the Chinese had in fact contained U-235, proving wrong the CIA‘s 
conclusion that the first Chinese bomb would be fuelled by plutonium.  This discovery 
indicated to US officials that China was likely to become a full nuclear power sooner than 
originally had been expected.
633
 
 
The combination of Johnson‘s reassuring announcement just hours after the test, and previous 
leaks and announcements about the approaching Chinese explosion, proved to be effective in 
downplaying the significance of the event and keeping allies calm – with the notable 
exception of Taiwan.  Not surprisingly, the Chinese test ended Chiang-Kai-shek‘s hopes for 
returning to power on the mainland. 
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c. Preventive War and North Korea – 1993-94 
 
Preventive Considerations 
The third and final case in which preventive options were extensively considered, related to 
the state of North Korea in 1993-94.  Once again, the US was confronted with a ―strange, 
secretive, dangerous, and deeply troubled small country‖ actively working to acquire a 
nuclear capability.
634
  Often known as the ―hermit kingdom,‖ North Korea was, in short, 
viewed by many US policy-makers as an extremely volatile and highly militarised old-
fashioned communist state dominated by a ruthless dictator committed to reunification of the 
Korean peninsula.  As contended by Michael O‘Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, ―North Korea‘s 
official name, the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea, could not be more misleading.  It 
is as badly out of place in today‘s world as Castro‘s Cuba but a far worse place to live and 
much more threatening to the international community... [North Korea] is a major military 
threat to South Korea ... a country it has invaded once, in 1950, as well as American forces in 
the ROK, Japan‘s nearby population centers, and the region as a whole with the possibility of 
a second unprovoked war, including massive artillery and missile attacks.‖635  Indeed, North 
Korea at the time had the second largest military in Asia (behind China) including one 
million troops out of a population of only 22 million.  In per capita terms, this represented the 
highest percentage in the world and ten times the global average.  Moreover, North Korea 
also devoted a far greater share of its gross domestic product to its armed forces than any 
other state in the world, thus contributing to the DMZ‘s characterisation as the ―densest 
concentration of firepower in the world.‖636  
 
Aside from creation of a nuclear weapon for its own individual use, the spectre of newly 
developed and inadequately safeguarded North Korean nuclear materials becoming ―lost‖ 
was a further concern.  As Carter and Perry reported, ―...if nuclear weapons are controlled by 
a country enmeshed in social and political turmoil, they might end up commandeered, bought 
or stolen by terrorists.  Who knows what might happen to North Korea‘s nuclear weapons as 
that state struggles to achieve a transformation, possibly violent, to a more normal and 
prosperous nation.‖637  Such potentiality garnered sentiments of striking first, because once 
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North Korea had produced nuclear materials – given the small size of a critical mass of 
plutonium and the porous nature of international borders – thwarting their transfer would be 
virtually impossible.  As confirmed by Wit et al., ―this scenario is as stealthy as it is 
worrisome... A detonation somewhere might well be the first evidence of such a transfer... 
The US could not expect to prevent, deter, or defend against such an act.‖638  Additionally, 
the US was once again concerned that North Korea‘s acquisition of nuclear weapons could 
engender a ―chain reaction.‖  As explained by Carter and Perry, ―a nuclear North Korea could 
very well set in motion a domino proliferation effect in East Asia.  The US had successfully 
persuaded South Korea to forgo nuclear weapons on the grounds that North Korea had none 
and with the US as an ally the South did not need nukes for its defense.  That argument could 
be undermined by a North Korean bomb.  The next dominoes to fall might be Japan and 
Taiwan.‖639  Indeed, it was viewed that if North Korea was able to develop nuclear weapons, 
a regional arms race could result, producing significant and destabilising tensions within 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as well other states within the region.  If such an arms race 
began, it was hard to predict where it might lead and how it might end.  As Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk argued in 1961, ―[if the US abetted nuclear proliferation], it would start us down a 
jungle path from which I see no exit.‖640  It is with this in mind that when confronted with the 
1994 North Korean nuclear crisis – in which a rogue state was actively engaging in the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons – the Clinton Administration, like its predecessors, seriously 
―contemplated its own act of pre[vention] against the strange, isolated regime then considered 
the greatest threat to US national security.‖641  
 
Unlike the cases of the Soviet Union and China, however, preventive war thinking towards 
North Korea developed in response to a single, very specific and highly publicised nuclear 
crisis.  Beginning in March 1993 with North Korea‘s rejection of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency‘s (IAEA) request for a ―special inspection‖ of two suspected nuclear waste 
sites at the Yongbyon nuclear complex (of which the North Koreans were required to permit 
as a signatory to the NPT) and the controversial announcement that it would soon secede 
completely from the NPT, the 1994 nuclear crisis lasted approximately fifteen months and 
almost ended in outright conflict.  Indeed, at its peak, the US and North Korea came very 
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close to the brink of conflict when the latter indicated that it had already begun to remove 
spent nuclear fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor containing enough plutonium to produce 
up to five nuclear bombs.  When the US threatened to impose economic sanctions on the 
embattled regime, Pyongyang responded by stating that, ―sanctions mean war and there is no 
mercy in war.‖642  Clinton‘s advisers viewed this declaration with varying degrees of alarm, 
but agreed that it would have been irresponsible for the US to ignore the warning.  As Daniel 
Poneman explained: 
 
The North Koreans had said that they would view the imposition of UN Security 
Council sanctions an act of war.  Now we were not shaking in our boots when 
they said this but, you know, if you‘re Bill Perry, Secretary of Defense, you 
cannot ignore that.  Therefore, what we were doing quietly and pretty much 
continuously, with the exception of the Patriots which got hung up politically, 
was we were enhancing our force presence and our posture in the Korean 
peninsula and in that theater.  The view of the Principals was that at such time as 
the UN Security Council sanctions would actually kick into force, that we 
should have a sufficiently robust presence in theatre to deter the North Koreans 
from any foolish military action and response to sanctions, so effectively, to call 
their bluff and say ―You‘re going to call that an act of war... well let me put 
enough forces in here that you don‘t treat it as such.‖  And so the trick is to put 
enough force in to deter but not so much in that you provoke the attack you‘re 
trying to deter.
643
 
 
Aside from the outcomes or provocative nature of sanctions, the actual notion of using 
preventive military force to preclude North Korea from obtaining a nuclear arsenal became a 
distinct possibility based on the issue of defueling.  Reprocessing was a further possible 
trigger: If the US learned that the North Koreans had begun reprocessing – the step after 
defueling in which the plutonium would be easier to transport and hide – the preventive 
option certainly would have moved to the forefront of deliberation.  This is not to say that 
such sentiments were not already on the agenda; the DOD had been studying the 
requirements for attacking Yongbyon since the discovery of the existence of the nuclear 
facility in 1989.  The methods of preventive strikes considered by the Pentagon ranged from 
targeting single buildings to the entire installation, employing everything from cruise missiles 
to raids carried out by commandos.
644
  Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and 
Secretary of Defense William Perry have at varying intervals admitted that a preventive 
military option was on the table during 1994.  As stated, ―The two of us, then at the Pentagon 
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readied plans for striking at North Korea‘s nuclear facilities and for mobilising hundreds of 
thousands of American troops for the war that probably would have followed.‖645  Indeed, a 
successful attack required ―timely intelligence, accurate targeting, tight command and 
control, and pinpoint timing‖ as the ―option‖ needed to take place just as the North Koreans 
were moving the spent fuel to the reprocessing plant, but before the separated plutonium was 
moved to a different location to manufacture nuclear weapons.
646
  Tactically complicating the 
execution of this attack was the nearby placement of more than 300 antiaircraft guns and the 
construction of a half dozen new surface-to-air missile bases.
647
  Despite the complexity of 
this option, Defense Secretary William Perry declared to Congress in 1995, ―I can tell you 
flatly that we know how to do that.‖648 
 
Not wanting to take any chances with what was perceived as a hostile regime, many in the 
US advocated ―seizing the initiative‖ and striking first via preventive war.  Indeed, due to its 
unprecedented media coverage, preventive war thinking during the 1994 North Korean 
nuclear crisis commanded a wide range of support throughout the US government as well as 
the general population.  So popular was the notion that the US should eliminate North 
Korea‘s nuclear capability that one high-ranking South Korean diplomat on his first trip to 
Washington was reportedly ―struck by the willingness of the American witnesses – think-tank 
experts and former US officials – to advocate a preventive strike against North Korea.‖649  In 
June 1994, six out of every ten Americans surveyed thought that US ―vital‖ interests were at 
stake in North Korea – a far higher figure than for any other international situation at the time 
(generally speaking, a vital interest is one for which the US would be willing to wage war).  
While this does not provide a conclusive assessment into those Americans who supported the 
taking of preventive military action against North Korea in 1994, it does illustrate that ―the 
stakes were both high and well understood; the American people viewed the threat of nuclear 
proliferation in North Korea as the top foreign policy risk facing the nation.‖650 
 
In addition, various media commentators and think-tank observers throughout the US openly 
endorsed preventive action against North Korea before it was able to produce a nuclear 
                                               
645 Carter & Perry, ―Nuclear over North Korea.‖ 
646 Wit, Poneman & Gallucci, Going Critical, p. 103. 
647 Jack Anderson & Michael Binstein, ―North Korea: Loose Nuclear Cannon,‖ The Washington Post, March 29, 1992, p. 
C1; North Korea News, no.702, September 27, 1993, p. 5; Wit, Poneman & Gallucci, Going Critical, p. 103. 
648 William Perry, Testimony as Secretary of Defense at the Joint Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 104 Congress, 1st session, Government Printing office, January 1995, p. 15. 
649 Wit, Poneman & Gallucci, Going Critical, p. 28.    
650 Ibid., p. 241. 
192 
 
weapon.  As argued by Larry DiRita of the Heritage Foundation, ―...rather than trying to 
appease one of the last remaining Stalinist dictatorships in the world, [the Clinton 
Administration] should set a deadline for North Korea to allow international inspectors, or 
else impose sanctions and consider destroying military headquarters, ballistic missile launch 
sites, or command and control facilities.‖651  Moreover, as exhorted by Washington Post 
columnist Charles Krauthammer, ―the Administration‘s response to North Korea‘s nuclear 
drive has been all carrots and no stick.  As an inducement to be nice, we have already given 
the North Koreans their first direct high-level talks with the US.  We have dangled diplomatic 
recognition.  We are now dangling an offer to cancel joint US military exercises with South 
Korea.  These are gestures of weakness.  Enough talk.  The time has come for action.‖652  As 
the crisis deepened, former National Security Council staff member Richard Haas insisted 
that the Clinton Administration should ―launch a preventive military attack against North 
Korea‘s nuclear facilities at Yongbyon that is comparable to Israel‘s attack that destroyed 
Iraq‘s reactor in 1981.‖653  Meanwhile, within the pages of the Economist periodical, various 
―hawks‖ and ―hard-liners‖ expressed their opinions in which one commentator stated that, ―at 
some point the talking has got to stop... Faced with a chilling choice of risk – between a 
pre[ventive] strike to cripple North Korea‘s nuclear program and waiting until its tough talk 
is backed up by nuclear threats – America would in the end be right to strike first.‖654  In a 
more direct endorsement of preventive action, former Pentagon official Frank Gaffney, Jr. 
stated that ―... [the US] should take military steps to neutralize those facilities we know 
about... It is a question of risking going to war now, when US military capabilities are still 
relatively strong and North Korean forces are minimal, if extant, rather than later when such 
advantageous conditions will almost surely not exist.‖655 
 
Finally, throughout the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, preventive war thinking also 
received a great deal of attention from many high level US government officials and military 
planners.  On ABC‘s Nightline, for example, US Senators John McCain and Bob Kerrey 
exhibited rare bipartisan agreement when they together argued that resolving the North 
Korean nuclear crisis warranted running the risk of war.  In articulating his case, McCain 
incorporated preventive logic, querying that, ―is it better to act now, while the nuclear 
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weapons program is still in an embryonic state, or is it better to wait two or three or four 
years when you are facing an enemy with nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them as 
far away as Japan?  I think the answer is we have to act now.‖656  Moreover, in the Wall 
Street Journal, US Congresswoman Karen Elliot House observed that, ―... negotiations, pleas 
and promises of cooperation for good behaviour haven‘t had the slightest effect [on the North 
Koreans] ... [instead of sending former President Jimmy Carter to negotiate] President 
[William J.] Clinton ought to be sending [General] Norman Schwarzkopf – perhaps with a 
few sample photos of high-tech warfare in the Gulf... The Administration has to be willing 
not only to go to war on the Korean peninsula but also to put the US-China relationship on 
the line...‖657  Furthermore, according to Wit et al., ―former [George H.W.] Bush 
Administration officials Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter advocated such a strike unless 
the North allowed the IAEA continuous, unfettered monitoring to ensure that no further 
reprocessing took place.‖658  Aside from the above, specific policy-makers within the Clinton 
Administration also considered and weighed up the notion of using the preventive option. 
 
Anthony Lake, National Security Adviser 
From the beginning of the crisis, National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, was prepared to 
run the risk of a violent North Korean reaction to sanctions and undertake preventive air 
strikes if it meant stopping Pyongyang from obtaining a nuclear arsenal.  For Lake, North 
Korea‘s effort to develop a nuclear capability was especially dangerous because of their 
ballistic missile program and the likelihood that Pyongyang would export both technologies 
to other rogue states.
659
  As stated: 
 
North Korea has become one of the foremost merchants of such [ballistic 
missiles] weapons.  It has sold Scud missiles to Syria and Iran, and it is actively 
marketing its next generation of ballistic missiles.  In short, if North Korea 
develops nuclear weapons, we face a greatly increased danger that other hostile, 
rogue states around the world will soon have them also.
660
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However, despite Lake‘s thinking on the preventive option, he was convinced that it ―almost 
certainly would have provoked a North Korean attack.‖661  Lake characterised preventive air 
strikes as riskier than sanctions, noting there was a general belief among Clinton 
Administration officials that a second Korean war would be won by the US but at a 
considerable cost.  ―We... went through intensive planning on what a Korean conflict would 
entail – concluding that it would be very bloody, with heavy civilian as well as military 
casualties, but we would win.‖662  According to Lake, there were three issues that could 
hinder the preventive air strikes option: 
 
One is would they work? Would you get it all? The second is what sort of plume 
would you create? And the third was what were the chances of the North 
Koreans then responding with a conventional attack across the parallel? And 
what would be the consequences of that and how well would we be prepared for 
it?
663
 
 
William Perry, Secretary of Defense 
Secretary of Defense, William Perry, ―thought this was one of the most serious crises that we 
faced during his tenure... the most serious and [he] did not believe that we could permit the 
North Koreans to go forward with their nuclear program and was preparing unilateral military 
options...‖664  Underscoring the risk of escalation, however, Perry ruled out the use of force 
up front, but made it clear that preventive military force would not be taken off the table.  As 
stated, ―at the other end of the spectrum would be the application of military pressure, but 
even limited application of military pressure entails the risk of a large-scale war.  Although 
we will not rule out any option for all time, this course should only be considered when all 
other possibilities have been exhausted.‖665  In a June l0 memo to Clinton, Perry cautioned 
the President against limiting US options, ―either in terms of military preparations or pre-
emption.‖666   However, Perry stressed that military action was considered a last resort: 
 
It was serious enough that we had put together a detailed plan to do it but I want 
to emphasize, it was never something we considered doing without having first 
exhausted many other alternatives.  So, it was something that was on the table 
but at the end of the table not at the beginning of the table.  We would not 
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consider doing it until we had first positively exhausted our diplomatic 
alternatives and then exhausted all of the non-military coercive diplomatic 
alternatives.  So, it was in the sequence but it was at the end of the sequence.
667
 
 
Perry‘s aversion to the preventive air strikes option was related to its astronomical 
consequences.  While he felt confident that the US would win a second Korean war, Perry 
judged that the cost would be disastrously high. 
 
We understood that it would be very costly – very costly to the Koreans and to 
the American forces as well.  So, we considered that we wanted to take every 
step we could possibly take to avoid that alternative short of allowing North 
Korea to precede with a full blown nuclear arsenal.  The way I presented it to the 
President was that we had – that if we got to that military option, we would have 
to consider the choice between two terrible alternatives: one of them was taking 
action which might precipitate a war and a war which would be very – would 
have disastrous consequences for everybody or allowing North Korea to precede 
with a nuclear arsenal which we also believed could have disastrous 
consequences.  Had we gotten to that point, we would have had to choose 
between two very bad alternatives therefore our whole strategy was to try to 
figure out – to try to take a course of action which would keep us from having to 
make that choice.
668
 
 
James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 
Of the senior-level officials in the Clinton Administration, DCI James Woolsey was the 
strongest proponent of preventive war as a means to destroy North Korea‘s nuclear program; 
particularly upon their announcement that defueling was imminent.  Throughout the crisis, 
Woolsey had viewed the possibility of a negotiated solution with scepticism, predicting that 
North Korea would negotiate only as a means to buy time in which they could continue 
building nuclear weapons.  From Woolsey‘s viewpoint, Kim Il Sung was ―a dictator and a 
liar and a cheat‖ and ―I didn‘t think we could trust him as far as we could throw him.‖669  
This lack of trust for the regime and the knowledge that North Korea could soon process 
plutonium for more nuclear weapons motivated Woolsey‘s hawkish stance on the nuclear 
crisis.  According to Gallucci, ―In terms of what the [North Korean nuclear] program was all 
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about and therefore, [were] negotiation[s] a reasonable thing to be engaged in – the Director 
of the CIA at the time, thought we were nuts, absolutely nuts.‖670 
 
While Woolsey did endorse the preventive war option, he also held some misgivings about 
the long-term effectiveness of launching preventive, surgical air strikes against Yongbyon.  
That is, Woolsey agreed with Clinton‘s senior advisers that a surgical strike against the North 
would not be guaranteed to get all of the nuclear material, as the location of the plutonium 
was unknown and would likely motivate some response from the North Korean military.
671
  
As explained: 
 
It seems to me you always want to know what the practicality is of the use of 
force.  And, whereas most thinking centers on a surgical strike against 
Yongbyon, I don‘t think that would have been very reasonable because of the 
North Koreans would have attacked the South.  I think you had to answer the 
question, ―What would it take to pull their teeth and their capacity – this was 
now eleven years ago – and their capacity to move effectively against the 
South?‖ I don‘t think it matters that they have a huge army.  A huge army is a 
sitting duck for smart weapons as we‘ve showed time and time again.  It‘s those 
artillery sites and possibly missile launching sites that could hit South Korea that 
we would have had to have been able to take out virtually all of them.
672
 
 
In essence, Woolsey rationalised that if surgical strikes were going to lead to armed conflict 
between the US and North Korea, then it made more sense to launch the initial strike against 
their artillery sites as well as the nuclear facilities; in effect, to launch a preventive war.  The 
DCI believed preventive surgical strikes were only a short-term solution, unlikely to 
permanently halt the North Korean nuclear program, and instead, urged officials to at least 
consider all variables pertaining to the execution of a preventive attack against North Korea.  
Woolsey believed such an attack would be less risky than just striking Yongbyon because he 
judged that a first strike with overwhelming force would give the offensive advantage to the 
US, whereas preventive surgical strikes could incite a full-scale response in which case the 
US would be on the defensive.  Although Woolsey was the highest level official opposed to 
negotiating a solution to the nuclear crisis with North Korea, his role as DCI precluded him 
from participating in the policy process in the same way other high level Administration 
officials did.  As stated: 
                                               
670 Amy K. Furches, Interview with Robert Galluci, Presidential Decision Making: When Do US Presidents Use Preventive 
Force to Counter Nuclear Proliferation? George Washington University, 2007, p. 200. 
671 Furches, Interview with James Woolsey, p. 200. 
672 Ibid. 
197 
 
My opinion wasn‘t solicited on policy matters at all... One of the only things 
that we did talk about was that the DCI really shouldn‘t be a policy adviser.  He 
asked me what I thought.  I said that I did not think he should, that I thought he 
ought to call it the way he saw it – if the DCI was a policy adviser, people were 
going to get the idea that intelligence was getting skewed to support the policy 
beliefs of the DCI... The President didn‘t want me to be so I was there to 
present the intelligence, period.
673
 
 
As a result, Woolsey‘s assertive position on North Korea played little to no role in the 
President‘s ultimate decision on how to deal with Pyongyang‘s nuclear program. 
 
Clinton: Returning to Negotiations 
Clinton described the North Korean nuclear crisis as ―by far the biggest foreign policy 
issue.‖674  The showdown over defueling presented the President with a problem to which 
every solution involved risks: How to preserve the security of the US by preventing the North 
Koreans from becoming a nuclear power without provoking a second Korean War.  On the 
one hand, choosing a non-military option diminished the prospect of expeditiously ending 
North Korea‘s nuclear program and still stood a chance of provoking a major war if 
Pyongyang was serious that sanctions equalled war.  If he chose not to launch preventive 
strikes against Yongbyon, and Pyongyang began not only defueling the reactor but also 
reprocessing the spent fuel, Clinton risked missing the opportunity to destroy the fissile 
material before it was hidden away.  Refraining from preventive strikes also risked allowing 
the North Koreans to level the playing field for a future war by providing them with the time 
to develop a nuclear arsenal.  On the other hand, launching preventive strikes at Yongbyon 
would possibly achieve the policy goal of preventing North Korea from building a nuclear 
arsenal in the short term, but there was no guarantee it would destroy all of the fissile material 
possessed by Pyongyang. There was also a very good chance striking Yongbyon would 
provoke a retaliation that could escalate into a costly second Korean War.
675
  
 
The Turning Point 
The commencement of defueling also marked the point when Clinton moved closer to 
considering preventive strikes against Yongbyon, although this alternative was always an 
option of last resort.  On May 18, as a sanctions package was being pulled together and 
military preparations continued, Perry and Shalikashvili called in every active four-star 
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general and admiral in the US military to discuss support for Commander, US Forces and 
Korea and General Luck‘s war plan for Korea.  The ensuing meeting discussed troops, 
materiel, logistics, and in particular, ―details of preparatory deployments of troops and 
transport from other commands, the shifting of US aircraft carriers and land-based warplanes 
closer to the Korean coast and plans for massive reinforcements – deployment of roughly half 
of all US major combat forces – if hostilities actually got under way.‖676  According to Don 
Oberdorfer‘s account, on May 19, Perry, Shalikashvili and Luck informed the President of 
the costs and consequences should the nuclear crisis escalate to military conflict and then 
potentially to general war with North Korea.
677
   Luck told Clinton that the US-ROK chances 
against North Korea in a conventional war were good but success would be costly.  In the 
first ninety days, the generals estimated ―52,000 US military casualties, killed or wounded, 
and 490,000 South Korean military casualties... at a financial outlay exceeding $61 billion, 
very little of which could be recouped from US allies.‖678  Overall, US officials estimated 
that the damage caused by a second Korean war would be in the range of a million lives and a 
trillion dollars.
679
 
 
Clinton Changes Approach 
The following day (May 20), now armed with information regarding the human and 
economic costs likely to result from a war with North Korea, Clinton held a meeting with his 
senior advisers to discuss the crisis.
680
  Here, despite North Korea‘s defiant defueling of the 
reactor at Yongbyon, the President changed tactics, moving back to pursuing a diplomatic 
solution; a far less risky endeavour than sanctions or prevention.  Clinton offered to join 
Pyongyang in a third round of high-level negotiations and attempted to set up a direct 
meeting between Kim Il Sung and Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar in hopes of 
communicating directly with North Korean leadership to ease the rising tension.  In simple 
terms, Clinton altered his direction because he hoped to avoid the risks associated with an 
option that could escalate to war.  However, based on the IAEA‘s June 3rd declaration that 
North Korea had deliberately destroyed information that would reveal the operating history of 
the reactor, the Nunn and Lugar meeting did not take place.
681
 According to Clinton, ―...they 
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have triggered this, not the United States or anyone else. I just don‘t think we can walk away 
from this.‖682  
 
Just as the Clinton Administration began to again consider more assertive options, former 
President Jimmy Carter intervened, offering to meet with Kim Il Sung.  Carter‘s unofficial 
―eleventh hour‖ mission to North Korea was successful and averted what was likely to be a 
very costly war on both sides.  As recalled by Clinton: 
 
President Carter called me on June 1 and said he would like to go to North 
Korea to try to resolve the problem.  I sent Ambassador Bob Gallucci, who was 
handling the matter for us, down to Plains, Georgia, to brief Carter on the 
seriousness of the North Korean violations.  He still wanted to go, and after 
consulting with Al Gore and my national security team, I decided it was worth 
trying.  About three weeks earlier, I had received a sobering estimate of the 
staggering losses both sides would suffer if war broke out... Al Gore called 
Carter and told him that I had no objection to his going to North Korea as long 
as President Kim Il Sung understood that I would not agree to a suspension of 
sanctions unless North Korea let the inspectors do their jobs, agreed to freeze its 
nuclear program and committed to a new round of talks with the United States 
on building a non-nuclear future.
683
 
 
It was here that Carter‘s diplomatic effort not only helped averting a major crisis, but also 
served to mark the end of the third era of the preventive war option.  
 
Preventive Restrictions 
Implementing the preventive war option against North Korea carried significant risks. The 
augmentation of US force posture in South Korea was meant to pressure North Korea into 
staying at the negotiating table to avoid sanctions, deter a North Korean attack, and better 
prepare US-ROK forces in the event that negotiations faltered, deterrence failed or the US 
opted to launch air strikes against Yongbyon.  But the military build-up necessary to 
accomplish this could actually provoke the North Koreans to launch an assault below the 38th 
parallel.  Pyongyang had made a study of US actions preceding the l99l Gulf War, 
particularly the build-up of US troops in the Gulf prior to the fighting. Kim Il Sung was likely 
to view any build-up in American forces as a prelude to war with his country.  Launching 
preventive strikes against North Korea‘s nuclear facilities also risked putting off much 
needed allies like Japan – who did not want to get involved in a major war but whose 
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involvement was critical to US success – and China – who would not take kindly to US 
aggression on the Korean peninsula.  Launching preventive strikes against North Korea ran 
the very real risk of potentially provoking a form of Chinese intervention, just as it had done 
in June 1950.  Foremost in terms of risks was the very high probability that North Korea 
would retaliate against a US military strike and that any retaliatory strike could escalate 
quickly to a second Korean war.  US intelligence and several Clinton Administration officials 
estimated that the US could not launch preventive surgical strikes against Yongbyon and 
destroy North Korea‘s nuclear facilities without facing retaliation, although there was 
uncertainty about what form this retaliation would take.
684
 
 
Part of the ambiguity relating to this option was the lack of US intelligence on how North 
Korean leadership thought and how they might react to a US limited strike on Yongbyon. 
While US knowledge on North Korea‘s nuclear program was considered to be relatively 
sound by most high level Administration officials, intelligence on the intricacies of the 
leadership and how the regime functioned was limited.  Pyongyang‘s response could range 
from a contained artillery barrage to a full-scale attack in which the North Korean army 
moved south over the 38
th
 parallel.  Specifically, military planners were concerned about a 
possible attack on South Korean nuclear power plants which were vulnerable to sea attack 
and which, if hit, could shower parts of South Korea with significant radioactive fallout and 
damage the economy by knocking out much of its power.
685
  Additionally, the vast majority 
of North Korea‘s troops were gathered just north of the 38th parallel, only 30 miles north of 
Seoul – the population of which accounted for one fourth of the people in South Korea and 
close to one half of the country‘s economic output – increasing the risks associated with any 
military option.
686
 
 
General Gary Luck, Commander, US Forces Korea at the time of the crisis, thought North 
Korea would respond to any US strike with an all-out counterattack:  ―If we pull an Osirak, 
they will be coming south.‖687  In this event, according to Daniel Poneman, ―A variety of 
target sets were looked at including target sets that would interfere with their ability to move 
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south.‖688  A former, senior US military official assessed the situation, asserting that from a 
military perspective, preventive surgical strikes were not truly an option if President Clinton 
wanted to avoid a second Korean war. 
 
A surgical strike was not really an option because what you did with a surgical 
strike is you gave them the reason to attack you, which then put the odds in their 
favor for the first phase of the campaign.  If you attack Yongbyon, then you‘ve 
got to put down the probabilities that go with that; the probability that they‘ll 
accept that without retaliating.  That‘s a real small probability.  And then you 
keep doing your math-calculus – if they surprise attacked us while we‘re in the 
defensive crouch, what are the losses?  If we take the aggressive approach, and 
attack them, which we would have to do anyway after they attacked us, what are 
the odds?  It made sense that if we felt strongly enough about punishing North 
Korea for continuing with their nuclear program, the best option would have 
been for us to launch a full-scale attack as opposed to a few preventive strikes. 
The third option – you boil all the smoke out of it and that‘s what you‘ve got... 
Preventively attacking Yongbyon would have just been an invitation to the fight.  
There was nothing clean about this.  It was either you‘re going to fight or you‘re 
going to negotiate.
689
 
 
The option was also constrained because of the significant risk that a preventive attack would 
not necessarily destroy all North Korean plutonium or important bomb-making equipment. 
Military planners were concerned that North Korea would unload the fuel rods and move 
them to the reprocessing facility and separate the plutonium, which could then be transported 
to a secret location and made into nuclear weapons. According to a former senior US military 
official: 
 
We didn‘t know where they had the stuff.  They [the North Koreans] don‘t have 
anything else to do up there except dig tunnels.  Who knew where they had 
stored the material?  How much credence do you put in an intelligence report 
from a closed society?  We had nothing other than overhead pictures to tell us 
anything.
690
 
 
In essence, a US preventive strike risked releasing a significant amount of radiation or, if the 
radioactive material was moved, the attack would fail to destroy it, thus giving the North 
Koreans a chance to rebuild the foundation of their nuclear program.  Moreover, the option 
was the riskiest of those examined because it offered the largest variance in outcome – the 
destruction of the North Korean nuclear program – if successful, but also the worst outcome 
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if North Korea responded with an all out attack on the South, which the Clinton 
Administration judged it was likely to do.
691
 
 
Litwak further conveys the potential risk of a preventive war when he stated that ―the North 
Koreans did not distinguish between a narrow US counter-proliferation option on the North‘s 
nuclear facilities and general war.  On the American side, the fear of inadvertent escalation 
and catalytic war – the possibility that a counter-proliferation strike on the North‘s nuclear 
infrastructure would provoke an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula – was a key policy 
determinant.  This overriding concern prompted the Clinton Administration to pursue 
alternative non-military approaches...‖692  Indeed, although no one was certain about the 
extent to which North Korea may respond, most observers agreed that that if attacked, North 
Korea would undertake some form of massive counterattack against allied positions.  
According to Philip Saunders, Pyongyang had various options at its disposal: ―North Korean 
long-range artillery could hit Seoul with artillery shells and chemical weapons, causing panic 
and massive civilian casualties… it could hit Japan with its… missiles.  Seventy percent of 
North Korean army ground units are located within 100 miles of the demilitarized zone... 
positioned to undertake offensive ground operations.  These units could fire up to 500,000 
artillery rounds per hour against South Korean defenses for several hours.  Finally, if North 
Korea does have one or two deliverable nuclear weapons, nuclear retaliation (or nuclear 
threats) would also be available...‖693  In any event, the results were expected to be disastrous.  
According to Wit et al.: 
 
If war were to occur, the US and South Korea would win, but it would be costly.  
Computer projections showed 30,000 American casualties and 450,000 South 
Korean casualties, but these numbers might be too low; the killed-in-action 
numbers would likely be higher since the battlefield was far more lethal during 
the Korean War in the 1950s... another Korean war would kill or wound 1 
million civilians, cost more than $60 billion, devastate the South Korean 
economy to the tune of at least $1 trillion, cause an Asian recession, and 
adversely affect the rest of the global economy.  When asked by the President... 
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whether the US would win the war, General [Gary] Luck [commander of the US 
forces in South Korea] replied, ‗Yes, but at the cost of a million [casualties] and 
a trillion [dollars].‘694 
 
In simple terms, the costs in executing the preventive option on the Korean peninsula were so 
high as to be prohibitive.  The significant possibility that a preventive attack on North 
Korea‘s nuclear facilities would engender a general war on the Korean peninsula, in essence, 
effectively removed the US military option from consideration. 
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In the Context of the Bush Administration 
 
Despite claims to the contrary, it appears that the efforts by the Bush Administration to 
prevent rogue states from acquiring nuclear weapons were not altogether new or 
groundbreaking.  In fact, as evident in aforementioned, every single time a state hostile to the 
US has sought to acquire nuclear weapons, the incumbent Administration – whether 
composed of Republicans or Democrats – has considered utilising force as a means to hinder 
this development.  Indeed, not including Iraq, Iran and North Korea from 2001-03, over the 
last fifty years, the US has assessed the viability in waging large-scale unilateral preventive 
wars against three additional rogue proliferators: the Soviet Union from 1945-54; China from 
1960-63; and North Korea from 1993-94.  Significantly, in all three cases, it is apparent that 
the US opted not to take preventive action due to a number of overriding moral and practical 
inhibitions.  What can we infer from this record of inaction and how does this evidence help 
to explain the 2003 War in Iraq? 
 
In the first instance, while it is impossible to fully comprehend the specific reason as to why  
each respective Administration chose not to employ the preventive war option – analytically 
it is difficult if not unworkable to separate normative concerns from strategic calculations.  
As stated by Lebow, the former are ―intangible considerations that do not lend themselves to 
ready assessment let alone to quasi-quantification,‖ and based on the available information, it 
is fair to assume that the key US decision-makers in all of the cases reviewed in the above 
were more heavily influenced by the practical costs of said action.
695
  To be sure, none of 
these Administrations were completely unaware or unmoved by the immorality and illegality 
associated with preventive war, however, it was clear that each one – from Truman and 
Eisenhower to Kennedy and Clinton – was ultimately willing (if not always able) under the 
―right‖ conditions, to embark upon a preventive path of action irrespective of the moral costs.  
If any of these Administrations were truly concerned with or repulsed by the ―moral 
depravity‖ of preventive war, we would expect to find an immediate and wholesale dismissal 
of such thinking.  The sheer fact that not a single one was willing to dismiss preventive war 
in an absolute fashion signifies that morality was not the most significant restraint.  As 
confirmed by Trachtenberg, ―[the reason that a preventive war strategy was never adopted as 
policy]… was not that Eisenhower was shocked or appalled by this... the real problem was 
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that it did not make any strategic sense.‖696  While Trachtenberg was referring specifically to 
the case of the Soviet Union, it would be accurate to attribute such a conclusion to the cases 
of, China from 1960-63, Iraq 2001-03 and North Korea from both 1993-94 and 2001-03 as 
well. 
 
Indeed, one cannot resolutely pronounce that normative objections by themselves restricted 
American action against any of the aforementioned states.  In only one of the three cases 
reviewed – the Soviet Union from 1945-54 – was morality explicitly mentioned and 
considered; in the other two cases it is evident that very little, if any, discussion was prevalent 
in the context of morals, arms or legality.  Furthermore, it was apparent that in some cases, 
morality was actually used to endorse and promote preventive war.  For example, in the early 
1950s James Burnham, a political scientist at Harvard University argued that, ―if there is 
good reason to believe that a sudden and massive blow [to the Soviet Union] would save 
many lives and goods [in the US], result in less destruction and social disintegration [than if 
the US waited for the Soviet Union to acquire nuclear weapons and attack first], give a better 
chance for building a workable world polity, then to strike such a blow, far from being 
morally wrong, is morally obligatory.  If there is to be war in any case, it is hard to 
comprehend why a war is morally better because it is more difficult, longer, more cruel and 
costly and bloody.‖697  Four phenomena may assist in articulating this apparent disregard for 
traditional morality. 
 
First, there exists substantial empirical evidence to support the claim that largely dynamic 
moral constructs such as the characterisation of preventive war as ―aggressive‖ or 
―dishonourable‖ may be either refined or deferred in times of supreme national crisis.  Many 
historians and political scientists have explained Japan‘s 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor in these 
terms.  Second, it was not uncommon for conventional morality to be temporarily suspended 
whenever the results were expected to produce a more favourable long-term outcome.  For 
example, torturing an individual to gain valuable information which will save a number of 
lives was widely viewed to be an occasion in which the postponement of morality was 
acceptable.  Similarly, the preventive motivation was based on the belief that war was 
probably inevitable and that it is better to fight now while the costs and/or risks are low(er), 
than later when they are expected to be high(er).  In both cases, the ―ends‖ were said to 
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―justify the means.‖  Third, it is significant to note a critical difference between the case of 
the Soviet Union – the only case in which the moral implications of undertaking a preventive 
war were seriously debated – and the remaining cases.  In the former, a successful preventive 
strike would have required the US to use nuclear weapons as a means to annihilate both 
counter-force and counter-value targets, including major Soviet cities; in the latter, it would 
have been possible for the US to employ superior military technology to eliminate the 
requisite nuclear programs without causing an overzealous level of collateral damage.  In this 
light, the preventive option in the more recent examples would have required far less 
violence, and thereby, meant that debates pertaining to notions of morality were far less 
pressing.  Finally, in respect to non-proliferation, it has been apparent in the last twenty years 
that a strong international norm has developed against the horizontal proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, to the extent that such proliferation is widely considered to be an unlawful act.  In 
this view, any state actively working to attain weapons is deemed a ―criminal‖ and thus 
subject to appropriate sanctions and diplomatic condemnation.  Moreover, because a nuclear 
proliferator has already broken the ―law,‖ any military action taken against it would be 
considered reactive, not preventive.  Maintaining this position thus removes the moral 
approbations surrounding the ―unprovoked‖ use of force. 
 
Nonetheless, the fact that none of the aforementioned Administrations were compelled to 
reject or even thoroughly discuss the moral consequences of preventive war strongly supports 
the argument that practicality, especially concerns pertaining to enemy retaliation and general 
war, and not morality, did more to coerce US decision-makers away from waging preventive 
war against the Soviet Union from 1945-54, China from 1960-63 and North Korea from 
1993-94.  Indeed, it was apparent that political leaders and military planners during each of 
the periods in question were not guided primarily by legal or moral reasoning.  In any of the 
cases reviewed, if the extremely prohibitive practical situations had not existed, would the 
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Clinton Administrations have measured 
morality in the same way?  More importantly, would they have been deterred by morality 
alone?  For instance, if the US had been in possession of a more substantial amount of 
nuclear bombs and bombers from 1945-54, and the Soviet Union was not able to effectively 
retaliate against Western Europe or so big as to prohibit a post-war 
occupation/reconstruction, would things have turned out differently?  Would the US have 
attacked the Soviet Union?  We will of course never know for sure, however, if viewed in the 
context of Iraq from 2001-2003, it is evident that morality alone did not impede the US from 
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undertaking a preventive war against a comparatively small and weak rogue proliferator, with 
no real prospects for retaliation.  The circumstances surrounding the Soviet Union from 1945-
54, China from 1960-63, and North Korea from 1993-94 and Iraq from 2001-03 differ in 
some very distinct and important ways (i.e.  the September 11 terrorist attacks and the newly 
perceived threat of nuclear terrorism may have allayed some of the opposition to preventive 
war).  The application of preventive war in the latter suggests that the historically pervasive 
anti-preventive war moral sentiment in the US has neither changed dramatically, nor has it 
been the most significant deterrent when it comes to waging preventive war. 
 
Indeed, assuming that the moral purview of preventive war thinking in the US has not 
changed significantly over the last half century – and recent polls and studies, to say nothing 
of the academic and political rhetoric, have shown that it has not – and furthermore, that the 
Bush Administration subscribed to the same morality as its predecessors, it stands to reason 
that the practical costs of waging preventive war was – and still is – the more critical of the 
two deterrent variables.  In essence, while morality may be a necessary constraining factor of 
preventive war, alone it is not sufficient.  If this is true and if states are more likely to wage 
preventive attacks when the practical costs and/or risks of retaliation are low, then it lends 
robust support to the claim that the Bush Administration‘s decision to pursue the preventive 
option against Iraq is best seen as a strategic choice primarily based upon practical 
considerations, especially the relative military capabilities of the targeted states.  It also 
underscores the powerful logic of deterrence and yields some important conclusions. 
 
First, it was evident that from 2001-03, the Bush Administration likely preferred to wage 
preventive war against Iraq first because it was the weakest of the three perceived threats.  
(Iran being second and North Korea a distant third.)  If the US continued to believe that the 
cost of inaction was higher than the cost of action (which, as we have seen may be 
significant), we can expect that the Bush Administration – if given the chance – would have 
sought to attack the outstanding threats in that order.   Second, if a rogue proliferator emerges 
in the future, the US will again strongly consider waging preventive war against it.  For 
example, if Syria were to make a serious drive to acquire nuclear weapons, we can expect 
that the US would seriously consider taking preventive measures to stop it from doing so.  
Even so, it is highly unlikely that a strategy of preventive war will ever replace or supplant 
the reality of deterrence or be implemented uniformly against all nuclear proliferators.  
Indeed, the fact that the US has historically been extremely reluctant to attack militarily 
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strong rogue proliferators suggests that the US will continue to differentiate between big and 
small, weak and strong states and also continue to weigh the military costs involved in 
waging war against them.  A commensurate statement was articulated by Feaver and Niou: 
 
A military strike is simply not a credible option against many countries that 
might develop nuclear weapons, regardless of the strength of US resolve... There 
are obvious costs involved in executing a military strike against proliferators, 
and these costs vary directly with the military capabilities of the [rogue] 
proliferators.  The costs of a decapitating strike against a Great Power like the 
Soviet Union would be prohibitive, making the force option not viable... [strong] 
enemies are simply too large for such an option to be workable.  Indeed, the 
military option is only credible against small enemies.  But even here, the 
military option is not credible once the country has, in fact, deployed nuclear 
weapons because of the risk that the proliferator would be able to fire off one of 
the weapons before the US could destroy the arsenal... Weighing these factors, 
our argument draws the following conclusions.  The US will never...attack a 
large enemy... [and] the final deployment of nuclear weapons could be thought 
of as rendering a ‗small‘ country into a ‗big‘ one... making the costs of a military 
strike prohibitive.
698
  
 
Similarly, Drell and Goodby have observed that the relevant lessons to be learned from 
America‘s experience with preventive war and rogue proliferators are as follows: ―Military 
force, or the threat of it, was only usable when the likelihood of successful retaliation against 
the homelands of the attacking power by the potential proliferant was low... Military force is 
not likely to be used when the costs of doing so are judged to be higher than allowing 
proliferation to occur… The conclusion from this analysis is that military force or the threat 
of using such force is quite circumscribed in its application to the problem of nuclear 
proliferation.‖699   
 
Indeed, based upon the historical record, we may anticipate that in the future the US will 
―think twice‖ before waging war against three kinds of strong rogue proliferators:  those that 
have strong conventional forces capable of defending against a US  invasion (i.e. a large, 
populous Iran); those that have strong conventional forces capable of deterring a US invasion 
(i.e. North Korea‘s artillery over Seoul); and those that have nuclear weapons, which can, by 
themselves, raise the costs/risks of preventive war to an unacceptable level by defending 
against a US invasion, deterring it, or both (i.e. North Korea with proven nuclear capability).  
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Simply put, in the future it is reasonable to say that the US will continue to ―aim at what is 
feasible, holding in view the real sentiments... that right as the world goes, is only in question 
between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they 
must.‖700   For Trachtenberg, the preventive war term is one that endorses the notion of force 
being used even if a country has not been attacked, ―but we also mean a policy rooted in 
concerns about the future, about what might happen tomorrow if nothing is done today.‖701  
By this definition it was evident that the Bush policy certainly qualified as a preventive war 
policy, however, did the ―adoption of that strategy of ‗prevention‘ mark a total break with 
American tradition, or did earlier Administrations, to one extent or another, also think in 
‗preventive‘ terms?‖   As affirmed by Trachtenberg, ―it turns out that the sort of thinking one 
finds in the Bush policy documents is not to be viewed as anomalous.  Under Roosevelt and 
Truman, under Eisenhower and Kennedy, and even under Clinton in the 1990s, this kind of 
thinking came into play in a major way.  Concerns about the future – about what might 
happen if nothing were done – weighed heavily on American policy during the period from 
1941 through 1963.‖  This continued through to end of the Cold War and the 1990s, and will 
no doubt continue on in the 2000s and ―beyond.‖702 
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As has been established, the motivation and consideration of preventive war has been an 
implicit part of US policy-makers‘ strategic thinking since 1945.  While it can be argued that 
the preventive tenets of the Bush Doctrine stalled in Iraq after the quick and easy defeat of 
Saddam Hussein in 2003, the nuclear dimension encompassed in the Doctrine, and the 
reassertion of this option, became the legacy of the Bush Administration when he departed in 
January, 2009.  As the focus of Chapter 7, Bush asserted nuclear weapons as a distinct pillar 
within US security strategy, articulating and refining such sentiments through the 2002 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (NSCWMD), CONPLAN (Concept Plan) 8022 (Global Strike), the 2005 
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the 2006 
Strategic Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0, and in recent times, the Reliable 
Replacement Warhead (RRW) program.  While it is clear that Bush attempted to place the 
nuclear option back to the fore in an assertive fashion, acknowledgment to the transition 
between the Clinton and Bush Administrations is imperative when analysing and evaluating 
the extent of the shift that the Bush Doctrine engendered, and will thereby, be the focus of 
this chapter.  In many instances, it can be argued that the Clinton Administration ignored its 
historic opportunity to reverse decades of dangerous and provocative nuclear weapons 
planning, while the Bush Administration – in its punctuating and reaffirming policy 
instruments (as posited above) – furthered the process towards increasing the role of nuclear 
weapons in US policy and security strategy.  Indeed, the Bush documents and policy 
instruments signified a renewed role for nuclear weapons and the quest of his Administration 
to upgrade US offensive forces, deploy missile defenses, reconfigure communications and 
satellite systems, and overall, revitalise the nuclear complex.  Nonetheless, it would be both 
remiss and incorrect to see this as merely the result of the Bush Administration‘s policies.  It 
was evident that the Clinton Administration retained much of the existing US nuclear 
weapons policy and force posture in the decade after the demise of the Soviet Union and 
affirmed the role of nuclear weapons in US security strategy.   Furthermore, the Clinton 
Administration began to develop targeting options for the use of nuclear weapons in response 
to chemical or biological attacks from states other than Russia, and, in its declaratory policy, 
the Administration did not rule out the possible first use of nuclear weapons in these 
circumstances.  It was here that military planners and policy-makers – through the Defense 
Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI) 1993, Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 1994, Doctrines 
for Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-12) 1993/1995, Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear 
Operations 1996, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 1997 and Presidential Decision 
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Directive (PDD) 60 1997 – maintained the significance of nuclear weapons despite the Cold 
War‘s conclusion.  Ultimately, it was the Bush Doctrine and its accompanying guidance 
documents that expanded on this Clinton ―base‖ in a much more defined and assertive 
posture, foreshadowing a new nuclear era in which the once termed ―weapon of last resort‖ 
became a usable and necessary preventive war-fighting option. 
 
During the Cold War, the United States maintained nuclear forces that were sized and 
structured as a means to deter any attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, and 
if deterrence failed, to defeat the Soviet Union.
703
  In the period after the 1989 collapse of the 
Berlin wall and 1991 demise of the Soviet Union, officials in the US government and analysts 
outside government pursued numerous reviews and studies of US nuclear weapons policy and 
force structure.  While these studies varied in scope, intent and outcome, most attempted to 
define a new role for US nuclear weapons, including the appropriate size and structure of the 
US nuclear arsenal in the post-Cold War era.  In positing their recommendations, these 
analyses addressed not only the end of the hostile US-Soviet global rivalry, but also the 
emergence of new threats and regional challenges to US security.  As stated by Siracusa and 
Coleman:  
 
As the defence forces began to look beyond containment, it became readily 
apparent that the threats to US security had not faded away – they had changed.  
Rather than giving way to a time of peace and stability as many had hoped, the 
end of the Cold War paved the way for instability and the surfacing of regional 
issues that had long been suppressed during the Cold War and introduced other, 
non traditional threats.
704
 
 
In response, the US Department of Defense conducted several far-reaching reviews – 
including the 1993 Bottom-up Review, the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review and the 1997 
Quadrennial Defense Review – that contributed to the Clinton Administration‘s response to 
changes in the international security environment.
705
  These formal reviews, when combined 
with less prominent internal studies, resulted in numerous changes to the structure of US 
nuclear forces and policy guiding their potential use.  It was with this in mind that by the end 
of the 1990s many critics of the Clinton Administration argued that the US nuclear posture 
looked very much as it had at the beginning of the decade.  While the number of deployed 
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nuclear weapons had declined – reflected in its implementation of the first Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START I) as well as the completed withdrawal of most of its non-strategic 
nuclear weapons – the Clinton Administration and others argued that nuclear weapons 
remained important as a means to deter the range of threats faced by the United States.  
Indicative of such thinking was expressed by Secretary of Defense Perry in his Annual 
Report for 1995, noting that ―recent international upheavals have not changed the calculation 
that nuclear weapons remain an essential part of American military power.  Concepts of 
deterrence... continue to be central to the US nuclear posture.  Thus, the United States will 
continue to threaten retaliation, including nuclear retaliation, to deter aggression against the 
United States, US forces, and allies.‖706   In theory, this deterrent strategy extended beyond 
Russia in which ―the United States must continue to maintain a robust triad of strategic forces 
sufficient to deter any hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear forces and to convince 
it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile.‖  Furthermore, according to the Clinton 
Administration, ―nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of 
our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those who would contemplate 
developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons.‖707  Clinton retained the 
existing US policy on ―first use‖ and specifically, did not forswear the actual first use of 
nuclear weapons.  The Clinton Administration signified that states other than Russia might 
encounter nuclear retaliation if they attacked the United States with nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons.  Indeed, while it reaffirmed the US negative security assurance in 1995, 
Administration officials indicated that the United States would reserve the right to use 
nuclear weapons first ―if a state is not a state in good standing under the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) or an equivalent international convention.‖708  Furthermore, a state 
might relinquish its protections under the negative security assurance if it attacked the United 
States or US forces with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
709
  Hence, regardless of the 
Cold War‘s demise, it was apparent that Clinton both maintained and even asserted nuclear 
weapons as a mainstay of US security strategy and counter proliferation.   
 
For the United States government, the 1991 Gulf War highlighted the significance of being 
prepared to fight WMD-armed adversaries.  While Iraq did not ultimately use chemical or 
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biological weapons in the conflict, post-war intelligence into the nature of Iraqi WMD 
developments shocked those within the national security community; startling even well 
informed observers and highlighting the potential susceptibility of US regional security 
strategies.
710
  According to the US Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS): 
 
The Iraqi nuclear program was massive, for most practical purposes fiscally 
unconstrained, closer to fielding a weapon, and less vulnerable to destruction by 
precision bombing than Coalition air commanders and planners or US 
intelligence specialists realized before Desert Storm. The target list on 16 
January 1991 contained two nuclear targets, but after the war, inspectors 
operating under the United Nations Special Commission eventually uncovered 
more than twenty sites involved in the Iraqi nuclear weapons program; sixteen 
of the sites were described as ―main facilities.‖711 
 
As further articulated by Keaney and Cohen, after the war, it was concluded that ―the air 
campaign no more than inconvenienced Iraqi plans to field atomic weapons.‖712  The 
GWAPS study stated that, ―we now know that the Iraqis‘ program to amass enough enriched 
uranium to begin producing atomic bombs was more extensive... further along, and 
considerably less vulnerable to air attack than was realized at the outset of Desert Storm.‖713  
It was in response to such findings that at the Gulf War‘s conclusion, Defense Secretary 
Cheney orchestrated the classified Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP), 
formally advising the military to plan for nuclear operations against nations it deemed to be 
capable of developing weapons of mass destruction.
714
  It was evident that had Iraq used 
chemical and biological weapons (CBW), the US and allied forces may not have been 
sufficiently equipped to counter them.  This Iraqi ―capacity‖ – albeit somewhat exaggerated 
by the more conservative sector of the national security community – together with its 
supposed (and largely undetected) technical progress, defined the emergence of a major post-
Cold War defense planning challenge.  As the (post Cheney) Secretary of Defense Les Aspin 
declared, ―we are making the essential change demanded by this increased threat... adding the 
task of protection to the task of prevention.‖715  In his view, while containment remained the 
United States‘ main focus, the Defense Department had undertaken a new strategy: 
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developing military capabilities as a means to cope with WMD-armed regional adversaries.
716
  
As Aspin further articulated, ―...the American experience in the Gulf War made manifest the 
implications of NBC proliferation for defense planning.  For DOD to do its job in the post-
Cold War era, it must take seriously the potential NBC dimension of future conflicts.  US 
forces must be properly trained and equipped for all potential missions, including those in 
which opponents might threaten or use NBC weapons. The Defense Counter-proliferation 
Initiative is designed to meet these challenges.‖717 
 
Defense Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI) 1993 
From the outset, there has been much conjecture pertaining to counter-proliferation as a 
policy based on its inclusion of nuclear weapons in the resources available to US 
commanders for use against enemy NBC weapon targets.   The inclusion of nuclear use 
doctrines during the 1990s, for this purpose and the potential use of nuclear weapons in 
regional wars, evoked a dichotomy in viewpoints and opinions.  While there is some merit to 
the notion that Bush merely continued the policies implemented by the Clinton 
Administration, in reality, it was Bush who took Clinton‘s ―base‖ and asserted the emphasis 
of nuclear weapons to one of centrality within US security strategy.  Nonetheless, to define 
the Clinton era as one of unbridled internationalism devoid of any degree of nuclear weapon 
assertions would be both careless and historically selective.  Indeed, while the Bush 
Administration certainly placed the nuclear option back to the fore, the nuclear dimension of 
US security during the Clinton era was more than evident – as these following initiatives, 
documents and policy instruments will clearly highlight.  Beginning in 1993, it was evident 
that nuclear considerations would definitely play a role in Clinton‘s Counter-Proliferation 
Initiative.  That is, pursuant to a Presidential Directive, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin 
announced on December 7, 1993, that the United States would add a military dimension to its 
fight against the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  In a speech before 
members of the National Academy of Science in Washington, DC, Aspin explained the 
rationale and initial program of what he termed a US ―Defense Counter-Proliferation 
Initiative (CPI).‖  Aspin signified that the post-Cold War threat of nuclear, chemical, 
biological and ballistic missile systems posed by unstable states or terrorist groups required a 
five-point counter-proliferation drive.   He informed the audience that the five points would 
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encompass: an understanding that this was a new mission, not the old Cold War mission; the 
development of new US weapons to destroy weapons of mass destruction; a reassessment of 
the strategies used against the new kind of threat; a concentration of intelligence efforts on 
detecting weapons of mass destruction; and, the facilitation of international cooperation in 
curtailing the threat of such weapons.
718
  As described by Schneider: 
 
The new program, called the Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI), provides 
funding to prepare for combating foes with nuclear, biological, and chemical 
(NBC) and missile weapons on future battlefields, improves monitoring for 
locating rival NBC/missile programs, improves theater defenses, and develops 
weapons capable of penetrating and destroying underground facilities.  US 
efforts will include a diplomatic offensive to persuade US allies to take similar 
counter-proliferation steps...  The central thrust of the CPI is to prepare US and 
allied forces for dealing with future enemies on the battlefield who are armed 
with weapons of mass destruction...  An important secondary thrust of the CPI is 
to provide the Commander-in-Chief with the tools to disarm an adversary 
unilaterally if necessary, before the adversary can initiate the use of WMD in 
situations where we are on a collision course with such an enemy and no 
alternative course seems feasible.
719
 
 
Aspin stated that the United States was now undertaking a campaign to improve and 
specialise military capabilities, doctrine, training and contingency plans to pursue such 
counter-proliferation policies.  Further to this, he signified that the Department of Defense 
was tripling the number of people assigned to gathering counter-proliferation intelligence.  
The DOD Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI) would encompass: extra preparations for 
countering nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) and missile weapons on future battle zones 
through changes in contingency planning, doctrine, equipment, and  training;
720
 increased 
monitoring of specific NBC/missile programs on a global level, including a sounder 
coordination of US defense  and intelligence operations directed against emerging programs 
and arsenals; improved non-nuclear weapons capable of penetrating and destroying 
underground facilities; a US diplomatic offensive aimed at NATO, Japan and other allies as a 
means of persuading them to take on similar initiatives – thereby strengthening their own 
counter-proliferation efforts; and accelerated funding for high-technology defense  programs 
as a means to detect and locate mobile missile systems.
721
  Additionally, it would: enlist 
Japan in a cooperative effort to develop a regional ballistic missile defense program against a 
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potential North Korean nuclear missile threat; renew the focus on creating effective theater 
missile defenses capable of intercepting missiles with NBC warheads;
722
 alter the 1972 ABM 
Treaty to permit the development, testing, and deployment of an effective US theater defense 
system and create an interservice body as a means of dealing with defenses against biological 
weapons.
723
  While positing such new military and intelligence initiatives, Aspin also 
indicated that diplomacy, export controls, treaty restrictions, security assurances, non-
military sanctions and economic cooperation would still remain an important component 
with the US security framework of preventing, and coping with, the proliferation of  
WMD.
724
  Nonetheless, the role of nuclear weapons would remain an integral part of the CPI 
as it would provide improved US capability to deal with, in Aspin‘s words, a ―Saddam 
Hussein with nukes,‖ either in a reactive or a pre-emptive mode, primarily the former, but 
also the latter when no other option provided a better means of defense.
725
  As further 
articulated by Schneider:   
 
This new US policy anticipates a troubled world in which more states acquire 
WMD – with some of those states governed by dangerous and hostile radical 
regimes.  Hopefully, leaders of such states can be deterred from WMD use.  
However, it is for those states who are willing to accept risks, are very 
dissatisfied with the status quo, and may not be deterred by threats to their 
people or their nation‘s economy that the DOD Counter-Proliferation Initiative 
was designed.
 726
 
 
The arms control community regarded Aspin‘s strategy as a declaration of war on traditional 
non-proliferation tools such as diplomacy and arms control.  For them, Aspin appeared to be 
suggesting that failure in US and international non-proliferation efforts was preordained, 
even though he did try to qualify his ―declaration‖ by stating that ―prevention remains our 
preeminent goal... The CPI in no way means we will lessen our non-proliferation efforts.‖727    
The dichotomy of opinion at the time was expressed by Angus McColl: 
 
To some analysts, pursuit of both paths appears to pose a conflict of interest. 
Many proponents of traditional diplomatic non-proliferation efforts fear that the 
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coercive element of counter proliferation, especially the threat to use military 
force, will undermine the international cooperation and consensus upon which 
non-proliferation depends for its success.  They also criticize counter-
proliferation as a short-term solution to the WMD proliferation problem because 
it does not directly confront the long-term security concerns that motivate 
regional adversaries to acquire WMD in the first place.  Others point out that 
some people view counter-proliferation as a panacea, whereas, at best, it is 
probably only a stopgap measure that could be stillborn if required technologies 
cannot be developed.  They know that military operations are not without risk, 
pointing to past intelligence and operational failures.  Finally, some people fear 
that counter-proliferation will undermine the traditional US leadership that has 
been so vital to negotiating, implementing, and improving various non 
proliferation treaties and agreements.
728
 
 
Aspin‘s announcement also engendered reactions from various executive departments and 
agencies.  The State Department viewed it as a challenge to its preeminent role in dealing 
with all things related to proliferation.  Officials there moved right away to limit the scope of 
the CPI to protect their role as vicars of non-proliferation policy.
729
  The Department of 
Energy (DOE) – particularly its Defense Programs element – saw the CPI as a means of 
reversing the downward spiral of its budget.  The national laboratories, in particular, saw it as 
a potential godsend; after all, their primary mission – the development and testing of nuclear 
weapons – clearly did not have the support of the Clinton Administration.  Thus, DOE 
scientists sought to sustain certain critical skills through challenging projects other than 
nuclear testing – and the CPI held great promise in that regard.  The military services reacted 
sceptically, seeing the CPI as: (1) a potential drain on service budgets already strained; and 
(2) as another OSD driven ―initiative,‖ such as the Strategic Defense Initiative, imposed from 
above without a great deal of forethought and with little or no involvement of the military.  
Their concern was heightened when Dr Harold Smith, assistant to the Secretary of Defense 
for atomic energy, speaking at a conference in New Mexico, suggested that the DOD would 
budget $300-400 million per year on the DCI, mostly for new hardware programs.
730
  How 
would OSD seek to pay for this new, unfunded mandate?  Each of the services fully expected 
to be hit with a ―tax‖ that would further undermine readiness and slow the few remaining 
modernisation projects.  The services also reacted negatively to the blunt challenge issued by 
OSD‘s Dr Carter.  In a July 1994 interview with Jane‘s Defence Weekly, Carter warned that 
DOD civilians would dictate to the services how much would be spent on the CPI.  As stated, 
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if the services ―do not hear the music, then we will have to do it ourselves.‖731  Such words 
clearly did not convey a strong willingness on the part of senior OSD officials involved in 
the CPI to take into account service concerns.   Indeed, as observed by analyst Joseph Pilat, 
the counter-proliferation debate became unnecessarily ―complicated by divergent 
bureaucratic interests and the absence of a widely accepted definition of the term.‖732 
 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 1994 
Nonetheless, regardless of the conjecture and debates at the time, it was clear that the usage 
of counter-proliferation and the role that US nuclear weapons would play was given greater 
weight and clarified within a formal review of nuclear policy and force structure.   Initiated 
in October 1993, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was described as the most ambitious 
review of US nuclear weapons and nuclear planning in decades.  The six working groups 
were to investigate:
733
 the role of nuclear weapons in US security strategy; nuclear force 
structure and infrastructure; nuclear force operations and Command & Control; nuclear 
safety, security, and use control; the relationship between alternative US nuclear postures and 
counter-proliferation policy; the relationship between alternative US nuclear postures and the 
threat reduction policy with the former Soviet Union.
734
  Of the six working groups that were 
created to review US nuclear policy and force structure, one was specifically given the role 
of investigating the link between alternative US nuclear postures and counter-proliferation 
policy.  The group approved STRATCOM‘s735 incorporation of regional WMD 
contingencies into nuclear war planning.  During the meeting process, Ashton Carter‘s 
special assistant and former professor at the University of Maryland, Dr. Steven Fetter, stated 
vehemently that nuclear weapons could only deter nuclear use or acquisition, although the 
effect on acquisition was intensely debated.  For Fetter, no reasonable contribution was likely 
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to come from nuclear weapons in deterring chemical and biological weapons of mass 
destruction.
736
  For the military leaders of STRATCOM, it was all or nothing if deterrence 
was to be seen as credible.  The documents from the group‘s meetings provide a sound 
insight into the inner ―ideology‖ of STRATCOM and its perception of the role of nuclear 
weapons against proliferating states.  For STRATCOM, while nuclear weapons may not have 
directly impacted Third World countries‘ acquisition of WMD, maintaining nuclear weapons 
could support US political aims.  This would be accomplished, it was argued, ―through 
demonstrating intent by maintaining an arsenal and continuously providing war plans to 
support regional CINCs [Commanders-in-Chief]...‖737  As stated: 
 
…the US should preserve its options for responding to the situation by 
maintaining its current policy in which the DOE does not preclude first use of 
nuclear weapons.  While it would not be in our interest to unleash the destructive 
power of a nuclear weapon, the loss of even one American city, or the 
endangerment of vital American interests overseas is unacceptable.  To counter 
this threat, the US should not rule out the pre-emptive first use of nuclear 
weapons.  In addition, following the use of WMD, the US should again seek to 
preserve its options.  The US policy should not require retaliation with nuclear 
weapons, but it should leave that option open as one of a complete spectrum of 
possible options.
738
 
 
The Nuclear Posture Review of 1994 affirmed the role of nuclear weapons and endorsed 
STRATCOM‘s force structure as posited above.  Not only did it accept STRATCOM‘s broad 
nuclear deterrence vision, it also subscribed to the philosophy that deep and extensive 
reductions in US nuclear weapons may influence proliferators negatively as they attempt to 
match US numbers or allies under US protection – such as Japan and Germany – and go 
nuclear.
739
  Within the counter-proliferation group there was a ―consensus that [the] full 
range of nuclear options was desirable to deter proliferant nations,‖ and the majority wanted 
the ―unique contribution of nuclear deterrence to counter-proliferation‖ to be ―stated more 
forcefully.‖740  Additionally, the group also argued that nuclear weapons should remain as 
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the core method of destroying specific types of targets including deeply buried structures and 
facilities.
741
  It was in relation to the scenario of deterring terrorist use of WMD that the 
group envisaged limitations to the role of nuclear weapons and stipulated that nuclear 
deterrence should only be applicable to state sponsored terrorism as non-state actors would 
not be deterred by the US nuclear posture.
742
  However, this inclusion was only temporary as 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff would later include non-state actors as potential targets for US 
nuclear weapons in their Joint Theater Nuclear Doctrine publication from early 1996 
(discussed later in this chapter).
743
  In essence, STRATCOM was pleased with the outcome 
and impact it had on the NPR, for when the findings were conveyed to Congress in 
September 1994, nuclear weapons featured extensively in counter-proliferation roles.  
Interestingly, such findings were largely absent from the ―spin the Clinton Administration 
gave on the NPR in public, which instead portrayed the NPR as a continuation of the 
disarmament process and a further reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in US national 
security policy.‖744 
 
In September 1994, the Clinton Administration approved the recommendations of the 
Pentagon‘s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).  A significant conclusion of this review was that 
the United States would retain a triad of strategic nuclear forces with the capacity to deter 
any potential hostile state or group – who had access to strategic nuclear forces – from acting 
against US interests and would be able to convince the state or group that seeking ―a nuclear 
advantage would be futile.‖745  As a result, the 1994 National Security Strategy of 
Engagement and Enlargement paper argued that the United States would continue to 
maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability as a means ―to hold at risk a broad 
range of assets valued by such political and military leaders.‖746  Indeed, encompassed in the 
NPR‘s ―broad range of assets‖ and strategic nuclear force posture were: 14 Trident 
submarines, each carrying 24 Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles; 3 wings of 
Minuteman III intercontinental range ballistic missiles, each equipped with a single warhead; 
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66 B-52 bombers capable of carrying air-launched cruise missiles; and 20 B-2 bombers 
capable of carrying gravity bombs.
747
  
 
The Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the need for ICBMs and SLBMs and signified that it 
would undertake ―extensive studies to identify how to keep ICBMs and SLBMs on alert for 
decades to come.‖748  Additionally, it highlighted that the DOD would develop an investment 
plan for ICBM service life extension which would encompass new technologies in the 
―propulsion systems, guidance systems and re-entry vehicles.‖749  Such programs, it was 
stated, would extend the service life of this system through to 2020.  Other programs and 
initiatives encompassed in the NPR further illustrated the significance that nuclear weapons 
would play in US security strategy in the post-Cold War era.  These included: the Minuteman 
III propulsion replacement program – a $2.9 billion effort that included repouring rocket 
motors; the $1.6 billion Guidance Replacement Program to provide a full upgrade for aging 
Minuteman III electronics; modification of the B-1 and B-2 fleet for conventional missions to 
help keep these strategic-alternative systems ready; investment in a $4.5 billion D-5 backfit 
program to replace C-4 missiles aboard Trident submarines; and a $250 million Trident 
Navigation Commonality Program to provide an updated, D-5 compatible navigation suite.
750
  
The NPR also contained nuclear infrastructure requirements for the DOE as a means to 
maintain the enduring stockpile, namely to: preserve nuclear weapons capability without 
underground testing or the production of fissile material; develop a stockpile surveillance 
engineering base; provide the capability to refabricate and certify weapon types in the 
enduring stockpile; maintain the capability to design, fabricate and certify new warheads; 
maintain a science and technology base; ensure tritium availability; and accomplish these 
tasks with no new-design nuclear warhead production.
751
  
 
It was evident that the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirmed the role of nuclear 
weapons in US Security and that such weapons would be retained as a means of deterring 
―any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting 
against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage‖ would be 
fruitless.  ―Therefore we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and 
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capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by such political and military 
leaders.‖ 752   The Nuclear Posture Review assessed the size and role of US nuclear forces in 
the global arena and the extent to which the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction, rather than the nuclear arsenal of a hostile superpower, posed a 
security risk to the United States.  However, while it reiterated the significance of the 
Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI) and in the instance of a potential WMD threat or use, 
senior political and military leaders also required a wide array of options, particularly those 
of a non-nuclear nature.
753
  According to some observers, it was here that in NPR, the 
Department of Defense attempted to strike a balance between what it deemed to be ―leading 
the way to a safer world‖ and hedging against the unexpected.  As stated by William Perry, 
―in the post-Cold War environment the United States continues to require a nuclear deterrent.  
The strategic triad has been streamlined and adjusted, as have non-strategic nuclear forces, to 
account for the new role nuclear weapons play in US national security.  Major force 
reductions and cost savings are already underway, leading to a smaller, safer, and more 
secure US nuclear force.‖754  In one sense, while the Pentagon indicated that the NPR had 
changed the way it thought about nuclear weapons and the changing nature of their role, it 
still quietly endorsed the importance of nuclear weapons as a means to counter the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
755
  As Deputy Secretary of Defense John 
Deutch explained to the Senate, ―an examination of the remaining nuclear threat from Russia 
and the non-Russia republics that possess nuclear weapons as well as the emerging threat 
from other countries around the world indicate that the United States will continue to need 
nuclear weapons for deterrence for the foreseeable future.‖756  The NPR was widely reported 
at the time to provide only non-nuclear responses to hostile use of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) in regional conflicts.  However, nuclear weapons were clearly advocated 
in counter-proliferation roles pertaining to deterring both acquisition and use.  Moreover, 
several non-strategic nuclear weapon missions in support of the non-proliferation scenarios 
were, according to Kristensen and Handler, ―deleted from public record.‖757   
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Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (Joint Pub 3-12) 1993 
The impact of STRATCOM was also apparent in instruments outside of the NPR domain and 
needs to be acknowledged in both emphasising and complimenting the role of nuclear 
weapons within the Clinton security framework.  This was evident when in April 29, 1993, 
the first Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (Joint Pub 3-12) was published, stating that 
with the conclusion of the Cold War, the reorganisation of US military planning for joint 
operations was needed.  The doctrine utilised Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as the 
key term in defining the role of nuclear deterrence in US security strategy: 
 
The fundamental purpose of nuclear forces is to deter the use of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMDs), and to serve as a hedge against the emergence of an 
overwhelming threat... credible and capable nuclear weapons are essential for 
national security.
758
   
 
For the main extent, the Joint Pub 3-12 transferred notions and strategies of Cold War 
deterrence against the Soviet Union over to the new security arena that encompassed a more 
regional context.  STRATCOM‘s efforts to formulate a regional nuclear deterrence against 
―rogue‖ states armed with WMD, engendered notions of nuclear strike options and 
requirements for new capabilities, including those of a low low-yield nature.  As stated: 
 
WMD used on US forces would cause a significant tactical or operational loss; 
greatly change the character of the war, putting the outcome in doubt and 
threatening escalation; leave the United States with a difficult choice: to retaliate 
or not to retaliate.  A selective capability of being able to use lower-yield nuclear 
weapons in retaliation, without destabilizing the conflict, is a useful alternative 
for the US National Command Authorities (NCA).
759
 
 
The proponents of Joint Pub 3-12 argued that it caught up with the realities of nuclear 
planning that was well underway at the time.
760
  Even before JP 3-12 was approved, 
STRATCOM planners had been undertaking an extensive modernisation process of weapon 
systems and nuclear planning capabilities as a means to target specific states on a global 
scale.  As a result, the ―new‖ doctrine JP 3-12 was based on existing key nuclear planning 
documents that directed detailed nuclear planning against rogue states: NUWEP (Guidance 
for the Employment of Nuclear weapons) issued by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney in 
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November 1992, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan - Annex C (Nuclear) FY 1993-1995 
from 1992, the National Military Strategy Document - Annex B (Nuclear), and SIOP-93 
from April 1993.
761
 
 
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (Joint Pub 3-12) 1995 
During December 1995, the JCS released a newer version of Doctrine for Joint Nuclear 
Operations (Joint Pub 3-12 1995).  As in the case of its predecessor, STRATCOM played a 
leading role.  The 1995 Joint Pub 3-12 was a more thorough document than the 1993 version, 
expanding on the role of nuclear deterrence and force posture and deployment considerations 
in much greater detail.  As indicated in the above, the Clinton Administration‘s NPR 
affirmed the importance of nuclear weapons and maintained a Cold War-type triad of nuclear 
warheads on submarines, land-based missiles and bombers.  Joint Pub 3-12 reiterated this 
expansive role of nuclear deterrence outside of Russia and China to those deemed as ―rogue‖ 
states.  While the 1995 Joint Pub 3-12 doctrine was published after the 1995 Congressional 
ban on low-yield nuclear weapons development (the so-called PLYWD legislation), it 
nonetheless repeated the need for such weapons, particularly in relation to regional 
conflicts.
762
  The expanded role of nuclear deterrence beyond nuclear to also cover non-
nuclear opponents armed with chemical or biological (or just ballistic) missiles had real 
implications for the NPT.  The indefinite extension of the treaty was secured partially 
because the US (together with the other five original nuclear powers) pledged not to use 
nuclear weapons to threaten or attack non-nuclear states party to (and in compliance with) the 
NPT.  However, since the NPT only regulates nuclear but not other forms of WMD, the 
expanded US nuclear deterrence meant that a non-nuclear NPT country could potentially find 
itself a target for US nuclear weapons threat or use if it possessed chemical or biological 
weapons.  Proponents argued that, as with its predecessor, the 1995 Joint Pub 3-12 brought 
official nuclear doctrine ―up to the realities of nuclear planning as it occurred at the time‖763 
and reaffirmed that as per the NPR of 1994, nuclear weapons would remain fundamental to 
the US security strategy in the post-Cold War era.  As stated: 
 
US nuclear forces serve to deter the use of WMD across the range of military 
operations.  From a massive exchange of nuclear weapons to limited use within 
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a theater, US nuclear capabilities must confront an enemy with risks of 
unacceptable damage and disproportionate loss should the enemy choose to 
introduce WMD in a conflict.
764
 
 
As a result of the increased focus on regional military operations and nuclear deterrence of 
―rogue‖ states armed with WMD, the 1995 Joint Pub 3-12 addressed mainly strategic nuclear 
operations.   It did include descriptions of theater nuclear operations, however, this was from 
a strategic context and threats from terrorists were only looked at in the context of securing 
nuclear weapons against theft.  Such issues, as well the targeting of ―rogue‖ states and 
terrorists, were addressed in a more in-depth level in the Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear 
Operations 1996.
765
 
 
Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations 1996 
Efforts to further align nuclear deterrence with the requirements for regional conflicts 
resulted in the publication in February 1996 of a doctrine document specifically focused on 
theater nuclear operations.  The Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations (Joint Pub 3-
12.1) outlined a regional security situation where the risk of use of nuclear and other forms of 
WMD was said to have increased after the Cold War: 
 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has greatly reduced the possibility of a large 
scale nuclear exchange.  However, the loss of the stability inherent in a clearly 
bipolar world has increased the likelihood of a nuclear exchange by regional 
powers. In addition, the threat to the United States, its allies, and its deployed 
forces due to the proliferation of WMD has grown following the end of the Cold 
War.  The flow of advanced technology to potential or actual hostile nations has 
led to a proliferation of systems (missiles and aircraft) capable of delivering 
WMD.  The possibility of a WMD exchange in a regional conflict has risen 
dramatically, threatening our forward-deployed forces and challenging our long-
range power projection capabilities.
766
 
 
The emergence of a specific doctrine for theater nuclear operations followed on the 
heels of efforts in 1993-1995 within STRATCOM to more clearly define how nuclear 
deterrence would work against regional aggressors armed with WMD.  With its focus 
on regional nuclear deterrence, Joint Pub 3-12.1 included important details that were 
not described in Joint Pub 3-12.  Foremost among these were the kind of targets that 
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might be subject to nuclear strikes in a regional conflict.  Enemy combat forces and 
facilities that may be likely targets for nuclear strikes, included: WMD and their 
delivery systems, as well as associated command and control, production, and 
logistical support units; Ground combat units and their associated command and 
control and support units; Air defense facilities and support installations; Naval 
installations, combat vessels, and associated support facilities and command and 
control capabilities; Non-state actors (facilities and operation centers) that possess 
WMD; and Underground facilities.
767  
As explained by Kristensen: 
 
The focus was on the regions, and in February 1996 regional nuclear counter-
proliferation was formally enshrined into nuclear doctrine when the JCS 
published its Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations (Joint Pub 3-12.1). 
This document ―translates‖ the overall joint nuclear doctrine from 1995 for use 
in regional scenarios such as in Europe, the Middle East and the Korean 
Peninsula.  The emphasis on WMD is striking.  Joint Pub 3-12.1 defines that the 
threat of nuclear exchange by regional powers and the proliferation of WMD 
have grown following the end of the Cold War... Short, medium, and 
intermediate-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear, biological, or chemical 
warheads, the doctrine concludes, are ―the primary threat‖ in theaters.768 
 
Most of these target categories were ―mirrored‖ from Cold War nuclear targeting onto 
regional scenarios, but there was one big surprise: ―non-state actors.‖  The 1994 Nuclear 
Posture Review spent considerable time analysing the effect of nuclear deterrence against 
regional opponents, and while the review concluded that nuclear weapons should have a 
prominent role against ―rogue‖ states armed with WMD, it also concluded that nuclear 
weapons were unlikely to have any deterrence effect on non-state actors.
769
  STRATCOM 
was a participant in that analysis but apparently did not let the findings affect the language of 
Joint Pub 3-12.1 which fully endorsed non-state actors as a target.  Indeed, it was apparent 
that while the Clinton Administration retained much of the existing US nuclear weapons 
policy and force posture and affirmed the role of nuclear weapons in US security strategy, it 
also began to develop targeting options for the use of nuclear weapons in response to 
chemical or biological attack from states and regions other than Russia, and as conveyed in 
its declaratory policy, the Administration did not rule out the possible first use of nuclear 
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weapons in these circumstances.  The Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations (Joint 
Pub 3-12.1) was testament to this mode of thinking.   
 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 1997 
Undertaken in 1997, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
770
 examined US nuclear 
strategy and force posture and once again, reaffirmed the continuing need for ―a robust and 
flexible nuclear deterrent.‖771  In simple terms, nuclear forces were assessed and deemed to 
be an integral part of United States‘ security strategy.  The review of defense ―issues‖ 
encompassed those pertaining to threat, strategy, force structure considerations, and finally, 
resource issues.
772
  As the fourth comprehensive review of the US military since the end of 
the Cold War, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was an attempt to extend on the 
United States‘ experience with the policy and forces of the 1991 Base Force Review, the 
1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) and the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of the 
Armed Forces (CORM).  It was argued that as a result of such reviews, the US had made 
extensive adjustments in its forces, procedures and organisations.  While it had ―accumulated 
a wealth of experience‖ in a new and constantly changing security environment, it recognised 
that this was a propitious time to re-examine its assumptions, programs and operations.  
Indeed, ―the rapid rate of change in the world since the end of the Cold War underscores the 
importance of undertaking such a re-examination on a regular basis.‖773   
 
The QDR was a collaborative effort between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
and the Joint Staff, with extensive participation from the Military Services and the 
Commanders-in-Chief of the Combatant Commands.  The Review was designed to be both 
bottom-up and top-down:  It was bottom-up in the sense that the QDR sought expertise and 
ideas from the Department and solicited additional ideas and support from beyond DOD.  
The effort was top-down in the sense that the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff guided the process to ensure that all choices and alternatives provided the 
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capabilities necessary to execute the strategy.
774
  The QDR was structured into three 
organisational tiers or levels.  At the first level, seven panels conducted reviews of strategy, 
force structure, readiness, modernisation, infrastructure, human resources and information 
operations and intelligence.  At the second level, an ―Integration Group‖ collated the panel 
results into a streamlined set of ―integrated options‖ designed to be consistent with the 
defense strategy.  At the third level, a Senior Steering Group, co-chaired by the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, oversaw the entire 
process and made recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, who, in turn, reviewed the 
recommendations in consultation with the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff.
775
  It was here that a road map was established, requiring close adherence to the 
following milestones:  
 
    Start-up and guidance phase (December 1996): Identify issues, provide 
guidance and direction to panels, and begin evaluation of the threat 
assessment.  
    Strategy and fiscal context phase (January 1997): Present defense strategy 
and projection of fiscal environment and program risks.  
    Analysis phase (February 1997): Report initial results of panel reviews.  
     Integration phase (March 1997): Evaluate and refine integrated options 
within the defense strategy framework.  
    Decision phase (April 1997): Present refined alternatives to Secretary of 
Defense for decision and identify issues for further evaluation.
776
 
 
Drawing on the basic principles of the Review, work in each phase built directly upon the 
work of the preceding phase, leading ultimately to the decisions that are conveyed below. 
Work in the second and third phases began simultaneously and was initially conducted 
largely in parallel because of the enormity of the task and the tight schedule.  The second and 
third phases were then reconciled in the last two phases in order to produce an integrated 
result.  The National Defense Panel received regular briefings on the work of the panels as 
well as on the integration options and decisions.  The National Security Council staff and 
other Administration agencies also participated at various points in the Review.  As the 
decision options began to take shape, the Department began consultation with Congress.  The 
President reviewed and then approved the defense strategy and the final decisions regarding 
program directions.
777
  For Thomason, Richanbach, Fiore and Christie, the QDR process 
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fostered a range of structured comparisons of alternative ways to implement the newly 
articulated defense strategy – ―Shape, Respond, and Prepare.‖  Through this process the 
Secretary of Defense made a series of choices among options, or ―paths,‖ and selected a path 
to ―balance available resources across the major requirements of the strategy, both for the 
near and the longer term.‖778  Three paths were explicitly described in the QDR report.  Each 
was said to be an equal cost option and the three were compared for their relative prospects 
of achieving the capabilities to carry out each dimension of the ―Shape, Respond, and 
Prepare‖ strategic construct at acceptable levels of risk.  At the Secretary‘s direction, each 
path was examined to ensure that it was fiscally executable.
779
  Overall, and most 
importantly, the QDR review concluded that the policy and strategy to maintain US nuclear 
forces was ―still correct.‖780  Indeed, as stated by the Secretary of Defense at the time, 
William Cohen, ―it is imperative that the United States maintain its military superiority in the 
face of evolving, as well as discontinuous, threats and challenges. Without such superiority, 
our ability to exert global leadership and to create international conditions conducive to the 
achievement of our national goals would be in doubt.‖781  Moreover, as explained by 
Conetta: 
 
The priority that the QDR places on maintaining military superiority and the role 
it accords military power as a means of influence constitute a wager about the 
future character of international competition. A contending view holds that 
military contests among the great and emerging powers will be less important in 
the new era than in the old, while economic and other forms of international 
competition will be more critical. The BUR partially reflected this view in 
recognizing the primacy of economic and social renewal as a national goal. 
Against this perspective, the QDR implies that military power is now and will 
continue to be as relevant as ever to the attainment of national goals.
782
 
 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 60  1997 
During November 1997, and in response to the QDR, President Clinton signed and approved 
a new Decision Directive (known as Presidential Decision Directive [PDD] 60) on nuclear 
weapons employment policy guidance.  While US nuclear plans had been updated regularly 
and refined through Presidential Decisions such as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives and the 
                                               
778 James S. Thomason, Paul H. Richanbach, Sharon M. Fiore & Deborah P. Christie, ―The Quadrennial Defense Review 
Process: Lessons Learned from the 1997 Review and Options for the Future,‖ the Commonwealth Institute Website, 
Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, August 1998, p. 1, available at <http://www.comw.org/qdr/thomason.pdf>. 
779 Ibid. 
780 Ibid. 
781 William S. Cohen, quoted in Conetta, ―Backwards Into the Future.‖ 
782 Conetta, ―Backwards Into the Future.‖ 
231 
 
Nuclear Posture Review, this was the first revision of such guidance in over 15 years.
783
  The 
directive considered the changes in policy and force posture brought on by the end of the 
Cold War and expanded on the findings of previous policy reviews, such as the NPR and 
QDR.  According to The Washington Post, the highly classified Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD) 60 contained language that ―would permit‖ US nuclear strikes after enemy 
attacks using chemical or biological weapons.  As stated, ―rogue states, a terminology 
commonly used by the Pentagon for countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and 
Syria, are specifically listed as possible targets in the event of regional conflicts or crises.‖784  
Aside from positing the broad Presidential guidance for developing operational plans, the 
directive articulated guidelines for maintaining nuclear deterrence and US nuclear forces.
785
   
As stated: 
 
...the United States must maintain the assured response capability to inflict 
―unacceptable damage‖ against those assets a potential enemy values most. It 
also posits that the US must continue to plan a range of options to insure that the 
US can respond to aggression in a manner appropriate to the provocation, rather 
than being left with an ―all or nothing‖ response. The new guidance also 
continues the policy that the US will not rely on ―launch on warning,‖ but will 
maintain the capability to respond promptly to any attack, thus complicating an 
adversary‘s calculations. However, the new guidance eliminates previous Cold 
War rhetoric including references to ―winning a protracted nuclear war.‖786  
 
Moreover, PDD 60 reaffirmed that the United States should have a triad of strategic deterrent 
forces as a means to complicate an adversary‘s attack and defense planning.  It also argued 
that deterrent forces and their associated command and control should be ―flexible and 
survivable, to ensure that the US would be able to make an adequate and appropriate 
response.‖787  In essence, the PDD 60 ordered the military to no longer target Russian 
conventional forces and industry, but focus on destroying nuclear forces as well as the 
military and civilian leadership.  In simple terms, it replaced a nearly 17-year old directive 
signed by President Reagan in 1981 at the height of the Cold War in which ―fighting and 
winning a protracted nuclear war against Russia would no longer be an objective.‖788   PDD 
60 was drafted by an extremely small and specialised group, led by Special Assistant Robert 
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Bell of the National Security Council and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Affairs, Franklin Miller.
789
  There was no review or panel, and while the State Department 
was supposedly involved, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency were not 
consulted, signifying an inability to consider the impact on non-proliferation efforts.
790
  
According to Bell, the three basic situations in which the United States might use nuclear 
weapons were not changed by the new PDD 60.
791
  The criterion were as follows: if the 
attacking country has nuclear weapons; if the aggressor is not in compliance with the 
international treaty to curb the spread of nuclear weapons; or if it is allied to a nuclear power 
in its attack on the United States.  While Bell emphasised that the PDD 60 reflected the 
reality of the time in which an attacker using weapons of mass destruction could face nuclear 
reprisal,
792
 Kristensen argued that ―a reaffirmation of the commitments to non-proliferation 
and nuclear disarmament by removing chemical, biological, and radiological weapons and 
facilities from US war planning would be a more fitting post-Cold War measure.‖793  As the 
above Clinton initiatives and documents suggest, planning for nuclear war in ―the Third 
World‖ against states and non-state actors evolved significantly after the Gulf War of 1991.  
For nuclear planners, the logical conclusion of proliferation and the US renunciation of 
chemical and biological weapons, was that nuclear weapons would now remain prominent in 
deterring the acquisition and use of WMD.
794
  Behind a mask of military secrecy, planning in 
the form of guidance documents and initiatives progressed virtually unopposed.  As 
Kristensen further lamented, ―with little informed opposition and public debate, the result 
was a nuclear doctrine that borrowed heavily from Cold War nuclear thinking.  President 
Clinton‘s Decision Directive of November 1997 merely permitted this planning to 
continue.‖795 
 
National Security Strategy 1999 
Interestingly, such planning was not mentioned nor addressed in President Clinton‘s 1999 
National Security Strategy Report.  The report, entitled ―A National Security Strategy for a 
New Century,‖ outlined the President‘s vision for America‘s role in the world and discussed 
the Administration‘s international priorities.  The three core objectives of NSS1999 were: to 
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enhance America‘s security; to bolster America‘s economic prosperity; and to promote 
democracy and human rights abroad.  All of these themes were present in the NSS1998 and 
were expanded upon in this document.  Central to the President‘s strategy for achieving these 
aims was US engagement and leadership in world affairs.
796
  The NSS1999 placed less of an 
emphasis on the role of military power in promoting American interests as it was not 
considered ―a substitute for other forms of engagement, such as diplomatic, economic, 
scientific, technological, cultural and educational activities.‖797  While Clinton‘s NSS placed 
more of an emphasis on ―soft power‖ and the ability to influence foreign powers through 
cultural or ideological means,
798
 the role of nuclear weapons in US security strategy was 
conspicuously presented in a non-proliferation ―only‖ fashion.  As stated: 
 
We have a fundamental responsibility to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and 
reduce the danger of nuclear war. To this end, the United States remains 
committed to bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into 
force...  and is encouraging all other states to do the same.  We are encouraging 
all states that have not done so to sign and ratify the CTBT.  We remain 
committed to obtaining Senate advice and consent toward ratification of the 
CTBT...  The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of 
international nuclear non-proliferation efforts and reinforces regional and global 
security by creating confidence in the non-nuclear commitments of its 
parties...
799
  To reinforce the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, we 
seek to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards 
system and achieve a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in the Geneva Conference 
on Disarmament...  Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) Program and other initiatives, we aim to strengthen controls over 
weapons, usable fissile material and prevent the theft or diversion of WMD and 
related material and technology from the former Soviet Union... At the Cologne 
summit in June 1999, the leaders of the G-8 nations affirmed their intention to 
establish arrangements to protect and safely manage weapons-grade fissile 
material no longer required for defense purposes, especially plutonium...
800
  We 
seek to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) with a new 
international regime to ensure compliance.
801
 
 
Despite Clinton‘s willingness to embrace internationalist approaches to nuclear weapons 
proliferation, his tenure in office saw the continued (and potentially offensive) role that 
nuclear weapons would play in his security strategy.  As evident in the above excerpt from 
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NSS1999, when it came to the public domain, the Clinton Administration emphasised its 
multilateral nuclear drives and initiatives, but in reality, hedged its approach and kept the 
nuclear platform intact. 
 
From Clinton to Bush 
When looking at the nuclear weapons policy initiatives, policies, documents and instruments 
of the Clinton Administration, it would be easy to assume that George W. Bush merely 
continued the trend.  However, if we are to compare both the Clinton Doctrine and the Bush 
Doctrine it is apparent that Bush clearly downplayed traditional non-proliferation measures 
in favour of an assertive counter-proliferation stance; one that encompassed a driving 
assertion of the nuclear option.  Whereas the National Security Strategy of 1999 issued by 
Clinton detailed action on initiatives such as the Biological Weapons Convention, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the START 
agreements, the National Security Strategy of 2002 outlined its non-proliferation activities in 
one paragraph, mentioning a recent Group of Eight agreement gauged towards the disposal of 
weapons in Russia.  There is no doubt that the Clinton Administration was a key factor in 
formally defining and maintaining the role of nuclear weapons in US security strategy.  
However, while the concept of prevention as a means to counter the perceived threat of an 
adversarial use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was explicit in the Bush 
Administration‘s National Security Strategy of 2002, and evident in several of the 
requirements of the 1993 Defense Counter-proliferation Initiative (CPI) that called for an 
―improved counterforce capabilities to destroy adversary WMD,‖802 they cannot be viewed in 
the same degree.  That is, the National Security Strategy of September 2002, as well as the 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2002, expanded on the Clinton platform in a more 
vigorous fashion, calling for contingency plans to be made for nuclear attacks on seven 
nations, in both ―pre-emptive‖ and wartime counter-proliferation operations.  While it is 
apparent that Clinton‘s guidance documents and instruments (discussed throughout this 
chapter) emphasised that the significance of nuclear weapons remained a central pillar in US 
security strategy, they appeared to be at least somewhat balanced with a national strategy 
predicated on traditional and more non-proliferation measures – albeit at times rhetorically.  
Although there were occasions where pre-emptive or preventive measures were actively 
contemplated by the Clinton Administration against proliferant states, such as North Korea in 
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1993-1994, the Administration‘s general approach revolved more around diplomatic 
dissuasion than military operations. 
 
Perhaps the greatest dichotomy between the two strategies, and certainly the most 
contentious, was the Bush Administration‘s unbridled determination in not allowing enemies 
of the United States to strike first, emphasising that the risks of inaction or containment in 
specific cases may outweigh the risks of action.  The National Security Strategy of 2002 
stated that in the face of a looming threat, the United States ―will, if necessary, act pre-
emptively‖ to ―forestall or prevent hostile acts by our adversaries.‖803  Even though 
discussion pertaining to ―pre-emption‖ was certainly evident during the Clinton 
Administration, the sentiments were articulated through terms such as, ―potential future 
requirements,‖ ―prospective utility‖ and ―potential liabilities‖ – with the required strategic 
and operational framework and military capacity to enact such an approach perceived as an 
impossibility that could derail the Defense Counter-proliferation Initiative (CPI).  However, 
under the Bush Administration, such ―issue‖ considerations were lowered as the nuclear 
option came to the forefront of national strategy.
804
  The urgency that motivated Bush in 
2002 and subsequent years derived from two underlying arguments: that WMD and missile 
capabilities would continue to proliferate; and that the use of such weapons against US 
forward-deployed forces, US friends and allies, or even US or allied homelands was 
increasingly likely.  In response, the United States sought to advance its security along two 
parallel and mutually reinforcing lines – that being, an assertive and proactive drive against 
security challenges emerging from the proliferation-terrorism nexus, while bolstering 
homeland and transforming military capabilities as a means to deter, protect against, and 
nullify the effects of an attack.  It is with this in mind that Bush actively sought to devalue 
the appeal of WMD and missiles and to impede the dire consequences to US interests should 
adversaries successfully execute such attacks.
805
  Therefore, while it has been argued by 
some commentators that Bush continued a policy that was initiated by the Clinton 
Administration, his National Security Strategy of 2002, or ―doctrine,‖ and subsequent nuclear 
weapons guidance documents, focussed on a more assertive counter-proliferation route as a 
means to impede or remove existing adversarial holdings of WMD before they could be 
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used.  In the adjoining National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(NSCWMD), Bush began with an excerpt from his National Security Strategy of 2002, 
reemphasising the path that his Administration would take:  
 
Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. 
The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed… as a matter of 
common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats 
before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by 
hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies‘ plans, using 
the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly 
those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have 
entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.
806
 
 
Furthermore, in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, the Pentagon outlined a list of 
contingencies and targets where nuclear weapons might be used.  As stated:   
 
In setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made 
among the contingencies for which the United States must be prepared. 
Contingencies can be categorized as immediate, potential or unexpected…North 
Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be 
involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies. All have 
longstanding hostility toward the United States and its security partners; North 
Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military concerns.  All sponsor or 
harbor terrorists, and all have active WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and 
missile programs.
807
   
 
While it is evident that Bush continued on the policy first instituted by Clinton, the above 
words signified a defining assertion in terms of his counter-proliferation policy.  Indeed, the 
adaptive planning described in the 2002 NPR expanded the role of nuclear weapons beyond 
the primary role of deterring a nuclear attack, and suggested that nuclear weapons could be 
employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack or in retaliation for use of 
biological or chemical weapons.
808
  The 2002 NPR suggested that the US must develop new 
nuclear weapon capabilities as a means to defeat ―hardened and deeply buried targets‖ in 
states that are party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (including Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria).  
Parts of the 2002 NPR that were leaked to the media illustrated Bush‘s view on how nuclear 
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weapons could be used in three different scenarios: against targets able to withstand non-
nuclear attack; in retaliation for attack with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons; or ―in 
the event of surprising military developments.‖  The 2002 NPR proposed that the US be 
prepared to launch a nuclear strike to destroy stocks of chemical and biological weapons as 
well as to break regional conflicts like an Arab-Israeli conflict, a North Korean attack on 
South Korea, or a military confrontation between China and Taiwan.
809
  The Bush 
Administration further articulated the notion of threatening the use of US nuclear weapons to 
prevent the proliferation of NBC weapons to other states or non-state groups in the 
September 2002 National Security Strategy and December 2002 National Strategy to Combat 
WMD respectively: 
 
We know from experience that we cannot always be successful in preventing 
and containing the proliferation of WMD to hostile states and terrorists. 
Therefore, US military and appropriate civilian agencies must possess the full 
range of operational capabilities to counter the threat and use of WMD by states 
and terrorists against the United States, our military forces, and friends and 
allies.
810
   
 
In contrast to Bush‘s nuclear amplification (and as indicated in the above), the Clinton 
Administration retained much of the existing US nuclear weapons policy and force posture in 
the decade after the demise of the Soviet Union.  While the Clinton Administration, and the 
Bush Snr Administration before it, eliminated many specific targets from the US war plan 
and reduced the size of the US nuclear arsenal, the central tenets of the US deterrence 
strategy and nuclear employment plans remained relatively unchanged and intact.
811
  
Furthermore, during the 1990s, the Clinton Administration began to develop targeting options 
for the use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological attack from states other 
than Russia, and, in its declaratory policy, the Administration did not rule out the possible 
first use of nuclear weapons in these circumstances.
812
  At the same time, many participants 
in the public debate over nuclear weapons policy argued that the United States should 
distinctly redefine its nuclear weapons strategy and force posture.  They argued that in the 
absence of the global threat from the Soviet Union, the United States could maintain its 
deterrent posture with a far smaller number of nuclear weapons; many proposed reductions to 
levels of around 1,000 warheads.  Some even argued that due to its overwhelming superiority 
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in conventional weapons, the United States could defeat almost any potential adversary 
without threatening to resort to nuclear weapons.
813
  Indeed, several studies came to the 
conclusion that a policy of ―nuclear abolition‖ could be a practical, albeit long term, goal for 
the United States and other nations with nuclear weapons.  In the meantime, it was posited, 
that the United States should use its nuclear weapons only to deter the potential use of nuclear 
weapons by other states.  As stated by Michael Gordon:  
 
...as the Cold War waned, so did the notion that nuclear weapons could be used 
to fight a war. While Washington did not give up its option to make the first use 
of nuclear weapons against a Warsaw Pact attack, it cast the use of such 
weapons as a last resort. With the end of the Cold War, the need for nuclear 
weapons seemed to fade further. 
814
 
 
While maintaining the nuclear role as affirmed under Clinton, the Bush Administration also 
provided a different description of what this role would entail.  Indeed, Bush assumed that 
nuclear weapons would be a part of US security strategy for at least the next 50 years.  Given 
this time frame, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2002 recommended that the United 
States should undertake a development process of its weapons systems that would enter the 
force in the years between 2020 and 2040.  It was clear that the Bush Administration did not 
assume that the ―current systems‖ in the US nuclear arsenal would be the last, and that to 
have an efficient nuclear option would involve redevelopment of such systems – even with 
the potential of creating a new nuclear weapon.  It was evident that the Bush Administration 
amplified the role for nuclear weapons beyond the ―weapon of last resort‖ designed to deter 
only nuclear attack.  The Administration not only argued that nuclear weapons could deter 
chemical, biological, and conventional attack, it believed that they could also be used to 
assure allies of US commitments, dissuade adversaries from acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction or threatening the United States and defeat adversaries by destroying critical 
targets if deterrence failed.  The Bush Administration outlined plans to develop a more 
focused nuclear war-fighting capability for the United States, and emphasised the 
development of such penetrating nuclear weapons as a means to destroy hardened and deeply 
buried targets, together with the ―capabilities‖ based approach in which it would seek the 
ability to destroy threatening capabilities possessed by any potential adversary.  Critics 
argued that these changes in the US nuclear posture made it more likely that the United States 
would use nuclear weapons in a future crisis.  However, according to Doyle McManus, the 
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Bush Administration argued that US plans and capabilities to use nuclear weapons against 
smaller countries would make nuclear use less likely because it would make the US deterrent 
more credible and robust.
815
  For Sokolsky and Rumer, the Bush Administration‘s approach 
had distinct limitations as ―leaders of rogue states may not take seriously a US threat to 
launch massive nuclear strikes on leadership and weapons sites...  Thus, having the capability 
to destroy such targets with smaller and less destructive weapons would strengthen, rather 
than erode deterrence.‖816  The Bush Administration, however, argued that this expanded role 
for nuclear weapons did not mean that the United States was increasing its reliance on 
nuclear weapons.  It noted that the addition of missile defenses and precision-guided 
conventional weapons to US deterrent forces would give the President a greater number of 
options in a crisis and actually reduce the likelihood of nuclear use.
817
   
 
Critics questioned this mode of thinking, arguing that the Bush Administration‘s approach 
would blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons and increase the 
likelihood of nuclear use.  According to Brookings Institute analyst, Ivo Daalder, the 
Administration outlined a role for nuclear weapons that emphasised war-fighting over 
deterrence.  As stated, ―if military planners are now to consider the nuclear option any time 
they confront a surprising military development, the distinction between nuclear and non-
nuclear options fades away.‖818  Others also concluded that the Bush Administration‘s plan 
did increase US reliance on nuclear weapons.  Former Senator Sam Nunn, former Secretary 
of Defense William Perry and retired General Eugene Habiger argued that the 
Administration‘s policy was ―expanding options for nuclear attacks, widening the number of 
targeted nations and developing new nuclear weapons variants.‖  They noted that ―each of 
these ideas may have a plausible military rationale,‖ but ―their collective effect is to suggest 
that the nation with the world‘s most powerful conventional forces is actually increasing its 
reliance on nuclear forces.‖819  Additionally, other critics of the Bush Administration queried 
as to whether threats to use nuclear weapons in response to anything other than a nuclear 
attack would be either necessary or credible.  In this regard, according to Peter Scoblic, ―the 
US would be far better served by adopting a genuinely new nuclear posture, one that 
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maintains nuclear weapons only to deter nuclear attack.  Given the awesome power of US 
conventional forces, we do not need nuclear weapons for any other purpose, even to deter a 
chemical or biological attack.‖820  Furthermore, given the long-standing ―taboo‖ against the 
use of nuclear weapons, some argued that the United States would enhance its standing in the 
international community if it sought to reduce, rather than expand, the role of nuclear 
weapons in international affairs.
821
   
 
Regardless of such critical sentiments, the Bush Administration emphasised that nuclear 
weapons would ―continue to be essential to our security, and that of our friends and allies.‖822   
In simple terms, nuclear weapons would remain the only weapons in the US arsenal that 
could hold at risk the full range of targets valued by an adversary, and as a result, would 
continue to play a key role in US deterrent strategy.  In contrast to Clinton, the Bush 
Administration described a more comprehensive and integrated role for nuclear weapons.  In 
outlining the results of the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, the Administration stated that 
nuclear weapons, along with missile defenses and other elements of the US military 
establishment, would not only deter adversaries by promising an unacceptable amount of 
damage in response to an adversary‘s attack, they also assured allies of the US commitment 
to their security by providing an extended deterrent, dissuading potential adversaries from 
challenging the United States with nuclear weapons or other ―asymmetrical threats‖ by 
convincing them that they can never negate the US nuclear deterrent; and defeat enemies by 
holding at risk those targets that could not be destroyed with other types of weapons.
823
  
According to former Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, ―linking nuclear forces to 
multiple defense policy goals, and not simply to deterrence, recognizes that these forces ... 
perform key missions in peacetime as well as in crisis or conflict.‖824   In addition to 
expanding the role of nuclear weapons beyond deterrence, Bush altered the role of deterrence 
in US national security strategy.  As will be expanded upon in the next chapter, the Bush 
Administration through varying guidance documents, instruments and speeches argued that 
the United States would not necessarily be able to contain or deter the types of threats 
―emerging today,‖ and therefore, must be prepared to ―pre-empt‖ these threats by launching 
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strikes against adversaries before the adversary attacks the United States, its allies or its 
interests.  Some analysts concluded that, with this change in perspective, the Bush 
Administration foresaw the possible preventive / ―pre-emptive‖ use of nuclear weapons 
against states or groups that were not necessarily armed with their own nuclear weapons.
825
   
 
In its National Security Strategy of 2002, the Bush Administration stated that the United 
States would ―deter and defend against the threat [of nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons] before it is unleashed.‖  However, the document also stated that the United States 
would seek to ―strengthen non-proliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from 
acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass 
destruction.‖  The report said that the United States would ―enhance diplomacy, arms control, 
multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede states and terrorists 
seeking WMD...‖826  According to the Administration, the development of new types of 
nuclear weapons that could defeat hardened and deeply buried targets, along with the 
potential use of nuclear weapons in retaliation for non-nuclear attacks, were a part of the US 
effort to deter and dissuade state and non-state actors from acquiring and threatening to use 
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.  Many critics at the time argued that the 
Administration‘ approach was likely to undermine US diplomatic efforts to discourage 
nuclear proliferation and in most instances they have been proven correct.  According to one 
analyst, ―by emphasizing the important role of nuclear weapons, the Pentagon is encouraging 
other nations to think it is important to have them as well.‖827  Senator John Kerry conveyed 
a similar viewpoint when he stated that the 2002 National Security Strategy and the 2002 
NPR would undermine US credibility as they sought to convince other states to forego 
nuclear weapons, noting that ―it reduces all our bona fides on the proliferation issue.‖828  
Critics of the Bush Administration‘s policy pointed specifically to the implications its views 
on the US negative security assurance might have for US non-proliferation efforts.  Many at 
the time noted that, through the negative security assurance, the United States sought to 
convince other states that they would not need their own nuclear weapons to deter a nuclear 
threat from the United States.  However, there would be ―no reason for other countries to 
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refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons‖ if the United States abandoned that policy.829  Not 
only would these states receive no security benefit from the absence of nuclear weapons in 
their arsenals, they might also conclude that they could only deter a US attack if they were to 
acquire their own nuclear weapons.  Others, however, argued that the negative security 
assurance has done little to stem proliferation or enhance US security because other states do 
not consider the US nuclear posture or declaratory policy when making their decisions about 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons.  Even if the United States did not have any nuclear 
weapons, some states would seek them for themselves to counter their neighbours or offset 
the US advantage in conventional weapons.  Furthermore, some analysts consider the 
negative security assurance, and its specific focus on nuclear weapons, as an ―outdated policy 
that effectively gives non-nuclear countries a safe haven for developing chemical and 
biological weapons.‖830   
 
Nevertheless, many critics of the Bush Administration‘s policy questioned the wisdom of an 
approach that may have undermined US nuclear non-proliferation objectives, even in the 
interest of providing new tools to address chemical and biological weapons.  They noted that 
the United States possessed conventional forces that were far superior to those of any other 
country.  If, however, potential adversaries were to acquire nuclear weapons, they may 
present the United States with an ―asymmetrical threat‖ that could offset US conventional 
superiority.  Therefore, according to Daalder and Lindsay, the United States should have 
sought to ―marginalize as much as possible the role that nuclear weapons play in US defense 
and foreign policy.‖  States can only negate the overwhelming US conventional superiority 
with nuclear weapons, so ―it is in US interest to keep the firewall between nuclear and 
conventional high and strong.‖831  Despite such sentiments, the Bush Administration 
vigorously pursued and outlined a posture that reflected the view that nuclear weapons 
should play a broader role in US national security strategy than just the deterrence of nuclear 
attack, that a credible deterrent required the capability to effectively threaten and destroy a 
range of critical targets, and that the United States may need different numbers of nuclear 
weapons and different types of nuclear weapons to address threats that emerge in the future.  
Under this formula, the flexibility to restore nuclear warheads quickly, expand the number of 
deployed warheads over time, and develop new weapons with new capabilities – the doctrine 
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argued – would make it possible for the United States to reduce its deployed weapons in the 
near term without creating potential risks to its security in the future.
832
 
 
As an extension of the broader National Security Strategy posited two months earlier in 
September 2002, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(NSCWMD) illustrated that Bush‘s policy was indeed a deviation in direction that endorsed 
and advocated an assertive nuclear weapons policy.  While the Clinton Administration 
reaffirmed earlier US pledges not to use nuclear weapons to attack non-nuclear-weapon 
states-parties to the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), at the same time, it kept open 
the option to use nuclear weapons, even in nuclear-weapon-free zones.  Indeed, as stated by 
Siracusa and Coleman, for the Clinton Administration ―nuclear weapons... were still a vital 
part of US efforts to hedge against an uncertain future.‖833  In essence, both Administrations 
found new reasons as to why nuclear weapons would remain vital to US security while they 
sought to keep the rest of the world denuclearized.
834
  Clinton retained much of the existing 
US nuclear weapons policy and force posture in the decade after the demise of the Soviet 
Union and affirmed the role of nuclear weapons in US security strategy through the Defense 
Counter-Proliferation Initiative, (CPI) 1993, Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 1994, Doctrines 
for Joint Nuclear Operations (Joint Pub 3-12) 1993/1995, Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear 
Operations 1996, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 1997 and Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD) 60 1997.  However, it was the Bush Administration that expanded on the 
Clinton ―platform‖ by amplifying the role of nuclear weapons, to the extent that they could 
be considered and used as a distinct option against potential nuclear, biological, and chemical 
threats from other states and non-state actors – even preventively.  As the next chapter will 
illustrate, the Bush Administration, through the National Security Strategy of 2002 (the Bush 
Doctrine) and the classified and unclassified guidance documents and instruments it 
implemented – notably the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the 2002 National Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCWMD), the 2005 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear 
Operations, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the 2006 Strategic Operations Joint 
Operating Concept Version 2.0, and in recent times, the Reliable Replacement Warhead 
(RRW) program – engendered a new era in which nuclear weapons were not just a mere 
feature of the United State‘s security strategy, but were reinvigorated as both an assertive and 
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driving force behind the Bush Administration‘s view of the world – and can be viewed as one  
of his legacies when he himself departed office in 2009. 
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The Bush Doctrine can be defined as the set of policies that President George W. Bush 
implemented in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and formalised on the 
20th of September 2002 in his National Security Strategy.  Bush declared that the United 
States would make ―no distinction between terrorists who committed these acts and those 
who harbor them,‖835 a statement that defined ―the doctrine‖ and launched the policy of pre-
emptive war against potential aggressors before they were capable of launching an attack 
against the United States.  As the core rationale and justification for the 2003 Iraq invasion 
and subsequent conflict, the National Security Strategy of 2002 has been often depicted as a 
marked departure from the policies of deterrence that characterised US foreign policy during 
the Cold War and ―Phase 1‖ of the post-Cold War period (1991-2001).  But if one is to 
thoroughly examine this subject, it is evident that elements of the Bush Doctrine pertaining to 
pre-emption, preventive considerations and regime change have been implicit in US foreign 
policy over the course of the last sixty five years.  Critics and commentators have often 
viewed the doctrine as a ―hawkish‖ moment in time, the quest of a belligerent warmonger, 
the beginning of ―Phase 2‖ of the post-Cold War era, and in doing so, define it in isolation.  
While there may be some merit to these views, they fail to comprehend the broader critical 
dimension of the doctrine – that being, the nuclear policy instruments and documents that it 
indirectly and directly sponsored throughout the entirety of Bush‘s two terms in office.  It is 
with this in mind that the National Security Strategy cannot be moribund to 2002 perceptions, 
but a document that must be viewed as a dangerous and living catalyst; a document that 
punctuated, updated, refined and reaffirmed its core sentiments through the unclassified and 
classified documents it spawned over the period of 2002-2008. 
 
In simple terms, these nuclear arteries of the Bush Doctrine can be viewed as formal policy 
instruments that advocated the United States‘ willingness to use nuclear weapons on states 
that it deemed to be adversarial.  The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the 2002 National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCWMD), the 2003/04 CONPLAN 
(Concept Plan) 8022 (Global Strike), the 2005 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, the 
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the 2006 Strategic Operations Joint Operating Concept 
Version 2.0, and in recent times, the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program,  
clearly illustrate that the Bush Doctrine should not be simply dismissed or defined as a 
doctrine of preventive intervention alone, but as one that advocated nuclear weapon 
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reactivation.  Specifically, it was these documents that signified the resurgent role of nuclear 
weapons and the Bush Administration‘s push to modernise US offensive forces, deploy 
missile defenses, upgrade communication and satellite systems, and overall, revitalise the 
nuclear military complex.  Behind the Administration‘s rhetoric of post-Cold War restraint 
were expansive plans to revitalise US nuclear forces and all the elements that would support 
them within a so-called ―New Triad‖ of capabilities that combined nuclear and conventional 
offensive strikes with missile defenses and nuclear weapons infrastructure.
836
  Not since the 
escalation of the Cold War in Ronald Reagan‘s first term had there been such an emphasis on 
nuclear weapons in US defense strategy.  The deeper policy within the Bush Doctrine and its 
accompanying documents foreshadowed a new nuclear era in which the once-termed 
―weapon of last resort‖ evolved into a usable and ―necessary‖ device.  Russell and Wirtz 
described this as a ―quiet revolution‖ in which the spectre of nuclear reactivation would 
become the Bush Doctrine‘s main legacy.837  As Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated in 
May of 2007, the assertion of nuclear weapons will ―play a critical role in the defense of the 
United States…their unique capabilities contribute in vital and irreplaceable ways to the 
ability to deter adversaries and dissuade others from pursuing nuclear capabilities on their 
own...‖838  These words coincided with the release of the Reliable Replacement Weapon 
program,
839
 clearly signifying both the culmination and continuum of a nuclear reactivation 
process that began with the National Security Strategy of 2002. 
 
When the Iraq conflict began on March 20, 2003, the United States‘ intervention strategy 
rested on four core principles founded in the Bush Doctrine.  Firstly, that the United States 
should act preventively to thwart strikes on US targets.  Secondly, that Washington should be 
willing to act unilaterally, alone or with a select coalition when the United Nations or allies 
balk.  Thirdly, that Iraq was the next cornerstone in the global war on terrorism.  Finally, that 
Baghdad‘s transformation into a new ―democracy‖ would foster region-wide change.  Of 
course, the Bush Doctrine‘s quest to legitimise a state intervention based on such pillars was 
undermined by the initial failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the inability to 
prove Iraq‘s ties to al Qaeda, the ongoing spectre of violence, limited reconstruction, the 
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US‘s apparent inability to cope with an asymmetrical threat and mounting Arab 
disillusionment with the US leadership and occupation.
840
  When critics point to the Iraq war 
as a clear repudiation of the Bush Doctrine, perhaps they are not considering all of the 
applications of the doctrine in a broader context.  True, Iraq was where the Bush Doctrine 
was most visible and most noticeably put to the test.  It was equally true that it failed this test 
– regardless of the 2007 surge and claims of success made by General Petraeus in recent 
times.  But while it is crucial to highlight the doctrine‘s key tenet failures, it is also 
imperative to acknowledge that it remained ―alive‖ in the nuclear classified and unclassified 
instruments it engendered over the course of the Bush Administration‘s tenure. 
 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 2002 
Of course, the ominous nuclear seeds of the Bush Doctrine were evident when the Bush 
Administration announced in January 2002 that a congressionally mandated review of US 
nuclear capabilities had been conducted.  Defined as the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the 
examination argued that a ―new strategic triad, encompassing nuclear and precision non-
nuclear strike forces, inert and active defenses and a revitalised defense infrastructure would 
be emphasised and implemented.‖841  The architects of the review considered nuclear 
weapons as one option in an array of capabilities designed to adapt to the perceived threats 
posed by the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and long-range 
ballistic missiles.  On a more specific level, the main focus of the Bush Administration‘s 
―new strategic triad‖ was to integrate defenses (i.e. missile defense), nuclear weapons and 
―non-nuclear strike forces‖842 into a streamlined capability as a means to dissuade and deter 
adversaries, while maintaining the ability to undertake conflict should deterrence fail.  The 
NPR stated that the strike elements ―could provide greater flexibility in the design and 
conduct of military campaigns to defeat opponents decisively.  Non-nuclear strike capabilities 
may be particularly useful to limit collateral damage and conflict escalation.  Nuclear 
weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack.‖843 
 
While the Nuclear Posture Review advocated the reduction of operationally-deployed nuclear 
forces to 1,700-2,200 warheads by 2012, it ambiguously vied for a ―flexible‖ and ―responsive 
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nuclear force‖ that could be ―uploaded within days‖ and guard against ―potential 
contingencies.‖844  This was evident in the NPR‘s quest to develop hardened and deeply-
buried targets (HDBTs), considered a key ―unmet‖ capability in US defense.  For the Bush 
Administration, the new triad encompassed a wider range of options available in which the 
United States would have what it deemed to be ―an appropriate way to respond to aggression, 
thereby bolstering deterrence.‖845  The most concerning aspect of the new triad was the 
greater latitude it gave to the Administration.  As Russell and Wirtz posited, it enabled a way 
to ―sidestep bureaucratic resistance to changing what constitutes one of the most respected 
elements of the nuclear creed that shaped US nuclear doctrine, the sanctity of the old (Cold 
War) triad of forces and the focus on guaranteeing a massive nuclear response under any 
circumstances.‖846  On a surface level, the Bush Administration argued that the new strategic 
triad allowed for further reductions in US strategic nuclear forces because it cleared a path for 
the possible elimination of one of the arms of the old nuclear triad.  However, its quest for 
flexibility and ―boutique‖ nuclear applications only highlighted a willingness to utilise the 
nuclear option.
847
 
 
The Bush Administration released its classified Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress 
on December 31, 2001, and followed up in September 2002 with the broader and well known 
National Security Strategy.  While the focus of this thesis has been focussed primarily on the 
Bush Doctrine, the NPR can essentially be defined as an integrated release that provided a 
more detailed insight into a key artery of the ―doctrine‖ itself, namely, the concept of 
assertive counter-proliferation.  While both documents called explicitly for pre-emptive (or 
preventive strikes), taken together they represented an alteration in US ―declaratory policy 
regarding nuclear weapons use.‖848  If one is to closely assess the NPR as an implementation 
strategy for the goals encompassed in the National Security Strategy of 2002, it is evident that 
the United States was placing itself in a position in which it was more likely to use nuclear 
weapons first against a perceived threat, or even a potential attacker – whether a state or non-
state actor; whether armed with nuclear weapons or not.
849
  As the National Security Strategy 
of 2002 stated, ―our enemies… are seeking weapons of mass destruction...  America will act 
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against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.‖850  It further argued that 
deterrence, or at least deterrence defined in its traditional sense, was unlikely to work against 
terrorists or ―rogue‖ states, warning that the United States ―cannot not let our enemies strike 
first.‖851  The Bush Administration worked to support the ―pre-emption‖ strategy by arguing 
that the United States was permitted under international law‘s recognised right of self 
defense, to undertake pre-emptive action against an ―imminent attack.‖  However, it is clear 
that the Administration‘s approach pushed the boundaries of the traditional definition of 
―imminent‖ to include preventing a state or non-state body from obtaining even the capacity 
to attack the United States or US interests, especially if the state or non-state actor was 
pursuing WMD as a means of attack.
852
  While the NPR did not specifically identify the issue 
of preventive or pre-emptive nuclear war, the document did endorse at an in-depth level the 
need for a ―flexible‖ arsenal with weapons that ―vary in scale, scope and purpose‖ to address 
expanding threats.  Specifically, the document emphasised the potential to use nuclear 
weapons as a means to penetrate secluded targets such as chemical or biological weapons 
storehouses or factories, or underground command centres.  It further advocated new nuclear 
weapons ―options,‖ including ―possible modifications to existing weapons to provide 
additional yield flexibility in the stockpile; improved earth-penetrating weapons (EPWs) to 
counter the increased use by potential adversaries of hard and deeply buried facilities; and 
warheads that reduce collateral damage.‖853 
 
In essence, the NPR examined the changes in the post-Cold War security environment and 
identified contingencies in which nuclear forces could be utilised.
854
  The effort defined the 
relationships among nuclear forces and other military capabilities, set objectives for nuclear 
and related capabilities, and outlined programs to further these ends.  As indicated in the 
above, the NPR called for the exploration of new nuclear weapons concepts to defeat hard, 
deeply-buried targets (HDBT) such as underground WMD bunkers, as well as Agent-Defeat 
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Weapons (ADW) to nullify biological and chemical weapons agents and thereby, required the 
development of several new nuclear warheads.
855
  As the report articulated: 
 
Greater flexibility is needed with respect to nuclear forces and planning than 
was the case during the Cold War.  The assets most valued by the spectrum of 
potential adversaries in the new security environment may be diverse and, in 
some cases, US understanding of what an adversary values may evolve. 
Consequently, although the number of weapons needed to hold those assets at 
risk has declined, US nuclear forces still require the capability to hold at risk a 
wide range of target types.  This capability is key to the role of nuclear forces in 
supporting an effective deterrence strategy relative to a broad spectrum of 
potential opponents under a variety of contingencies.  Nuclear attack options 
that vary in scale, scope, and purpose will complement other military 
capabilities.  The combination can provide the range of options needed to pose a 
credible deterrent to adversaries whose values and calculations of risk and of 
gain and loss may be very different from and more difficult to discern than those 
of past adversaries.
856
 
 
Advocates of the NPR asserted that the new posture was imperative as a means to change the 
US deterrence stance from a ―one-size-fits-all‖ structure gauged towards the Cold War global 
posture to one that could defeat all sizes and types of adversaries.  Indeed, both the NPR and 
the National Security Strategy engendered the continuum of policy guidance and reshaped 
US strategic planning by advocating the transferral of the top-heavy Cold War Single 
Integrated Operational Plan into a suite of boutique, flexible plans designed to thwart 
adversaries and those who might seriously undermine the security of the United States. 
 
In conjunction with the National Security Strategy of 2002, the Bush Administration‘s NPR 
can be perceived as a significant document that posited long-range nuclear weapons policy, 
plans and aspirations.  A year in the making, the expansive classified report was presented to 
Congress at the end of 2001, and was very quickly leaked to the media.
857
  Not since the 
reassertion of the Cold War during the Reagan era had there been such a focus on nuclear 
weapons in US defense strategy.  In many respects, the NPR reversed notions of post-Cold 
War progress by expanding the range of potential conflicts in which nuclear weapons could 
be employed; advocating the design and building of a new generation of warheads to meet 
these perceived needs; and putting in place a planning and command structure that would 
                                               
855 US Department of Defense, The Nuclear Posture Review. 
856 Ibid. 
857 Ibid. See also US Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Washington DC: Office of 
the Secretary, 2002, pp. 83-92, available at, <http://www.DOD.mil/execsec/adr2001/Chapter06.pdf>. 
252 
 
make it easier to plan and launch nuclear attacks.
858
  The Administration believed that its 
reinvigorated nuclear posture via the NPR and National Security Strategy of 2002 would 
restrengthen national security by deterring adversaries from using or even acquiring nuclear 
and other weapons of mass destruction. Yet the evidence from the Russian and Chinese 
responses to this assertive nuclear posture was not encouraging.  It was clear that the United 
States‘ intention to retain stockpiles of nuclear weapons and its motives for potentially 
creating new and more usable weapons have caused competitors to act with varying degrees 
of countermeasures since the NPR‘s inception.  Russia adjusted its nuclear forces in response 
to the NSS, NPR and subsequent US nuclear instruments, retaining warhead missiles that 
have the capability to penetrate the prospective US missile defense system.   China also 
created more missiles and warheads than it originally had envisaged and has possibly 
deployed MIRVed (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles) missiles in response to 
a US ballistic missile defense system.  Similarly, the assertive US stance since the NPR and 
NSS and its pursuit of  reduced-yield weapons – or what has been at times referred to as 
―boutique‖ nuclear weapons – have no doubt engendered certain state and non-state actors to 
seek weapons of mass destruction as leverage against the US.
859
 
 
Nonetheless, the NPR argued that an assertive nuclear policy made the United States more 
secure, and as such, to articulate the expanded role that nuclear weapons would play in 
defending US security, it adopted the terminology used in the Quadrennial Defense Review 
issued in 2001.
860
  As stated in the review, the Department of Defense was vying for the 
expansion of its nuclear framework around four core pillars:  to instil confidence in its allies; 
to deter military competition; to impede threats and coercion against US interests; and to 
defeat any adversary if deterrence failed.  The NPR used similar rhetoric to support the 
United States‘ ongoing usage of nuclear weapons when it stated that ―US nuclear forces 
[would] continue to provide assurance to security partners‖ and would ―serve to reduce the 
incentives for friendly countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own... Systems capable 
of striking a wide range of targets throughout an adversary‘s territory may dissuade a 
potential adversary from pursuing threatening capabilities.‖861  Indeed, both the NPR and the 
NSS can be deemed as the cornerstone of the Bush Administration‘s quest in placing the 
nuclear option back to the fore.  The NPR was clear in urging the United States to retain 
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existing nuclear weapons, while also positing the notion of developing new ones.  While the 
Bush Administration publicly pledged to reduce the nuclear stockpile in the vicinity of 1,700 
to 2,200 ―operationally deployed strategic warheads‖ by 2012, the Administration continued 
to impose unwarranted Cold War levels of secrecy on the changes it was making in the size 
of the active and reserve nuclear stockpile.
862
  It was evident through the NPR and subsequent 
guidance documents that followed that the Administration pursued a new mix of weapons in 
a future arsenal.  Since 2001, both the Pentagon and the Department of Energy played an 
assertive role in paving the way for a new generation of nuclear weapons.  Through a wide 
array of programs, they began soliciting a new intercontinental ballistic missile that was to be 
operational in 2018, a new submarine-launched ballistic missile and a nuclear-powered 
ballistic missile submarine for 2030, and a new heavy bomber ready in 2020, all presumably 
needing new or modified warheads.
863
 
 
A central pillar of the NPR was to make nuclear war planning speedier and flexible.  The 
virtue of flexibility in nuclear war conflict is that it enables agility and quick adjustments in 
―campaigns,‖ even after a mission has begun.  It can potentially provide a greater number of 
nuclear attack options available to the President, while enabling the ability to shift seamlessly 
from the identification of a target to one of destruction.  The NPR‘s quest was not just limited 
to notions of ―flexibility‖ and making the nuclear arsenal easier to use, it also advocated the 
merging of forces as a means to carry out nuclear and conventional ―global strikes.‖  That is, 
an intercontinental ballistic missile could carry either a nuclear warhead or a conventional 
warhead.  It was this that further accentuated Bush‘s nuclear option quest in that the 
―assimilation‖ dispelled the boundaries that had traditionally placed nuclear weapons with an 
extreme classification.  Incorporating the use of nuclear weapons as another step in the 
defense ―suite‖ only increased the likelihood of usage.  Indeed, the NPR‘s pursuit in 
combining nuclear and conventional weapons posed a very specific danger in which nuclear 
warheads could be utilised in regional conflicts as a means to destroy structures or facilities 
that conventional weapons could not.  For instance, the NPR called for the development of 
nuclear earth-penetrating and low-yield weapons to enhance the capability – meaning utility –
of the strike force.
864
  The rhetoric that surrounded such weapons – ―bunker busters,‖ 
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―mininukes,‖ ―micronukes,‖ ―collateral-damage limiting nukes‖ – illustrated a shift that 
potentially lowered the threshold of utilising them.
865
  
 
As was clearly outlined in the National Security Strategy of 2002, the Bush Administration 
expanded the set of adversaries, and coinciding with this, war plans that demanded that the 
US have a more specialised set of weapons to destroy them.  The NPR articulated these 
sentiments and contributed to the wide array of guidance documents that altered previous 
large-scale permanent nuclear strike plans, and instead, assembled attack plans in the event of 
hostilities with another nuclear state.  Given the destructive power of nuclear weapons, 
having fewer warheads in place at all times would not diminish their perceived power to deter 
enemies.  As the NPR emphasised, the Bush Administration had no intention of quashing the 
planning infrastructure left over from the Cold War.  Instead, it reasserted the nuclear option 
with the notion of creating new and specific types of weapons.  Indeed, the NPR‘s suggested 
force structure and number of deployed nuclear warheads was intended to support not only 
the pressing requirements for deterrence, but also to contribute to the further goals of assuring 
―allies and friends,‖ dissuading potential opponents from taking the path of arms competition 
or military challenge, and providing a barrier against the possible emergence of more extreme 
military threats or severe technical issues in the arsenal.
866
  As stated in the foreword to the 
NPR report by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the review ―put in motion a major 
change in our approach to the role of nuclear offensive forces in our deterrent strategy.‖867   
In Rumsfeld‘s testimony to Congress and several statements made by other officials, the 
Bush Administration portrayed the NPR as reducing the role of nuclear weapons, lowering 
the readiness requirement for nuclear forces and increasing the role of non-nuclear and 
missile defense capabilities.
868
  However, as the rest of this chapter will highlight, both the 
NPR and NSS only worked to reinvigorate the nuclear option – evident in the subsequent 
guidance documents that they have spawned.   
 
Indeed, the National Security Strategy of 2002 and ―editing‖ documents (particularly the 
NPR ―foundation document‖) illustrated the significant contradiction between the Bush 
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Administration‘s public rhetoric about reducing the role of nuclear weapons and the guidance 
issued to nuclear planners.  That is, while the overall number of warheads was being reduced, 
the National Security Strategy of 2002, NPR and subsequent guiding planning for the 
remaining arsenal, reaffirmed the assertive position in relation to having nuclear forces on 
high alert; ready to be used in an increasing number of limited-strike scenarios against 
adversaries anywhere, and even preventively.  In many ways, the National Security Strategy 
appeared to be precipitated by anticipation among military planners that deterrence would fail 
and US nuclear weapons would be used in a conflict sooner or later.
869
  While the NPR laid 
the foundation in articulating requirements for forces and planning tools that reemphasised 
operations against regional adversaries armed with WMD – and called for a ―New Triad‖ that 
intertwined nuclear and conventional weapons in offensive operations,
870 
the National 
Security Strategy of 2002 publicly articulated a preventive doctrine against WMD that 
required the transformation of military forces to rapidly and precisely impede rogue states 
before they were able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United 
States. 
 
National Security Strategy of 2002  
In other words, if the Nuclear Posture Review of 2002 established the nuclear framework and 
the supposed necessity of ―flexible‖ requirements for forces and planning tools by the US 
military, it was the National Security Strategy of 2002 (the ―Bush Doctrine‖) that placed the 
nuclear option back to the fore.
871
  As stated by Woolf, ―The Bush Administration‘s Nuclear 
Posture Review (NPR), completed at the end of 2001, sought to adjust the US nuclear posture 
to reflect, on the one hand, the emergence of a more cooperative relationship between the 
United States and Russia, and, on the other hand, increasing threats from other states and 
non-state actors, particularly those armed with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
(weapons of mass destruction or WMD).  The Administration has highlighted these changes 
in the international security environment in several documents, including the US National 
Security Strategy... The Administration has also emphasized that the United States will use 
any means necessary to deter or defeat the use of WMD by rogue nations or terrorist groups. 
One of the issues highlighted in the Nuclear Posture Review is the role that nuclear weapons 
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might play in addressing these emerging threats.‖872  Indeed, the National Security Strategy 
of 2002 document provided the first official public articulation of a strategy of ―pre-emptive‖ 
action against hostile states and terrorist groups developing weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).  As the document stated:   
 
We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they 
are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States 
and our allies and friends... The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction 
– and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend 
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of our enemy‘s 
attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United 
States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively... To support pre-emptive actions, we 
will…continue to transform out military forces to ensure our ability to conduct 
rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.
873
 
 
While many commentators have focussed on the Administration‘s endorsement of pre-
emptive intervention, it was the in the latter stages of Chapter 5, and more significantly, the 
conclusive chapter [9] that revealed the ―real‖ doctrine and its reference to nuclear 
applications.  As Chapter 5 admonished: 
 
Proactive counter-proliferation efforts [will continued to be pursued]. We must 
deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that 
key capabilities – detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce 
capabilities – are integrated into our defense transformation and our homeland 
security systems. Counter-proliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, 
training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we 
can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.
874
 
 
Through the course of the National Security Strategy of 2002, Bush provided veiled nuclear 
option references via a broad range of symbols and often undefined rhetoric.  References 
pertaining to ―proactive‖ forms of counter-proliferation were used at varying levels and no 
doubt provided an insight into what he would deliver on the nuclear front.  As Chapter 5 
further argued: 
 
In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last 
resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them.  Today, our 
enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice.  For rogue 
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states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against 
their neighbors.  These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to 
blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or 
repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states.  Such states also see these 
weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the 
United States.  
 
Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose 
avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-
called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is 
statelessness.  The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that 
pursue WMD compels us to action.  For centuries, international law recognized 
that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to 
defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. 
Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-
emption on the existence of an imminent threat – most often a visible 
mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.  We must 
adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today‘s 
adversaries.  Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using 
conventional means.  They know such attacks would fail.  Instead, they rely on 
acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction – weapons 
that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.  The 
targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in 
direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare.  As was 
demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is 
the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more 
severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.
875
 
 
By stating that ―we must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and 
objectives of today‘s adversaries‖ and ―traditional concepts of deterrence will not work,‖ it 
was apparent that Bush was alluding to the ominous shift in the US military complex as a 
means to counter such proliferators.  In fact, while the National Security Strategy of 2002 
was rife with rhetorical ambiguity, it was clear that ―proactive counter-proliferation‖ was to 
be the new course, and that such counter-proliferation would entail a reinvigorated nuclear 
option.  Chapter 9 further illustrated this direction:  
 
Our military‘s highest priority is to defend the United States.  To do so 
effectively, our military must: assure our allies and friends; dissuade future 
military competition; deter threats against US interests, allies, and friends; and 
decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails... A military structured to 
deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how 
an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur... 
Innovation within the armed forces will rest on experimentation with new 
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approaches to warfare, strengthening joint operations, exploiting US intelligence 
advantages, and taking full advantage of science and technology.
876
 
 
While the above two passages broadly conveyed Bush‘s nuclear weapon intentions, it was the 
NPR and the subsequent National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(NSCWMD) that, in essence, provided the NSS‘s detailed nuclear expository.  Indeed, as 
indicated above and through the course of this chapter, the Bush Administration consistently 
released updates of this nuclear strategy, suggesting that while the National Security Strategy 
of 2002 may appear to lack specific nuclear ―detail,‖ it can be perceived as the guiding force 
that must be viewed as a dangerous and living catalyst – a document that punctuated, 
updated, refined and reaffirmed its core sentiments through the unclassified and classified 
documents it sponsored. 
 
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCWMD) 2002 
It was only six weeks later on December 10, 2002 that the Bush Administration released the 
emphatically titled National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction which 
specifically advocated the use of nuclear weapons on states it deemed to be developing 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  However, what made this expansion of the Bush 
Doctrine controversial was the classified version of the ―National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction‖ – National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17 – 
which stated that ―the United States will make clear that it reserves the right to respond with 
overwhelming force – including potentially nuclear weapons – to the use of [weapons of 
mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.‖  The 
wording in NSPD 17 used the rhetoric of ―potentially nuclear weapons,‖ whereas the 
declassified version replaced this with the very ambiguous ―all of our options;‖877 no doubt 
an attempt by the Administration to soften and dilute potential international criticism.     
 
The specific detail pertaining to nuclear weapons reassertion that the NSS perhaps lacked was 
clearly supplemented in the concise NSCWMD, and in particular, the classified NSPD 17.  
The fact that the NSCWMD was introduced with a direct quote from the NSS illustrated the 
linkage, continuum and more importantly, guiding pillar that the NSS provided from here on 
in nuclear instrument formation.  As the NSCWMD quoted from the NSS: 
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The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and 
technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of 
mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with 
determination.  The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed... 
History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In 
the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of 
action.
878
 
 
The NSCWMD even specified this link further in its earlier stages by emphasising how the 
countering of WMD, including the use and further proliferation, was ―an integral component 
of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America.‖879  It then argued that the 
United States‘ strategy for homeland security, and its new concept of deterrence, including 
the ability to combat WMD, represented a fundamental change from the past and that the 
United States must take advantage of ―today‘s opportunities‖ – including the utilisation and 
application of new technologies, the increased focus on intelligence collection and analysis, 
the strengthening of alliance relationships, and the establishment of ―new partnerships with 
former adversaries.‖880  The focus on Weapons of Mass Destruction was further expanded on 
in the NSCWMD by highlighting how such weapons could enable adversaries to inflict 
massive harm on the United States, its military forces at home and abroad, and ―our friends 
and allies.‖  That is, some states, including several that have supported and have continued to 
endorse terrorism, already possessed WMD and were pursuing even greater capabilities, as 
vehicles of coercion and intimidation.  For ―them,‖ the NSCWMD emphasised, such 
weapons were not of the last resort but a militarily useful weapon of choice with the intention 
of undermining the United States‘ ―advantages in conventional forces,‖ and impeded it from 
―responding to aggression against our friends and allies in regions of vital interest.‖  In 
addition, it argued, terrorist groups have sought and are seeking to attain WMDs with the 
stated goal of killing large numbers of US people and those of friends and allies – ―without 
compunction and without warning.‖881 
 
Notions of counter-proliferation, including the capability and willingness to utilise nuclear 
weapons began to emerge as the NSCWMD shifted into its second stage.  It was here that the 
possession and increased likelihood of WMDs being used by hostile states and terrorists was 
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presented as stark ―realities of the contemporary security environment.‖882  In response to 
this, the document argued that it was imperative that the US military and applicable civilian 
agencies be prepared to deter and defend against the full range of possible WMD 
employment situations.  The NSCWMD further alluded to notions of nuclear weapons use 
and emphasised how all capabilities to combat WMD needed to be fully assimilated into the 
emerging defense transitional plan and into the homeland security structure.
883
 Counter-
proliferation, it continued, would also be fully integrated into the ―basic doctrine, training, 
and equipping of all forces‖ as a means to ―sustain operations to decisively defeat WMD-
armed adversaries.‖884 While the NSCWMD advocated a ―Strengthened Non-proliferation 
[effort] to Combat WMD Proliferation,‖ as well as ―Consequence Management to Respond to 
WMD Use,‖ its main focus and further articulation of the National Security Strategy was 
evident in its rhetoric pertaining to an assertive counter-proliferation with a nuclear 
dimension.  That is, in the section entitled ―Interdiction,‖ the NSCWMD argued that the US 
must enhance the capabilities of the military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement 
communities as a means to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology and 
expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations.   
 
Endorsement of nuclear considerations was made clear in the ―Deterrence‖ section.  It 
stipulated that as a consequence of state and non-state actors‘ willingness to take high risks to 
achieve their goals – including the aggressive pursuit of WMD and their means of delivery as 
critical tools in this effort – new methods of deterrence were imperative.  This would entail, it 
argued, a strong declaratory policy and effective military force as core elements for the 
United States‘ contemporary deterrent posture from here on in.  While the US would utilise a 
wide range of political tools to deter potential adversaries from seeking WMDs and the use of 
WMDs, it unequivocally reserved the ―right to respond with overwhelming force – including 
all of our options [including potentially nuclear weapons]
885
 – to the use of WMDs against 
the United States, its ―forces abroad, and friends and allies.‖886  It was here that the 
willingness to consider or utilise the nuclear option was emphasised in a clear and concise 
fashion – albeit interchanged in the classified and classified versions – and can be deemed as 
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a critical juncture in the guidance process that began with the NPR and National Security 
Strategy. 
 
In addition to the spectre of nuclear response and defense capabilities, the NSCWMD 
signified that the US deterrent platform against WMD threats would be reaffirmed by 
effective intelligence, surveillance, interdiction, and domestic law enforcement capabilities.  
Such assimilation in combined capabilities, it emphasised, would improve deterrence by 
―devaluing an adversary‘s WMD and missiles,‖ and by positing the notion of an extreme 
response to any use of such weapons.
887
  In the case that deterrence was not successful, the 
NSCWMD argued, US military forces and applicable civilian agencies must have the 
capacity to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in some instances, the 
capability to undertake ―pre-emptive measures.‖888  This would require capabilities as a 
means to detect and destroy an adversary‘s WMD structures before such weapons were used.  
Furthermore, active defenses that impeded, undermined, or destroyed WMD en route to their 
targets as well as vigorous air defense and effective missile defenses against threats were 
required.  Conversely, passive defenses needed be shaped to the individual and varying forms 
of WMD, as well as the means to enable the mitigation of the effects of a WMD attack 
against deployed forces.  The NSCWMD again alluded to the potential development of 
nuclear weapons or strike force without being overly specific.  As with deterrence and 
prevention, it argued, an effective response needed rapid attribution and a robust strike 
capability – and thereby, required the acceleration of efforts to create and field new 
capabilities as a means to defeat WMD-related assets.
889
  Further nuclear and preventive 
emphasis was made when the document stipulated the United States‘ need to undertake post-
conflict operations as a means to destroy or dismantle any residual WMD capabilities of the 
rogue state or terrorist network.  Such a response would not only eliminate the source of a 
WMD attack but could potentially work as a deterrent to other adversaries that possess or 
seek WMD or missiles.
890
 
 
While the National Security Strategy of 2002 provided the platform for nuclear option 
aspirations, the NSCWMD – as an artery of the NSS – began the refining process.  This was 
evident when it was revealed in a top secret appendix to NSPD 17, that Iran, Syria, North 
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Korea and Libya were specifically named among the states that were deemed to be the central 
focus of the new US strategy.  A senior Administration official briefing reporters on the new 
strategy stated at the time that the options included nuclear weapons.  The motivation, 
according to one participant in the interagency process that drafted the new strategy, was the 
conclusion that ―traditional non-proliferation has failed, and now we‘re going into active 
interdiction.‖891  The Joint Chiefs of Staff further explained that the NSPD 17: ―outlines a 
comprehensive approach to counter nuclear and other WMD.  The strategy has three principal 
pillars: Counter-proliferation to Combat WMD Use – recognising that the possession and 
increased likelihood of WMD use by hostile states and terrorists are realities of the 
contemporary security environment; strengthened Non-proliferation to Combat WMD 
Proliferation – determined to undertake every effort to prevent states and terrorists from 
acquiring WMD and missiles; and Consequence Management to Respond to WMD Use – to 
reduce to the extent possible the potentially horrific consequences of WMD use at home and 
abroad.‖892  It was clear that the National Security Strategy of 2002 was not limited to notions 
of prevention alone, but would be further articulated and kept ―alive‖ via the nuclear 
classified and unclassified documents it would engender – the core catalyst in advocating the 
United States‘ willingness to use nuclear weapons on states or non-state actors that it deemed 
to be adversarial. 
 
This is no clearer than the US nuclear war plan that entered into effect in March 2003 – 
including new executable nuclear strike options against regional states seeking or holding 
weapons of mass destruction.  Indeed, the declassified US Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM) document was a further crystallisation of the nuclear option initiated in the 
NSS and NPR guidance platforms.  When sections of the Nuclear Posture Review were 
leaked in the Los Angeles Times in March 2002, Bush Administration officials responded by 
attempting to devalue the significance of the document and its impact on nuclear option 
planning.  As stated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, 
the NPR ―is not a plan, it‘s not an operational plan… It‘s a policy document. And it simply 
states our deterrence posture, of which nuclear weapons are a part… And it‘s been the policy 
of this country for a long time, as long as I‘ve been a senior officer, that the President would 
always reserve the right up to and including the use of nuclear weapons if that was 
                                               
891 Hans M. Kristensen, ―US Nuclear Weapons Guidance,‖ The Nuclear Information Project: Documenting Nuclear Policy 
and Operations, Federation of Atomic Scientists, available at <http://www.nukestrat.com/us/guidance.htm>. 
892 Ibid. 
263 
 
appropriate. So that continues to be the policy.‖893  A formal comment articulated by the 
Department of Defense further highlighted that the NPR ―does not provide operational 
guidance on nuclear targeting or planning,‖ but that the military merely ―continues to plan for 
a broad range of contingencies and unforeseen threats to the United States and its allies.‖894  
However, such rhetoric was proven folly with the release of the US Strategic Command‘s 
(STRATCOM) plan to expand and transform the NSS, NPR and NSCWMD into reality in 
which a series of new nuclear strikes against regional states would become a physical and 
viable option. 
 
CONPLAN (Concept Plan) 8022 (Global Strike) 
In November 2003, the first CONPLAN (Concept Plan) 8022 (Global Strike) was completed 
by STRATCOM.  When Bush signed the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17 
he enacted the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCWMD) as an 
approach to thwart not just nuclear but also other weapons of mass destruction, including the 
willingness to use nuclear weapons – even preventively – against any state or non-state actor 
using weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its forces abroad, and friends 
and allies.  The initial STRATCOM CONPLAN 8022, entitled Global Strike was further 
articulation of this putting in place for the first time a pre-emptive and offensive strike 
capability.  The Concept Plan included processes for designing courses of action and 
decision-making, target selection, and the forces available.
895
  The origins of the 
STRATCOM CONPLAN 8022-02 were evident when President Bush approved Change 2 to 
the Unified Command Plan in January 2003, stipulating four  missions: Global Strike; missile 
defence; information operations; and global C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance).  This was followed in March 
2003 by the Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, a 26-page list of specific items 
from the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review that the armed forces were ordered to implement in 
creating the force structure that would make up the New Triad.
896
  To orchestrate the new 
guidance, STRATCOM devised a major reconstruction of the strategic war plan, previously 
                                               
893 US Department of Defense, News Briefing, Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 10, 2002; 
Interview with Wolf Blitzer, CNN Late Edition, distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, US 
Department of State, available at <http://usinfo.state.gov>. 
894 ―Defense Department Won‘t Comment on Leaked Nuclear Weapons Review (US Continues to Plan for Contingencies as 
Deterrence Strategy),‖ (360), March 10, 2002, distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, US 
Department of State, available at <http://usinfo.state.gov>. 
895 Hans M. Kristensen, Global Strike: A Chronology of the Pentagon’s New Offensive Strike Plan. Federation of American 
Scientists, March 2006, p. 75. 
896 Kristensen, ―US National Security Strategy and Pre-emption.‖ 
264 
 
known as the SIOP.
897
  The new plan, entitled OPLAN 8044 Revision 05, became effective 
on the 1st of October 2004, providing ―more flexible options to assure allies, and dissuade, 
deter, and if necessary, defeat adversaries in a wider range of contingencies.‖898   As a means 
to create the New Triad, the new plan encompassed the ―integration of conventional strike 
options‖ for the first time.  As an artery of the New Triad, Global Strike was added to 
STRATCOM‘s portfolio by the Unified Command Plan in January 2003, and was deemed to 
be one of the most significant components of the implementation of the ―pre-emption‖ 
doctrine.
899
  The Unified Command Plan defined Global Strike as ―a capability to deliver 
rapid, extended range, precision kinetic (nuclear and conventional) and non-kinetic (elements 
of space and information operations) effects in support of theatre and national objectives.‖900 
 
CONPLAN 8022 was not operational at the time in November 2003, but was nonetheless 
available for activation if instructed by the Secretary of Defence.  This occurred in June 2004, 
when shortly after the NUWEP was issued, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld ordered the 
military to implement CONPLAN 8022 as a means to provide the President with a prompt, 
global strike capability.  As he stated in the document, ―US nuclear forces must be capable 
of, and be seen to be capable of, destroying those critical war-making and war-supporting 
assets and capabilities that a potential enemy leadership values most and that it would rely on 
to achieve its own objectives in a post-war world.‖901  In response to this, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Chairman General Richard Myers signed the Global Strike Alert Order (ALERTORD) 
on June 30, 2004 which ordered STRATCOM to set CONPLAN 8022 into action in 
conjunction with the Air Force and Navy.  The nuclear option spectre became closer to being 
a reality when on August 17, STRATCOM published Global Strike Interim Capability 
Operations Order (OPORD) which changed CONPLAN 8022 from a concept plan to an 
operational contingency plan.  This development was further expanded on when on 
November 18, 2005, the Joint Functional Component Command Space and Global Strike 
achieved Initial Operational capability after ―being thoroughly tested in the nuclear strike 
exercise Global Lightning 06.‖902 
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The National Security Strategy of 2002 and subsequent documents and policy instruments 
pertaining to the reinvigorated nuclear option it engendered (including the Global Strike 
mission) signified much more than a hypothetical ―what if.‖  They illustrated real change in 
US planning and assumptions about the use of nuclear weapons.  CONPLAN 8022 was a new 
offensive war plan created specifically to support and substantiate the Administration‘s 
willingness to strike first.
903
  Indeed, it is evident that the nuclear option in CONPLAN 8022 
was not about influencing adversaries but about destroying targets that, according to the 
Administration, could not be destroyed by other means.  The underlying premise was that 
deterrence was ultimately flawed and limited, and as such, when it did fail, nuclear weapons 
would be available and used accordingly.  As again stated by Chairman General Richard 
Myers at the July 2004 retirement ceremony of Admiral James Ellis as STRATCOM 
commander in Omaha:  
 
[You reshaped] the roles and missions of that old command to better posture our 
military forces to defeat existing and future threats against our nation [after 
9/11]... You did this by expanding the options available to the President, both 
from a strong nuclear deterrence standpoint and conventional and non-kinetic 
response options.
904
 
 
The following year, General Myers repeated his description of the expansion of the 
nuclear option in a statement before Congress: 
 
Within DOD, the Secretary of Defense has tasked the US Strategic Command to 
synchronize our efforts to counter WMD and ensure the force structure and the 
resources are in place to help all combatant commands defeat WMD. 
STRATCOM has revised our strategic deterrence and response plan that became 
effective in the fall of 2004. This revised, detailed plan provides more flexible 
options to assure allies, and dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat adversaries 
in a wider range of contingencies.
905
 
 
A year after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, 
the Bush Administration released the National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America.  Expanding on the events of 9/11 – and a decade or so of gradual development of 
nuclear doctrine gauged towards Russia and China to one focused increasingly on regional 
actors armed with weapons of mass destruction – the new strategy defined the combination of 
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terrorism and WMD proliferation as requiring a more assertive US military and nuclear 
posture.  The Administration argued that they must be prepared to stop rogue actors and their 
terrorist clients before they were able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against 
the United States.  As means to impede or ―forestall‖ such hostile acts the United States 
would need to ―transform‖ its ―military forces‖ as a means to ensure its ―ability to conduct 
rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.‖906 
 
In 2005, the military and nuclear product of this strategy became operational under the 
banner of Global Strike; a strike plan created by STRATCOM in conjunction with the Air 
Force and Navy that would provide global strike options to the President with nuclear, 
conventional, space, and information warfare capabilities.
907
  It is important to understand 
that the Global Strike mission and CONPLAN 8022 were different than previous missions 
and plans both in their aims and capabilities.  While often defined and portrayed by its 
advocates at the time as a way of increasing the President‘s options for deterring adversaries, 
in reality Global Strike was an offensive and pre-emptive instrument firmly based on the 
notion that deterrence would fail sooner or later.
908
  ―Rather than waiting for the mushroom 
cloud to appear,‖909 a phrase used at various intervals by the Bush Administration, the Global 
Strike mission was gauged towards defeating a threat before it came to the fore.  At the most 
extreme end of the spectrum, Global Strike‘s main premise was to attain ―near-
invulnerability‖ for the United States by forcing ―vulnerability upon any potential 
adversary.‖910  It is with this in mind that CONPLAN (Concept Plan) 8022 (Global Strike), as 
a continuum of the National Security Strategy‘s endorsement of the nuclear option, can be 
deemed as an instrument focussed principally on war fighting rather than deterrence.  As 
stated by William M. Arkin: 
 
CONPLAN 8022 anticipates two different scenarios.  The first is a response to a 
specific and imminent nuclear threat, say in North Korea.  A quick-reaction, 
highly choreographed strike would combine pinpoint bombing with electronic 
warfare and cyber-attacks to disable a North Korean response, with commandos 
operating deep in enemy territory, perhaps even to take possession of the nuclear 
device.  The second scenario involves a more generic attack on an adversary‘s 
WMD infrastructure.  Assume, for argument‘s sake, that Iran announces it is 
mounting a crash program to build a nuclear weapon.  A multidimensional 
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bombing (kinetic) and cyber-warfare (non-kinetic) attack might seek to destroy 
Iran‘s program, and special forces would be deployed to disable or isolate 
underground facilities.  By employing all of the tricks in the US arsenal to 
immobilize an enemy country – turning off the electricity, jamming and 
spoofing radars and communications, penetrating computer networks and 
garbling electronic commands – global strike magnifies the impact of bombing 
by eliminating the need to physically destroy targets that have been disabled by 
other means.  The inclusion, therefore, of a nuclear weapons option in 
CONPLAN 8022 – a specially configured earth-penetrating bomb to destroy 
deeply buried facilities, if any exist – is particularly disconcerting.  The global 
strike plan holds the nuclear option in reserve if intelligence suggests an 
‗imminent‘ launch of an enemy nuclear strike on the United States or if there is a 
need to destroy hard-to-reach targets.
911
 
 
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (Joint Publication 3-12) 2005 
The regional strike plans posited and envisaged in STRATCOM‘s CONPLAN (Concept 
Plan) 8022 (Global Strike) also found their way into the draft Doctrine for Joint Nuclear 
Operations (Joint Publication 3-12); further illustrating that the Bush Administration‘s 
nuclear option extended outside notions of retaliation, including ―pre-emptive‖ strikes.  The 
second draft from March 2005 listed five scenarios where the use of nuclear weapons might 
be requested.  Firstly, to counter an adversary intending to use weapons of mass destruction 
against US, multinational, allied forces or civilian populations; secondly, to counter an 
imminent attack from an adversary‘s biological weapons that only effects from nuclear 
weapons can safely destroy; thirdly, to attack adversary installations including weapons of 
mass destruction, deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons, or the 
command and control infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack 
against the United States or its friends and allies [this was probably the ―target base‖ in 
OPLAN 8044 Revision 03]; fourthly, to counter potentially overwhelming adversary 
conventional forces; lastly, to demonstrate US intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to 
deter adversary WMD use.
912
 
 
It is evident with the 2005 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations that the continuum of the 
Bush Doctrine‘s nuclear aspirations were further accentuated, reaffirming the strategic 
planning concept of assimilating ―pre-emption‖ into a US nuclear doctrine with conventional 
weapons and missile defenses.  The document signified how combatant commanders 
attempted to articulate the Administration‘s quest to redefine US nuclear policy into 
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operational guidance for military forces.  It came nearly five years after the completion of the 
Bush Administration‘s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in December 2001 and National 
Security Strategy of 2002, and represented the first revision of basic nuclear doctrine in a 
decade.  In simple terms, the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations formally reaffirmed pre-
emption into a joint nuclear doctrine in which the threshold for nuclear use was lowered, 
endorsed a role for nuclear weapons against all forms of weapons of mass destruction, a role 
for nuclear weapons against terrorists, and described missile defenses as a means of 
defending nuclear forces rather than people against attack.  Encompassing the findings of the 
2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the core sentiments of the National Security Strategy of 2002, 
and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, it reflected the impact of 
9/11 on US strategic thinking in which a focus on all WMD threats – whether from state or 
non-state actors – would be pursued.  As a result of these developments, the updated Joint 
Pub 3-12 changed significantly in comparison to the previous versions of the document (as 
discussed in the previous chapter). 
 
Indeed, the decision to update the doctrine dated back to March 2001, when the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff issued a program directive in which the consolidation of Joint Pub 3-12 and Joint Pub 
3-12.1 (theater) was to be undertaken in which a single Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations 
would be established as a means to guide the employment of both strategic and non-strategic 
(theater) nuclear forces.  The format of the new nuclear doctrine changed considerably from 
the 1995 version.  It was twenty-two pages longer because of a new chapter on theater 
nuclear operations, a discussion of the role of conventional and defensive forces, and an 
expanded discussion on nuclear operations.  The insertion of a chapter on theater nuclear 
operations illustrated the post-Cold War focus of US nuclear planners in their quest to 
dissuade and deter regional aggressors (i.e. rogue states) holding nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons.
913
  Importantly, the document also reflected a decade-old rivalry between 
the regional combatant commanders and US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) over who 
―owned‖ regional nuclear strike planning.  The document showed that STRATCOM ―today‖ 
has responsibility for more than ―half of the phases in the theater planning support 
process.‖914 
 
                                               
913 Ibid. 
914 Ibid. 
269 
 
The Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations further illustrated the Bush Administration‘s 
willingness to utilise the nuclear option, as it gave nuclear pre-emption an increasingly 
flexible component that made nuclear weapons an easy to draw on device.  The revised 
doctrine enshrined notions of nuclear pre-emption into official US joint nuclear doctrine for 
the first time, defining four key goals that would guide the development of US force 
capabilities, their development and use:  
 
...assuring allies and friends of the US steadfastness of purpose and its capability 
to fulfil its security commitment; dissuading adversaries from undertaking 
programs or operations that could threaten US interests or those of our allies and 
friends; deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to 
swiftly defeat attacks and imposing severe penalties for aggression on an 
adversary‘s military capability and supporting infrastructure; and, decisively 
defeating an adversary if deterrence fails...
915
  Developing and sustaining a 
modern and diverse portfolio of military capabilities serves the four key defense 
policy goals, identified earlier, that guide the development, deployment, and use 
of military forces and capabilities, including nuclear forces.
916
 
 
The second final coordination draft of the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (JP 3-12) 
was published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and reaffirmed a prominent role for nuclear 
weapons against regional adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction.  As 
articulated by Kristensen: 
 
For the first time, JP 3-12 includes descriptions of pre-emptive use of nuclear 
weapons: an adversary intending to use WMD against US, multinational, or 
allies forces or civilian populations; imminent attack from adversary biological 
weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy; attacks on 
adversary installations including WMD, deep, hardened bunkers containing 
chemical or biological weapons or the command and control infrastructure 
required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack against United States or its 
friends and allies; to demonstrate US intent and capability to use nuclear 
weapons to deter adversary use of WMD.
917
 
 
In nuclear ―pre-emption,‖ the goal would no longer be deterrence through threatened 
retaliation, but the destruction of targets with nuclear weapons in anticipation that deterrence 
would fail.  As the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations argued, to deter a potential 
adversary from utilising WMDs, that adversary‘s leadership must ―believe the United States 
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has both the ability and will to pre-empt or retaliate promptly with responses that are credible 
and effective.‖918  The document also noted that US policy in the past had ―repeatedly 
rejected calls for the adoption of a ‗no first use‘ policy of nuclear weapons since this policy 
could undermine deterrence.‖919  In other words, to deter the use of WMD against the United 
States, the Pentagon paper endorsed preparations in which the use of nuclear weapons and 
determination to use them was ―necessary to prevent or retaliate against WMD use.‖920  
Indeed, the use of the nuclear option espoused in the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations 
depicted a post-Cold War scenario in which the use of nuclear weapons may take place at a 
much lower intensity level than envisioned during the Cold War. This was evident as the 
document regularly replaced ―war‖ with ―conflict‖ as a means to convey the lower intensity 
of hostilities that could involve the use of US nuclear weapons in post-Cold War nuclear 
battle zones.  As further explained by Kristensen: 
 
...the pre-emption language in the draft is accompanied by replacing the word 
―war‖ with ―conflict‖ in the war determination section.  In proposing this 
change, STRATCOM argues that it better ―emphasizes the nature of most 
conflicts resulting in use of a nuclear weapon. Nuclear war implies the mutual 
exchange of nuclear weapons between warring parties – not fully representative 
of the facts.‖  Echoing STRATCOM‘s assessment, European Command 
(EUCOM) further explains that ―the use of a bunker-buster ‗mini-nuke‘ might 
not, in fact, be ‗provoked by some action, event, or perceived threat‘ per se; 
rather, it may be used simply because it is the only weapon that will destroy the 
target!‖921 
 
Unlike the two previous versions of the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations from 1993 and 
1995,
922
 however, the new doctrine did not mention a need for weapons with lower yields.  
The paragraph included in the previous version was deleted.  Instead, lower yields were 
mentioned in the section that discussed reducing nuclear collateral damage as a matter-of-fact 
potential capability.  As stated, ―...specific techniques for reducing nuclear collateral damage 
may include lower yield weapons, improving accuracy, employing multiple smaller weapons, 
adjusting the height of burst, and offsetting the desired ground zero.‖923   
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Another distinct change was the insertion of discussion pertaining to the use of conventional 
weapons and defensive forces into the sections describing the purpose, planning, and 
employment of nuclear forces.  As the document states, ―as non-nuclear  strike capabilities 
and nuclear strike are integrated, targets that may have required a nuclear weapon to achieve 
the needed effects in previous planning may be targeted with conventional weapons, provided 
the required effects can be achieved.‖924  This no doubt echoed the 2002 Nuclear Posture 
Review in which the creation of a ―new triad‖ with nuclear weapons was depicted as 
constituting only part of (together with advanced conventional weapons) one of the pillars in 
the triad.  A second pillar, the NPR stated, would be missile defense, and together the two 
(conventional weapons and missile defenses) would reduce the role of nuclear weapons by 
providing the President with other response options than nuclear retaliation.
925
  Regardless of 
this, however, the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations admonished that while ―some 
contingencies will remain, the most appropriate response may include the use of US nuclear 
weapons.‖926  Further to this, the document appeared to posit another objective, that being, 
how advanced conventional weapons and missile defenses could be used to increase the 
survivability and effectiveness of US offensive nuclear forces.  
 
Aside from the specific new components inserted into the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear 
Operations, the core nuclear mission remained surprisingly similar to that described in 
previous versions of the document.  As such, the major reduction in the role of nuclear 
weapons promised by the Bush Administration in 2001-2002 was not evident.  Instead, the 
―new‖ Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations can be viewed as opportunistic in both 
deepening existing missions and defining new roles for nuclear weapons.  Despite the 
continued White House rhetoric about reducing the role of nuclear weapons, the document 
reaffirmed the significance of maintaining an aggressive nuclear option in which 
―modernised forces would be on a high readiness level, capable of destroying – even pre-
emptively – targets anywhere on the globe.‖927  As argued in the above, aside from 
immersing pre-emption into a nuclear doctrine, the Joint Nuclear Operations doctrine of 2005 
lowered the threshold for nuclear use by further reducing the level of hostilities where US 
nuclear weapons might be used; endorsed a role of nuclear weapons against all forms of 
                                               
924 Ibid., p. xi. 
925 Hans M. Kristensen, ―The Role of US Nuclear Weapons: New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge,‖ Arms Control 
Today, September, 2005, available at, < http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_09/Kristensen>. 
926 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations Final Coordination (2), Joint Pub 3-12, p. xi. 
927 Kristensen, ―Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations.‖  
272 
 
weapons of mass destruction; advocated a role of nuclear weapons against terrorists, and 
described missile defenses as a means of defending nuclear forces rather than people against 
attack.
928
  The doctrine expanded on the arguments and ―findings‖ of the 2002 Nuclear 
Posture Review, the 2002 National Security Strategy and the 2002 National Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction in which a flexible and nuclear option was no longer a 
last resort, but a defining and strategic device.  As a marked expansion on the Bush Doctrine, 
the 2005 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations and its intricate definitions of the ―pre-
emptive‖ use of US nuclear weapons was so controversial, it evoked the Senate Armed 
Services Committee to ask for a briefing and 16 lawmakers to protest in writing to President 
Bush to what they considered to be a ―drastic shift in US nuclear policy.‖  The detail of the 
controversial doctrine was leaked to Arms Control Today and in September 2005, the 
Washington Post followed up with a front-page story.  Embarrassed by the exposure, the 
Pentagon cancelled not only the draft doctrine (and four other related doctrine documents) 
but also the existing Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations document that had been publicly 
available on the Joint Chiefs of Staff website for a decade.  A Joint Staff official explained 
that the documents would not be published, revised or classified, explaining that they had 
been found not to be real doctrine documents but ―pseudo doctrine‖ documents discussing 
nuclear policy issues.  The public ―visibility led a lot of people to question why we have 
them,‖ he said.929 
 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006 
Nonetheless, this was only a minor derailment to the Bush Doctrine‘s nuclear reactivation 
process.  The apparent relentlessness of the Administration was again evident with the 
February 6, 2006 release of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  Formally created by 
the Department of Defense and Donald Rumsfeld, the review articulated the need for ―prompt 
global strike capabilities (that) would be available to attack fixed, hard and deeply buried, 
mobile and re-locatable targets with improved accuracy anywhere in the world promptly 
upon the President‘s order.  Nuclear weapons will be accurate, safe and reliable, and tailored 
to meet modern deterrence requirements.‖930  The QDR also gave the People‘s Republic of 
China more emphasis and reaffirmed its standing as an ongoing strategic competitor.  As the 
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review stated, ―of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to 
compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could 
over time offset traditional US military advantages absent in US counter strategies.‖931  Aside 
from the China connection, the 2006 QDR furthered continued the refinement of the nuclear 
option – in which a shift from a ―one size fits all‖ approach to deterrence would be tailored 
towards an approach it deemed appropriate for advanced military competitors, regional 
WMD states, as well as non-state terrorist networks.
932
  Indeed, the QDR clearly advocated 
―full balanced, tailored capability‖ as means to deter both state and non-state threats – 
including the utilisation of WMD, terrorist attacks in the tangible and information categories, 
and opportunistic aggression – while at the same time, assuring allies and ―dissuading 
potential competitors.‖933  The QDR remained very consistent with the New Triad priorities 
developed during the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and consolidated with the National 
Security Strategy of 2002.  That being, the assertion of force and how it would now 
encompass a wider range of non-kinetic and conventional strike capabilities, while also 
maintaining a stern and bold nuclear deterrent – the cornerstone of US national power.934  
This included an integrated ballistic and cruise missile defenses and a responsive 
infrastructure that would be supported by an agile and diligent National Command and 
Control System, superior intelligence, flexible planning systems and the capacity to maintain 
access to legitimate, high-quality information for ―timely situational awareness.‖935 
 
Of course, the most startling aspect of the document pertained to the notion that the Bush 
Administration was considering the development of a new nuclear weapon.  The document 
articulated how the Department of Defense was working with the Department of Energy as a 
means to assess the viability and cost of a Reliable Replacement Warhead and, if required, 
would begin the development of that system.  This ―system,‖ it argued, would enable 
reductions in the number of older, non-deployed warheads maintained as ―a hedge against 
reliability problems in deployed systems,‖ while assisting in the evolution and creation of a 
smaller, boutique and more responsive nuclear weapon infrastructure.  Overall, it was evident 
that the Quadrennial Defense Review of March 2006 revalidated the 2002 NPR planning 
assumptions that required defined yet flexible deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist 
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networks, and near-peer competitors.  It restated that international conditions ―are trending 
toward – if anything – a more stressing strategic landscape, for example, with respect to 
North Korea, Iran, and nuclear proliferation.‖936  But even more than this, the QDR again 
reinforced the Bush Doctrine‘s planning assumptions and the ―continuum of transformation 
in the Department... with strong, sound and effective war fighting capabilities in the decades 
ahead.‖937  Indeed, as stated by Josh White and Ann Scott Tyson in The Washington Post: 
 
The United States is engaged in what could be a generational conflict akin to the 
Cold War, the kind of struggle that might last decades as allies work to root out 
terrorists across the globe and battle extremists who want to rule the world, 
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said yesterday.  Rumsfeld, who laid out 
broad strategies for what the military and the Bush Administration are now 
calling the ―long war,‖ likened al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to Adolf Hitler 
and Vladimir Lenin while urging Americans not to give in on the battle of wills 
that could stretch for years.  He said there is a tendency to underestimate the 
threats that terrorists pose to global security, and said liberty is at stake.  The 
speech, which aides said was titled ―The Long War,‖ came on the eve of the 
Pentagon‘s release of its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which sets out 
plans for how the US military will address major security challenges 20 years 
into the future.  The plans to be released today include shifts to make the 
military more agile and capable of dealing with unconventional threats, 
something Rumsfeld has said is necessary to move from a military designed for 
the Cold War into one that is more flexible.
938
 
 
While the ―long war‖ was an ambiguous title it did nonetheless reflect the Bush 
Administration‘s transformative quest and desire for an ―agile‖ nuclear option – a process 
that began in 2002. 
 
National Security Strategy of 2006. 
Of course, such nuclear aspirations and force agility was to be further articulated in the 
National Security Strategy of 2006.  Published by the White House in March 2006 as a means 
to guide military and other areas of strategic planning in the future, the National Security 
Strategy of 2006 began with four words: ―America is at war.‖  The morbid but perhaps 
realistic first sentence was distinct to the introductory words stated in the previous National 
Security Strategy from 2002, in which the ―war on terror‖ focus remained (perhaps 
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strategically) in the background to notions of social struggle between democratic and 
oppressive societies.  Nonetheless, both documents were creations of the post 9/11 attacks 
which engendered the so-called ―pre-emption‖ doctrine in which the United States would ―no 
longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past‖939 but strike first if necessary.  
The NSS2006 document reiterated this bold proclamation when it stated that the United 
States would ―act pre-emptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defence.‖940  Since it 
was first published in September 2002, the Bush Administration‘s ―pre-emption‖ doctrine has 
been widely lambasted for conveying an overly aggressive security strategy.  While the NSS 
of 2006 did acknowledge this (―The United States will not resort to force in all cases to pre-
empt emerging threats. Our preference is that non-military actions succeed.  And no country 
should ever use pre-emption as  pretext for aggression‖941), it signified that regardless of the 
fact that US military forces were tied down in Iraq following the preventive invasion in 2003, 
very little had changed in terms of US security strategy.  As the document stated: 
 
If necessary, however, under long-standing principles of self defense, we do not 
rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to 
the time and place of the enemy‘s attack.  When the consequences of an attack 
with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by as 
grave dangers materialize.  This is the principle and logic of pre-emption.  The 
place of pre-emption in our national security strategy remains the same. We will 
always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions.  The 
reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.
942
 
 
The 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategy documents, as well as the guidance instruments 
that have punctuated them since, clearly shifted the emphasis more decisively toward 
prevention with nuclear aspirations.  Of course, what did change was the geographic 
positioning and depth of the preventive scenarios, the methods to execute them, and the type of 
conflict that could necessitate them.  While preventive strike options were no doubt still being 
refined against Russian and Chinese nuclear forces, the NSS2006 pre-emptive planning was 
focused on developing strike options against regional proliferators armed with weapons of 
mass destruction, in low-intensity conflicts, even before armed hostilities had broken out – and 
in doing so, echoed the sentiments expressed in the defunct Doctrine for Joint Nuclear 
Operations of 2005.  As has been emphasised above, the 2002 and 2006 National Security 
Strategy documents were only a small public insight into the evolution of the Bush 
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Administration‘s reassertion of the nuclear option.  While significant, they form part of a 
consortium of documents (most of which remain classified) that have been issued since 2001 
as a means to guide, refine and direct the military on how to implement the preventive 
doctrine.  This included over a dozen major new guidance documents issued by the White 
House and the Office of Secretary of Defence, as well as an entirely new strike plan designed 
by US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) to provide the President with new nuclear and 
conventional strike options against regional states and non-state actors.  The NSS of 2006 
merely reaffirmed this shift and how the nuclear option would continue to play ―a critical role‖ 
in US national security strategy: 
 
...safe, credible, reliable [nuclear weapons]... and will continue to play a critical 
role.  We are strengthening deterrence by developing a New Triad composed of 
offensive strike systems (both nuclear and improved conventional capabilities)...  
These capabilities will better deter some of the new threats we face, while also 
bolstering our security commitments to allies...  If necessary, however, under 
long-standing principles of self-defense, we do not rule out the use of force 
before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the 
enemy‘s attack. When the consequences of an attack with WMD are potentially 
so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idle grave dangers materialize. This is 
the principle and logic of pre-emption.
943
 
 
In essence, the National Security Strategy of 2006 further re-emphasised the function of 
nuclear weapons in pre-emptive military strikes against terrorists and ―aggressive‖ states 
armed with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.  As Hans Kristensen stated, the 
document ―was the Bush Administration‘s last opportunity to demonstrate that it has reduced 
the role of nuclear weapons after the Cold War... Instead it has chosen to reaffirm their 
importance and in the most troubling way possible: prevention and the nuclear option.‖944 
 
Strategic Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0 2006 
The extent to which the Bush Doctrine‘s nuclear option becomes a ―Bush only‖ legacy 
remains to be seen.  But as the 2006 Strategic Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 
2.0 indicates, long-term plans were clearly on the Department of Defense‘s agenda.  As 
stated: 
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The challenges identified in the National Security Strategy require a new 
concept for ‗waging‘ deterrence paired with revised joint force capabilities that 
provide a wider range of military deterrent options.  Deterrence requires a 
national strategy that integrates diplomatic, informational, military, and 
economic powers.
945
 
 
The core platform of the document was to stipulate ways to coerce decisively an adversary‘s 
decision-making process, and thereby, thwart hostile actions against US key interests.  The 
document‘s timeframe extended to 2025 and provided what it deemed to be ―a set of steps 
necessary to operationalise deterrence planning that supports the National Military Strategy 
(NMS) objective of ‗Prevent Conflict and Surprise Attacks‘ and the NMS requirement to 
develop a wider range of options that discourage aggression and coercion.  It provided the 
operational context and conceptual basis for further concept development, capability based 
assessments (CBA), integrated architectures and experimentation.‖946  The document did not 
distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear missions, but combined nuclear, conventional 
and non-kinetic capabilities under ―Global Strike‖ means as a way of directly influencing an 
adversary‘s decision process by creating deterrence operations to specific adversaries and 
contexts.  As such, the document focussed more than its predecessor on how to influence 
different kinds of adversaries.  In simple terms, it provided the ―conceptual framework 
needed to meet the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review requirements for deterrence activities 
tailored for rogue powers, terrorist networks and near-peer competitors.‖947  While it is often 
believed to be static and slow to change, US nuclear weapons policy since 2002 was 
continually punctuated with the above reaffirmative documents as a means to steer and refine 
the broader nuclear sentiments and ideology posited in the Bush Doctrine.  Indeed, the 
Strategic Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0 merely continued this process. 
 
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) 
The deeper policy within the Bush Doctrine and its accompanying documents foreshadowed 
a new nuclear era in which the once-termed ―weapon of last resort‖ became a usable and 
―necessary‖ option.  The ―quiet revolution‖ was further accentuated with ―Complex 2030‖ 
and the encompassing Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program; perceived by many 
as potentially being the United States‘ first development of a new nuclear weapon since 1992.  
Under the US Department of Energy‘s (DOE) Complex 2030, it was envisaged that the entire 
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US nuclear weapons complex would be upgraded whilst also designing and producing a 
series of new nuclear warheads.
948
  Such new weapons produced via the Reliable 
Replacement Warhead (RRW) program would ultimately replace the entire US nuclear 
arsenal.
949
  The main argument of Complex 2030 was that for the US to maintain warheads 
that were reliable and safe in the future, it was necessary to develop a responsive weapons 
complex that could rapidly produce additional warheads, remain cost efficient, and allow the 
United States to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal.
950
  The Department of Energy (DOE) – 
through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and in partnership with 
Department of Defense (DOD) – believed that the RRW would enable the United States to 
have ―a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.‖951  The Complex 2030 document 
acknowledged the changes implemented 2001 in which strategic deterrence was based on the 
―premise… of deterring a peer adversary to one of responding to emerging threats.‖952  
Indeed, as has been emphasised throughout the course of this thesis, the National Security 
Strategy of 2002 directed a change in the platform of the deterrent as a means to adapt to the 
perceived changing nature of the threat.  The NSS and NPR called for the following: 
 
• Changing the size, composition, and character of our nuclear stockpile in a 
way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over; 
• Achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear 
warheads consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations 
to our allies;  
• Transforming the NNSA nuclear weapons complex (also referred to as the 
―Complex‖) into a responsive infrastructure that supports the specific stockpile 
requirements and maintains the essential US nuclear capabilities needed for an 
uncertain global future.
953
 
 
As part of the ongoing continuum of nuclear option considerations,  Complex 2030 and its 
accompanying documental instruments illustrated the desire to cultivate a future nuclear 
weapons enterprise, in which the deployed stockpile would be transformed into one smaller 
than today.  It is here that the document posited the concept of the Reliable Replacement 
Warhead (RRW) in which the ―warhead design limitations‖ imposed on Cold War systems 
would be more easily and efficiently ―manufactured at fewer, modernized facilities with safer 
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and more environmentally benign materials.‖954  In an assertive fashion, Jacqueline Cabasso, 
described ―Complex 2030‖ as the ―publicly announced United States plan to modernize its 
nuclear weapons complex and replace its entire nuclear arsenal with new ‗Reliable 
Replacement Warheads‘ by the year 2030... the proposed project, which could cost more than 
$150 billion over 25 years, is tantamount to a US declaration of ‗nukes forever,‘ and a 
repudiation of its obligation under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
to end the arms race ‗at an early date‘ and to negotiate ‗in good faith‘ the elimination of its 
nuclear arsenal.‖955  However, proponents of Complex 2030 argued that such replacement 
warheads would have the same military characteristics, could be transferred on the same 
kinds of delivery systems, and hold at risk the same targets as the warheads they replaced.  
They would be redesigned to foster a greater sense of safety and security, while enabling an 
easier production process and maintenance.
956
  Moreover, the document contended, 
confidence in the stockpile would remain high, minus the resurrection of nuclear testing, as 
the RRW enabled the increase in performance margins based on a sounder understanding of 
nuclear weapons attained from the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) as well as the 
accompanying research and development (R&D).
957
  The structures that supported this 
smaller stockpile would be robust and able to efficiently address any technical problems in 
the stockpile, while simultaneously, being able to respond to adverse geopolitical change.
958
 
 
Supporting the NNSA‘s argument and concern, Congress provided capital for the RRW 
program in the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-447. The RRW was 
conveyed in the conference report as a ―program to improve the reliability, longevity, and 
certifiability of existing weapons and their components.‖959  Congress provided further 
authorisation in the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 109-163, Section 
3111.   As indicated in the above, Congress stipulated several goals for the RRW program, in 
particular,  an increase in confidence that warheads would perform as intended over the long-
term without nuclear testing.  Other goals pertained to increasing the ease of manufacturing 
and certification, the reduction in life cycle cost, the increase in weapon safety and use 
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control, and reduction in potential damage to the environment.
960
  As expected, the RRW 
program engendered varying levels of debate.  One commentator argued that ―the plutonium 
research results obliterate the chief rationale for NNSA‘s emerging strategy‖ of RRW,961 
while the New York Times opined that RRW ―is a public-relations disaster in the making 
overseas‖ and ―a make-work program championed by the weapons laboratories and belatedly 
by the Pentagon.‖962  Indeed, while Complex 2030 and the RRW it encompassed were 
depicted by the NNSA as developing a smaller and efficient nuclear weapons complex 
designed for the 21
st
 century with safety and security in mind, others were more wary of such 
developments.  As Jacqueline Cabasso testified, while the NNSA claimed that ―RRW is not a 
new weapon providing new or different military capabilities and/or missions,‖963  NNSA 
chief Linton Brooks was clear that the nuclear option and potential to develop a new nuclear 
weapon was not a farfetched proposition:  
 
In 2030, our Responsive Infrastructure can also produce weapons with different 
or modified military requirements as required. The weapons design community 
that was revitalized by the RRW program can adapt an existing weapon within 
18 months and design, develop and begin production of the new design within 3-
4 years of a decision to enter engineering development... goals that were 
established in 2004. Thus, if Congress and the President direct, we can respond 
quickly to changing military requirements.
964
 
 
As stern advocates of the RRW and its quest to redesign the physical aspects of the nuclear 
option, the Bush Administration argued that the current stockpile – most units of which were 
manufactured between 1979 and 1989 – were designed to deter and, if necessary, defeat the 
Soviet Union.  In today‘s international climate, the threat, strategy and missions have 
changed, leaving the United States with an ―out of date stockpile.‖965  As Brooks further 
stated, current warheads are wrong technically because ―we would [now] manage technical 
risk differently, for example, by ‗trading‘ [warhead] size and weight for increased 
performance margins, system longevity, and ease of manufacture.‖  These warheads were not 
―designed for longevity‖ or to minimize cost, and may be wrong militarily because yields are 
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too high and ―do not lend themselves to reduced collateral damage.‖ They also lack 
capabilities against buried targets or biological and chemical munitions, and they do not take 
full advantage of precision guidance.
966
  As O‘Brien articulated in Sustaining the Nuclear 
Enterprise:- A New Approach, the stockpile was wrong because it was too large: 
 
We retain ―hedge‖ warheads in large part due to the inability of either today‘s 
nuclear infrastructure, or the infrastructure we expect to have when the stockpile 
reductions are fully implemented in 2012, to manufacture, in a timely way, 
warheads for replacement or for force augmentation, or to act to correct 
unexpected technical problems.
967
 
 
Moreover, it was argued by RRW advocates that the stockpile was not appropriate in terms of 
physical security, as it was not designed for a situation in which terrorists may attain control 
or detonate a nuclear weapon.  As further exemplified by Brooks, ―if we were designing the 
stockpile today, we would apply new technologies and approaches to warhead-level use 
control as a means to reduce physical security costs.‖968  Of course, there were those who 
questioned the notion that the RRW would improve the current stockpile.  For the likes of 
Speed and May, new weapons may not offer much new capability: that is, earth penetrators 
may not necessarily destroy hardened facilities buried very deeply or at imprecisely-known 
locations, and nuclear weapons are of questionable effectiveness against chemical and 
biological agents.
969
  Medalia expanded on such doubts in his Congress Research Service, 
2008 Reliable Replacement Warhead program report: 
 
They (opponents of the RRW) anticipate that RRWs, like any other product, 
would have ―birth defects,‖ whereas such defects have been wrung out of 
existing warheads, and believe that such defects could require a larger stockpile. 
They state that performance margins of current warheads are adequate and can 
be improved somewhat if needed, such as by new systems to deliver boost gas. 
They question the argument that RRW would reduce physical security costs on 
grounds that a terrorist attempt to seize and detonate a nuclear warhead in place 
is most unlikely given the high level of security currently in place, and doubt 
that Congress or NNSA would reduce the guard force because of RRW.
970
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During the course of the 20
th
 Century, the nuclear weapons complex has expanded and 
contracted in response to what the Administration of the day perceived to be the national 
interest security imperative.  Whether it was the rush to produce the first bomb in World War 
II, the quest to produce many thousands of warheads of many different types during the Cold 
War, the desire for dismantlement and less production with the conclusion of the Cold War or 
the current era in which state and non-state actors are both nuclear players, ―the US 
Complex‖ has attempted to shift and adjust but with varying degrees of success.971  Indeed, 
the nuclear stockpile was constructed as a means to address Cold War demands in which, for 
example, high explosive yield per unit of warhead weight (the ―yield-to-weight ratio‖) was 
―critically important while cost, ease of manufacture, and reduction of hazardous material 
were less so.‖972  In today‘s climate, Medalia argued, ―yield-to-weight has become less 
important, the others just mentioned have become more important, new constraints have 
appeared in the wake of 9/11, and warheads must continue to be safe and reliable.‖973   As a 
result, the Bush Administration asserted, the RRW made it possible to adapt the stockpile to 
reflect such changes. 
 
The quest to update and reassert the nuclear option to the fore was reflected in the Bush 
Administration‘s support of the RRW from the outset.  The Administration saw the RRW 
program as the basis for addressing and complimenting the nuclear aspirations stipulated in 
the National Security Strategy of 2002 and NPR and the subsequent documents, instrument 
and plans.  This transformation was evident when Representative David Hobson, Chairman 
of the House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee in the 108th and 
109th Congresses, presented himself as a major advocate of the RRW.  In introducing the 
FY2005 energy and water bill (H.R. 4614) to the House, he highlighted the need to 
reconfigure the Complex as a means to adhere to the NPR, but also realign the nuclear option 
to what he perceived were ―today‘s‖ requirements.  As stated: 
 
...much of the DOE weapons complex is still sized to support a Cold War 
stockpile.  The NNSA needs to take a ‗time-out‘ on new initiatives until it 
completes a review of its weapons complex in relation to security needs, budget 
constraints, and [a] new stockpile plan.
974
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283 
 
For Hobson, the RRW would be an integral part of the Administration‘s effort to readjust US 
nuclear strategy, reshape the nuclear weapons stockpile and Complex to hold up that key 
strategy, pursue weapons programs aligned with that strategy, and reject those that were 
inconsistent.
975
  Indeed, the RRW further illustrated that notions of transforming the Complex 
into the responsive infrastructure articulated in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and 
National Security Strategy were becoming a reality.  As Thomas D‘Agostino, then NNSA 
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, articulated in 2006: 
 
By ―responsive‖ we refer to the resilience of the nuclear enterprise to 
unanticipated events or emerging threats, and the ability to anticipate 
innovations by an adversary and to counter them before our deterrent is 
degraded... much remains to be done to achieve stockpile and infrastructure 
transformation... The ―enabler‖ for transformation is our concept for the RRW. 
The RRW will benefit from relaxed Cold War design constraints that maximized 
yield to weight ratios.  This will allow us to design replacement components that 
are easier to manufacture; are safer and more secure; eliminate environmentally 
dangerous, reactive, and unstable materials... RRW, we believe, will provide 
enormous leverage for a more efficient and responsive infrastructure and 
opportunities for a smaller stockpile.
976
 
 
It was evident that those who endorsed the nuclear option continuum encompassed in the 
RRW, focussed extensively on safety and cost efficiency, rather than the fact that the RRW 
program also contained the capability to enable the development of a new nuclear weapon.  
As the Committee stated: 
 
The RRW weapon will be designed for ease of manufacturing, maintenance, 
dismantlement, and certification without nuclear testing, allowing the NNSA to 
transition the weapons complex away from a large, expensive Cold War relic 
into a smaller, more efficient modern complex.  A more reliable replacement 
warhead will allow long-term savings by phasing out the multiple redundant 
Cold War warhead designs that require maintaining multiple obsolete production 
technologies to maintain the older warheads.
977
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Those who were wary of the real potential of new nuclear weapons development expressed 
concerns about the link between RRW and the nuclear weapon Complex transformation.  As 
Representative Peter Visclosky, Chairman of the Energy and Water Development 
Appropriations Subcommittee indicated:  
 
I am also troubled by the apparent unbridled enthusiasm of the nuclear weapons 
complex over the Reliable Replacement Warhead and wish I saw that same 
enthusiasm replicated, as far as their dedication to downsizing the complex... 
The department [DOE] will have to develop a modernization plan that is near 
term and demonstrates a recognition that the long-term requirements of the 
nuclear weapons complex are tied to a much smaller nuclear stockpile.
978
 
 
Of course, proponents for a reinvigorated nuclear option lamented that if nothing was done, 
confidence in the stockpile would decline, and with it, the ability of the US to assure allies 
that its deterrent capacity was sound and able ―to dissuade competitors from beginning 
nuclear programs, to deter adversaries, and if necessary to defeat enemies, as called for in the 
2001 Nuclear Posture Review and National Security Strategy of 2002.‖979  The Bush 
Administration attempted to soften the RRW by portraying it as a pathway to attain a 
replacement weapon option, rather than a new weapon with new military capabilities.  It 
would be one that would be easier to manufacture, maintain, and certify than current 
warheads; with broader performance margins as a means to instil the confidence as 
intended.
980
  Critics of the Bush nuclear option argued that the RRW would make it more 
challenging for the United States to negotiate with Iranian and North Korean nuclear 
programs, and those programs in turn could lead to a follow-on wave of possible 
proliferators.  By conveying to the world that they were willing to emphasise the nuclear 
option through the RRW program instead of seeking to quell and devalue such weapons, the 
United States ultimately could undermine its capacity to lead global nuclear non-proliferation 
efforts.
981
  As former Senator Sam Nunn stated: 
 
On the RRW itself, if Congress gives a green light to this program in our current 
world environment – and I stress in our current world environment – I believe 
that this will be misunderstood by our allies, exploited by our adversaries, 
complicate our work to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons... and 
make resolution of the Iran and North Korea challenges all the more difficult. 
                                               
978 US Congress, Hearing on Department of Energy‘s FY2008 Budget for NNSA Programs, House Committee on 
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Also, I think it will make it more difficult to discourage the many new countries 
that are right on the tipping point of beginning their enrichment process... we 
will pay a very high price in terms of our overall national security if Congress 
goes forward with this program...  So I would not fund additional work on the 
RRW at this time, certainly not development and going forward with 
deployment.
982
 
 
Former Secretary of Defense William Perry reiterated the above sentiments when he argued 
that the development of a new nuclear weapon could be deferred, as this ―would put us in a 
stronger position to lead the international community in the continuing battle against nuclear 
proliferation, which threatens us all.‖983  Aside from external considerations, the Bush 
Administration repeatedly downplayed the possibility of a new nuclear weapon.  In the 
medium term, the plan conveyed involved the mixing of existing and RRW warheads in the 
stockpile as a means to increase the diversity of warheads pertaining to each of the nuclear 
triad.
984
  As highlighted above, the new warheads, the Administration claimed, would have 
more ―flexible design parameters and be simpler and cheaper to maintain without nuclear 
testing.‖985  In the long term, however, all warhead types in the ―enduring‖ stockpile could be 
replaced.  In its justification for the RRW nuclear option, the Administration undermined the 
original objective of a ban on nuclear testing – that being, the prevention of new nuclear 
weapons development and production.  Now, production was said to be necessary to avoid 
nuclear testing.   
 
In the latter stages of his Administration, it was apparent that Bush‘s quest for a new nuclear 
option was facing extensive opposition from a Congress that was (post 2006 mid-term 
elections) quite hostile to such aspirations.  Throughout the fiscal 2008 budget process, 
Congress was sceptical of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program, which the 
Bush Administration had promoted as a more reliable, proliferation-proof option, and some 
committees cut funding for RRW dramatically.
986
  They felt that it was premature to rush 
forward with a new warhead design and a production complex before basic questions were 
answered.  Such questions related to the amount of bombs that would be built, and more 
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fundamentally, the role of nuclear weapons in US security policy.  In part to address these 
issues, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed Defense and Energy to submit a new 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress in December 2009.  The committee advised: 
―The new NPR would include a review of policy objectives with respect to nuclear forces and 
weapons and include the relationship among United States nuclear deterrence policy, 
targeting strategy, and arms control objectives.‖987   
 
Nonetheless, the Bush Administration remained determined in its nuclear option quest.  For 
FY2009, DOE requested $10.0 million and projected a similar amount for each year in the 
FY2010-FY2013 period.
988
  It justified the request as follows:  
 
$10 million is requested to enable maturation of the RRW design to address 
questions raised by the JASON review of RRW feasibility study activities. 
Design refinement is necessary to establish parameters for potential impact on 
certification.  Without further design work, there is insufficient detail available 
to use this design to resolve certification questions raised by the JASON review. 
This funding will also facilitate documenting the Phase 2A RRW work that has 
been completed through 2007 (prior to the FY 2008 Consolidated 
Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161)) to support future Administration decisions 
on options for our nuclear weapons stockpile.  The Department of Defense and 
the Joint DOD-DOE Nuclear Weapons Council fully support continuing efforts 
to examine how the RRW concept can address issues of safety, security and 
long-term reliability of the nation‘s nuclear deterrent.989  
 
In February 2008, NNSA Administrator Thomas D‘Agostino testified that proceeding with 
the RRW study would provide information crucial to completing the review of the nuclear 
posture in a ―timely manner.‖  Moreover, it would address concerns about the US capacity in 
maintaining the stockpile for the long-term with LEP, offer the prospect of improving 
warhead surety and address the maintenance of nuclear skills.
990
  At the same hearing, 
General Kevin Chilton, USAF Commander, US Strategic Command, argued for the necessity 
in attaining ―a warhead that is designed for the 21st century,‖ with greater emphasis on 
reliability, safety, security, and maintainability, rather than on maximizing yield to weight.
991
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According to one report, he also stated that without completing the RRW study ―he would be 
ill-prepared to advise the incoming president next year on how best to modernize the atomic 
arsenal.‖992  Conversely, others maintained their opposition to the RRW and expressed their 
sentiments accordingly.  In relation to the need to improve surety, Daryl Kimball, Executive 
Director of the Arms Control Association, argued, ―should we spend billions of dollars to 
replace existing warhead types in our arsenal to reduce by an infinitesimal amount [the 
possibility] that al Qaeda could detonate it?‖993  Similarly, former Senator Sam Nunn said, 
―in this world atmosphere, in this climate, for us to build a new warhead now would be a real 
setback to all of our non-proliferation efforts, so I am opposed to it... At this moment I think 
it would be a mistake for America to go forward with that program.‖994 
 
Of course, it was apparent that the views of Kimball and Nunn were to prevail as Bush‘s 
RRW nuclear option faced an impasse after both the House and Senate had an informal 
conference on the defense authorization bill.  According to the Joint Explanatory Statement, 
―the result of these negotiations comprised the House amendment to S. 3001, which was 
considered and passed under suspension of the Rules of the House of Representatives on 
September 24, 2008, by a vote of 392-39.  By unanimous consent, the Senate agreed with the 
House amendment to S. 3001 on September 27, 2008.‖995  The resulting bill had no RRW 
funds for the Navy or NNSA.
996
  It was signed into law, P.L. 110-417, on October 14, 2008. 
The House Appropriations Committee marked up the FY2009 energy-water appropriations 
bill on June 25 and released a committee print version of its report in June.
997
  The committee 
eliminated the $10 million NNSA request for RRW and based its reasoning in the following: 
 
The Committee is aware of the advantages of a modern warhead design and 
strongly supports improved surety.  The Committee also understands that high 
margin provides protection against failure due to compound unknowns.  The 
Committee supports trading off Cold War high yield for improved reliability, in 
order to move to a smaller stockpile requiring a smaller and cheaper weapons 
complex with no need for nuclear testing.  
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That said, the Committee remains to be convinced that a new warhead design 
will lead to these benefits.  The Committee will not spend the taxpayers‘ money 
for a new generation of warheads promoted as leading to nuclear reductions 
absent a specific glide path to a specified, much smaller force of nuclear 
weapons.  Similarly, the Committee finds no logic in spending the taxpayers‘ 
money on a new generation of warheads promoted as avoiding the need for 
nuclear testing, while the Secretary of State insists that ―the Administration does 
not support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.‖  
 
Before the Committee will consider funding for most new programs, substantial 
changes to the existing nuclear weapons complex, or funding for the RRW, the 
Committee insists that the following sequence be completed: 
 
(1) replacement of Cold War strategies with a 21st Century nuclear deterrent 
strategy sharply focused on today‘s and tomorrow‘s threats, and capable of 
serving the national security needs of future Administrations and future 
Congresses without need for nuclear testing; (2) determination of the size and 
nature of the nuclear stockpile sufficient to serve that strategy; (3) determination 
of the size and nature of the nuclear weapons complex needed to support that 
future stockpile.
998
 
 
The committee argued that while plans to execute these steps were stipulated in the FY2008 
Omnibus Appropriations Act, ―none of the required plans have been submitted.‖999  The 
committee approved the bill by voice vote on June 25; the report (H.Rept. 110-921) was 
released December 10, 2008.  The Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 3258, the 
FY2009 energy water appropriation bill, on July 14.  It recommended no NNSA funds for 
RRW.
1000
  The House and Senate versions of this bill were not brought to the floor.  Instead, 
funding for NNSA
1001
 and many other agencies was made available through the continuing 
resolution component of H.R. 2638, Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and 
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, for the period October 1, 2008 - March 6, 2009 or until 
enactment of the applicable regular appropriations bill.  Section 104 provided that ―No 
appropriation or funds made available or authority granted pursuant to section 101 shall be 
used to initiate or resume any project or activity for which appropriations, funds, or other 
authority were not available during fiscal year 2008.‖1002  RRW was one such activity; 
accordingly, the bill provided no NNSA funds for RRW.  H.R. 2638 was signed into law, 
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P.L. 110-329, on September 30, 2008.  P.L. 111-6, a one-sentence continuing resolution, 
extended the expiration of P.L. 110-329 through March 11, 2009. P.L. 111-8, Omnibus 
Appropriations Act, 2009, provided funds for the balance of FY2009.  It also, provided no 
NNSA funds for RRW.
1003
  The Bush Administration also requested $23.3 million in RRW 
funds for the Navy in the Department of Defense appropriations bill.  These funds were part 
of an $80.1 million request for Program Element 11221N, strategic submarine and weapons 
system support.  While the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees marked up the bill, the 
full committees did not report their respective bills.  Instead, the Department of Defense 
appropriations bill was contained in H.R. 2638, Division C, as a regular appropriations bill.   
That bill eliminated Navy RRW funds.
1004
 
 
With Bush‘s departure in January, 2010, it was not surprising that for FY2010, the Obama 
Administration requested no funds for RRW and included the program in a list of programs 
to be terminated.  Indeed, an Office of Management and Budget report defined the RRW as 
―not consistent with Presidential commitments to move towards a nuclear-free world.‖1005  
The House Armed Services Committee reported H.R. 2647, the FY2010 defense 
authorization bill, on June 18, 2009.  Section 3112 of the bill would strike Section 4204a of 
the Atomic Energy Act directing DOE to establish the RRW program.
1006
  The bill passed the 
House, 389-22, with 1 present, June 25.  The Senate Armed Services Committee reported S. 
1390, FY2010 defense authorization bill, on July 2. Section 3113 would strike Section 4204a 
of the Atomic Energy Act.
1007
  The bill passed the Senate, 87-7, on July 23. No amendments 
on RRW were offered to either bill.  The House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 
3183, FY2010 energy and water development appropriations bill, on July 13.  It contained no 
funds for RRW.  The House passed the bill, 320-97, on July 17, with no amendments on 
RRW.  The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its energy-water bill on July 9.  It also 
contained no funds for RRW, and most importantly, appeared to be the final conclusion to the 
Bush Administration‘s nuclear drive.   
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During its two term tenure, statements and promises posited by the Bush Administration in 
regard to reducing the dependency on nuclear weapons in US national security through the 
creation of a ―New Triad‖ were relatively limited.  Rather than replacing nuclear weapons, 
conventional weapons and missile defence systems have been utilised as a means to 
complement the nuclear posture.  Although there has been a stern push in the US Congress  to 
re-examine nuclear policy, there will also be significant resistance as ―cutting too deep and 
changing too much (will be challenged amid) the political development in Russia, the rise of 
China, and the (continued) fear of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction‖ by non-state 
actors.
1008
  The nuclear doctrine encompassed in the National Security Strategy of 2002 and 
the subsequent ―editing‖ documents illustrated the stark contradiction between the Bush 
Administration‘s public rhetoric about reducing nuclear weapons and the guidance issued to 
the nuclear planners in the role they will really continue to play.  While the overall number of 
warheads was reduced, the new doctrine guiding planning for the remaining arsenal 
reaffirmed an aggressive posture with nuclear forces on high alert, ready to be used in an 
increasing number of limited-strike scenarios against adversaries anywhere, even 
preventively.  As signified above, the Bush Doctrine and revitalisation of the nuclear option 
has obviously been precipitated by the anticipation among military planners ―that deterrence 
would fail and US nuclear weapons would be used in a conflict sooner or later.‖  Perhaps the 
best example of how excessive and resilient the US nuclear posture has been since 2001, is 
that when all the planned reductions have been implemented by 2012, ―the US nuclear 
weapons stockpile will still – nearly a quarter of a century after the Cold War ended – be 15 
times greater than when the National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68) in 1950 outlined 
the US justifications for a rapid and massive military build-up to contain the Soviet 
Union.‖1009 
 
It took the Clinton Administration ten years to dismantle more than 11,000 warheads in the 
1990s, but it would take more than fifteen years to dismantle less than half that number under 
the Bush Administration‘s plan.  In fact, the Bush Administration dismantled the smallest 
number of nuclear weapons of any US Administration since 1957.
1010
  Its rationale was 
straightforward: the focus was never on disarmament but rather on extending the life of the 
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remaining stock of nuclear weaponry. The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program 
was testament to this in which the US Department of Energy proposed the development of a 
new generation of nuclear warheads; an attempt to redesign and replace the entire US nuclear 
arsenal with new warheads.  Despite the apparent defeat of the RRW program and election of 
Barack Obama, there will be immense difficulties in reversing the course on nuclear weapon 
development.  As stated by Michael O‘Hanlon, a military expert at the Brookings Institution 
who has specialised in nuclear issues, Obama and Gates are ‗at loggerheads on‘ the issue of 
nuclear weapons.
1011
  While serving under former President Bush, Gates had repeatedly 
called for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program to be put into operation as the current 
US nuclear arsenal – mostly produced in the 1970s and 1980s – was ageing and thereby had 
the potential to undermine both the arsenal‘s safety and its destructive capacity.  As Gates 
stated in early 2009:  
 
...the Reliable Replacement Warhead is necessary... even though the days of 
hair-trigger superpower confrontation are over, as long as other nations possess 
the bomb and the means to deliver it, the United States must maintain a credible 
strategic deterrent.
1012
 
 
For all of Obama‘s internationalist rhetoric, the sheer fact that he reappointed Gates as 
Defense Secretary in an unusual step of continuity between Republican and Democratic 
Administrations, suggests that the nuclear option asserted by Bush may be diluted, but not 
necessarily removed.  As further articulated by Gates, ―Congress needs to do its part by 
funding the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program – for safety, for security, and for a more 
reliable deterrent‖1013  and would give the US the confidence to shrink its overall nuclear 
arsenal.  For the likes of Gates, the RRW in essence trades away explosive force for greater 
assurance that the new warheads would work predictably in the absence of tests – which the 
US has refrained from conducting for nearly two decades to help advance non-proliferation 
goals.  Under a self-imposed moratorium, the US has not conducted nuclear tests to assure 
the reliability and potency of its weapons since 1992.  But it does spend more than $5 billion 
a year conducting analyses and computerised tests to monitor the health of the weapons.
1014
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Despite the withdrawal of RRW funding, it is apparent that there is a struggle within the new 
Administration between the ―transformationalists‖ who seek a new vision to transform US 
nuclear policy and the ―incrementalists‖ who focus on gradual steps using the techniques of 
previous years.  While Obama has indicated that he does not want to produce ―new‖ nuclear 
weapons, he has not removed the significance of nuclear weapons in US security policy thus 
far. Rather than a fully-fledged RRW program, future production of replacement or 
significantly modified warheads may instead be carried out by expanding the scope of Life 
Extension Program work to add new features to existing warhead designs.  Indeed, under 
Obama Congress authorised $13 million at the start of 2009 to develop a new arming, fusing 
and firing unit that can be used on a modified existing design or be used on a RRW.  The 
B83-1 is scheduled to receive a new fuze in 2029 and the W76-1/Mk-4A in 2039.
1015
  
Whether or not a form of the RRW continues is a moot point as ―other replacement warheads 
are likely to emerge in the future under other names.‖1016  It is this nuclear reality that 
confirms the notion that while key elements of the Bush Doctrine stalled in the context of the 
Iraq conflict, the deeper nuclear dimension of the doctrine – reiterated, refined, accentuated 
and guided through the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the 
2002 Nuclear Posture Review, CONPLAN (Concept Plan) 8022 (Global Strike), the 
abandoned 2005 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review, the 2006 Strategic Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0 and the recent 
Reliable Replacement Warhead program – foreshadowed a new nuclear era in which the once 
termed ―weapon of last resort‖ became a usable and, according to the Bush Administration, 
necessary war-fighting device. 
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The Bush Doctrine was developed incrementally over a span of approximately eight months.  
Beginning with the 2002 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush laid the 
foundation for a ―newly‖ proactive strategy of counter-proliferation.  In his address, states 
such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea and ―their terrorist allies,‖ were identified and defined as 
an ―axis of evil‖ that was aiming to threaten and undermine the ―peace of the world.‖  In their 
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, Bush argued that these regimes presented a ―grave 
and growing danger,‖ and that the United States would undertake what it deemed to be 
necessary as a means to preserve and ensure its security.  Bush informed his audience that 
while time was ―not on our side,‖ his Administration would be deliberate and not ―wait on 
events, while dangers gather.‖  In one of his first hints of prevention, Bush stated that he 
would ―not stand as peril draws closer and closer... and permit the world‘s most dangerous 
regimes to threaten us with the world‘s most destructive weapons.‖1017  Six months later, in a 
Commencement Speech to the US Military Academy at West Point, Bush elaborated upon 
the burgeoning national security doctrine, emphasising the need for a more forward thinking 
strategy that (again) would not wait for ―threats to fully materialize.‖  Maintaining his 
assertive posture, Bush stated that the United States would ―take the battle to the enemy, 
disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge... security will require... 
preventive action when necessary – to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.‖   
 
For Bush and his Administration, the ―new‖ post-9/11 world ―we have entered‖ required a 
―path of action‖ and the United States ―will act.‖1018  The West Point speech expressed such 
new world concerns in which the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, along 
with ballistic missile technology – enabled ―weak states and small groups‖ to attain a 
catastrophic power to strike ―great nations.‖  Furthermore, he argued, these ―enemies‖ 
declared a very clear intention and were ―seeking these terrible weapons‖ as a means to 
―blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends... [Thereby] we will oppose them with all 
our power.‖1019  Polarising his description of the ensuing War on Terror conflict, Bush 
asserted that there could ―be no neutrality between justice and cruelty‖ and that the United 
States and its allies were in a conflict between ―good and evil.‖  Again, emphasising his 
Administration‘s dogmatic course, Bush informed his audience that he had no qualms in 
―confronting evil and lawless regimes‖ and was ―prepared to lead the world‖ in this quest.1020 
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Finally, in September 2002, the White House released the National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America – the most comprehensive articulation of the Bush Doctrine – thus 
officially adopting preventive self-defense as a key element of the US security strategy.  
Here, Bush further justified the use of preventive war and argued that the biggest threat the 
United States faced were entities at ―the crossroads of radicalism and technology.‖  In 
forthright rhetoric, Bush reiterated that the US must be prepared to stop rogue states and their 
terrorist clients before they were able to threaten or use WMD against the US and its allies.  
His depiction of rogue states and terrorists necessitated that the US could no longer solely 
rely on the ―reactive posture‖ it had utilised in the past.  Once again highlighting the ―greater 
the risk of inaction,‖ the Administration made it clear that a ―compelling case‖ for ―taking 
anticipatory action‖ to defend itself was required.  Indeed, as some of the most defining 
words of his doctrine, Bush argued vehemently that in an era where ―uncertainty remains as 
to the time and place of the enemy‘s attack – to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our 
adversaries, the US, if necessary, will act pre-emptively.‖1021  In simple terms, the threat must 
be eliminated before it materialised.   
 
The National Security Strategy was very conscious of its historical context and how this new 
phase would ―harshly judge those who saw this coming danger but failed to act.‖  In this new 
historical stage, the United States would undertake a strategy of action as a means of 
defending itself, ―the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying 
and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders.‖1022  Foreshadowing the creation of 
the Coalition of the Willing, the Bush Administration specified that it would strive to enlist 
the support of the international community, however, if there was a requirement to ―exercise‖ 
its ―right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from 
doing harm against our people and our country... we will not hesitate to act alone.‖1023  
Implicit in this strategy was a very important linkage: the declared enemy was not only 
terrorists but also anyone, including states, who aided them.  Bush articulated this point on 
the night of 9/11: ―We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these 
acts and those who harbor them.‖1024   
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In contrast to the Cold War period of deterrence, the National Security Strategy of 2002 put 
forward what it deemed to be necessary in ―today‘s‖ environment.  During the Cold War, the 
document argued, deterrence was an effective form of defense.  However, in the post-Cold 
War world the threat of retaliation was ―far less likely to work against leaders of rogue states 
more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their 
nations.‖1025  Indeed, during the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered 
weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them.  In the post-
Cold War period, rogue actors viewed such weapons of mass destruction as weapons of 
choice; tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbours.  Moreover, 
such actors saw these weapons as the best way of overcoming the conventional superiority of 
the United States.
1026
  For Bush‘s National Security Strategy of 2002, the threat confronting 
the US in the 21st century was the evolving nexus of transnational terrorism and WMD 
proliferation.  It was this combination that engendered ―new deadly challenges‖ from rogue 
states and terrorists whose nature and motivations, determination to obtain destructive powers 
hitherto available only to the world‘s strongest states, and the ―greater likelihood that they 
will use weapons of mass destruction against us,‖ that made the post-9/11 security 
environment ―more complex and dangerous.‖1027  It was with this in mind that the 
Administration believed that notions of employing traditional concepts of deterrence would 
no longer be effective against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics were ―wanton 
destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death 
and whose most potent protection is statelessness.‖1028   
 
The Bush Doctrine argued that states that sponsored terror and those that pursued WMD 
would compel the United States into preventive action.  Interchanging the term preventive 
with the more ―acceptable‖ term of pre-emption, Bush made it clear that ―the United States 
had long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our 
national security.‖1029  Or in other words, the US had long reserved the right to take pre-
emptive action in the face of an imminent security threat.  However, it was ―necessary‖ to 
adapt the concept of imminent threat to a new era of security circumstances – where the 
determination of rogue states and terrorists to use weapons of mass destruction in attacks 
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aimed at the US had become very much apparent.  While Bush was adamant that an 
adjustment to imminence was necessary, the concept itself can be considered a temporal, not 
a consequential condition.  That is, the consequences of a rogue state or terrorist nuclear 
attack may be of critical – indeed, decisive – importance in the overall assessment of 
emerging threats, and may in the future provide the basis for permitting some form of 
anticipatory self-defence.  But it is irrelevant to the temporal appreciation of that threat and 
should not be folded into the concept of imminence.
1030
  Whether a single rifle shot or a 
massive nuclear attack, an imminent threat is just that – one that is ―instant, overwhelming, 
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.‖1031  Bush‘s extended 
understanding of imminent threat connected logically to a consideration of ―pre-emption‖ (or 
preventive war) as a strategic option in confronting that threat.  The Bush Doctrine hastened 
to add that ―pre-emption‖ would not necessarily be the first or the only option considered 
when confronting these threats.  Nor, it warned, should other states use this option as a 
pretext for aggression.  But henceforth, it insisted, the US retained the option of acting pre-
emptively when the cause was just – in other words, pre-emption if necessary, but not 
necessarily pre-emption.  As articulated, to forestall or impede such hostile acts by ―our 
adversaries,‖ the United States would be prepared to ―act pre-emptively (preventively)… To 
support pre-emptive actions (preventive war), it will… continue to transform its military 
forces (assert the nuclear option).‖1032  
  
It was the above philosophy, rhetoric, ideology and security strategy of the Bush 
Administration‘s National Security Strategy of 2002 that provoked vigorous debate in the 
United States and abroad.  Indeed, many argued that the Bush Doctrine symbolised a total 
break with American tradition in which the United States had undertaken a more cautious and 
defensive policy; a policy that was defined by the core arteries of containment and 
deterrence; a policy that advocated respect for legal norms and for the sovereign rights of 
other states.
1033
  It was argued that the United States had a history of refraining from the use 
of force until it or one of its allies had been attacked, and that the Bush Administration had 
dispelled this tradition and was now undertaking a far more assertive policy.  As the Bush 
Administration articulated its National Security Strategy to both domestic and international 
                                               
1030 For the contrary view on this point see, Christopher Greenwood, ―International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: 
Afghanistan, al-Qaida, and Iraq,‖ International Law Journal 2003, 7(16); and Terence Taylor, ―The End of Imminence?‖ 
The Washington Quarterly, 2004, 57: pp. 66-67. 
1031 Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary.  
1032 Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 16. 
1033 Trachtenberg, ―Preventive War and US Foreign Policy,‖ p. 2. 
298 
 
audiences, the cessation of debate over United Nations action and Congressional approval for 
intervention in Iraq presented legitimating issues for these national and international 
institutions struggling to address security issues in an era of globalisation.  In the United 
States, an anti-terrorist narrative dominated post-9/11 security discourse and shifted the 
presumption against the acceptance of the Cold War analytical structures that had dominated 
foreign policy.  Citizens and states opposed to US military action against Iraq invariably 
articulated their opposition through a narrative warning of the perils of US global hegemony.  
Conversely, advocates of Bush‘s policy in the US alluded to the inevitability of future 
security threats if the United States and a ―willing coalition‖ failed to take preventive action 
against the state of Iraq.  The Bush Administration, as well as international counterparts, all 
faced the common predicament of how to construct and reposition their arguments amid a 
frenzied global media environment, while fulfilling the challenging demands of creating a 
foreign policy rhetoric that addressed the dispositions of their national audiences.   
 
The Bush Administration‘s arguments for redefining the United States‘ global security 
strategy depended on the shared premise that 9/11 engendered a new security environment.  
The National Security Strategy of 2002 explicitly presented rhetoric that worked to reinforce 
the threats presented by terrorism.  The document defined the War on Terror, the nature of 
the enemy, and in detail, how ―the United States of America‖ was ―fighting a war against 
terrorists of a global reach... The enemy (was) terrorism – premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against innocents.‖1034  Consistent with Bush‘s post-September 11 
public rhetoric was the emphasis of the ―new war,‖ presented and dramatised in the National 
Security Strategy of 2002 as a global security struggle that would be different from previous 
national struggles.  Indeed, the document clearly identified how in the post-9/11 order the 
United States would champion aspirations for human dignity and ―oppose those who resist 
it.‖1035  When looking at the rhetoric, philosophy and security strategy espoused in the 
National Security Strategy it is not surprising that it came to dominate American political 
discourse from 2002-04 as political leaders, academic scholars and the general public debated 
the implications of this broad and contentious initiative.  Whereas its proponents contended 
that an urgent and unprecedented threat revolution was well under way which required new 
and proactive approaches to using force, critics of the Bush Doctrine viewed its espousal of 
preventive war as a means to combat the expansion of WMD as further testimony to 
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American unilateralism, and perhaps most importantly, a fundamental and unnecessary 
departure from the strategies of deterrence and containment.
1036
  Their political inclinations 
notwithstanding, both sides agreed that the Bush Doctrine was something entirely ―new,‖ 
―candid,‖ ―bold‖ and ―revolutionary,‖ a radical doctrine the likes of which the world had 
never seen and perhaps the most defining readjustment of US strategic thinking since the end 
of World War II. 
 
It was the notion that the Bush Doctrine was an apparent radical departure that led to this 
researcher‘s initial investigation, culminating into an approach that engendered two very clear 
structural paths.  First, and as a means to address the extent that this was a radical departure 
in a historical context, this thesis pursued an approach that looked at both recent history – on 
a doctrinal level, as well as a broader Administration level – since 1945.  As a means to 
undertake this process, the researcher defined the approach by addressing the following 
questions/areas: the extent to which the core elements of the National Security Strategy of 
2002 (―Bush Doctrine‖) were implicit in US foreign policy in comparison to previous 
National Security Strategies since their inception in 1986 under the Goldwater-Nicholls Act; 
and the degree to which the most defining assertion of the National Security Strategy of 2002 
(the advocacy of preventive war) was evident, considered or even implicit in previous 
Administrations.  Of course, if the Bush Doctrine was indeed an instrument/policy/security 
strategy that was not overly new, then how did it distinguish itself, if at all?  In simpler terms, 
if it was apparent that the Bush Doctrine was not overly new in comparison to previous 
National Security Strategies or its advocacy in acting preventively, then did the doctrine 
actually posit something defining at all?  It became apparent to this author during the research 
process that the Bush Administration was not just advocating prevention in its National 
Security Strategy of 2002, but was also pursuing the alignment of nuclear weapons to this 
proactive and assertive framework.  As a result, this led to the second focus of the thesis: the 
extent that the Bush Doctrine attempted to reinvigorate the nuclear option.  As a means to 
address these two question scenarios, the following structure was undertaken: 
  
Chapter One provided an overview and evaluation of the pertinent literature surrounding the 
controversy deriving from the release of the National Security Strategy of 2002.  Such issues 
and debates pertained to the interpretations and meanings associated with pre-emption and 
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prevention, the adaptation of the concept of ―imminent‖ by the Administration and the legal 
implications associated with the doctrine – particularly its endorsement of regime change via 
the undertaking of preventive/―pre-emptive‖ war against sovereign states.  The chapter also 
pointed to the literature surrounding the historical context of these two terms in relation to the 
security challenges Administrations have experienced when facing adversarial threats, as well 
as the rhetoric chosen by Presidents in a time of ―war‖ or extreme national crises.  The 
chapter argued that while there exists writers and commentators who have acknowledged the 
Bush Administration‘s nuclear aspirations and subsequent actions, most have not made the 
correlation emanating from Chapters Five and Nine of the National Security Strategy of 
2002, nor the more detailed National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(NSCWMD) released a month later.  In simple terms, this chapter posited the notion that 
while there is reasonable discourse assessing the merits of Bush‘s penchant for 
prevention/―pre-emption‖ and the historical context of these terms (albeit disjointed), 
sufficient linkages to the nuclear option that the National Security Strategy advocated and 
punctuated during the period of 2002-2008, have been remiss, fleeting and broadly 
inconsistent. 
 
Chapter Two illustrated that while the Bush Doctrine was only ―formally‖ introduced to the 
American public in 2002, the theoretical logic underlying its framework, including 
perceptions of threat and counter-proliferation, were already an integral part of the strategic 
thought of policy-makers, officials and military planners at the highest levels of the US 
government.  Despite its portrayal as a ―bold‖ National Security Strategy, the Bush Doctrine 
was, in fact, neither ―new‖ nor ―revolutionary.‖  As Chapter Two explained, the document of 
2002 and its pursuit of strategic counter-proliferation policies as a means to thwart potential 
and real adversaries, was a core pillar encompassed in each National Security Strategy release 
since its inception in 1987.  These official strategy documents were implemented in 
accordance to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and as articulated, provided an overview of the US 
Administration‘s perceptions of the international security environment including WMD 
threats and arms control opportunities.  Additionally, this chapter traced the presidential 
vision and rhetoric regarding several Administrations‘ counter-proliferation policy goals, 
objectives and initiatives.   It was evident that the National Security Strategy of 2002 was 
setting forth the security strategy of the United States, including a comprehensive description 
of the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives ―that were vital to the national security.‖  
Moreover, it was defining what it viewed to be ―the national defense capabilities of the 
301 
 
United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of 
the United States… [as well as the] the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to 
carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the 
balance among the capabilities of all elements of national power of the United States to 
support the implementation of the national security strategy.‖1037  When taken in comparison 
with the National Security Strategy releases of the Reagan Administration (1987, 1988); the 
first Bush Administration (1990, 1991, and 1993); and Clinton Administration (1994, 1995, 
1998 and 2000), it is evident that Bush deviated little from his predecessors and notions of 
countering, documenting and articulating the perceived threats ―of the day‖ into formal 
doctrine.  Both proponents and critics of the Bush Doctrine argued that the National Security 
Strategy of 2002 was something entirely ―new,‖ ―candid,‖ and ―bold;‖ a radical doctrine the 
likes of which the world had never seen and ―perhaps the most sweeping reformulation of US 
strategic thinking in more than half a century.‖1038  As clearly illustrated, however, when 
taken in comparison to the National Security Strategies that preceded it, the Bush release of 
2002 merely continued the US foreign policy desire to counter proliferators and those 
adversarial states and non-state actors that had the potential to undermine the United States‘ 
national interest objectives and broader hegemonic aspirations. 
 
Chapter Three expanded on the argument in Chapter Two, but more importantly, investigated 
the most controversial aspect of the National Security Strategy: its official adoption of 
―anticipatory self-defense‖ as a key element of the US security strategy, in which the United 
States was prepared to ―act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.‖1039  
Simply put, the Administration‘s advocacy of ―pre-emption‖ or, in reality, preventive war.  
The chapter established and perhaps even resolved some of the debates associated with the 
meanings and definitions pertaining to pre-emption and prevention.  By confirming the core 
meanings and disparities associated between these two ―strategic concepts,‖ a clearly defined 
analysis was able to be undertaken in latter chapters in which the researcher was able to 
assess the extent to which preventive war had long been a deep and implicit consideration in 
US security strategy.  It was evident that what Bush himself was advocating during the period 
after 9/11 (2001), the release of the National Security Strategy (September 2002), through to 
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the Iraq War (March 2003), was the serious consideration, endorsement and ultimately, use of 
preventive war against those actors deemed to be a major threat to the United States‘ security 
and well-being.  The chapter also investigated the extent to which such definitions and 
interpretations of pre-emption and prevention during this period challenged and transcended 
every facet of international relations and US security policy – within the context of history, 
doctrine, international law and use within a Presidential rhetorical framework.  
 
Indeed, while there may be a place for pre-emption both in a state‘s national security policy 
and, as discussed in this chapter, in international law, this does not extend to the brand of 
prevention/―pre-emption‖ set out in the Bush Doctrine; particularly in so far as it did not meet 
the conditions of necessity and proportionality that regulate the anticipatory use of defensive 
force under the current interpretation of the Charter jus ad bellum regime.  The reason being 
was that the strategic option enshrined in the Doctrine was not pre-emption but, rather, 
prevention masked in the rhetoric of pre-emption.  As explained, such action, based often on 
ambiguous evidence of potential long-term threats, can engender greater scope for abuse for 
the pursuit of aggressive ends under the guise of anticipatory self-defence, as well as for 
major informational mistakes in which thousands die as a result.  In order to make its 
preventive strategy more palatable to the international community – and hence, lessen its 
instinctive opposition to the strategy – the Bush Administration attempted to convey this 
strategic post-9/11 direction as pre-emption.  It drew the conceptual link (to pre-emption) 
through its emphasis on an expanded notion of imminence; a key element in the condition of 
necessity as it related to pre-emption.  Here again, the Bush Doctrine embellished the concept 
of imminence beyond the semantic breaking point.  The hypothesised demise of millions of 
innocents effectively served to justify any level of preventive military action.  It is here that 
while there may have been grounds, at least in principle under the UN Charter jus ad bellum 
regime for a counter-proliferation strategy of pre-emption that satisfied the conditions of 
necessity and proportionality, the Bush Doctrine‘s brand of pre-emption – prevention by any 
other name – was extensively limited in this context of international law.1040 
 
                                               
1040 Bowett, Self Defence in International Law; and Brierly, The Law of Nations, p. 419.  According to Akehurst it was 
expected in 1945 that all States would eventually join the UN.  Therefore, the failure to mention protection of non-members 
from armed attack was ―probably due to an oversight.‖ See, Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law, p. 261.  
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As many commentators noted, the rules governing the use of force under the Bush Doctrine 
were deliberately imprecise.
1041
  For Bunn, ―[t]he National Security Strategy is notably silent 
on the issue of what, if any, decision criteria our [i.e., the American] national leadership 
would apply in considering the possibility of pre-emptive military action to counter 
WMD.‖1042  The National Security Strategy of 2002 was clear as to the adversaries against 
whom it was directed: terrorists and rogue states.  However, it was evasive as to what action 
the US would take under what circumstances.  It did not specify the level of threat that would 
trigger the consideration of preventive/―pre-emptive‖ action, only that ―the greater the threat, 
the greater the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory 
action to defend ourselves.‖1043 Nor did it necessarily commit the US to forcible 
prevention/―pre-emption‖ even if the triggering threshold should be crossed: ―The United 
States will not use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats.‖1044  Moreover, as Alvarez 
maintained, the National Security Strategy of 2002 left an undefined level of evidence needed 
to substantiate the claim that a situation activating a state‘s inherent right of self-defence 
existed, or whether a state must produce such evidence in the first place.
1045
  Finally, the rules 
for attributing state responsibility for the violent acts of non-state actors were left ―purposely 
vague.‖1046  The net result of this multifaceted ambiguity was to leave Washington free to 
decide against whom it would take whatever self-defence measures it deemed necessary, in 
response to whatever acts of terror it felt ―crossed the line,‖ based on whatever evidence it 
deigned to disclose.  This ambiguity in the rules was especially useful to the hegemon.  Apart 
from broadening its room to manoeuvre, this ambiguity may have left rogue states unsettled 
and uncertain as to the circumstances under which they would run afoul of the new rules on 
the defensive use of force.
1047
  This may have encouraged, in turn, greater caution and 
prudence in their behaviour.  On the other hand, rogue states could ―make potentially flawed 
assumptions about the actual scope of the new policy.‖1048  Unsure as to whether or not they 
have been ―irreversibly ‗marked‘ as irredeemably evil,‖1049 they may be encouraged to 
accelerate their efforts to acquire a WMD capability in order to deter US preventive or pre-
emptive action.   
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The ambiguity of the rules may have also put off friends and allies.  The terminological 
confusion in the public debate over prevention and pre-emption, for instance, invited ―a 
confluence of strategic worst-case analysis and political anti-US sentiment‖ among 
America‘s allies.1050  At the political and strategic level, this ―may [have] hinder(ed) a 
convergence between the new US national strategy and those of US allies.‖1051  Not 
surprisingly, the uncertainty surrounding these definitions came to prominence within 
American political discourse from 2002-04 as policy-makers, academics and the broader 
community debated the meanings, historical contexts in which both definitions had been 
pursued and executed, and potential ramifications if undertaken again by the Bush 
Administration.  Despite the disparities in viewpoints, and as subscribed to in this thesis, 
what the Bush Doctrine was in fact advocating was prevention and preventive war – a 
military strategy undertaken by states as a means to address long-term tensions emanating 
from hostile and/or powerful rivals.  Simply put, it is employed ―upstream‖ as a means to 
confront factors that may be likely to contribute to the development of a threat before they 
have a chance to become specific, direct, or immediate.  Conversely, pre-emption is 
employed ―downstream,‖ in response to a more specific, direct, and immediate threat where 
the necessity of self-defense becomes so instant and overwhelming that it leaves no choice of 
means and no moment for deliberation. 
 
Having established the meanings and definitions associated with pre-emption and prevention; 
and the extent to which preventive war was considered a viable option, Chapter Four 
investigated the Bush Administration‘s task of ―choosing‖ a state in which it would undertake 
the preventive war strategy.  It was clear that from 2001-2003, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea 
were all perceived by the US to be ―grave and gathering threats‖ – and were all considered 
rogue proliferators.  It was also clear that the US was determined to act preventively against 
at least one of them.  Although many arguments have been proposed to account for the US 
decision to attack Iraq rather than Iran or North Korea, given the varying similarities between 
them – it appeared that one of the major palatable differences between the three threatening 
states at the time was their relative military strength and relative military capabilities.  
However, even though Iraq may have been deemed as the weaker of the three states in the 
eyes of the Bush Administration, it was still perceived as being a dangerous ―rogue 
proliferator.‖  Regardless of some of the varying considerations posited in the chapter, it was 
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clear that Bush and his Administration chose Iraq because it argued that it allegedly had 
WMDs, had supposed links to al Qaeda and posed an extensive threat to the United States‘ 
security, but more importantly, had assessed the probability of a successful preventive war 
against Iraq as being fairly high based primarily upon practical considerations.   
 
As Chapter Four further posited, indications that the Bush Administration was considering a 
counter-proliferation strategy of preventive war were foreshadowed in statements made well 
before the publication of the National Security Strategy of 2002.  Beginning with a speech 
given at the Citadel on September 23, 1999, through to the more defining words spoken at the 
State of the Union and West Point graduation ceremony of 2002 – and formalised with the 
release of the document itself in September of the same year – the justification and emphasis 
of prevention and ―action‖ was made abundantly clear.  But also coinciding with such 
developments was a drive to link such notions of preventive war to the state of Iraq – deemed 
as the ―rogue proliferator‖ of choice.   Once the preventive doctrine had been made public in 
the National Security Strategy of 2002, Bush was both forthright and consistent in his quest 
to sway the American public of the ―threat‖ that Saddam Hussein posed and of the possible 
ramifications should he acquire nuclear weapons – an attack similar to, but potentially more 
devastating than the events of 9/11.  In terms of the ―choice‖ of Iraq, the cultivation of the 
preventive war doctrine (rhetorically and formally in the context of the National Security 
Strategy of 2002), the alignment of the preventive war option to Iraq, as well as the 
orchestration and lead up to the preventive war itself – it appears that the Bush Doctrine 
could be deemed as overzealous, extreme and unprecedented.  However, despite such 
appearances of a radically new approach, at its core, the Bush Doctrine‘s push for preventive 
war in Iraq in 2003 had long pervaded the strategic thought of policy-makers, officials, and 
military planners at the highest levels of the US government. 
 
Indeed, as Chapter Five clearly argued, since the dawning of the nuclear era in 1945, at least 
three other US Presidents (Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lyndon B. Johnson and William J. 
Clinton) have faced the potential threat of nuclear technology in the hands of states hostile to 
their respective Administrations and each dealt with the same decision problem faced by 
President Bush in 2003: whether to use preventive military force as a means to counter the 
proliferation of such nuclear weapons technology.  Each was forced to make their decision 
regarding the preventive use of force in the face of uncertainty.  Each had to weigh the costs 
– many of them unknown – of preventively striking an adversarial state perceived to be 
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developing nuclear weapons against the costs of refraining from preventive intervention and 
employing more conservative diplomatic methods, even while the threat of future military 
conflict hovered.  The historical record of the last half century is replete with examples of 
high level US decision-makers who seriously considered the undertaking of major unilateral 
preventive military actions as a means to thwart the proliferation of nuclear weapons by 
rogue states.  Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US had considered waging preventive 
war against no less than three additional rogue proliferators – the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (Soviet Union) from 1945-54; the People‘s Republic of China (China) from 1960-
64; and the Democratic People‘s Republic of North Korea (North Korea) from 1993-94.  By 
appraising these examples, it became clearly evident that several US Administrations had 
considered executing preventive war against their respective adversaries at the time, only to 
be inhibited in most instances by practical factors – and that what Bush himself advocated in 
2003, was not new, radical and certainly not revolutionary.  It was clear that the Bush policy 
certainly qualified as a preventive war policy, however, the adoption of that strategy of 
prevention did not mark a total break with American tradition or earlier Administrations.  As 
affirmed by Trachtenberg, when looking at various Administrations in the post-World War II 
era, it turns out that the ―sort of [preventive] thinking‖ that one finds in the Bush policy 
documents, should ―not to be viewed as anomalous.  Under Roosevelt and Truman, under 
Eisenhower and Kennedy, and even under Clinton in the 1990s, this kind of thinking came 
into play in a major way.‖1052   
 
If the earlier chapters of this thesis dispelled arguments pertaining to the supposed 
―revolutionary,‖ ―new,‖ or ―radical‖ nature of the Bush Doctrine – based on comparisons 
with previous National Security Strategies and previous Administrations‘ penchant for 
prevention – it was apparent that what was ―new‖ or ―bold‖ about the Bush Administration‘s 
National Security Strategy of 2002, was its willingness to embrace ―innovation within the 
armed forces... experimentation with new approaches to warfare... exploiting US intelligence 
advantages, and taking full advantage of science and technology‖1053 – to the extent of 
reinvigorating a nuclear option which could ultimately be used in the context of prevention.  
While the motivation and consideration of preventive war has been an integral part of US 
policy-makers strategic thought since 1945, and while it can be argued that the preventive 
actions of the Bush Doctrine stalled in Iraq, the nuclear dimension encompassed in the 
                                               
1052 Trachtenberg, ―Preventive War and US Foreign Policy,‖ p. 29. 
1053 Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, pp. 1-3. 
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Doctrine can be viewed as the truly ―bold‖ assertion.  Simply put, the prevention motivation 
embodied in the Bush Doctrine was not new, but the reinvigoration of the new nuclear option 
was.  In its punctuating and reaffirming policy instruments (released through the period of 
2002-2008), Bush furthered the process towards increasing the role of nuclear weapons in US 
policy and security strategy.  Indeed, the Bush documents and policy instruments signified a 
renewed role for nuclear weapons and the quest of his Administration to upgrade US 
offensive forces, deploy missile defenses, reconfigure communications and satellite systems, 
and overall, revitalise the nuclear complex.   
 
However, to look at this development as purely a Bush Administration initiative would be 
both historically inaccurate and selective.  As signified in Chapter Six, it was evident that the 
Clinton Administration retained much of the existing US nuclear weapons policy and force 
posture in the decade after the demise of the Soviet Union and affirmed the role of nuclear 
weapons in US security strategy.   Furthermore, the Clinton Administration flirted with 
targeting options for the use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological attacks 
from states other than Russia, and in its declaratory policy, did not rule out the possible first 
use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances.  It was here that military planners and 
policy-makers – through the Defense Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI) 1993, Nuclear 
Posture Review (NPR) 1994, Doctrines for Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-12) 1993/1995, 
Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations 1996, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
1997 and Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 60 1997 – maintained the significance of 
nuclear weapons despite the Soviet Union‘s demise.  But as is revealed in the last and most 
defining chapter of this thesis (Chapter Seven), it was the Bush Doctrine and its 
accompanying guidance documents that amplified the Clinton ―base,‖ foreshadowing a new 
nuclear era in which the once termed ―weapon of last resort‖ became a usable and, according 
to the Bush Administration, necessary preventive war-fighting option.  It is with this in mind 
that the National Security Strategy cannot be moribund to 2002 perceptions, but a document 
that must be viewed as a dangerous catalyst; a document that punctuated, updated, refined 
and reaffirmed its core sentiments through the unclassified and classified documents it 
spawned. 
 
In 1990, as the Cold War was coming to a close and the Soviet Union was entering its final 
year, the United States had more than 12,000 nuclear warheads deployed on 1,875 strategic 
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nuclear delivery vehicles.
1054
  After completing the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the 
Bush Administration indicated that the United States would reduce its forces to 2,200 
operationally deployed warheads, the number and concept codified in the Moscow Treaty, 
but it did not identify the specific combination of delivery vehicles or warhead loadings that 
the United States would maintain to reach the specified number.  Subsequent Pentagon 
studies, including the Strategic Capabilities Assessment in 2005 and the 2006 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR), offered further guidance on strategic nuclear force structure.  As of 
January 1, 2009, according to the counting rules in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START), the United States had reduced this to 5,576 nuclear warheads on 1,198 strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicles.
1055
  In addition, according to the State Department, the United 
States reduced its number of operationally deployed warheads, a number that excluded many 
warheads that count under START, to 2,871 as of the end of December 2007.
1056
  While these 
figures do not count the same categories of nuclear weapons, they signify that the number of 
deployed warheads on US strategic nuclear forces has declined significantly in the two 
decades following the end of the Cold War.  Yet, despite such figures, it is evident that 
nuclear weapons will remain important in the US national security strategy posture.
1057
  
While the United States continues to reduce its deployed forces to meet the mandates of the 
Moscow Treaty, it is also likely to continue to pursue programs as a means to modernise and 
adjust its strategic forces.  During the 2008 election campaign, then candidate Obama stated 
that he supported the goal of working to eliminate all nuclear weapons, but he also stated that 
―America will not disarm unilaterally,‖ and that ―as long as nuclear weapons exist, I will 
retain a strong, safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.‖1058  Indeed, regardless of 
Obama‘s nuclear reduction intentions, it is apparent that the significance of nuclear weapons 
in US security policy will continue as other replacement warheads and nuclear options 
emerge in the future under other names.   
                                               
1054 Natural Resources Defense Council, Table of US Strategic Offensive Force Loadings, Archive of Nuclear Data, 
available at <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab1.asp>. The same source indicates that the Soviet Union, in 1990, had 
just over 11,000 warheads on 2,332 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. 
1055 Russia, by the same accounting, had 3,909 warheads on 814 delivery vehicles. See US Department of State, START 
Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Weapons, Fact Sheet, Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Inspection, 
Washington, DC, April 1, 2009.  
1056 The State Department did not provide an unclassified estimate for Russia‘s current force of operationally deployed 
warheads. See US Department of State, Annual Report on Implementation of the Moscow Treaty, Bureau of Verification, 
Compliance, and Inspection, May 13, 2008, p. 2. 
1057 The Bush Administration emphasised this point in early 2002, when presenting the results of the 2001 Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR). Douglas Feith, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, stated that nuclear weapons ―continue to be 
essential to our security, and that of our friends and allies.‖ See Feith, Prepared statements before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. 
1058 ―Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q&A: Democratic Candidate Barack Obama,‖ Arms Control Today, 
September 24, 2008, available at <http://www.armscontrol.org/2008election>. 
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Nonetheless, despite this apparent nuclear continuum, it is without a doubt that the Bush 
Doctrine amplified, asserted and revitalised the nuclear option and the willingness to use 
nuclear weapons on states or actors deemed to be adversarial.  As explored in Chapter Seven, 
the nuclear arteries espoused by the National Security Strategy – the 2002 Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR), the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(NSCWMD), CONPLAN (Concept Plan) 8022 (Global Strike), the 2005 Doctrine for Joint 
Nuclear Operations, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the 2006 Strategic Operations 
Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0, and in recent times, Reliable Replacement Warhead 
(RRW) – cultivated and defined the resurgent role of nuclear weapons and the Bush 
Administration‘s push to modernise US offensive forces and the broader nuclear military 
complex.  Behind the Administration‘s rhetoric of post-Cold War restraint were expansive 
plans to revitalise US nuclear forces and all the elements that supported them within a so-
called ―New Triad‖ of capabilities that combined nuclear and conventional offensive strikes 
with missile defenses and nuclear weapons infrastructure.
1059
  It was the National Security 
Strategy of 2002 / Bush Doctrine and subsequent ―editing documents‖ that revealed the 
significant contradiction between the Administration‘s public rhetoric about reducing the role 
of nuclear weapons and the guidance issued to nuclear planners.  Although the overall 
number of warheads was reduced, the doctrine guiding planning for the remaining arsenal 
reaffirmed an assertive posture with nuclear forces on high alert, ready to be used in an 
increasing number of strike scenarios against adversaries anywhere – even preventively.  It 
was the National Security Strategy that provided the platform for the ―quiet revolution‖ in US 
nuclear strategy undertaken by the Bush Administration during the period of 2002-2008.   
Indeed, it was this deeper policy within the Bush Doctrine that foreshadowed a new nuclear 
era in which the Administration pursued a path of retaining and upgrading its enormous 
strategic arsenal as a means to defeat any adversary.  It was a ―radical‖ option that placed 
nuclear weapons back to the fore; ―a strategy‖ that endorsed ―repeated regime change... a 
steadily modernizing nuclear arsenal‖ and ―a determination to retain deployed nuclear 
weapons forever.‖1060 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1059 National Resources Defense Council, ―Faking Nuclear Restraint.‖  
1060 Perkovich, ―Bush‘s Nuclear Revolution,‖ p. 4. 
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